


## Main decommissioning work and steps

Fuel removal from the Unit 4 SFP was completed on December 22, 2014 and removal from the Unit 3 SFP has been underway since April 15, 2019. Dust density in the surrounding environment is being monitored and work is being implemented with safety first. Work continues sequentially toward the start of fuel removal from Units 1 and 2 and debris (Note 1) retrieval from Units 1-3.



### Fuel removal from the spent fuel pool

Toward fuel removal from the Unit 2 spent fuel pool, based on findings from internal operating floor investigations from November 2018 to February 2019, instead of fully dismantling the upper part of the building, the decision was made to install a small opening on the south side and use a boom crane. The changed method will be established and the fuel removal process refined.

<Reference> Progress to date  
Previously, potential to recover the existing overhead crane and the fuel handling machine was examined. However, the high radiation dose inside the operating floor meant the decision was taken to dismantle the upper part of the building in November 2015. Findings from internal investigations of the operating floor from November 2018 to February 2019 underlined the potential to conduct limited work there and the means of accessing from the south side had been examined.


Overview (bird's-eye view) of fuel removal

## Three principles behind contaminated water countermeasures

Countermeasures for contaminated water are implemented in accordance with the following three principles:

- 1 **Remove** contamination sources
  - ① Purification using Multi-nuclide removal equipment and other measures
  - ② Removal of contaminated water from the trench (Note 3)

(Note 3) Underground tunnel containing pipes.
2. **Redirect groundwater** from contamination sources
  - ③ Pump up groundwater for bypass
  - ④ Pump up groundwater near buildings
  - ⑤ Land-side impermeable walls (frozen-soil walls)
  - ⑥ Waterproof pavement
3. **Prevent leakage** of contaminated water
  - ⑦ Enhance soil by adding sodium silicate
  - ⑧ Sea-side impermeable walls
  - ⑨ Increase the number of (welded-joint) tanks



### Multi-nuclide removal equipment (ALPS), etc.

- This equipment removes radionuclides from the contaminated water in tanks and reduces risks.
- Treatment of contaminated water (RO concentrated salt water) was completed in May 2015 with multi-nuclide removal equipment, additional multi-nuclide removal equipment installed by TEPCO (operation commenced in September 2014) and a Japanese Government subsidy project (operation commenced in October 2014).
- Strontium-treated water from equipment other than ALPS is being re-treated in ALPS.

(High-performance multi-nuclide removal equipment)

### Reducing the generation of contaminated water through multi-layered measures

- Multi-layered measures are implemented to suppress the inflow of rainwater and groundwater into buildings.
- Multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including land-side impermeable walls and subdrains, have stabilized the groundwater at a low level. The increase in the amount of contaminated water generated during rainfall is being suppressed by repairing damaged portions of building roofs, facing onsite, etc.
- Through these measures, the generation of contaminated water was reduced from approx. 470 m<sup>3</sup>/day (in FY2014) to approx. 170 m<sup>3</sup>/day (in FY2018).
- The groundwater level around Unit 1-4 Reactor Buildings will remain limited by steadily operating land-side impermeable walls. In addition, measures to prevent the inflow of rainwater, including repairing damaged parts of building roofs and facing, continue to reduce the generation of contaminated water still further.

Inside the land-side impermeable wall    Outside the land-side impermeable wall

### Replacing flanged tanks with welded-joint tanks

- Flanged tanks are being replaced with more reliable welded-joint tanks.
- Strontium-treated water stored in flanged tanks was purified and transferred to welded-joint tanks. The transfer was completed in November 2018. Transfer of ALPS-treated water was completed in March 2019.

(Installed welded-joint tanks)


# Progress status

◆ The temperatures of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) and Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) of Units 1-3 have been maintained within the range of approx. 20-30°C<sup>\*1</sup> over the past month. There was no significant change in the density of radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Buildings into the air<sup>\*2</sup>. It was concluded that the comprehensive cold shutdown condition had been maintained.

