Status of TEPCO's Nuclear Power Stations after the Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake (Daily Report as of 3:00 PM on July 3)

Due to the Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake which occurred on March 11, 2011, TEPCO's facilities including our nuclear power stations have been severely damaged. We deeply apologize for the anxiety and inconvenience caused.
With regard to the accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, on April 17, 2011, we have compiled the roadmap towards restoration from the accident and on July 19 we accomplished the Step1 target "Radiation dose is in steady decline". Then on December 16 we confirmed the accomplishment of the Step 2 target "Release of radioactive materials is under control and radiation doses are being significantly held down".
In addition, on December 21, 2011, we have compiled the "Mid-to-long-Term Roadmap toward the Decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Units 1-4, TEPCO".
In addition to the maintenance of the plant's stable condition, we will implement Mid-to-Long Term countermeasures towards the decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Units 1-4 to enable evacuees to return to their homes as soon as possible and reduce the anxiety of the people in Fukushima and the whole nation as soon as possible.

Below is the status of TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.

* The updates are underlined.

[Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station]
·Unit 1 to 4: Abolishment (April 19, 2012)
·Unit 5 to 6: Outage due to regular inspections before the earthquake

-As for the underground reservoir No.2 installed within the power station site, 10¹Bq/cm³ level of radiation was detected as a result of analyzing the water accumulated between the sheet on the outside (bentonite sheet) and the ground (the underground reservoir is made of three layers of impermeable sheets) on April 3. On April 5, radiation was detected in the water between the sheet on the outside (bentonite sheet) and the sheet on the inside (double-layered permeable sheet) as a result of analysis. The radioactivity density of all β detected was approx. 5.9×10³Bq/cm³. Considering that there is no drain ditch in the surrounding area, it is considered that there is no possibility of the leaked water flowing into the sea. At 5:10 AM on April 6, the incident was judged to be a leakage which is subject to the application of Article 19-17, Item 10 of the Rule for the Installation, Operation, etc. of Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors (Rule for Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors). The amount of leaked water is approx. 120m³, all γ radioactivity density is approx. 1.5×10⁰Bq/cm³ and all β radioactivity density is approx. 5.9×10³Bq/cm³, the γ ray radiation dose leaked is estimated to be approx. 1.8×10⁸Bq and the β radiation dose is estimated to be approx. 7.1×10¹¹Bq. Details are currently being investigated.
While enhancing the monitoring of the water level of the underground reservoir No.3, on April 7, sampling was performed on the water in the drain hole (southwest) and the leakage detection hole (southwest) of the underground reservoir No.3 for the purpose of investigating the leakage location.
Considering that all β nuclides were detected in the water in the leakage detection hole and the drain hole of the underground reservoir No.3 as a result of sampling, it was judged at 8:53 AM on the same day that there may be a small amount of leakage from the impermeable sheet on the outside (bentonite sheet) of the reservoir to the outside.
The samples collected in the morning of April 9 in the drain hole (at 2 locations) and the leakage detection hole (at 2 locations) of the underground reservoir No.1 have been analyzed. As a result, the chloride concentration of the water in the leakage detection hole (northeast) has increased from 4ppm (on the previous day) to 910ppm. At 12:47 PM, water transfer from the underground reservoir No.2 to No.1 utilizing temporary pumps was suspended. Considering that all β nuclides were detected as a result of sampling performed in the leakage detection hole of the underground reservoir No.1 for the purpose of investigating the leakage location, it was judged that there may be a small amount of leakage from the sheet on the inside (double -layer impermeable sheet) to the impermeable sheet on the outside (bentonite sheet) of the reservoir although the water level of the underground reservoir No.1 has not decreased and the analysis results of the drain hole water of the underground No.1 have not yet been confirmed.
On April 10, the soil covering the leakage detection hole (northeast) penetration of the underground reservoir No.2 was removed to perform a visual inspection of the penetration. The removal of the impermeable sheet, gravels, etc. will be continued. Furthermore, drilling work was started for the boring investigation to confirm the contamination condition of the surrounding area of the underground reservoirs and contamination expansion to the sea side. The work will be continued. Though water transfer from the underground reservoir No.3 to No.6 was started at 2:00 PM on the same day, the transfer pump was stopped at 2:03 PM as water leakage from the connection part (flange) of the transfer pump outlet pipe was found. The pipe flange was disassembled for cause investigation. As a result, the cause was identified to be the problem with the flange connection part (inhomogeneous amount of gap on the surfaces). The flange was recovered after replacing the gasket. Since no problem was found as a result of measuring the gaps on other flanges and checking the tightening condition of the flange bolts, the water transfer was started at 9:56 PM on April 12. As for the removal of the soil covering the upper part of the reservoir (embankment) where the leaked water is assumed to have been absorbed, further drilling was performed (a total of the drilling depth: 30-60cm) and the radioactivity density on the ground surface has been reduced down to 0.05mSv/h (β＋γ) (max.). At 3:06 PM on April 14, the water transfer from the underground reservoir No.3 to No.6 was suspended as the transfer of the planned water amount had completed.
On April 12, sampling was performed in the drain holes of the underground reservoirs No.1-7 (at 14 locations) and the leakage detection holes of the underground reservoirs No.1-4 and 6 (sample could not be collected at 2 out of 10 locations). As a result, the all β density in the drain hole (northeast) of the underground reservoir No.1 was found to have increased during the period from April 10 to 12. Thus, it was judged that there has been a small amount of leakage from the sheet on the outside (bentonite sheet) to the outside. Since there is no drainage in the surrounding area, there is no possibility that the leaked water has flowed out to the sea.
On April 19, the filtrate water tank No.1 was detached from the transfer line between the buffer tank and the filtrate water tanks No.1/No.2 in order to prepare for the water transfer from the underground reservoir No.1 to the filtrate water tank.

