Due to the Tohoku-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake which occurred on March 11th
2011, TEPCO's facilities including our nuclear power stations have been
severely damaged. We deeply apologize for the anxiety and inconvenience
caused.
Below is the status of TEPCO's major facilities.
*new items are underlined
[Nuclear Power Station]
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station:
Units 1 to 3: shutdown due to the earthquake
(Units 4 to 6: outage due to regular inspections)
*The national government has instructed the public to evacuate for those
local residents within 20km radius of the site periphery and to evacuate
voluntarily for those local residents between 20km and 30km radius of the
site periphery.
*Off-site power has been connected to Unit 1 to 6 by March 22, 2011.
* Unit 1
-The explosive sound and white smoke was confirmed near Unit 1 when the
big quake occurred at 3:36 pm, March 12th.
-We started injection of sea water at 8:20 pm, March 12th, and then boric
acid which absorbs neutron into the reactor afterwards.
-At approximately 2:30 am, March 23rd, we started the injection of sea
water into the reactor from feed water system. After that, the injection
of freshwater was started from 3:37 pm on March 25th (switched from the
seawater injection). At 8:32 am, Mar 29th, transfer from the fire
fighting pump to a temporary motor driven pump was made. From 10:42am to
11:52am on April 3rd we temporarily switched the pump to the fire
fighting pump to inject fresh water to use power through off-site
transmission line. We're now injecting fresh water to the reactor by a
motor driven pump powered by off-site transmission line.
-At approximately 10:50 am on March 24th, white smoke was confirmed
arising from the top of the reactor building.
-At approximately 11:30 am, March 24th, lights in the main control room
were restored.
-At approximately 5:00 pm, March 24th, draining water from underground
floor of turbine buildings into a condenser was started and it was paused
at approximately 7:30 am, March 29th because we confirmed that the water
level reached almost full capacity of a condenser. In order to move the
water in the condenser into a condensate storage tank, water transfer
from the condensate storage tank to suppression pool's water surge-tanks
was conducted from around 0:00 pm, March 31st to 3:26 pm, April 2nd.
-From 1:03 pm, March 31st, the water spray by the concrete pumping vehicle
was started, and finished at 4:04 pm.
-In order to confirm the position of water spray to the spent fuel pool by
the concrete pumping vehicle, the water spray was conducted from 5:16 pm
to 5:19 pm.
-Some of turbine building lights were turned on April 2nd.
-The water transfer from the condenser to the condensate storage tank has
been implemented since 1:55 pm, April 3rd. The transfer was completed at
9:30 am on April 10th.
-As it is suspected that hydrogen gas may be accumulated inside reactor
containment vessel, at 10:30 pm, April 6th, we started the operation of
the valve for the injection of nitrogen to the reactor in order to
prevent the increase of oxygen density. Following this, the injection of
nitrogen to the reactor was started at 1:31AM, April 7th.
* Unit 2
-At 1:25 pm, March 14th, since the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System
has failed, it was determined that a specific incident stipulated in
Clause 1, Article 15 of Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear
Emergency Preparedness occurred (failure of reactor cooling function).
At 5:17 pm, March 14th, while the water level in the reactor reached the
top of the fuel rod, we have restarted the water injection with the valve
operation.
-At approximately 6:14 am, March 15th, the abnormal sound was confirmed
near the suppression chamber and the pressure inside the chamber
decreased afterwards. It was determined that there was a possibility that
something happened in the suppression chamber. While sea water injection
to the reactor continued, TEPCO employees and workers from other
companies not in charge of injection work started tentative evacuation to
a safe location.
Sea water injection to the reactor continued.
-On March 18th, power was delivered up to substation for backup power
through offsite transmission line. We completed laying cable further to
unit receiving facility in the building, and at 3:46 pm, March 20th the
load-side power panel of the receiving facility started to be energized.
-From approximately 3:05 pm to approximately 5:20 pm on March 20th, about
40 tons of seawater was injected into Unit 2 by TEPCO employees.
-At approximately 6:20 pm on March 21st, white smoke was confirmed arising
from the top of the reactor building. As of 7:11 am on March 22nd, smoke
decreased to the level where we could hardly confirm.
-From around 4:00 pm to 5:00 pm on March 22nd, approximately 18 tons of
sea water was injected into the spent fuel pool by TEPCO employees.
