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Press Release (Apr 11,2011)
Status of TEPCO's Facilities and its services after the Tohoku-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake (as of 9:00AM)
Due to the Tohoku-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake which occurred on March 11th
2011, TEPCO's facilities including our nuclear power stations have been
severely damaged. We deeply apologize for the anxiety and inconvenience
caused. 

Below is the status of TEPCO's major facilities.
*new items are underlined 
[Nuclear Power Station] 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station: 
 Units 1 to 3: shutdown due to the earthquake 
 (Units 4 to 6: outage due to regular inspections) 

*The national government has instructed the public to evacuate for those
local residents within 20km radius of the site periphery and to evacuate
voluntarily for those local residents between 20km and 30km radius of the
site periphery.

*Off-site power has been connected to Unit 1 to 6 by March 22, 2011.

*Unit 1
-The explosive sound and white smoke was confirmed near Unit 1 when the
 big quake occurred at 3:36 pm, March 12th.
-We started injection of sea water at 8:20 pm, March 12th, and then boric
 acid which absorbs neutron into the reactor afterwards.
-At approximately 2:30 am, March 23rd, we started the injection of sea
 water into the reactor from feed water system. After that, the injection
 of freshwater was started from 3:37 pm on March 25th (switched from the
 seawater injection). At 8:32 am, Mar 29th, transfer from the fire
 fighting pump to a temporary motor driven pump was made. From 10:42am to
 11:52am on April 3rd we temporarily switched the pump to the fire
 fighting pump to inject fresh water to use power through off-site
 transmission line. We're now injecting fresh water to the reactor by a
 motor driven pump powered by off-site transmission line.
-At approximately 10:50 am on March 24th, white smoke was confirmed
 arising from the top of the reactor building.
-At approximately 11:30 am, March 24th, lights in the main control room
 were restored.
-At approximately 5:00 pm, March 24th, draining water from underground
 floor of turbine buildings into a condenser was started and it was paused
 at approximately 7:30 am, March 29th because we confirmed that the water
 level reached almost full capacity of a condenser. In order to move the
 water in the condenser into a condensate storage tank, water transfer
 from the condensate storage tank to suppression pool's water surge-tanks
 was conducted from around 0:00 pm, March 31st to 3:26 pm, April 2nd.
-From 1:03 pm, March 31st, the water spray by the concrete pumping vehicle
 was started, and finished at 4:04 pm.
-In order to confirm the position of water spray to the spent fuel pool by
 the concrete pumping vehicle, the water spray was conducted from 5:16 pm
 to 5:19 pm.
-Some of turbine building lights were turned on April 2nd.
-The water transfer from the condenser to the condensate storage tank has
 been implemented since 1:55 pm, April 3rd. The transfer was completed at
 9:30 am on April 10th.
-As it is suspected that hydrogen gas may be accumulated inside reactor
 containment vessel, at 10:30 pm, April 6th, we started the operation of
 the valve for the injection of nitrogen to the reactor in order to
 prevent the increase of oxygen density. Following this, the injection of
 nitrogen to the reactor was started at 1:31AM, April 7th. 