<Measures to prevent the expansion of contaminated water>
On July 2, leaked water in the leakage detection holes at the underground reservoirs No.1-No.3 was transferred to the notch tank, and leaked water in the drain holes at the underground reservoir No.2 was transferred into this underground reservoir.
Meanwhile, on June 19, since the decrease of all-β radioactivity density in the leakage detection hole (northeast) at the underground reservoirs No.1 has been slow, an operation to dilute the underground reservoir No.1 by transferring desalination-system (RO) treated water (the all-β radioactivity density: approx. 1×10¹Bq/cm³) into the reservoir was started (the all-β radioactivity density of residual water in the underground reservoir No.1: 6.6×10⁴Bq/cm³).
[Dilution operation records] The volumes of injected desalination-system (RO) treated water were approx. 24m³ on June 19 and approx. 16m³ on June 20. On June 21, approx. 40m³ of the water was transferred to a temporary tank. On June 26, approx. 40m³ of desalination-system (RO) treated water was injected. On June 27, approx. 33m³ of the water was transferred to the temporary tank. On June 28, approx. 40m³ of desalination-system (RO) treated water was injected. On July 1, approx. 40m³ of the water was transferred to the temporary tank. On July 2, approx. 40m³ of desalination-system (RO) treated water was injected.
On June 27, since the decrease of all-β radioactivity density in the leakage detection hole (northeast) at the underground reservoirs No.2 has been slow, an operation to dilute the underground reservoir No.2 by transferring filtered water into the reservoir was started.
[Dilution operation records] On June 27, approx. 40m³ of filtered water was injected. On July 2, approx. 40m³ of the water was transferred to a temporary tank.

<Sampling>
On July 2, sampling was performed in the drain holes of the underground reservoirs No.1-No.7 (14 locations), the leakage detection holes of the underground reservoirs No.1-No.4 and No.6 (sample could not be collected at 2 out of 10 locations), the observation holes of the underground reservoirs (22 locations), the groundwater bypass investigation holes a-c (sample could not be collected at 1 out of 3 locations), the groundwater bypass pump wells No.1-No.4, and the observation holes on the sea side (1)-(4). No significant change was found with the analysis results compared to the analysis results from the sampling performed previously (on June 25 in the groundwater bypass investigation holes a-c, the groundwater bypass pump wells No.1-No.4, and the observation holes on the sea side (1)-(4), and on July 1 in the other locations). Further, analysis for tritium was performed on water sampled on June 24 and 25 in the groundwater bypass (investigation holes a-c and pump wells No.1-No.4; sample could not be collected at 1 investigation hole out of 3 investigation holes) and the observation holes on the sea side (1)-(8). As a result, no significant change was found compared to the previous analysis results (from the sampling on June 17 in the observation holes on the sea side (5)-(8), and on June 18 in the other locations).

-At 9:37 AM on July 2, cooling of the Unit 4 spent fuel pool was suspended due to work to add antifreeze solution into circulated water of the secondary system of the Unit 4 spent fuel pool. At 5:20 PM on the same day, cooling of the spent fuel pool was restarted (the temperature increased from approx. 31℃ to approx. 33℃) upon completion of the work. After the restart, we noted no decrease in the pool water temperature, and rechecked the operation status of the secondary system. As a result, it was found that the cooling had been carried out with water passing through the primary system heat exchanger (A) of the spent fuel pool alternative cooling system, although it had to be carried out with water passing through the primary system heat exchanger (B). At 7:11 PM, the cooling was started after with water set passing through the primary system heat exchanger (B). The pool water temperature was approx. 33℃ at 7:09 PM on the same day, staying the same from 5:20 PM. This is sufficiently low compared to the operational limit value of 65℃, and causes no problem in controlling the water temperature of the spent fuel pool.