-From 10:10 am on March 26th, freshwater (with boric acid) injection was
initiated. (switched from the seawater injection) At 6:31pm, March 27th,
transfer from the fire fighting pump to a temporary motor driven pump was
made. From 10:22am to 0:06pm on April 3rd, we temporarily switched the
pump to the fire fighting pump to inject fresh water to use power through
off-site transmission line. We're now injecting fresh water to the
reactor by a motor driven pump powered by off-site transmission line.
-From 10:30 am on March 25th, seawater injection through Fuel Pool Cooling
and Filtering System was initiated. The work was finished at 12:19 pm,
March 25th. From 4:30 pm, March 29th, freshwater injection through Fuel
Pool Cooling and Filtering System was initiated. (We switched from
seawater to freshwater). The work was finished at 6:25 pm on March 29th.
At 9:25 am, March 30th, we started fresh water injection by a temporary
motor driven pump, but we switched the pump to the fire fighting pump due
to the pump trouble. At 1:10 pm, March 30th, freshwater injection was
suspended, because we found the crack on a part of the hose. At 7:05 pm,
March 30th, freshwater injection was resumed and finished at 11:50 pm,
March 31.
-At approximately 4:46 pm, March 26th, lights in the main control room
were restored.
-At approximately 4:45 pm, March 29th, the water in a condensate storage
tank was being transferred to suppression pool water surge-tanks to
prepare for water transfer from a condenser to a condensate storage tank
in order to drain water on the underground floor of the turbine building
into a condenser. At 11:50 am, April 1st, transfer was completed.
-At 2:56 pm, April 1st, water injection into spent fuel pool in Unit 2 by
temporary motor driven pump was initiated. At 5:05 pm on April 1st, the
water injection was finished.
-The water transfer from the condenser to the condensate storage tank has
been implemented since 5:10 pm, April 2nd.It was finished at 1:10 pm,
April 9th.
-Some of turbine building lights were turned on April 2nd.
-At 11:05 am, April 4th, water injection into spent fuel pool in Unit 2 by
a temporary motor driven pump was initiated. At 1:37 pm, April 4th, the
water injection was finished.
-At 1:29 pm, April 7th, water injection into spent fuel pool in Unit 2 by
a temporary motor driven pump was initiated. At 2:34 pm, April 7th, the
water injection was finished.
-At 10:37 am on April 10th, water injection into a spent fuel pool of
Unit 2 by a temporary motor driven pump was initiated. At 0:38 pm on
April 10th, the water injection was finished.
* Unit 3
-At 6:50 am, March 14th, while water injection to the reactor was under
operation (injection of boric acid was done on Mar 13th), the pressure in
the reactor containment vessel increased to 530 kPa. As a result, at 7:44
am, it was determined that a specific incident stipulated in article 15,
clause 1 occurred (abnormal increase of the pressure of reactor
containment vessel). Afterwards, the pressure gradually decreased (as of
9:05 am, 490 kPa).
-We continue injecting water into a reactor. (Boric acid was added on March 13)
* We announced in our past reports that "On March 14, the pressure in the
primary containment vessel increased and it was determined that a
specific incident stipulated in the Article 15, the Clause 1 of Act on
Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness occurred".
However, we made a mistake in the calculation of the pressure value and
the status of Unit 3 did not fall under the above-mentioned specific
incidents. We will delete the related description from our latest report.
-At approximately 11:01 am, March 14th, an explosion followed by white
smoke occurred near Unit 3. 4 TEPCO employees and 3 workers from other
companies (all of them were conscious) sustained injuries and were taken
to the hospital by ambulances.
-As the temperature of water in the spent fuel pool rose, spraying water
by helicopters with the support of the Self Defense Force was considered.
However the operation on March 16th was cancelled.
-At 6:15 am, March 17th, the pressure of the Suppression Chamber
temporarily increased, but currently it is stable within a certain range.
On March 20th, we were preparing to implement measures to reduce the
pressure of the reactor containment vessel (partial discharge of air
containing radioactive material to outside) in order to fully secure
safety. However, at present, it was not a situation to immediately
implement measures and discharge air containing radioactive material to
outside. We will continue to monitor the status of the pressure of the
reactor containment vessel.
-In order to cool spent fuel pool, water was sprayed by helicopters on
March 17th with the cooperation of Self-Defense Forces.
-At approximately past 7:00 pm, March 17th, Self-Defense Forces and the
police started spraying water by water cannon trucks upon our request for
the cooperation. At 8:09 pm, March 17th, they finished the operation.