*Unit 2
-At 1:25 pm, March 14th, since the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System
 has failed, it was determined that a specific incident stipulated in
 Clause 1, Article 15 of Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear
 Emergency Preparedness occurred (failure of reactor cooling function).
 At 5:17 pm, March 14th, while the water level in the reactor reached the
 top of the fuel rod, we have restarted the water injection with the valve
 operation.
-At approximately 6:14 am, March 15th, the abnormal sound was confirmed
 near the suppression chamber and the pressure inside the chamber
 decreased afterwards. It was determined that there was a possibility that
 something happened in the suppression chamber. While sea water injection
 to the reactor continued, TEPCO employees and workers from other
 companies not in charge of injection work started tentative evacuation to
 a safe location. 
 Sea water injection to the reactor continued.
-On March 18th, power was delivered up to substation for backup power
 through offsite transmission line. We completed laying cable further to
 unit receiving facility in the building, and at 3:46 pm, March 20th the
 load-side power panel of the receiving facility started to be energized.
-From approximately 3:05 pm to approximately 5:20 pm on March 20th, about
 40 tons of seawater was injected into Unit 2 by TEPCO employees.
-At approximately 6:20 pm on March 21st, white smoke was confirmed arising
 from the top of the reactor building. As of 7:11 am on March 22nd, smoke
 decreased to the level where we could hardly confirm.
-From around 4:00 pm to 5:00 pm on March 22nd, approximately 18 tons of
 sea water was injected into the spent fuel pool by TEPCO employees. 
-From 10:10 am on March 26th, freshwater (with boric acid) injection was
 initiated. (switched from the seawater injection) At 6:31pm, March 27th,
 transfer from the fire fighting pump to a temporary motor driven pump was
 made. From 10:22am to 0:06pm on April 3rd, we temporarily switched the
 pump to the fire fighting pump to inject fresh water to use power through
 off-site transmission line. We're now injecting fresh water to the
 reactor by a motor driven pump powered by off-site transmission line.
-From 10:30 am on March 25th, seawater injection through Fuel Pool Cooling
 and Filtering System was initiated. The work was finished at 12:19 pm,
 March 25th. From 4:30 pm, March 29th, freshwater injection through Fuel
 Pool Cooling and Filtering System was initiated. (We switched from
 seawater to freshwater). The work was finished at 6:25 pm on March 29th.
 At 9:25 am, March 30th, we started fresh water injection by a temporary
 motor driven pump, but we switched the pump to the fire fighting pump due
 to the pump trouble. At 1:10 pm, March 30th, freshwater injection was
 suspended, because we found the crack on a part of the hose. At 7:05 pm,
 March 30th, freshwater injection was resumed and finished at 11:50 pm,
 March 31. 
-At approximately 4:46 pm, March 26th, lights in the main control room
 were restored.
-At approximately 4:45 pm, March 29th, the water in a condensate storage
 tank was being transferred to suppression pool water surge-tanks to
 prepare for water transfer from a condenser to a condensate storage tank
 in order to drain water on the underground floor of the turbine building
 into a condenser. At 11:50 am, April 1st, transfer was completed.
-At 2:56 pm, April 1st, water injection into spent fuel pool in Unit 2 by
 temporary motor driven pump was initiated. At 5:05 pm on April 1st, the
 water injection was finished.
-The water transfer from the condenser to the condensate storage tank has
 been implemented since 5:10 pm, April 2nd.It was finished at 1:10 pm,
 April 9th.
-Some of turbine building lights were turned on April 2nd.
-At 11:05 am, April 4th, water injection into spent fuel pool in Unit 2 by
 a temporary motor driven pump was initiated. At 1:37 pm, April 4th, the
 water injection was finished.
-At 1:29 pm, April 7th, water injection into spent fuel pool in Unit 2 by
 a temporary motor driven pump was initiated. At 2:34 pm, April 7th, the
 water injection was finished.
-At 10:37 am on April 10th, water injection into a spent fuel pool of Unit
 2 by a temporary motor driven pump was initiated. At 0:38 pm on April
 10th, the water injection was finished.