-At 2:00 PM on June 26, accumulated water transfer from the Unit 3 Turbine Building basement to the Central Radioactive Waste Treatment Facility (Miscellaneous Solid Waste Volume Reduction Treatment Building [High Temperature Incinerator Building]) was started. At 9:49 AM on July 3, the transfer was stopped.

-At 10:22 AM on July 3, accumulated water transfer from the Unit 3 Turbine Building basement to the Central Radioactive Waste Treatment Facility (Process Main Building) was started.

-At 10:00 AM on July 3, accumulated water transfer from the Unit 6 Turbine Building basement to the temporary tank was started. At 3:00 PM on the same day, the transfer was stopped.

-Construction for installing condensate storage tank (CST) reactor water injection systems was carried out as a measure to improve reliability of the reactor water injection systems of Units 1 to 3. System tests were completed. On July 2 to 4, we are scheduled to sequentially start, from Unit 1, replacement of the upland water injection systems with the CST reactor water injection systems and actual reactor water injection using the CST reactor water injection systems.
The CST reactor water injection systems are included in reactor water injection systems that become subject to Article 138 (reactor water injection systems) of the technical specification after we announce the start of operation. For this reason, during an observation period regarding actual reactor water injection and during the replacement of the upland water injection systems with the CST reactor water injection systems, we apply Article 136, Section 1 (intentional transition out of the scope of operational requirement for maintenance work) of the technical specification to the CST reactor water injection systems. Operational activities so far conducted are as follows.
[Unit 1] From 10:07 to 11:57 AM on July 2, an operation to switch from the upland water injection system to the CST reactor water injection system was carried out. From 0:03 to 3:13 PM on the same day, actual reactor water injection using the CST reactor water injection system was observed. With regards the onsite water injection amount into the reactor, water was injected at approx. 2.5m³/h from the feed water system and at approx. 2.0m³/h from the reactor core spray system. We confirmed that there was no abnormality onsite.
[Unit 2] From 10:44 to 11:38 AM on July 3, an operation to switch from the upland water injection system to the CST reactor water injection system was carried out. From 11:40 AM to 2:10 PM on the same day, actual reactor water injection using the CST reactor water injection system was observed. With regards the onsite water injection amount into the reactor, water was injected at approx. 2.0m³/h from the feed water system, and approx. 3.5m³/h from the reactor core spray system. We confirmed that there was no abnormality onsite.

-At 9:51 AM on June 26, in nitrogen injection into the primary containment vessel (PCV) and reactor pressure vessel (RPV) in Unit 1, the nitrogen injection amounts were changed in order to know the impacts that the nitrogen injection has on the various parameters in a case where the injection is made only through the RPV injection line as in the cases of Units 2 and 3. Specifically, the nitrogen injection amount into the RPV was increased from approx. 24m³/h to approx. 30m³/h, and the nitrogen injection amount into the PCV was decreased from approx. 12m³/h^*1 to approx. 6m³/h. At 10:18 AM on July 3, the nitrogen injection amount into the PCV was decreased from approx. 6m³/h to approx. 0m³/h, and the exhaust gas flow rate of the PCV gas control system was decreased from approx. 27.3m³/h to approx. 21.4m³/h.
*1 The value indicated by the meter was approx. 11.7m³/h when the flow rate was changed.

-We installed observation holes east of the Unit 1-4 Turbine Buildings, and have been conducting sampling and analysis of groundwater from the observation holes. On June 19, we announced that tritium and strontium were detected at high densities in the observation hole located between Units 1 and 2, as follows:
- Tritium: 4.6-5.0×10⁵Bq/L (Sampling dates: May 24 and 31, and June 7)
- Strontium-90: 8.9×10²-1×10³Bq/L (Sampling dates: May 24 and 31)
We also announced that we would continue the sampling and analysis, and conduct intensified monitoring.
The densities of γ nuclides and all-β were measured in water sampled on July 1 in the groundwater observation hole No.1, the groundwater observation hole No.1-1 (on the east side (sea side) to the groundwater observation hole No.1), and the groundwater observation hole No.2.
As a result of the measurement, water in the groundwater observation hole No.1-1 was found with γ nuclide densities about the same levels as those from the previous sampling (on June 28), and with an all-β density of 4300Bq/L, which increased from the previous value (3000Bq/L).

* Revised past progress

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