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Press Release (Apr 21,2011)
Report to Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency at the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry regarding emergency countermeasures for safety at Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station
Due to the Tsunami generated by Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake 
which occurred on March 11th 2011, TEPCO's facilities including our 
nuclear power stations have been severely damaged, released radioactive 
materials. We deeply apologize for the anxiety and inconvenience caused 
to local residents near the site, residents of Fukushima prefecture and 
throughout the entire society.

Considering the situation of the damages at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 
Power Station caused by the Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake, TEPCO 
have taken following emergency countermeasures for safety to prevent 
damages of reactor core and spent fuel, suppress discharge of radioactive 
materials and restore cooling function of reactor facility, even if three 
functions such as function of all facilities that supplies AC power, 
function of all facilities that cools reactor facility and function of 
all facilities that cools spent fuel pool are lost by tsunami.

We received the Order(*) from Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry that 
requires conducting enforcement of emergency countermeasures for safety at 
Nuclear Power Station. Based on this, further to the emergency 
countermeasures for safety, improve water proof performance for water 
exposure due to Tsunami, we reported Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry (METI) emergency countermeasures for safety which we organized to 
secure further safety on April 21st, 2011.
 

<1. Enforcement of emergency countermeasures for safety>
I. Considering the situation of the damages at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 
Power Station, we institute emergency response procedure in case of outage 
of three functions by April 20th, 2011.
(1)Securement of electronic power supply in case of outage of all AC power
(2)Enhancement of inject water and cooling function in reactor
(3)Securement of fresh water source
(4)Securement of depressurization function in reactor containment vessel
(5)Enhancement of inject water and cooling function in spent fuel pool
(6)Enhancement of cooling function in reactor and spent fuel pool using 
   alternative seawater pump 

II. In case of outage of three functions, we conducted enforcement of 
emergency countermeasures for safety by April 20th, 2011 for preventing 
damage core or spent fuel.

1. Implementation of emergency inspection
 (1)Confirmation of critical equipment for safety by periodic inspections
 (2)Implementation of emergency inspection of equipments and facilities
2. Implementation of review and training on emergency response plan
 (1)Establishment response plan in an emergency 
 (2)Implementation of training on emergency response plan
3. Securing of power source in emergencies
 Securing of backup power-supply car and power source which can supply 
 necessary power agilely, in case of outage AC power sources in the 
 Nuclear Power Station.
4. Securing of definitive heat removal function in emergencies
 (1)In preparation the situation of out of commission Emergency Core 
    Cooling System (ECCS) due to outage of AC power, supply power to 
    makeup pump and stand-by liquid control system by power-supply car. 
    Enable securement water injection into reactor. (interchangeable in 
    the back up by fire engine)
 (2)Securement water injection into reactor by the supply water from 
    demineralized water storage tank or Filtered water storage tank.
 (3)In preparation to stop supply of compressed-air due to outage of all 
    AC power, prepare backup bottle of compressed nitrogen, securement 
    of supply of nitrogen for depressurization in reactor containment 
    vessel.
 (4)Securement of cooling function by portable submersible pump
5. Securing of cooling of spent fuel pool in emergencies
 (1)Establishment of procedure to continue inject water and cooling 
    function
 (2)Deployment of necessary equipment
6. Implementation of immediate countermeasures taken in consideration of 
   the configuration of the Nuclear Power Station
 (1)Improvement of water proof performance at the building that was 
    installed safety significance equipment 
 (2)Deployment of heavy equipment to ensure access by the road in the 
    Nuclear Power Station

<2.future measures>
We will go ahead with the following plan in anticipation of Tsunami to 
prevent flooding from Tsunami and to secure additional safety
I. Installation of coast levee
Install seawalls to prevent Tsunami from invading the site and to protect 
light oil tanks, buildings, and other facilities in the power station.

II. Install water proofing gate at the buildings containing critical 
equipment in order to prevent Tsunami from damaging power facilities to 
protect equipment from water.
(1) Installation of seawalls at reactor building
Install seawalls around reactor buildings containing critical equipment 
in order to prevent Tsunami from damaging power facilities and diesel 
generators for emergency and to secure safety of the power plant.
(2) Installation of water proofing gates
Install water proofing gate at reactor buildings and turbine buildings 
to protect equipment from water.