*Unit 3
-At 6:50 am, March 14th, while water injection to the reactor was under  
 operation (injection of boric acid was done on Mar 13th), the pressure in  
 the reactor containment vessel increased to 530 kPa. As a result, at 7:44  
 am, it was determined that a specific incident stipulated in article 15,  
 clause 1 occurred (abnormal increase of the pressure of reactor  
 containment vessel). Afterwards, the pressure gradually decreased (as of  
 9:05 am, 490 kPa).  
-We continue injecting water into a reactor. (Boric acid was added on March 13)
* We announced in our past reports that "On March 14, the pressure in the 
  primary containment vessel increased and it was determined that a 
  specific incident stipulated in the Article 15, the Clause 1 of Act on 
  Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness occurred". 
  However, we made a mistake in the calculation of the pressure value and 
  the status of Unit 3 did not fall under the above-mentioned specific 
  incidents. We will delete the related description from our latest report.
-At approximately 11:01 am, March 14th, an explosion followed by white
 smoke occurred near Unit 3. 4 TEPCO employees and 3 workers from other
 companies (all of them were conscious) sustained injuries and were taken
 to the hospital by ambulances.
-As the temperature of water in the spent fuel pool rose, spraying water
 by helicopters with the support of the Self Defense Force was considered.
 However the operation on March 16th was cancelled.
-At 6:15 am, March 17th, the pressure of the Suppression Chamber
 temporarily increased, but currently it is stable within a certain range.
 On March 20th, we were preparing to implement measures to reduce the
 pressure of the reactor containment vessel (partial discharge of air
 containing radioactive material to outside) in order to fully secure
 safety. However, at present, it was not a situation to immediately
 implement measures and discharge air containing radioactive material to
 outside. We will continue to monitor the status of the pressure of the
 reactor containment vessel.
-In order to cool spent fuel pool, water was sprayed by helicopters on
 March 17th with the cooperation of Self-Defense Forces.
-At approximately past 7:00 pm, March 17th, Self-Defense Forces and the
 police started spraying water by water cannon trucks upon our request for
 the cooperation. At 8:09 pm, March 17th, they finished the operation.
-Before 2:00 pm, March 18th, spraying water by fire engines was started
 with the cooperation of Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed
 Forces. At 2:45 pm, March 18th, the operation was finished.
-At approximately 12:30 am, March 19th, spraying water was started with
 the cooperation of Fire Rescue Task Forces of Tokyo Fire Department. At
 approximately 1:10 am, March 19th, the operation was finished. They
 resumed spraying water at 2:10 pm and finished at approximately 3:40 am,
 March 20th.
-At approximately 9:30 pm, March 20th, spraying water was started with the
 cooperation of Fire Rescue Task Forces of Tokyo Fire Department. At
 approximately 3:58 am, March 21st, the operation was finished.
-At approximately 3:55 pm, March 21st, light gray smoke was confirmed
 arising from the southeast side of the 5th floor roof of the Unit 3
 building. The situation was reported to the fire department at
 approximately 4:21 pm. The parameters of reactor pressure vessel,
 reactor containment vessel, and monitored environmental data remained
 stable without significant change. However, employees working around Unit
 3 evacuated to a safe location. On March 22nd, the color of smoke changed
 to somewhat white and it was slowly dissipating.
-At approximately 3:10 pm on March 22nd, spraying water to Unit 3 by Tokyo
 Fire Department's Hyper Rescue and Osaka City Fire Department was
 conducted, and completed at approximately 4:00 pm on the same day.
-At approximately 10:45 pm on March 22nd, lights in the main control room
 were restored.
-At approximately 11:00 am on March 23rd, the injection of sea water to
 spent fuel pool was conducted, and finished approximately at 1:20 pm on
 the same day.
-At 4:20 pm on March 23rd, light gray smoke was observed belching from
 Unit 3 building. The situation was reported to the fire department at
 4:25 pm on March 23rd. The parameters of the reactor, the reactor
 containment vessel of Unit 3, and monitored figures around the site's
 immediate surroundings remained stable without significant change. To be
 safe, workers in the main control room of Unit 3 and around Unit 3
 evacuated to a safe location. At approximately 11:30 pm on March 23rd and
 4:50 am on March 24th, TEPCO employees confirmed the smoke has
 disappeared. Accordingly, workers evacuation was lifted.
-From approximately 5:35 am on March 24th, sea water injection through
 Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering System was initiated, and finished at
 approximately 4:05 pm on the same day.
-From 1:28 pm on March 25th, Hyper Rescue team started water spray. The
 work finished at 4:00 pm on March 25th.
-From 6:02 pm on March 25th, the injection of freshwater to the reactor
 was started (switched from the seawater injection). At 8:30 pm on March
 28th, the injection of fresh water was switched to temporary electricity
 pumps from the fire engine pumps. From 10:03am to 0:16pm on April 3rd, we
 temporarily switched the pump to the fire fighting pump to inject fresh
 water to use power through off-site transmission line. We're now
 injecting fresh water to the reactor by a motor driven pump powered by
 off-site transmission line.
-At approximately 12:34pm March 27th, the injection of water by the
 concrete pump truck was started. At approximately 2:36 pm, March 27th,
 the operation was finished.
-At approximately 2:17pm March 29th, the injection of fresh water by the
 concrete pump truck was started. (Sea water had been injected so far and
 transfer from seawater to freshwater was made). The water injection was
 finished at 6:18 PM, March 29th.
-At approximately 5:40 pm, March 28th, the water in a condensate storage
 tank was being transferred to suppression pool water surge-tanks to
 prepare for water transfer from a condenser to a condensate storage tank
 in order to drain water on the underground floor of the turbine building
 into a condenser. We finished the transfer work at approximately 8:40 am,
 March 31st.
-From 4:30 pm, March 31st, the water spray by the concrete pumping vehicle
 was started, and finished at 7:33 pm.
-From 9:52 am, April 2nd, the water spray by the concrete pumping vehicle
 was started, and finished at 0:54 pm.
-Some of turbine building lights were turned on April 2nd. 
-From 5:03 am, April 4th, the water spray by the concrete pumping vehicle
 was started, and finished at 07:19 pm.
-From 6:53 am, April 7th, water spray by the concrete pumping vehicle was
 started, and finished at 8:53 am.
-From 5:06 pm, April 8th, water spray by the concrete pumping vehicle was
 started, and finished at 8:00 pm.
-From 5:15 pm, April 10th, water spray by the concrete pumping vehicle was 
 started, and finished at 7:15 pm. 
 
