Status of TEPCO's Nuclear Power Stations after the Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake (Daily Report as of 3:00 PM on June 30)

Due to the Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake which occurred on March 11, 2011, TEPCO's facilities including our nuclear power stations have been severely damaged. We deeply apologize for the anxiety and inconvenience caused.
With regard to the accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, on April 17, 2011, we have compiled the roadmap towards restoration from the accident and on July 19 we accomplished the Step1 target "Radiation dose is in steady decline". Then on December 16 we confirmed the accomplishment of the Step 2 target "Release of radioactive materials is under control and radiation doses are being significantly held down".
In addition, on December 21, 2011, we have compiled the "Mid-to-long-Term Roadmap toward the Decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Units 1-4, TEPCO".
In addition to the maintenance of the plant's stable condition, we will implement Mid-to-Long Term countermeasures towards the decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Units 1-4 to enable evacuees to return to their homes as soon as possible and reduce the anxiety of the people in Fukushima and the whole nation as soon as possible.

Below is the status of TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.

* The updates are underlined.

[Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station]
·Unit 1 to 4: Abolishment (April 19, 2012)
·Unit 5 to 6: Outage due to regular inspections before the earthquake

-As for the underground reservoir No.2 installed within the power station site, 10¹Bq/cm³ level of radiation was detected as a result of analyzing the water accumulated between the sheet on the outside (bentonite sheet) and the ground (the underground reservoir is made of three layers of impermeable sheets) on April 3. On April 5, radiation was detected in the water between the sheet on the outside (bentonite sheet) and the sheet on the inside (double-layered permeable sheet) as a result of analysis. The radioactivity density of all β detected was approx. 5.9x103Bq/cm³. Considering that there is no drain ditch in the surrounding area, it is considered that there is no possibility of the leaked water flowing into the sea. At 5:10 AM on April 6, the incident was judged to be a leakage which is subject to the application of Article 19-17, Item 10 of the Rule for the Installation, Operation, etc. of Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors (Rule for Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors). The amount of leaked water is approx. 120m³, all γ radioactivity density is approx. 1.5x10⁰Bq/cm³ and all β radioactivity density is approx. 5.9x10³Bq/cm³, the γ ray radiation dose leaked is estimated to be approx. 1.8x10⁸Bq and the β radiation dose is estimated to be approx. 7.1x10¹¹Bq. Details are currently being investigated.
While enhancing the monitoring of the water level of the underground reservoir No.3, on April 7, sampling was performed on the water in the drain hole (southwest) and the leakage detection hole (southwest) of the underground reservoir No.3 for the purpose of investigating the leakage location.
Considering that all β nuclides were detected in the water in the leakage detection hole and the drain hole of the underground reservoir No.3 as a result of sampling, it was judged at 8:53 AM on the same day that there may be a small amount of leakage from the impermeable sheet on the outside (bentonite sheet) of the reservoir to the outside.
The samples collected in the morning of April 9 in the drain hole (at 2 locations) and the leakage detection hole (at 2 locations) of the underground reservoir No.1 have been analyzed. As a result, the chloride concentration of the water in the leakage detection hole (northeast) has increased from 4ppm (on the previous day) to 910ppm. At 12:47 PM, water transfer from the underground reservoir No.2 to No.1 utilizing temporary pumps was suspended. Considering that all β nuclides were detected as a result of sampling performed in the leakage detection hole of the underground reservoir No.1 for the purpose of investigating the leakage location, it was judged that there may be a small amount of leakage from the sheet on the inside (double -layer impermeable sheet) to the impermeable sheet on the outside (bentonite sheet) of the reservoir although the water level of the underground reservoir No.1 has not decreased and the analysis results of the drain hole water of the underground No.1 have not yet been confirmed.
On April 10, the soil covering the leakage detection hole (northeast) penetration of the underground reservoir No.2 was removed to perform a visual inspection of the penetration. The removal of the impermeable sheet, gravels, etc. will be continued. Furthermore, drilling work was started for the boring investigation to confirm the contamination condition of the surrounding area of the underground reservoirs and contamination expansion to the sea side. The work will be continued. Though water transfer from the underground reservoir No.3 to No.6 was started at 2:00 PM on the same day, the transfer pump was stopped at 2:03 PM as water leakage from the connection part (flange) of the transfer pump outlet pipe was found. The pipe flange was disassembled for cause investigation. As a result, the cause was identified to be the problem with the flange connection part (inhomogeneous amount of gap on the surfaces). The flange was recovered after replacing the gasket. Since no problem was found as a result of measuring the gaps on other flanges and checking the tightening condition of the flange bolts, the water transfer was started at 9:56 PM on April 12. As for the removal of the soil covering the upper part of the reservoir (embankment) where the leaked water is assumed to have been absorbed, further drilling was performed (a total of the drilling depth: 30-60cm) and the radioactivity density on the ground surface has been reduced down to 0.05mSv/h (β＋γ) (max.). At 3:06 PM on April 14, the water transfer from the underground reservoir No.3 to No.6 was suspended as the transfer of the planned water amount had completed.
On April 12, sampling was performed in the drain holes of the underground reservoirs No.1-7 (at 14 locations) and the leakage detection holes of the underground reservoirs No.1-4 and 6 (sample could not be collected at 2 out of 10 locations). As a result, the all β density in the drain hole (northeast) of the underground reservoir No.1 was found to have increased during the period from April 10 to 12. Thus, it was judged that there has been a small amount of leakage from the sheet on the outside (bentonite sheet) to the outside. Since there is no drainage in the surrounding area, there is no possibility that the leaked water has flowed out to the sea.
On April 19, the filtrate water tank No.1 was detached from the transfer line between the buffer tank and the filtrate water tanks No.1/No.2 in order to prepare for the water transfer from the underground reservoir No.1 to the filtrate water tank.

