Due to the Tohoku-Chihou-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake which occurred on March 11, 2011, TEPCO's facilities including our nuclear power stations have been severely damaged. We deeply apologize for the anxiety and inconvenience caused.
With regard to the accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, on April 17, 2011, we have compiled the roadmap towards restoration from the accident and on July 19 we accomplished the Step1 target "Radiation dose is in steady decline". Then on December 16 we confirmed the accomplishment of the Step 2 target "Release of radioactive materials is under control and radiation doses are being significantly held down".
In addition, on December 21, 2011, we have compiled the "Mid-to-long-Term Roadmap toward the Decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Units 1-4, TEPCO".
In addition to the maintenance of the plant's stable condition, we will implement Mid-to-Long Term countermeasures towards the decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Units 1-4 to enable evacuees to return to their homes as soon as possible and reduce the anxiety of the people in Fukushima and the whole nation as soon as possible.

Below is the status of TEPCO's nuclear power stations (Fukushima Daiichi and Fukushima Daini).

* The updates are underlined.

[Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station]
・Unit 1 to 4: Abolishment (April 19, 2012)
・Unit 5 to 6: Outage due to regular inspections before the earthquake

-On October 15, a worker of a cooperative company found a water leakage in a corridor in the back of the large equipment hatch on the first floor of Unit 3 Turbine Building. At around 10:10 AM on the same day, a TEPCO employee confirmed the leakage. As we stopped the pump transferring the accumulated water from Unit 3 Turbine Building basement to the Central Radioactive Waste Treatment Facility (Miscellaneous Solid Waste Volume Reduction Treatment Building [High Temperature Incinerator Building]) at 10:18 AM, the leakage was stopped at 11:16 AM. The leaked water remained on the floor on the downside of the slope in the back of the large equipment hatch and there was no leakage to the outside of the building. The leakage location was identified to be the accumulated water transfer line from Unit 3 Turbine Building basement to the Central Radioactive Waste Treatment Facility. The area affected by the leakage was approx. 3m x approx. 6m and approx. 5mm in depth. The leakage amount was estimated to be approx. 90L. The results of nuclide analysis of the leaked water are as follows.
Cesium 134: 1.0 x 10⁴ Bq/cm³
Cesium 137: 1.8 x 10⁴ Bq/cm³
The leaked water was identified to be the accumulated water of the Turbine Building. At 6:05 PM on the same day, we started transferring the accumulated water from Unit 3 Turbine Building basement to the Central Radioactive Waste Treatment Facility (Miscellaneous Solid Waste Volume Reduction Treatment Building [High Temperature Incinerator Building]) utilizing an alternative transfer line with no leakage.

-At 10:14 AM on October 16, we started transferring the accumulated water from Unit 2 Turbine Building basement to Unit 3 Turbine Building basement.

-At around 3:03 PM on September 9, a TEPCO employee found that a strange sound was coming out from the duct of Unit 2 PCV gas control system installed on the first floor of Unit 2 Turbine Building. As a small hole was found on the duct upon site investigation, the hole was covered up with tape as an emergency repair. As a result, the sound stopped at 3:28 PM. At 10:25 AM on October 16, the PCV gas control system was stopped* for a repair as all the necessary parts had been prepared. At 11:34 AM on the same day, the system was restarted as the repair had completed. The measurement utilizing the noble gas monitor was restarted at 1:24 PM on the same day. No abnormality was found with the monitoring parameter values while the system had been suspended.
* The facility management policy based on the "Policy on the Mid-term Security" (Article 12 of the technical specification for the nuclear reactor facility) stipulates the "operational requirements" and the "necessary measures to be implemented in the case that the operational requirements are not fulfilled" (When the operational requirements are not fulfilled, the required measures must be implemented). In this case, Unit 2 PCV gas control system was stopped intentionally for maintenance from 10:25 AM to 1:24 PM on October 16 (transition out of the scope of operational requirements).

[Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station]
・Unit 1 to 4: Shutdown due to the earthquake.

Appendix: Past Progress (As of 3:00 pm, on October 16, 2012) (PDF 560KB)
Appendix: Past Progress (From March 11, 2011 to December 31, 2011) (PDF 523KB)
* Revised past progress

The aforementioned attachments are only available in Japanese.
We apologize for any inconvenience this may cause.