Due to the Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake which occurred on March 11, 2011, TEPCO's facilities including our nuclear power stations have been severely damaged. We deeply apologize for the anxiety and inconvenience caused.
With regard to the accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, on April 17, 2011, we have compiled the roadmap towards restoration from the accident and on July 19 we accomplished the Step1 target "Radiation dose is in steady decline". Then on December 16 we confirmed the accomplishment of the Step 2 target "Release of radioactive materials is under control and radiation doses are being significantly held down".
In addition, on December 21, 2011, we have compiled the "Mid-to-long-Term Roadmap toward the Decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Units 1-4, TEPCO".
In addition to the maintenance of the plant's stable condition, we will implement Mid-to-Long Term countermeasures towards the decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Units 1-4 to enable evacuees to return to their homes as soon as possible and reduce the anxiety of the people in Fukushima and the whole nation as soon as possible.

Below is the status of TEPCO's nuclear power stations (Fukushima Daiichi and Fukushima Daini).

* The updates are underlined.

[Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station]
· Unit 1 to 4: Abolishment (April 19, 2012)
· Unit 5 to 6: Outage due to regular inspections before the earthquake

- At 12:31 PM on November 8, we started transferring the accumulated water in Unit 3 Turbine Building basement to the Central Radioactive Waste Treatment Facility (Process Main Building). At 10:02 AM on November 15, the transfer was stopped.

- At 10:18 AM on November 15, we started transferring the accumulated water in Unit 3 Turbine Building basement to the Central Radioactive Waste Treatment Facility (Miscellaneous Solid Waste Volume Reduction Treatment Building [High Temperature Incinerator Building]).

- The regular reactor water injection pump on the hill used for reactor water injection at Units 1-3 will be suspended on November 27 and 28 due to a power supply construction. During that time, the reactor water injection pump in the Turbine Building will be used as a substitute. Since there was no water injection pipe running from the reactor water injection pump in the Turbine Building to the reactor core spray system side, an additional water injection pipe was installed at Unit 2. At 10:30 AM on November 15, the reactor injection water amount at Unit 2 reactor was changed as follows for pipe installation. Feed water system: Increased from approx. 2.0m³/h to approx. 6.5m³/h, Reactor core spray system: Decreased from approx. 4.5m³/h to 0m³/h. At 11:29 AM on the same day, the reactor injection water amount at Unit 2 reactor was changed as follows since the work was completed. Feed water system: Decreased from approx. 6.5m³/h to approx. 2.0m³/h, Reactor core spray system: Increased from 0m³/h to approx. 4.5m³/h. Though the reactor water injection was done only from the feed water system during the pipe installation, the amount was maintained at a total of approx. 6.5m³/h.

[Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station]
· Unit 1 to 4: Shutdown due to the earthquake.

- At around 2:25 PM on October 5, a TEPCO employee fell down from the opening of the ball collector pit (approx. 4m high) located outside of Unit 4 (uncontrolled area) during repair/paint work of the pit frame. The injured worker was transported to the clinic in J-Village at 3:37 PM on the same day upon judgment by a doctor at the clinic in the power station and was examined at the clinic. The worker was conscious and no radioactive material was attached on his body. Upon judgment by a doctor at the clinic in J-Village, an ambulance was called at around 5:21 PM on the same day to transport the worker to Fukushima Accident Hospital. As a result of a medical examination, the worker was diagnosed to have fractures of the transverse process of the fourth lumbar vertebra and the spine of the fifth lumbar vertebra, which will take a month to heal. The causes of the incident are considered to be such as the lid of the opening on the floor being open without a warning sign, improper work allocation not taking into considerations the tasks and working experience at the site and not being aware of the risk of falling down from the opening on the floor due to insufficient risk prediction before work. For recurrence prevention, the lids of all the openings on the floor will be kept closed using annealing wire, install signs "Do not open" near the openings, check the work environment before work even when TEPCO employees engage in the work, require the supervisor to determine work allocation depending on the tasks, assign an observer for tasks deemed to be of risk as a result of work environment check, require all members involved in tasks to check the work environment for risk prediction and share the information on the risks found and implement necessary measures to ensure work safety.

Appendix: Past Progress (As of 3:00 pm, on November 15, 2012) (PDF 589KB)
Appendix: Past Progress (From March 11, 2011 to December 31, 2011) (PDF 523KB)
* Revised past progress

The aforementioned attachments are only available in Japanese.
We apologize for any inconvenience this may cause.