III. Enhanced heat removal and cooling function
Taking all possible measures of cooling function for safety, we will 
install transferable equipment in addition to permanent installation 
equipment.
(1)Installation of water source
Install a fresh water reservoir in the power station to secure stable 
supply of coolant water for reactors and spent fuel pools.
(2)Additional installation of gas turbine generation vehicle Install 
large capacity gas turbine generation vehicles to supply electricity 
to residual heat removal system in case of outage of all AC power.
(3)Installation of medium voltage switchgear for emergency and permanent
cables for reactor buildings
Install medium voltage switchgear for emergency and permanent cables for 
reactor buildings to secure power supply in case of outage of all AC 
power, and to supply power to residual heat removal system.
(4)Installation of alternative submerged pump and heat exchanger
Install alternative submerged pump and other equipment to continue to 
operate residual heat removal system even if cooling function using 
seawater is lost.
(5)Installation of top venting on reactor buildings 
Install top venting system to prevent hydrogen from piling up in a 
reactor building.
(6)Additional environment monitoring cars
Prepare additional monitoring cars to continuously measure radiation 
dose at the site, for taking all possible measures to ensure gathering 
of information in emergency situations.
(7)Installation of a warehouse for emergency on a hill
Install of a warehouse containing facilities for emergency in case of 
Tsunami.

We will enlist cooperation from the government, each ministries and local 
government, with a strong association, we will put all our efforts toward 
breaking the deadlock

In the process of analytical estimation of the cause of the accident, if 
we confirm the event that we should reflect in the countermeasures against 
Tsunami in Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station, we will take measures 
for it.

Attachment1:Outline of emergency countermeasures for safety in Kashiwazaki
            Kariwa Nuclear Power Station(PDF 1.36MB)
Attachment2:Outline of measures to secure safety in Kashiwazaki Kariwa
            Nuclear Power Station(PDF 469KB)
Reference:  Emergency countermeasures for safety in Kashiwazaki Kariwa
            Nuclear Power Station (implementation report)

*Order:
"Implementation of emergency safety measures of other nuclear power 
stations based on the accident of Fukushima Daiichi & Fukushima Daini 
Nuclear Power Stations (Order)"
                                        (NISA no.7 on March 28, 2011)

The accident of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station caused by tsunami 
arisen from T Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake has brought 
unprecedented nuclear disaster in Japan, and currently, as well as TEPCO, 
authorities concerned such as nation and local governments come together 
an make utmost efforts to prevent outspread of this nuclear disaster and 
repair the damages. 
NISA tackles this accident response continuously with utmost effort, and 
hereafter, NISA will get the accident in perspective, conduct analysis 
and evaluation of the accident including generating mechanism of tsunami, 
conduct investigation into the cause of the accident and take the drastic 
measures.
On the other hand, regarding extremely large tsunamis arisen from large 
earthquakes like this, it would appear that occurrence frequency of such 
tsunami is very few, but it might cause serious damage to nuclear power 
station. Considering this matter, for the nuclear power stations except 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power 
Station, to begin with, based on the currently known findings, we consider 
that we should take emergency safety measures which enable to suppress 
discharge of radioactive materials and restore cooling function of reactor 
facility in case of loss of power supply function by tsunami. And electric 
power suppliers should work on the emergency safety measures appropriately, 
and NISA confirms it by examination and so on, then we should prevent 
reactor damages in case of loss of power supply function by tsunami and 
occurrence of nuclear disaster.
Therefore, according to the regulations on operation maintenance for 
operation system for maintenance of reactor facility in case of occurrence 
of tsunami and installation of actual generation reactor after revision 
which requires maintenance of security regulations and operation 
regulations, we request to work on the following emergency safety measures 
and report implementation status of these emergency safety measures 
immediately. 

Notes:
For emergency safety measures, following countermeasures to prevent 
damages of reactor core and spent fuel, suppress discharge of radioactive 
materials and restore cooling function of reactor facility should be 
taken even if three functions such as function of all facilities that 
supplies AC power, function of all facilities that cools reactor facility 
and function of all facilities that cools spent fuel pool by seawater are 
lost by tsunami, and security regulation should be maintained according 
to the revision of the regulations on installation of actual generation 
reactor and operation, and the approval of revision of the security 
regulation should be applied.

1. Implementation of emergency inspection
   Implementation of emergency inspection of equipments and facilities for 
   emergency response caused by tsunami
2. Implementation of review and training on emergency response plan
   Implementation of review and training on emergency response plan that 
   assumes losses of function of all facilities that supplies AC power, 
   function of all facilities that cools reactor facility and function of 
   all facilities that cools spent fuel pool by seawater
3. Securing of power source in emergencies
   Securing of backup power source which can supply necessary power 
   agilely in case any power sources in nuclear power station are lost 
   and any emergency power sources cannot be secured
4. Securing of definitive heat removal function in emergencies
   Preparation of restoration countermeasures of agile heat removal 
   function that assumes loss of seawater system facility or its 
   function
5. Securing of cooling of spent fuel pool in emergencies
   Implementation of countermeasures to supply cooling water agilely in 
   case of stoppage of cooling of spent fuel pool and normal water 
   supply to spent fuel pool in nuclear power station
6. Implementation of immediate countermeasures taken in consideration of 
   the configuration of each nuclear power station

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