*Unit 4
-At approximately 6:00 am, March 15th, an explosive sound was heard and
 the damage in the 5th floor roof of Unit 4 reactor building was confirmed.
 At 9:38 am, the fire near the north-west part of 4th floor of Unit 4
 reactor building was confirmed. At approximately 11:00 am, TEPCO
 employees confirmed that the fire was out. 
-At approximately 5:45 am on March 16th, a TEPCO employee discovered a
 fire at the northwest corner of the Nuclear Reactor Building. TEPCO
 immediately reported this incident to the fire department and the local
 government and proceeded with the extinction of fire. At approximately
 6:15 am, TEPCO staff confirmed at the site that there were no signs of
 fire.
-At approximately 8:21 am on March 20th, spraying water by fire engines
 was started with the cooperation of Self-Defense Forces and they finished
 the operation at approximately 9:40 am. At approximately 6:45 pm spraying
 water was started by Self-Defenses' water cannon trucks and finished at
 approximately 7:45 pm.
-At approximately 6:30 am, March 21st, spraying water by fire engines was
 started with the cooperation of Self-Defense Forces and the United States
 Armed Forces. At approximately 8:40 am, March 21, they had finished the
 operation.
-On March 21st, cabling has been completed from temporary substation to
 the main power center.
-From approximately 5:20 pm on March 22nd, spraying water from the
 concrete pumping vehicle was conducted and ended at approximately 8:30 pm
 on the same day.
-From approximately 10:00 am on March 23rd, spraying water from the
 concrete pumping vehicle was conducted and ended at approximately 1:00 pm
 on the same day.
-From approximately 2:35 pm on March 24th, spraying water by the concrete
 pumping vehicle was conducted and ended at approximately 5:30 pm on the
 same day.
-From 6:05 am on March 25th, seawater injection through Fuel Pool Cooling
 and Filtering System was initiated and finished at approximately 10:20 am
 on the same day.
-From 7:05 pm on March 25th, water spray by the concrete pumping vehicle
 was started and finished at 10:07 pm on March 25th.
-From 4:55 pm on March 27th, water spray by the concrete pumping vehicle
 was started and finished at 7:25 pm on March 27th.
-At approximately 11:50 am on March 29th, lights in the main control room
 were restored.
-From 2:04 pm on March 30th, water spray by the concrete pumping vehicle
 was started and finished at 6:33 pm on March 30th.
-Some of turbine building lights were turned on March 31st.
-From 8:28 am, April 1st, the water spray by the concrete pumping vehicle
 was started. At 2:14 pm, the water spray finished.
-From 5:14 pm, April 3rd, the water spray by the concrete pumping vehicle
 was started. At 10:16 pm, the water spray finished.
-From 5:35 pm, April 5th, the water spray by the concrete pumping vehicle
 was started. At 6:22 pm, the water spray finished.
-From 6:23 pm, April 7th, the water spray by the concrete pumping vehicle
 was started. At 7:40 pm, the water spray finished.
-From 5:07 pm, April 9th, the water spray by the concrete pumping vehicle
 was started. At 7:24 pm, the water spray finished.

