Status of TEPCO's Nuclear Power Stations after the Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake (Daily Report as of 5:30 PM on June 21)

Due to the Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake which occurred on March 11, 2011, TEPCO's facilities including our nuclear power stations have been severely damaged. We deeply apologize for the anxiety and inconvenience caused.
With regard to the accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, on April 17, 2011, we have compiled the roadmap towards restoration from the accident and on July 19 we accomplished the Step1 target "Radiation dose is in steady decline". Then on December 16 we confirmed the accomplishment of the Step 2 target "Release of radioactive materials is under control and radiation doses are being significantly held down".
In addition, on December 21, 2011, we have compiled the "Mid-to-long-Term Roadmap toward the Decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Units 1-4, TEPCO".
In addition to the maintenance of the plant's stable condition, we will implement Mid-to-Long Term countermeasures towards the decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Units 1-4 to enable evacuees to return to their homes as soon as possible and reduce the anxiety of the people in Fukushima and the whole nation as soon as possible.

Below is the status of TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.

* The updates are underlined.

[Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station]
·Unit 1 to 4: Abolishment (April 19, 2012)
·Unit 5 to 6: Outage due to regular inspections before the earthquake

- As for the underground reservoir No.2 installed within the power station site, 10¹Bq/cm³ level of radiation was detected as a result of analyzing the water accumulated between the sheet on the outside (bentonite sheet) and the ground (the underground reservoir is made of three layers of impermeable sheets) on April 3. On April 5, radiation was detected in the water between the sheet on the outside (bentonite sheet) and the sheet on the inside (double-layered permeable sheet) as a result of analysis. The radioactivity density of all β detected was approx. 5.9×10³Bq/cm³. Considering that there is no drain ditch in the surrounding area, it is considered that there is no possibility of the leaked water flowing into the sea. At 5:10 AM on April 6, the incident was judged to be a leakage which is subject to the application of Article 19-17, Item 10 of the Rule for the Installation, Operation, etc. of Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors (Rule for Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors). The amount of leaked water is approx. 120m³, all γ radioactivity density is approx. 1.5×10⁰Bq/cm³ and all β radioactivity density is approx. 5.9×10³Bq/cm³, the γ ray radiation dose leaked is estimated to be approx. 1.8×10⁸Bq and the β radiation dose is estimated to be approx. 7.1×10¹¹Bq. Details are currently being investigated.
While enhancing the monitoring of the water level of the underground reservoir No.3, on April 7, sampling was performed on the water in the drain hole (southwest) and the leakage detection hole (southwest) of the underground reservoir No.3 for the purpose of investigating the leakage location.
Considering that all β nuclides were detected in the water in the leakage detection hole and the drain hole of the underground reservoir No.3 as a result of sampling, it was judged at 8:53 AM on the same day that there may be a small amount of leakage from the impermeable sheet on the outside (bentonite sheet) of the reservoir to the outside.
The samples collected in the morning of April 9 in the drain hole (at 2 locations) and the leakage detection hole (at 2 locations) of the underground reservoir No.1 have been analyzed. As a result, the chloride concentration of the water in the leakage detection hole (northeast) has increased from 4ppm (on the previous day) to 910ppm. At 12:47 PM, water transfer from the underground reservoir No.2 to No.1 utilizing temporary pumps was suspended. Considering that all β nuclides were detected as a result of sampling performed in the leakage detection hole of the underground reservoir No.1 for the purpose of investigating the leakage location, it was judged that there may be a small amount of leakage from the sheet on the inside (double -layer impermeable sheet) to the impermeable sheet on the outside (bentonite sheet) of the reservoir although the water level of the underground reservoir No.1 has not decreased and the analysis results of the drain hole water of the underground No.1 have not yet been confirmed.
On April 10, the soil covering the leakage detection hole (northeast) penetration of the underground reservoir No.2 was removed to perform a visual inspection of the penetration. The removal of the impermeable sheet, gravels, etc. will be continued. Furthermore, drilling work was started for the boring investigation to confirm the contamination condition of the surrounding area of the underground reservoirs and contamination expansion to the sea side. The work will be continued. Though water transfer from the underground reservoir No.3 to No.6 was started at 2:00 PM on the same day, the transfer pump was stopped at 2:03 PM as water leakage from the connection part (flange) of the transfer pump outlet pipe was found. The pipe flange was disassembled for cause investigation. As a result, the cause was identified to be the problem with the flange connection part (inhomogeneous amount of gap on the surfaces). The flange was recovered after replacing the gasket. Since no problem was found as a result of measuring the gaps on other flanges and checking the tightening condition of the flange bolts, the water transfer was started at 9:56 PM on April 12. As for the removal of the soil covering the upper part of the reservoir (embankment) where the leaked water is assumed to have been absorbed, further drilling was performed (a total of the drilling depth: 30-60cm) and the radioactivity density on the ground surface has been reduced down to 0.05mSv/h (β＋γ) (max.). At 3:06 PM on April 14, the water transfer from the underground reservoir No.3 to No.6 was suspended as the transfer of the planned water amount had completed.
On April 12, sampling was performed in the drain holes of the underground reservoirs No.1-7 (at 14 locations) and the leakage detection holes of the underground reservoirs No.1-4 and 6 (sample could not be collected at 2 out of 10 locations). As a result, the all β density in the drain hole (northeast) of the underground reservoir No.1 was found to have increased during the period from April 10 to 12. Thus, it was judged that there has been a small amount of leakage from the sheet on the outside (bentonite sheet) to the outside. Since there is no drainage in the surrounding area, there is no possibility that the leaked water has flowed out to the sea.
On April 19, the filtrate water tank No.1 was detached from the transfer line between the buffer tank and the filtrate water tanks No.1/No.2 in order to prepare for the water transfer from the underground reservoir No.1 to the filtrate water tank.