‹Measures to prevent the expansion of contaminated water>
On June 29, leaked water in the leakage detection holes at the underground reservoirs No.1-No.3 was transferred to the notch tank, and leaked water in the drain holes at the underground reservoir No.2 was transferred into this underground reservoir.
Meanwhile, on June 19, since the decrease of all-β radioactivity density in the leakage detection hole (northeast) at the underground reservoirs No.1 has been slow, an operation to dilute the underground reservoir No.1 by transferring desalination-system (RO) treated water (the all-β radioactivity density: approx. 1x10¹Bq/cm³) into the reservoir was started (the all-β radioactivity density of residual water in the underground reservoir No.1: 6.6x10⁴Bq/cm³).
[Dilution operation records] The volumes of injected desalination-system (RO) treated water were approx. 24m³ on June 19 and approx. 16m³ on June 20. On June 21, approx. 40m³ of the water was transferred to a temporary tank. On June 26, approx. 40m³ of desalination-system (RO) treated water was injected. On June 27, approx. 33m³ of the water was transferred to the temporary tank. On June 28, approx. 40m³ of the water was transferred to the temporary tank.
On June 27, since the decrease of all-β radioactivity density in the leakage detection hole (northeast) at the underground reservoirs No.2 has been slow, an operation to dilute the underground reservoir No.2 by transferring filtered water into the reservoir was started.
[Dilution operation records] On June 27, approx. 40m³ of filtered water was injected.

‹Sampling>
On June 29, sampling was performed in the drain holes of the underground reservoirs No.1-No.7 (14 locations), the leakage detection holes of the underground reservoirs No.1-No.4 and No.6 (sample could not be collected at 2 out of 10 locations), and the observation holes of the underground reservoirs (22 locations). No significant change was found with the analysis results compared to the analysis results from the sampling performed previously (on June 28).