*Unit 5 and 6
-At 5:00 am on March 19th, we started the Residual Heat Removal System
 Pump (C ) of Unit 5 in order to cool the spent fuel pool. At 10:14 pm, we
 started the Residual Heat Removal System Pump (B ) of Unit 6 in order to
 cool the spent fuel pool.
-Unit 5 has been in reactor cold shutdown since 2:30 pm on March 20th.
 Unit 6 has been in reactor cold shutdown since 7:27 pm on March 20th.
-At Units 5 and 6, in order to prevent hydrogen gas from accumulating
 within the buildings, we have made three holes on the roof of the reactor
 building for each unit.
-At approximately 5:24 pm on March 23rd, the temporary Residual Heat
 Removal System Seawater Pump automatically stopped when its power source
 was switched. We restarted the pump at around 4:14 pm, March 24th, and
 resumed cooling of reactor at around 4:35 pm.

*On March 18th, regarding the spent fuel in the common spent fuel pool,
 we have confirmed that the water level of the pool was secured. At around
 10:37 am March 21st, water spraying to common spent fuel pool and
 finished at 3:30 pm. At around 6:05 pm, fuel pool cooling pump was
 started to cool the pool.
  *common spent fuel pool: a spent fuel pool for common use set in a
   separate building in a plant site in order to preserve spent fuel which
   are transferred from the spent fuel pool in each Unit building.

*On March 17th, we patrolled buildings for dry casks and found no signs of
 abnormal situation for the casks by visual observation. A detailed
 inspection was under preparation.
  *dry cask: a measure to store spent fuel in a dry storage casks in
   storages. Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station started to utilize
   the measure from August 1995.

*On March 21st, 23rd to April 9th we detected radioactive materials from
 the seawater around the discharge canal of the station. The data of 
 detected three nuclides (Iodine-131, Cesium-134 and Cesium-137) was 
 reported as fixed data. Other nuclides figures are to be re-evaluated 
 based on the improved measures for recurrence prevention which have been 
 prepared in accordance to a strong warning by NISA on April 1st. 
 
*On March 20th, 21st, 23rd to April 9th, we detected radioactive materials
 in the air collected at the site of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
 Station. The data of detected three nuclides (Iodine-131, Cesium-134 and 
 Cesium-137) was reported as fixed data. Other nuclides figures are to be 
 re-evaluated based on the improved measures for recurrence prevention. 
 which have been prepared in accordance to a strong warning by NISA on 
 April 1st. 

*Plutonium has been detected from the sample of soil at the site of
 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station collected on 21st, 22nd, 25th and
 28th of March, Concentration level of Plutonium detected was same as that
 of under usual environment and it was thought not to be harmful to human
 health. We will strengthen environmental monitoring of power station and
 surrounding environment.
 Additionally Iodine, Cesium, Tellurium, Barium, Niobium, Ruthenium,
 Molybdenum, Technetium, Lanthanum, Beryllium, Silver have been detected
 from the sample of soil collected at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
 Station on 21st, 22nd, 25th and 28th of March.

*We detected radioactive materials contained in the puddles found in the
 turbine building of Unit 1 to 4. We are planning to conduct water
 analysis in preparation for treating the water. The analysis will be
 carried out in Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station with support from
 other nuclear companies (Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Japan Nuclear Fuel
 Limited).