<Measures to prevent the expansion of contaminated water>
On June 20, leaked water in the leakage detection holes at the underground reservoirs No.1-3 and leaked water in the drain holes at the underground reservoir No.2 were transferred to the notch tank.
On June 21, leaked water in the leakage detection holes at the underground reservoirs No.1-3 and leaked water in the drain holes at the underground reservoir No.2 were transferred to the notch tank.
Meanwhile, since the decrease of all-β radioactivity density in the leakage detection hole (northeast) at the underground reservoirs No.1 has been slow (3.4×10²Bq/cm³ for sampling on June 18), an operation to dilute the underground reservoir No.1 by transferring desalination-system (RO) treated water (the all-β radioactivity density: approx. 1×10¹Bq/cm³) into the reservoir was started (the all-β radioactivity density of residual water in the underground reservoir No.1: 6.6×10⁴Bq/cm³).
[Dilution operation records] Approx. 24m³ on June 19 and approx. 16m³ on June 20. On June 21, the treated water received on June 19 and 20 (approx. 40m³) was transferred to a temporary tank.

<Sampling>
On June 20, sampling was performed in the drain holes of the underground reservoirs No.1-7 (14 locations), the leakage detection holes of the underground reservoirs No.1-4 and 6 (sample could not be collected at 2 out of 10 locations), and the observation holes of the underground reservoirs (22 locations). As a result of the analysis, no significant change was found compared to the analysis results from the sampling performed previously (on June 19).

- At 3:47 PM on June 11, water transfer from the underground reservoir No. 4 (for storage of water accumulated in Units 5 and 6) to F area tanks (temporary tanks) by way of the Unit 6 Turbine Building basement was started. At 4:50 PM on the same day, the transfer was stopped. Please note that water transfer from the underground reservoir No. 4 to the Unit 6 Turbine Building basement is carried out during the daytime using a temporary line.

- At 10:03 AM on June 20, accumulated water transfer from the Unit 6 Turbine Building basement to the temporary tanks was started. At 3:45 PM on the same day, the transfer was suspended. On June 21, the transfer was started at 9:30 AM, and was suspended at 4:30 PM.

- At around 11:00 PM on June 15, during dew condensation check, a TEPCO employee found a trace of discolored (brown) water in the leaked water receiving pan under the batch treatment tank (2A) of the multi-nuclide removal equipment system A (currently in trial operation utilizing waste liquid treated at water treatment facility). There is no possibility of water leaking outside the equipment since the trace of water was found in the leaked water receiving pan under the tank. Partially discolored dew condensation water was found attached on the surface of the batch treatment tank (2A), and the partial discoloration was found near the welding line. We therefore placed a bucket to receive the water droplet and have monitored the water dropping condition. Although dew condensation has been continuously occurring on the surface of the tank, no additional dropping of discolored water has been found.
An operation to stop the multi-nuclide removal equipment system A was started at 6:17 PM on June 17, and the system A was stopped at 11:20 PM on the same day.
The results of surface contamination measurement using smear filter paper and radiation dose measurement performed on the surface of the tank and on the floor are as follows.