-Before 2:00 pm, March 18th, spraying water by fire engines was started
with the cooperation of Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed
Forces. At 2:45 pm, March 18th, the operation was finished.
-At approximately 12:30 am, March 19th, spraying water was started with
the cooperation of Fire Rescue Task Forces of Tokyo Fire Department. At
approximately 1:10 am, March 19th, the operation was finished. They
resumed spraying water at 2:10 pm and finished at approximately 3:40 am,
March 20th.
-At approximately 9:30 pm, March 20th, spraying water was started with the
cooperation of Fire Rescue Task Forces of Tokyo Fire Department. At
approximately 3:58 am, March 21st, the operation was finished.
-At approximately 3:55 pm, March 21st, light gray smoke was confirmed
arising from the southeast side of the 5th floor roof of the Unit 3
building. The situation was reported to the fire department at
approximately 4:21 pm. The parameters of reactor pressure vessel, reactor
containment vessel, and monitored environmental data remained stable
without significant change. However, employees working around Unit 3
evacuated to a safe location. On March 22nd, the color of smoke changed
to somewhat white and it was slowly dissipating.
-At approximately 3:10 pm on March 22nd, spraying water to Unit 3 by Tokyo
Fire Department's Hyper Rescue and Osaka City Fire Department was
conducted, and completed at approximately 4:00 pm on the same day.
-At approximately 10:45 pm on March 22nd, lights in the main control room
were restored.
-At approximately 11:00 am on March 23rd, the injection of sea water to
spent fuel pool was conducted, and finished approximately at 1:20 pm on
the same day.
-At 4:20 pm on March 23rd, light gray smoke was observed belching from
Unit 3 building. The situation was reported to the fire department at
4:25 pm on March 23rd. The parameters of the reactor, the reactor
containment vessel of Unit 3, and monitored figures around the site's
immediate surroundings remained stable without significant change. To be
safe, workers in the main control room of Unit 3 and around Unit 3
evacuated to a safe location. At approximately 11:30 pm on March 23rd and
4:50 am on March 24th, TEPCO employees confirmed the smoke has
disappeared. Accordingly, workers evacuation was lifted.
-From approximately 5:35 am on March 24th, sea water injection through
Fuel Pool Cooling and Filtering System was initiated, and finished at
approximately 4:05 pm on the same day.
-From 1:28 pm on March 25th, Hyper Rescue team started water spray. The
work finished at 4:00 pm on March 25th.
-From 6:02 pm on March 25th, the injection of freshwater to the reactor
was started (switched from the seawater injection). At 8:30 pm on March
28th, the injection of fresh water was switched to temporary electricity
pumps from the fire engine pumps. From 10:03am to 0:16pm on April 3rd, we
temporarily switched the pump to the fire fighting pump to inject fresh
water to use power through off-site transmission line. We're now
injecting fresh water to the reactor by a motor driven pump powered by
off-site transmission line.
-At approximately 12:34pm March 27th, the injection of water by the
concrete pump truck was started. At approximately 2:36 pm, March 27th,
the operation was finished.
-At approximately 2:17pm March 29th, the injection of fresh water by the
concrete pump truck was started. (Sea water had been injected so far and
transfer from seawater to freshwater was made). The water injection was
finished at 6:18 PM, March 29th.
-At approximately 5:40 pm, March 28th, the water in a condensate storage
tank was being transferred to suppression pool water surge-tanks to
prepare for water transfer from a condenser to a condensate storage tank
in order to drain water on the underground floor of the turbine building
into a condenser. We finished the transfer work at approximately 8:40 am,
March 31st.
-From 4:30 pm, March 31st, the water spray by the concrete pumping vehicle
was started, and finished at 7:33 pm.
-From 9:52 am, April 2nd, the water spray by the concrete pumping vehicle
was started, and finished at 0:54 pm.
-Some of turbine building lights were turned on April 2nd.
-From 5:03 am, April 4th, the water spray by the concrete pumping vehicle
was started, and finished at 07:19 pm.
-From 6:53 am, April 7th, water spray by the concrete pumping vehicle was
started, and finished at 8:53 am.
* Unit 4
-At approximately 6:00 am, March 15th, an explosive sound was heard and
the damage in the 5th floor roof of Unit 4 reactor building was confirmed.