*At approximately 3:30 pm, March 27th, we found water pooling in the
 vertical shaft of the trench outside of the turbine buildings for Units 1
 to 3. The radiation dose at the surface of the water amounted 0.4 mSv/h
 in Unit 1 and over 1,000 mSv/h in Unit 2. We could not confirm the amount
 of the radiation dose in Unit 3. We will keep observing the condition of
 the water in the vertical shaft.
 On March 29th, we detected niobium, tellurium, ruthenium, silver,
 tellurium, iodine, cesium, and ruthenium in the water collected at the
 trench of unit 1.
 On March 30th, we took samples from the water in the trench of Unit 2 and
 3, and conducted nuclide analysis on them. We are now confirming the
 results of the analysis.

*At approximately 9:30 am, April 2nd, we found that there was water in the
 shaft for storing power cable (concrete product) near the intake of water
 for Unit 2, the radioactive air dose was over 1,000mSv/h and the water
 spilled into the sea from the crack (approximately 20 cm) on the side of
 the shaft. We injected fresh concrete to the shaft twice, however, we
 could not observe a change in the amount of water flowing into the sea.
 Therefore, we considered that a new method of stopping the water and
 determined to use the polymer. Necessary equipment and experts of water
 shutoff will be dispatched to the site and after checking the condition,
 we began to stop water shutoff and were injecting polymer on April 3rd.
 On April 4th, we injected the tracer from the vertical shaft of the
 trench to start to examine the water current. We did not observe
 reduction of flow or change of color or water leaking. We checked the
 diagram and confirmed the route. At the same time, we checked the
 situation of the pit in detail and considered the possibility that the
 water was not from the pit, rather, from the joint between the piping
 upstream of the pit and the duct, then the water seeped through a layer
 of gravel below the piping. In order to stop that seepage from the layer
 of gravel, we decided to conduct the water sealing to the bedrock around
 the piping. We arranged for the specialist and gathered equipments. On
 April 5th, liquid glass was injected to the bedrock. Tracer was put
 through the two new holes drilled near the pit to investigate the water
 flow. At 2:15 pm, April 5th, it was observed the water with tracer came
 out from the crack on the concrete wall of the pit. At 3:7 pm, April 5th,
 injection of coagulant from the holes was initiated and we have confirmed
 the outflow from the crack on the concrete wall of the pit has stopped at
 5:38 am, April 6th. We confirmed water level has not been rising in the
 turbine building of unit 2. On April 6th, a countermeasure by using
 rubber plate and fixer was implemented to prevent discharge of
 radioactive materials, and we are continuously monitoring for any
 existence of leakage. From 3:00pm April 5th, a construction of installing
 large sandbags around the pier to prevent the outflow of the contaminated
 water from station's port on the south side to the ocean was started.
 Also we are preparing spillage prevention fences as countermeasures for
 lowering the outflow to the ocean.
 Iodine and Cesium were detected from the water sampled in the pit and in
 the sea near the water discharge. Additional nuclide analysis will be
 implemented.
 In addition, from April 2nd, we will implement sampling at 15km offshore
 Fukushima Daiichi and Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Stations(3 points
 have been added since April 5th) and will evaluate these samples
 comprehensively.

*Since approximately 9:20 am, March 31st, the water transfer from the
 vertical shaft of Unit 1 to the reservoir of the centralized
 environmental facility was conducted. We finished the task around 11:25
 am of the same day.

*We found a puddle of water at the main building of the centralized
 environmental facility process. We analyzed and detected approximately
 1.2 x 101Bq/cm3 of radioactivity in full dose in the Controlled Area and
 2.2 x 101Bq/cm3 in full dose in the Non-Controlled Area on March 29.
 From April 3rd, the water level in the trench of Unit 3 increased by 15
 cm. The route is not yet known, but there is a possibility that water in
 the turbine building of Unit 4 may be running to the trench of Unit 3. To
 be safe, at 09:22am, April 4th, we stopped transferring water to the
 turbine building of Unit 4. At this moment, the water level in the trench
 of Unit 3 became stable after stopping the water transfer.