[Surface contamination measurement using smear filter paper]
- Surface of the batch treatment tank (discolored part near the welding line): 7,900cpm
- Surface of the batch treatment tank (part not discolored near the welding line): 700cpm
- Leaked water receiving pan under the tank (part having trace of discolored water): 4,300cpm
- Leaked water receiving pan under the tank (part not discolored): 1,300cpm
(Reference) Background: 180cpm

[Radiation dose measurement]
- Surface of the batch treatment tank (discolored part near the welding line): Surface radiation dose
γ ray: 0.09mSv/h
β ray + γ ray: 0.18mSv/h
- Surface of the batch treatment tank (part not discolored near the welding line): Surface radiation dose
γ ray: 0.08mSv/h
β ray + γ ray: 0.11mSv/h
- Leaked water receiving pan under the tank (part having trace of discolored water): Surface radiation dose
γ ray: 0.04mSv/h
β ray + γ ray: 0.04mSv/h
- Leaked water receiving pan under the tank (part not discolored): Radiation dose in the atmosphere
γ ray: 0.05mSv/h
β ray + γ ray: 0.06mSv/h

The nuclide analysis results of the dew condensation water (370ml) which was received at a bucket placed under the tank are as follows.

[Nuclide analysis results of water received at the bucket]
- Cs-134: 1.9×10⁰Bq/cm³
- Cs-137: 3.9×10⁰Bq/cm³
- All-β nuclides: 6.7×10³Bq/cm³

In the surface contamination measurement using smear filter paper and the radiation dose measurement, the discolored parts showed higher values than the parts not discolored both near the welding line on the surface of the tank and in the leaked water receiving pan. This suggested a possibility of concentrated saltwater, which has been contained in the tank, leaking from the welded part of the tank. Therefore, we were to make detailed investigation.
On June 20, a liquid penetrant inspection on the batch treatment tank (1A), which has the same structure as the batch treatment tank (2A), was performed although no discolored water drop trace was found on the 1A tank. As a result, oozing of liquid was found at one location on the surface of the tank. We consider the oozing to have occurred by seeping of liquid having remained in a small amount on the inner surface of the tank, as in the case of the 2A tank. We consider that the 1A tank also has a pinhole as in the case of the 2A tank. We will continue the detailed investigation.

- At 9:29 AM on June 20, the Unit 1 spent fuel pool alternative cooling system was suspended due to work to add antifreeze into the secondary system of this cooling system (the pool water temperature was 27.5°C at the start of the suspension). At 4:16 PM on the same day, the cooling system was started up (the pool water temperature was 28.0°C at the startup). No abnormality has been found with operation of the spent fuel pool alternative cooling system.

- At 7:37 PM on June 20, a decrease was seen in the amount of water injected into Unit 1 Reactor, and we adjusted the amount by increasing the amount injected from the feed water system from approx. 2.4m³/h to approx. 2.5m³/h, and increasing the amount injected from the reactor core spray system from approx. 1.7 m³/h to approx. 2.0m³/h.

- At around 2:58 AM on June 21, we found that a leak detector of the desalination system 3 (reverse osmosis membrane; RO-3) in the temporary warehouse went off. At 3:03 AM, a cooperative company worker found water leakage and suspended the RO-3. The leaked water all remains inside the dike of the temporary warehouse and has not flowed out of the temporary warehouse. Please note that no significant change has been found with the monitoring post data. The leakage has already stopped, and the amount of leaked water, within the temporary warehouse, is estimated to be approx. 250 liters. The results of nuclide analysis on the leaked water are as follows.
- Cs-134: 5.7×10^-1Bq/cm³
- Cs-137: 1.7×10⁰Bq/cm³
- Co-60: 1.4×10^-1Bq/cm³
- Sb-125: 1.5×10^-1Bq/cm³
- All-β: 2.6×10⁴Bq/cm³
Based on the above results, we determined that the leaked water is water before treatment at the entrance of the desalination system 3 (reverse osmosis membrane; RO-3). As a result of an investigation conducted thereafter, we found that the leakage occurred through a cap section in the lower part of a flow meter at the ultra filter raw water pump outlet. Regarding this flow meter, the cap section in the lower part of the flow meter was removed when the ultra filter was cleaned on June 20. We determined that the leakage occurred because the cap was tightened too much after the cleaning. We are planning to restart operation of the desalination system 3 after restoring the normal state by replacing this flow mater with a backup flow meter.

- At 3:04 PM on June 21, decreases were seen in the amounts of water injected into Unit 2-3 Reactors, and we adjusted these amounts as follows:
[Unit 2] The amount injected from the feed water system was increased from approx. 1.8m³/h to approx. 2.0m³/h, and the amount injected from the reactor core spray system was increased from approx. 3.3m³/h to approx. 3.5m³/h.
[Unit 3] The amount injected from the feed water system was increased from approx. 1.9m³/h to approx. 2.0m³/h, and the amount injected from the reactor core spray system was increased from approx. 3.4m³/h to approx. 3.5m³/h.

* Revised past progress

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