At 9:38 am, the fire near the north-west part of 4th floor of Unit 4
reactor building was confirmed. At approximately 11:00 am, TEPCO
employees confirmed that the fire was out.
-At approximately 5:45 am on March 16th, a TEPCO employee discovered a
fire at the northwest corner of the Nuclear Reactor Building. TEPCO
immediately reported this incident to the fire department and the local
government and proceeded with the extinction of fire. At approximately
6:15 am, TEPCO staff confirmed at the site that there were no signs of fire.
-At approximately 8:21 am on March 20th, spraying water by fire engines
was started with the cooperation of Self-Defense Forces and they finished
the operation at approximately 9:40 am. At approximately 6:45 pm spraying
water was started by Self-Defenses' water cannon trucks and finished at
approximately 7:45 pm.
-At approximately 6:30 am, March 21st, spraying water by fire engines was
started with the cooperation of Self-Defense Forces and the United States
Armed Forces. At approximately 8:40 am, March 21, they had finished the
operation.
-On March 21st, cabling has been completed from temporary substation to
the main power center.
-From approximately 5:20 pm on March 22nd, spraying water from the
concrete pumping vehicle was conducted and ended at approximately 8:30 pm
on the same day.
-From approximately 10:00 am on March 23rd, spraying water from the
concrete pumping vehicle was conducted and ended at approximately 1:00 pm
on the same day.
-From approximately 2:35 pm on March 24th, spraying water by the concrete
pumping vehicle was conducted and ended at approximately 5:30 pm on the
same day.
-From 6:05 am on March 25th, seawater injection through Fuel Pool Cooling
and Filtering System was initiated and finished at approximately 10:20 am
on the same day.
-From 7:05 pm on March 25th, water spray by the concrete pumping vehicle
was started and finished at 10:07 pm on March 25th.
-From 4:55 pm on March 27th, water spray by the concrete pumping vehicle
was started and finished at 7:25 pm on March 27th.
-At approximately 11:50 am on March 29th, lights in the main control room
were restored.
-From 2:04 pm on March 30th, water spray by the concrete pumping vehicle
was started and finished at 6:33 pm on March 30th.
-Some of turbine building lights were turned on March 31st.
-From 8:28 am, April 1st, the water spray by the concrete pumping vehicle
was started. At 2:14 pm, the water spray finished.
-From 5:14 pm, April 3rd, the water spray by the concrete pumping vehicle
was started. At 10:16 pm, the water spray finished.
-From 5:35 pm, April 5th, the water spray by the concrete pumping vehicle
was started. At 6:22 pm, the water spray finished.
-From 6:23 pm, April 7th, the water spray by the concrete pumping vehicle
was started. At 7:40 pm, the water spray finished.
-From 5:07 pm, April 9th, the water spray by the concrete pumping vehicle
was started. At 7:24 pm, the water spray finished.
* Unit 5 and 6
-At 5:00 am on March 19th, we started the Residual Heat Removal System
Pump (C ) of Unit 5 in order to cool the spent fuel pool. At 10:14 pm, we
started the Residual Heat Removal System Pump (B ) of Unit 6 in order to
cool the spent fuel pool.
-Unit 5 has been in reactor cold shutdown since 2:30 pm on March 20th.
Unit 6 has been in reactor cold shutdown since 7:27 pm on March 20th.
-At Units 5 and 6, in order to prevent hydrogen gas from accumulating
within the buildings, we have made three holes on the roof of the reactor
building for each unit.
-At approximately 5:24 pm on March 23rd, the temporary Residual Heat
Removal System Seawater Pump automatically stopped when its power source
was switched. We restarted the pump at around 4:14 pm, March 24th, and
resumed cooling of reactor at around 4:35 pm.
*On March 18th, regarding the spent fuel in the common spent fuel pool, we
have confirmed that the water level of the pool was secured. At around
10:37 am March 21st, water spraying to common spent fuel pool and finished
at 3:30 pm. At around 6:05 pm, fuel pool cooling pump was started to cool
the pool.
*common spent fuel pool: a spent fuel pool for common use set in a
separate building in a plant site in order to preserve spent fuel which
are transferred from the spent fuel pool in each Unit building.
*On March 17th, we patrolled buildings for dry casks and found no signs of
abnormal situation for the casks by visual observation. A detailed
inspection was under preparation.