\* 1 The values varied somewhat, depending on the unit and location of the thermometer.  
 \* 2 In October 2019, the radiation exposure dose due to the release of radioactive materials from the Unit 1-4 Reactor Buildings was evaluated at less than 0.00009 mSv/year at the site boundary. The annual radiation dose from natural radiation is approx. 2.1 mSv/year (average in Japan).



## Examination of the plan to initially install a large cover for fuel removal from Unit 1

Toward fuel removal from Unit 1, the conditions of the fallen roof on the south side and contamination on the reactor well plug were investigated. Based on the results of these investigations, the fallen overhead crane and other items removal is required to more careful work, taking dust scattering into consideration. Thus, in addition to existing plan (Plan A), Plan B which initially install a large cover over the Reactor Building and then remove rubble inside the cover for safer and more secure removal, are being examined.



## Check on the condition of the Unit 1 PCV head

To enhance the dust density monitoring during construction of an access route for the internal investigation of the Unit 1 PCV, a dust monitor for the work was installed near the PCV head. During the installation, the condition of the PCV head was checked using a camera. The image obtained showed no significant damage or large deformation detected on the PCV head and its flange.




## Resumption of access route construction toward internal investigations of PCV

To further enhance dust-density monitoring during the construction of an access route at Unit 1, a dust monitor for the work was installed near the PCV head on November 7. From November 25, work was resumed for proven cutting hours to collect more data on dust densities, including that from the newly installed dust monitor. Based on the results, optimization of the management method during work will be examined, also taking the influence on the surrounding environment into consideration. At the same time, dust reduction measures will be examined.

## Dismantling for the 4th block of the Unit 1/2 exhaust stack

Dismantling of the 4th block started from October 27. Subsequently, the subdrain, which is temporarily suspended due to work interference, will be restored. In parallel with that, the efforts will be made to improve so that safer work can be done with reviewing the work to date.




Cutting of diagonal bracing

## Effect assessment of Zeolite sandbags on the basement floor of the Process Main Building

For Zeolite sandbags on the basement floor of the Process Main Building, the dose effect during floor exposure was assessed using the investigative results in September 2019. The assessment results showed that at the nearby site boundaries there would be little effect on the radiation dose with an increase of about 10<sup>-4</sup> mSv/year from the normal dose rate, but at the opening on the 1st floor of the building the dose rate could increase by 14 mSv/h from the present level. Zeolite samples will be taken in January 2020. In December 2019, the High-Temperature Incinerator Building (HTI) will also be investigated to assess the same effect. Based on the investigative results, stable management methods of Zeolite sandbags in these buildings will be examined.


## Check on the condition of fuel handles, with the progress of the rubble removal from the Unit 3 SFP

Toward fuel removal from Unit 3, rubble removal from the SFP was resumed from September 2. With the progress of the removal, the condition of fuel handles inside the pool was also checked (286/566). During the check, 12 fuel assemblies with deformed handles were confirmed, including those previously detected. No variation was detected in the water quality of the pool and it was evaluated that there was no influence on the environment. Work to repair defects detected in October will continue toward completion of fuel removal by the end of FY2020.



Detected fuel assemblies with deformed handle

# Major initiatives – Locations on site




\* Data of Monitoring Posts (MP1-MP8.)  
 Data (10-minute values) of Monitoring Posts (MPs) measuring the airborne radiation rate around site boundaries showed 0.397 – 1.318  $\mu\text{Sv/h}$  (October 30 – November 26, 2019).  
 We improved the measurement conditions of monitoring posts 2 to 8 to measure the air-dose rate precisely. Construction work, such as tree-clearing, surface soil removal and shield wall setting, were implemented from February 10 to April 18, 2012.  
 Therefore, monitoring results at these points are lower than elsewhere in the power plant site.  
 The radiation shielding panels around monitoring post No. 6, which is one of the instruments used to measure the radiation dose at the power station site boundary, were taken off from July 10-11, 2013, since further deforestation, etc. had caused the surrounding radiation dose to decline significantly.

Provided by Japan Space Imaging, photo taken on June 14, 2018  
 Product(C) [2018] DigitalGlobe, Inc.

