TEPCO

Responding to
New Regulatory Requirements Compliance Reviews
at Units 6 and 7 of
the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station

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Responding to New Regulatory Requirements Compliance Reviews

On September 27, 2013, TEPCO Holdings applied to the Nuclear Regulation Authority to check whether Units 6 and 7 of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station comply with the New Regulatory Requirements.
This web page explains the progress of the New Regulatory Requirements Compliance Review.

We carried out 150 review meetings, 6 field surveys, and all review items for “Changes in Reactor Installation” were already discussed.
Subsequently, we will reflect properly previous observations and discussions to prepare the application for Changes in Reactor Installation.

Separate review item documents are available in Japanese. Click here.

The flow of review and inspection for checking conformity to New Regulatory Requirements. Click here.

As of August 9 , 2017

Main review items and their current status

Response to terrorist attacks

  • 1Response to intentional plane crashes*1 Reviewed

*1 Separate reviews will be conducted for specific major accident response facilities.

Major accident response facilities(response to major accidents)

  • 2Probabilistic risk assessments Reviewed
  • 3Selecting accident sequences Reviewed
  • 4Effectiveness assessments(Reactor core damage prevention measures) Reviewed
  • 5Effectiveness assessments(Primary containment vessel damage prevention measures) Reviewed
  • 6Effectiveness assessments(Fuel damage prevention measures in the spent fuel storage pools) Reviewed
  • 7Effectiveness assessments(Fuel damage prevention measures during reactor shutdowns) Reviewed
  • 8Analysis codes Reviewed
  • 9Reactor control room Reviewed
  • 10Emergency response center Reviewed
  • 11Access routes Reviewed
  • 12Measures for hydrogen generation in the reactor buildings Reviewed
  • 13Filter vents Reviewed
  • 14Technical competence for major accidents Reviewed

Design basis target facilities(prevention of major accidents)

  • 15Impact assessments of external fires and countermeasures Reviewed
  • 16Selecting target volcanoes Reviewed
  • 17Measures for volcanoes Reviewed
  • 18Impact assessments of tornadoes and countermeasures Reviewed
  • 19Impact assessments of other natural phenomena and countermeasures Reviewed
  • 20Fire protection measures Reviewed
  • 21Measures for internal flooding Reviewed
  • 22Prevention of erroneous operations Reviewed
  • 23Evacuation passages for safety Reviewed
  • 24Single failure of static equipment Reviewed
  • 25Sharing of safety systems Reviewed
  • 26Countermeasure facilities for station blackouts Reviewed
  • 27Fuel assemblies handling and storage facilities Reviewed
  • 28Reactor coolant pressure boundaries*2 Reviewed
  • 29Protection circuits for safety Reviewed
  • 30Monitoring and measuring devices Reviewed
  • 31Power-supply facilities for safety Reviewed
  • 32Telecommunication equipment Reviewed

*2 The boundaries define the areas where equipment such as pipes reaches the same pressure level as pressure vessels during normal operations.

Response to earthquakes
and tsunamis

  • 33Fault activities around the power station Reviewed
  • 34Fault activities within the power station Reviewed
  • 35Seismic motion Reviewed
  • 36Seismic-resistant design Reviewed
  • 37Stability of ground and slope Reviewed
  • 38Tsunami Reviewed
  • 39Tsunami-resistant design Reviewed
Reviewed :
Comprehensive documents are being prepared reflecting
responses to review findings (reviewed items under
“response to earthquakes and tsunamis” completed and
explained to the Nuclear Regulation Authority).
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  • Response to intentional plane crashes*1

    Requirement: Procedures and equipment necessary in the event of terrorism should be prepared.
    *1 Separate reviews will be conducted for specific major accident response facilities.

  • Emergency response center

    Requirement: An emergency response center should be established to respond to major accidents.

  • Access routes

    Requirement: Portable equipment should be deployed at locations away from the reactor buildings and can be moved to where it is necessary at the time of major accidents.

  • Technical competence for major accidents

    Requirement: Procedures and equipment necessary for major accidents should be prepared.

  • Probabilistic risk assessments
    Selecting accident sequences
    Effectiveness assessments
    Analysis codes

    Requirement: Assessments should be conducted to confirm that major accident countermeasures can prevent damage to reactor cores or primary containment vessels.

  • 事故シーケンス選定

    重大事故対策により炉心の損傷や格納容器の破損が
    防止できることを評価すること。

  • 有効性評価(炉心損傷防止対策)

    重大事故対策により炉心の損傷や格納容器の破損が
    防止できることを評価すること。

  • 有効性評価(格納容器破損防止対策)

    重大事故対策により炉心の損傷や格納容器の破損が
    防止できることを評価すること。

  • 有効性評価
    (使用済燃料貯蔵槽内の燃料損傷防止対策)

    重大事故対策により炉心の損傷や格納容器の破損が
    防止できることを評価すること。

  • 有効性評価
    (運転停止中原子炉における燃料損傷防止対策)

    重大事故対策により炉心の損傷や格納容器の破損が
    防止できることを評価すること。

  • 解析コード

    重大事故対策により炉心の損傷や格納容器の破損が
    防止できることを評価すること。

  • Reactor control room

    Requirement: Operators should be able to stay in the main control room at the time of major accidents.

  • Measures for hydrogen generation in the reactor buildings

    Requirement: Equipment that prevents hydrogen explosions in the reactor buildings should be installed.

  • Filter vents

    Requirement: Equipment that prevents damage to primary containment vessel should be installed.

  • Selecting target volcanoes

    Requirement: Volcanoes or volcanic events should be selected and their impacts should be assessed.