*There is plenty of radioactive wastewater in the turbine buildings.
 Especially, Unit 2's wastewater is very highly radioactive. To store this
 stably, it was decided that this needed to be transferred to the Central
 Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility. However, within that facility, we
 are storing ten thousand tons of low level radioactive wastewater. In
 order to transfer more wastewater, we need to discharge the low level
 radioactive wastewater. In addition, as low radioactive subsurface water
 is piling up in sub-drain pits of Units 5 and 6 and a part of subsurface
 water is running into buildings. We are concerned that important
 equipment to secure the safety of reactors may be submerged.
 Based on the Section 1 of the Article 64 of the Nuclear Reactor
 Regulation Law, we have decided to discharge to the sea approximately ten
 thousand tons of the accumulated low level radioactive water and a total
 of fifteen hundred tons of the low level radioactive subsurface water
 stored in the sub drain pits of Unit 5 and 6 as soon as we get ready. 
 From 7:03 pm, April 4th, we are discharging the low level radioactive
 wastewater stored in the Central Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility to
 the south of the water discharge canal. We're confirming whether there is 
 stored waste water or not. Also, from 9:00 pm, April 4th, we are
 discharging the low level radioactive wastewater stored in the sub drain
 pits of Unit 5 and 6 by using one pump via the water discharge canal of
 Units 5 and 6. After that, at 6:52 pm, April 9th we finished discharging
 water. The amount of water was approximately 1,323 tons. 
 We evaluate the impact on the discharge of the low radioactive wastewater
 to the sea as approximately 0.6 mSv per year per an adult if an adult
 eats adjacent fish and seaweeds everyday. The amount (0.6 mSv of
 effective radioactive doses per year) is one-forth of annual radioactive
 dose (2.4 mSv) to which the general public is exposed from nature.

*On April 7th, we knocked holes in the external walls of turbine
 buildings at Units 2 to 4 for the preparation of draining the puddles to
 the centralized waste treatment facility. We are checking the heath in
 the building of centralized waste treatment facility.

*The first barge of the U.S. Forces with fresh water to be used to cool
 down reactors etc. was towed by a ship of Maritime Self-Defense Force and
 docked at 3:42 pm on March 31st 2011. At approximately 3:58 pm, April 1st,
 we started to replenish filtrate tanks with the fresh water, and finished
 at 4:25 pm. At approximately 10:20 am, April 2nd, we resumed replenishing
 filtrate tanks with the fresh water, and finished at 4:40 pm. 
 The second barge of the U.S. Forces with the fresh water towed by the
 ship of Maritime Self-Defense Force came alongside the pier at
 approximately 9:10 am, April 2nd. It was in preparation for replenishing
 filtrate tanks with the fresh water. We began to transfer fresh water
 from the second barge to the first barge on April 3rd at 9:52 am and
 continued until 11:15 am on April 3rd.

*At 11:35 am, April 1st, a worker fell into the sea while stepping into
 the ship from the pier during the hose laying work of the barge. Other
 crew immediately rescued the worker. While no injury or contamination was
 confirmed, whole body counter has been implemented to check the
 contamination inside the body just in case. 

*At 9:19 am, April 9th, one contractor with a full-face mask who was
 working on cables in the water treatment building felt sick and got
 injured by stepping into the manhole whose cover was dislocated. This
 person was transported to the hospital. The result of medical examination
 was "contusion of right knee and doubt of medical collateral ligament
 injury on right knee." It is confirmed that there is no possibility of
 body contamination. 

*From 3:00 pm, April 1st, we started spraying inhibitor in order to
 prevent diffusion of radioactive materials. This attempt was conducted on
 a trial basis at the mountain side area of the common spent fuel pool in
 the range of 500m2. The spraying finished at 4:05 pm. On April 5th and
 6th , we also sprayed the inhibitor in order to prevent the spread of
 radioactive materials on a trial basis at the mountain side area of the
 common spent fuel pool in the range of 600m2. On April 8th, we conducted
 trial spraying of the inhibitor at the mountain side area of the common
 spent fuel pool in the range of 680m2. On April 10th, we sprayed it in
 the range of approximately 550 m2. 

*Monitoring posts (no.1 to no.8) which were installed around the site
 boundary have been restored. We will continue monitoring the measured
 value and make announcements on those values accordingly.
 