*dry cask: a measure to store spent fuel in a dry storage casks in
storages. Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station started to utilize
the measure from August 1995.
*On March 21st, 23rd to April 8th we detected technetium, cobalt, iodine,
cesium, tellurium, barium, lanthanum and molybdenum from the seawater
around the discharge canal of the station. (We are reevaluating)
*On March 20th, 21st, 23rd to April 8th, we detected iodine, cesium,
tellurium and ruthenium in the air collected at the site of Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. (We are reevaluating)
*Plutonium has been detected from the sample of soil at the site of
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station collected on 21st, 22nd, 25th and
28th of March, Concentration level of Plutonium detected was same as that
of under usual environment and it was thought not to be harmful to human
health. We will strengthen environmental monitoring of power station and
surrounding environment.
Additionally Iodine, Cesium, Tellurium, Barium, Niobium, Ruthenium,
Molybdenum, Technetium, Lanthanum, Beryllium, Silver have been detected
from the sample of soil collected at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Station on 21st, 22nd, 25th and 28th of March.
*We detected radioactive materials contained in the puddles found in the
turbine building of Unit 1 to 4. We are planning to conduct water analysis
in preparation for treating the water. The analysis will be carried out in
Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station with support from other nuclear
companies (Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited).
*At approximately 3:30 pm, March 27th, we found water pooling in the
vertical shaft of the trench outside of the turbine buildings for Units 1
to 3. The radiation dose at the surface of the water amounted 0.4 mSv/h in
Unit 1 and over 1,000 mSv/h in Unit 2. We could not confirm the amount of
the radiation dose in Unit 3. We will keep observing the condition of the
water in the vertical shaft.
On March 29th, we detected niobium, tellurium, ruthenium, silver,
tellurium, iodine, cesium, and ruthenium in the water collected at the
trench of unit 1.
On March 30th, we took samples from the water in the trench of Unit 2 and
3, and conducted nuclide analysis on them. We are now confirming the
results of the analysis.
*At approximately 9:30 am, April 2nd, we found that there was water in the
shaft for storing power cable (concrete product) near the intake of water
for Unit 2, the radioactive air dose was over 1,000mSv/h and the water
spilled into the sea from the crack (approximately 20 cm) on the side of
the shaft. We injected fresh concrete to the shaft twice, however, we
could not observe a change in the amount of water flowing into the sea.
Therefore, we considered that a new method of stopping the water and
determined to use the polymer. Necessary equipment and experts of water
shutoff will be dispatched to the site and after checking the condition,
we began to stop water shutoff and were injecting polymer on April 3rd. On
April 4th, we injected the tracer from the vertical shaft of the trench to
start to examine the water current. We did not observe reduction of flow
or change of color or water leaking. We checked the diagram and confirmed
the route. At the same time, we checked the situation of the pit in detail
and considered the possibility that the water was not from the pit, rather,
from the joint between the piping upstream of the pit and the duct, then
the water seeped through a layer of gravel below the piping. In order to
stop that seepage from the layer of gravel, we decided to conduct the
water sealing to the bedrock around the piping. We arranged for the
specialist and gathered equipments. On April 5th, liquid glass was
injected to the bedrock. Tracer was put through the two new holes drilled
near the pit to investigate the water flow. At 2:15 pm, April 5th, it was
observed the water with tracer came out from the crack on the concrete
wall of the pit. At 3:7 pm, April 5th, injection of coagulant from the
holes was initiated and we have confirmed the outflow from the crack on
the concrete wall of the pit has stopped at 5:38 am, April 6th. We
confirmed water level has not been rising in the turbine building of unit
2. On April 6th, a countermeasure by using rubber plate and fixer was
implemented to prevent discharge of radioactive materials, and we are
continuously monitoring for any existence of leakage. From 3:00pm April
5th, a construction of installing large sandbags around the pier to
prevent the outflow of the contaminated water from station's port on the
south side to the ocean was started. Also we are preparing spillage
prevention fences as countermeasures for lowering the outflow to the ocean.
Iodine and Cesium were detected from the water sampled in the pit and in
the sea near the water discharge. Additional nuclide analysis will be
implemented.
In addition, from April 2nd, we will implement sampling at 15km offshore
Fukushima Daiichi and Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Stations(3 points have
been added since April 5th) and will evaluate these samples
comprehensively.
*Since approximately 9:20 am, March 31st, the water transfer from the
vertical shaft of Unit 1 to the reservoir of the centralized environmental
facility was conducted. We finished the task around 11:25 am of the same
day.