  • Measures for volcanoes

    Requirement: Safety functions should not be impaired by the impact of volcanoes.

  • Impact assessments of tornadoes and countermeasures

    Requirement: Safety functions should not be impaired by the impact of tornadoes.

  • Impact assessments of other natural phenomena and countermeasures

    Requirement: Safety functions should not be impaired by the impact of assumed natural phenomena.

  • Power-supply facilities for safety

    Requirement: Electrical circuits to receive electricity from external sources and emergency power sources should be set up.

  • Telecommunication equipment

    Requirement: A variety of telecommunication equipment should be installed to be used at the time of accidents.

  • Impact assessments of external fires and countermeasures

    Requirement: Safety functions should not be impaired by fires or blasts occurring outside of the power station.

  • Fire protection measures

    Requirement: Safety functions should not be impaired by fires within the power station.

  • Measures for internal flooding

    Requirement: Safety functions should not be impaired by flooding within the reactor buildings.

  • Prevention of erroneous operations

    Requirement: Facilities should be designed for easy operations to minimize the potential for human error.

  • Evacuation passages for safety

    Requirement: Evacuation passages during station blackouts should be secured.

  • Single failure of static equipment

    Requirement: Systems should maintain safety functions even if pipes fail for example.

  • Sharing of safety systems

    Requirement: Safety systems should not be shared by multiple reactor facilities.

  • Countermeasure facilities for station blackouts

    Requirement: Power supply to operate safety systems should be secured during station blackouts.

  • Fuel assemblies handling and storage facilities

    Requirement: Fuel assemblies stored in the pools should be protected from any damage.

  • Reactor coolant pressure boundaries*2

    Requirement: Boundaries should be set to prevent leakage of reactor coolant.
    *2 The boundaries define the areas where equipment such as pipes reaches the same pressure level as pressure vessels during normal operations.

  • Protection circuits for safety

    Requirement: Activation of safety protection circuits should stop reactors.

  • Monitoring and measuring devices

    Requirement: Radiation monitoring and measurements should be conducted even at the time of accidents.

  • Power-supply facilities for safety

    Requirement: Electrical circuits to receive electricity from external sources and emergency power sources should be set up.

  • Telecommunication equipment

    Requirement: A variety of telecommunication equipment should be installed to be used at the time of accidents.

  • Fault activities around the power station

    Requirement: Fault activities around the power station should be assessed.

  • Fault activities within the power station

    Requirement: Fault activities inside the power station should be assessed.

  • Seismic motion

    Requirement: An assumed maximum seismic motion should be established as a design basis.

  • Seismic-resistant design

    Requirement: Safety functions that can tolerate design basis seismic motion, should be secured.

  • Stability of ground and slope

    Requirement: Ground foundation and slopes around the reactor buildings should be stable.

  • Tsunami

    Requirement: An assumed maximum tsunami should be established as a design basis.

  • Tsunami-resistant design

    Requirement: Safety functions that can tolerate design basis tsunami, should be secured.

TEPCO

Responding to
New Regulatory Requirements
Compliance Reviews
at Units 6 and 7 of
the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa
Nuclear Power Station

As of August 9 , 2017

Responding to New Regulatory Requirements Compliance Reviews

On September 27, 2013, TEPCO Holdings applied to the Nuclear Regulation Authority to check whether Units 6 and 7 of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station comply with the New Regulatory Requirements. This web page explains the progress of the New Regulatory Requirements Compliance Review.

We carried out 150 review meetings, 6 field surveys, and all review items for “Changes in Reactor Installation” were already discussed.
Subsequently, we will reflect properly previous observations and discussions to prepare the application for Changes in Reactor Installation.

Separate review item documents are available in Japanese. Click here.

The flow of review and inspection for checking conformity to New Regulatory Requirements.
Click here.

Main review items and
their current status

Response to terrorist attacks

  • 1Response to intentional plane crashes*1 Reviewed

*1 Separate reviews will be conducted
for specific major accident response facilities.

Major accident response facilities(response to major accidents)

  • 2Probabilistic risk assessments Reviewed
  • 3Selecting accident sequences Reviewed
  • 4Effectiveness assessments(Reactor core damage prevention measures) Reviewed
  • 5Effectiveness assessments(Primary containment vessel damage prevention measures) Reviewed
  • 6Effectiveness assessments(Fuel damage prevention measures in the spent fuel storage pools) Reviewed
  • 7Effectiveness assessments(Fuel damage prevention measures during reactor shutdowns) Reviewed
  • 8Analysis codes Reviewed
  • 9Reactor control room Reviewed
  • 13Filter vents Reviewed
  • 14Technical competence for major accidents Reviewed

Design basis target facilities(prevention of major accidents)

  • 15Impact assessments of external fires and countermeasures Reviewed
  • 16Selecting target volcanoes Reviewed
  • 17Measures for volcanoes Reviewed
  • 18Impact assessments of tornadoes and countermeasures Reviewed
  • 20Fire protection measures Reviewed
  • 21Measures for internal flooding Reviewed

*2 The boundaries define the areas
where equipment such as pipes reaches
the same pressure level as pressure vessels
during normal operations.

Response to earthquakes
and tsunamis

  • 33Fault activities around the power station Reviewed
  • 34Fault activities within the power station Reviewed
  • 35Seismic motion Reviewed
  • 38Tsunami Reviewed
Reviewed :
Comprehensive documents are being prepared reflecting responses to review findings (reviewed items under “response to earthquakes and tsunamis” completed and explained to the Nuclear Regulation Authority).