*At around 11:00 am on April 10th, at the yard of Unit 2, a worker who
 wore an anorak and a full face mask said that he felt sick while he was
 laying a discharging hose. A medical personnel rode on the same vehicle
 from Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station and sent him to J-Village with
 conducting a course of injections. And after that, at 2:27 pm, he was
 sent to Sougou Iwaki Kyoritsu Hospital by an ambulance. No radioactive
 material attached to his body.

*From 3:59 pm and 4:28 pm on April 10th , we conducted video recording of 
 Unit 1 to 4 reactor buildings from the air by using an unmanned 
 helicopter to check the current status of the buildings. 

*We will continuously endeavor to securing safety, and monitoring of the
 surrounding environment. 
Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station: 
 Units 1 to 4: shutdown due to the earthquake 
*The national government has instructed evacuation for those local
 residents within 10km radius of the periphery.

*In order to achieve cold shutdown, reactor cooling function was restored
 and cooling of reactors was conducted. As a result, all reactors achieved
 cold shutdown: Unit 1 at 5:00 pm, March 14th, Unit 2 at 6:00 pm, March
 14th, Unit 3 at 0:15 pm, March 12th, Unit 4 at 7:15 am, March 16th. 

*At 2:30 pm on March 30th, the power source of the residual heat removal
 system (B) to cool the reactor of Unit 1 was secured from an emergency
 power source in addition to an offsite power. This means that all the
 units secure backup power sources (emergency power sources) for the
 residual heat removal system (B).

*Unit 1
 As it was confirmed that the temperature of the Emergency Equipment
 Cooling Water System *1 has increased, at 3:20 pm, March 15th, we stopped
 the Residual Heat Removal System (B) for the inspection. Subsequently,
 failure was detected in the power supply facility associated with the
 pumps of the Emergency Equipment Cooling Water System. At 4:25 pm, March
 15th, after replacing the power facility, the pumps and the Residual Heat
 Removal System (B) have been reactivated.

*Unit 4
 As it was confirmed that the pressure at the outlet of the pumps of the
 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water System*1 has been decreased, at 8:05 pm,
 March 15th, we stopped the Residual Heat Removal System (B) for the
 inspection. Subsequently, failure was detected in the power supply
 facility associated with the pumps of the Emergency Equipment Cooling
 Water System. At 9:25 pm, March 15th, after replacing the relevant
 facility, the pumps and the Residual Heat Removal System (B) have been
 reactivated.

*1:emergency water system in which cooling water (pure water) circulates
 which exchanged the heat with sea water in order to cool down bearing
 pumps and/or heat exchangers etc. 
Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station: 
 Units 1, 5, 6, 7: normal operation 
 (Units 2 to 4: outage due to regular inspection) 
[Thermal Power Station] 
-Hirono Thermal Power Station Units 2 and 4: shutdown due to the
 earthquake
-Hitachinaka Thermal Power Station Unit 1: shutdown due to the earthquake
-Kashima Thermal Power Station Unit 6: shutdown due to the earthquake 
[Hydro Power Station] 
-Power supply has returned to normal, but facilities damaged by the
 earthquake are now being handled in a timely manner. 
[Impacts on Transmission Facilities] 
-Power supply has returned to normal, but facilities damaged by the
 earthquake are now being handled in a timely manner. 
[Avoidance of further Implementation on Planned Rolling Blackouts and 
 Request for Conserving Electricity Consumption]  
 Currently, we are giving our utmost efforts to restore power supply after
 our nuclear and thermal power facilities are severely damaged by
 Tohoku-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake. The widespread understanding and
 cooperation to the conservation of electricity among each customer have
 contributed to the improvement in the tight power supply-demand balance.
 Amidst this backdrop, in principle, we have decided not to implement
 further rolling blackouts.
 However, we must sincerely ask for your continued cooperation in
 conserving electricity consumption due to the possible increase in demand
 caused by abrupt climate change or unexpected trouble in power stations
 that are currently being restored. In case the electricity supply-demand
 balance becomes tighter than expected, on the condition of prior
 announcement, we may reluctantly implement the rolling blackouts. We
 kindly ask for your cooperation.
 Also, we will give our utmost efforts to maintain this policy of avoiding
 further implementation on rolling blackouts in summer. 
 
* Revised past progress 
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