-At 3:47 PM on June 11, water transfer from the underground reservoir No. 4 (for storage of water accumulated in Units 5 and 6) to F area tanks (temporary tanks) by way of the Unit 6 Turbine Building basement was started. At 4:50 PM on the same day, the transfer was stopped. Please note that water transfer from the underground reservoir No. 4 to the Unit 6 Turbine Building basement is carried out during the daytime using a temporary line.

-At 10:15 AM on June 28, accumulated water transfer from the Unit 6 Turbine Building basement to the temporary tank was started. At 4:00 PM on June 28, the transfer was stopped.

-We installed observation holes east of the Unit 1-4 Turbine Buildings, and have been conducting sampling and analysis of groundwater from the observation holes. On June 19, we announced that tritium and strontium were detected at high densities in the groundwater observation hole No.1, as follows:
-Tritium: 4.6-5.0x10⁵Bq/L (Sampling dates: May 24 and 31, and June 7)
-Strontium-90: 8.9x10²-1x10³Bq/L (Sampling dates: May 24 and 31)
We also announced that we would continue the sampling and analysis, and conduct intensified monitoring.
On June 29, tritium measurement was performed on water sampled on June 28 in the groundwater observation hole No.1 and the groundwater observation hole No.1-1 (on the east side (sea side) to the groundwater observation hole No.1), which is new and was installed completely on June 27.
The tritium measurement on the groundwater observation hole No.1 water showed no significant change compared to the previous measurement (on water sampled on June 25).
The tritium measurement on water in the groundwater observation hole No.1-1 (on the east side (sea side) to the groundwater observation hole No.1) showed that the density in the water was 430,000Bq/L, which is the same level as the density in the groundwater observation hole No.1 water.
We are continuing to tackle this problem in such manners as to intensely bring forward implementation of contamination prevention measures such as foundation improvement work to the bank protection, and comprehensively intensify the monitoring by using the results of additional boring to drill additional locations, and the analyses results on seawater at such locations as the port interior and the water outlets.

-On June 29, an incident occurred where one in-station service vehicle (a concrete mixer truck) at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station went out of the station premises (outside from the main gate) with contamination attached to the upper part of the rear bumper, and without having been decontaminated. This vehicle underwent a vehicle survey after completion of its work in the station premises, was found having contamination (22,000cpm) attached to the upper part of the vehicle's rear bumper, and received a decontamination instruction. At 1:26 PM on the same day, however, this vehicle exited from the premises through the main gate.
Later, the vehicle was loaded with concrete in Naraha-machi, reentered into the station premises and carried out some work. Then, the vehicle underwent the vehicle survey again, was found having contamination (20,000cpm) attached to the same part of the vehicle. Found having contamination for the second time, the vehicle underwent decontamination, and was confirmed to be at a contamination level (3,000cpm) that is lower than the benchmark value (13,000cpm) for allowing to exit the station..
At 4:27 PM on the same day, regarding the route and so on where this vehicle travelled, we started confirming whether there are influences of the travelling of this contaminated vehicle. Measurement of atmosphere radiation dose along the travelling route of the vehicle resulted in approximately the same levels as these in the Distribution Map of Radiation Dose, etc, provided by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, whereby it was verified that there are no influences of the travelling of the vehicle. Further, since the contaminated part was such that concrete having a contaminated substance attached was solidly attached to the upper part of the rear bumper, we consider the contaminated substance to have been unlikely to fall off easily when the vehicle was travelling. We confirmed that the radiation exposure of the driver was 0.012mSv as a result of radiation exposure measurement, which was not a particularly noticeable value.
We are implementing measures for preventing a recurrence of such an incident. The measures include requiring contamination inspectors to more clearly instruct the driver of a contaminated vehicle about the necessity of decontamination through posters, and thoroughly reeducating contract workers which are at the main gate to check the completion status of the contamination inspection.

-At 0:00 AM on June 30, operation of the entrance/exit control facility was started.

* Revised past progress

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