*We found a puddle of water at the main building of the centralized
environmental facility process. We analyzed and detected approximately
1.2 x 101Bq/cm3 of radioactivity in full dose in the Controlled Area and
2.2 x 101Bq/cm3 in full dose in the Non-Controlled Area on March 29.
From April 3rd, the water level in the trench of Unit 3 increased by 15 cm.
The route is not yet known, but there is a possibility that water in the
turbine building of Unit 4 may be running to the trench of Unit 3. To be
safe, at 09:22am, April 4th, we stopped transferring water to the turbine
building of Unit 4. At this moment, the water level in the trench of Unit
3 became stable after stopping the water transfer.
*There is plenty of radioactive wastewater in the turbine buildings.
Especially, Unit 2's wastewater is very highly radioactive. To store this
stably, it was decided that this needed to be transferred to the Central
Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility. However, within that facility, we are
storing ten thousand tons of low level radioactive wastewater. In order to
transfer more wastewater, we need to discharge the low level radioactive
wastewater. In addition, as low radioactive subsurface water is piling up
in sub-drain pits of Units 5 and 6 and a part of subsurface water is
running into buildings. We are concerned that important equipment to
secure the safety of reactors may be submerged.
Based on the Section 1 of the Article 64 of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Law, we have decided to discharge to the sea approximately ten thousand
tons of the accumulated low level radioactive water and a total of fifteen
hundred tons of the low level radioactive subsurface water stored in the
sub drain pits of Unit 5 and 6 as soon as we get ready.
From 7:03 pm, April 4th, we are discharging the low level radioactive
wastewater stored in the Central Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility to
the south of the water discharge canal. By 7:10 pm, we started ten pumps.
Also, from 9:00 pm, April 4th, we are discharging the low level
radioactive wastewater stored in the sub drain pits of Unit 5 and 6 by
using one pump via the water discharge canal of Units 5 and 6. After that,
at 6:52 pm, April 9th we finished discharging water. The amount of water
was approximately 1,320 tons.
We evaluate the impact on the discharge of the low radioactive wastewater
to the sea as approximately 0.6 mSv per year per an adult if an adult eats
adjacent fish and seaweeds everyday. The amount (0.6 mSv of effective
radioactive doses per year) is one-forth of annual radioactive dose
(2.4 mSv) to which the general public is exposed from nature.
*On April 7th, we knocked holes in the external walls of turbine buildings
at Units 2 to 4 for the preparation of draining the puddles to the
centralized waste treatment facility. We are checking the heath in the
building of centralized waste treatment facility.
*The first barge of the U.S. Forces with fresh water to be used to cool
down reactors etc. was towed by a ship of Maritime Self-Defense Force and
docked at 3:42 pm on March 31st 2011. At approximately 3:58 pm, April 1st,
we started to replenish filtrate tanks with the fresh water, and finished
at 4:25 pm. At approximately 10:20 am, April 2nd, we resumed replenishing
filtrate tanks with the fresh water, and finished at 4:40 pm.
The second barge of the U.S. Forces with the fresh water towed by the ship
of Maritime Self-Defense Force came alongside the pier at approximately
9:10 am, April 2nd. It was in preparation for replenishing filtrate tanks
with the fresh water. We began to transfer fresh water from the second
barge to the first barge on April 3rd at 9:52 am and continued until 11:15
am on April 3rd.
*At 11:35 am, April 1st, a worker fell into the sea while stepping into
the ship from the pier during the hose laying work of the barge. Other
crew immediately rescued the worker. While no injury or contamination was
confirmed, whole body counter has been implemented to check the
contamination inside the body just in case.
*At 9:19 am, April 9th, one contractor with a full-face mask who was
working on cables in the water treatment building felt sick and got
injured by stepping into the manhole whose cover was dislocated. This
person was transported to the hospital. The result of medical examination
was "contusion of right knee and doubt of medical collateral ligament
injury on right knee." It is confirmed that there is no possibility of
body contamination.
*From 3:00 pm, April 1st, we started spraying inhibitor in order to
prevent diffusion of radioactive materials. This attempt was conducted on
a trial basis at the mountain side area of the common spent fuel pool in
the range of 500m2. The spraying finished at 4:05 pm. On April 5th and 6th,
we also sprayed the inhibitor in order to prevent the spread of
radioactive materials on a trial basis at the mountain side area of the
common spent fuel pool in the range of 600m2. On April 8th, we conducted
trial spraying of the inhibitor at the mountain side area of the common
spent fuel pool in the range of 680m2. On April 10th, we sprayed it in
the range of approximately 550 m2.
*Monitoring posts (no.1 to no.8) which were installed around the site
boundary have been restored. We will continue monitoring the measured
value and make announcements on those values accordingly.
*At around 11:00 am on April 10th, at the yard of Unit 2, a worker who
wore an anorak and a full face mask said that he felt sick while he was
laying a discharging hose. A medical personnel rode on the same vehicle
from Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station and sent him to J-Village with
conducting a course of injections. And after that, at 2:27 pm, he was
sent to Sougou Iwaki Kyoritsu Hospital by an ambulance. No radioactive
material attached to his body.
*We will continuously endeavor to securing safety, and monitoring of the
surrounding environment. Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station:
Units 1 to 4: shutdown due to the earthquake
*The national government has instructed evacuation for those local
residents within 10km radius of the periphery.
*In order to achieve cold shutdown, reactor cooling function was restored
and cooling of reactors was conducted. As a result, all reactors achieved
cold shutdown: Unit 1 at 5:00 pm, March 14th, Unit 2 at 6:00 pm, March
14th, Unit 3 at 0:15 pm, March 12th, Unit 4 at 7:15 am, March 16th.
*At 2:30 pm on March 30th, the power source of the residual heat removal
system (B) to cool the reactor of Unit 1 was secured from an emergency
power source in addition to an offsite power. This means that all the
units secure backup power sources (emergency power sources) for the
residual heat removal system (B).
* Unit 1
As it was confirmed that the temperature of the Emergency Equipment
Cooling Water System *1 has increased, at 3:20 pm, March 15th, we stopped
the Residual Heat Removal System (B) for the inspection. Subsequently,
failure was detected in the power supply facility associated with the
pumps of the Emergency Equipment Cooling Water System. At 4:25 pm, March
15th, after replacing the power facility, the pumps and the Residual Heat
Removal System (B) have been reactivated.
* Unit 4
As it was confirmed that the pressure at the outlet of the pumps of the
Emergency Equipment Cooling Water System*1 has been decreased, at 8:05 pm,
March 15th, we stopped the Residual Heat Removal System (B) for the
inspection. Subsequently, failure was detected in the power supply
facility associated with the pumps of the Emergency Equipment Cooling
Water System. At 9:25 pm, March 15th, after replacing the relevant
facility, the pumps and the Residual Heat Removal System (B) have been
reactivated.
*1:emergency water system in which cooling water (pure water) circulates
which exchanged the heat with sea water in order to cool down bearing
pumps and/or heat exchangers etc.
Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station:
Units 1, 5, 6, 7: normal operation
(Units 2 to 4: outage due to regular inspection)
[Thermal Power Station]
-Hirono Thermal Power Station Units 2 and 4: shutdown due to the
earthquake
-Hitachinaka Thermal Power Station Unit 1: shutdown due to the earthquake
-Kashima Thermal Power Station Unit 6: shutdown due to the earthquake
[Hydro Power Station]
-Power supply has returned to normal, but facilities damaged by the
earthquake are now being handled in a timely manner.
[Impacts on Transmission Facilities]
-Power supply has returned to normal, but facilities damaged by the
earthquake are now being handled in a timely manner.
[Avoidance of further Implementation on Planned Rolling Blackouts and
Request for Conserving Electricity Consumption]
Currently, we are giving our utmost efforts to restore power supply after
our nuclear and thermal power facilities are severely damaged by
Tohoku-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake. The widespread understanding and
cooperation to the conservation of electricity among each customer have
contributed to the improvement in the tight power supply-demand balance.
Amidst this backdrop, in principle, we have decided not to implement
further rolling blackouts.
However, we must sincerely ask for your continued cooperation in
conserving electricity consumption due to the possible increase in demand
caused by abrupt climate change or unexpected trouble in power stations
that are currently being restored. In case the electricity supply-demand
balance becomes tighter than expected, on the condition of prior
announcement, we may reluctantly implement the rolling blackouts. We
kindly ask for your cooperation.
Also, we will give our utmost efforts to maintain this policy of avoiding
further implementation on rolling blackouts in summer.
* Revised past progress