## I. Confirmation of the reactor conditions

### 1. Temperatures inside the reactors

Through continuous reactor cooling by water injection, the temperatures of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) bottom and the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) gas phase were maintained within the range of approx. 20 to 30°C for the past month, though they varied depending on the unit and location of the thermometer.




\* The trend graphs show part of the temperature data measured at multiple points.

### 2. Release of radioactive materials from the Reactor Buildings

As of October 2019, the density of the radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Building Units 1-4 into the air and measured at the site boundary was evaluated at approx.  $2.7 \times 10^{-12}$  Bq/cm<sup>3</sup> and  $7.1 \times 10^{-12}$  Bq/cm<sup>3</sup> for Cs-134 and Cs-137 respectively, while the radiation exposure dose due to the release of radioactive materials there was less than 0.00009 mSv/year.

Annual radiation dose at site boundaries by radioactive materials (cesium) released from Reactor Building Units 1-4



#### (Reference)

- \* The density limit of radioactive materials in the air outside the surrounding monitoring area:  
[Cs-134]:  $2 \times 10^{-5}$  Bq/cm<sup>3</sup>  
[Cs-137]:  $3 \times 10^{-5}$  Bq/cm<sup>3</sup>
- \* Data of Monitoring Posts (MP1-MP8).  
Data of Monitoring Posts (MPs) measuring the air dose rate around the site boundary showed 0.397 – 1.318 μSv/h (October 30 – November 26, 2019).  
To measure the variation in the air dose rate of MP2-MP8 more accurately, environmental improvement (tree trimming, removal of surface soil and shielding around the MPs) was completed.

Note 1: Different formulas and coefficients were used to evaluate the radiation dose in the facility operation plan and monthly report. The evaluation methods were integrated in September 2012. As the fuel removal from the spent fuel pool (SFP) commenced for Unit 4, the radiation exposure dose from Unit 4 was added to the items subject to evaluation since November 2013. The evaluation has been changed to a method considering the values of continuous dust monitors since FY2015, with data to be evaluated monthly and announced the following month.

Note 2: Radiation dose was calculated using the evaluation values of release amount from Units 1-4 and Units 5 and 6. The radiation dose of Unit 5 and 6 was evaluated based on expected release amount during operation until September 2019 but the evaluation method was reviewed and changed to calculate based on the actual measurement results of Units 5 and 6 from October.

### 3. Other indices

There was no significant change in indices, including the pressure in the PCV and the PCV radioactivity density (Xe-135) for monitoring criticality, nor was any abnormality in the cold shutdown condition or criticality sign detected.

Based on the above, it was confirmed that the comprehensive cold shutdown condition had been maintained and the reactors remained in a stabilized condition.


## II. Progress status by each plan

### 1. Contaminated water management

*In accordance with the three principles "remove" contamination sources, "redirect" groundwater from contamination sources and "prevent leakage" of contaminated water, multi-layered contaminated water management measures have been implemented to stably control groundwater*

### ➤ Status of contaminated water generated

- Multi-layered measures, including pumping up by subdrains and land-side impermeable walls, which were implemented to control the continued generation of contaminated water, suppress the groundwater inflow into buildings.
- Following the steady implementation of "redirecting" measures (groundwater bypass, subdrains, land-side impermeable walls and other measures), the generation amount reduced from approx. 470 m<sup>3</sup>/day (the FY2014 average) when the measures were first launched to approx. 170 m<sup>3</sup>/day (the FY2018 average).
- Measures will continue to further reduce the volume of contaminated water generated.



- \*1 Values differ from those announced at the 20<sup>th</sup> Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment (held on August 25, 2017) because the method of calculating the contaminated water volume generated was reviewed on March 1, 2018. Details of the review are described in the materials for the 50<sup>th</sup> and 51<sup>st</sup> meetings of the Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Treatment.
- \*2: The monthly daily average is derived from the daily average from the previous Thursday to the last Wednesday, which is calculated based on the data measured at 7:00 on every Thursday.
- \*3: The average (provisional value) for the period April – October 2019.

Figure 1: Changes in contaminated water generated and inflow of groundwater, rainwater, into buildings

### ➤ Operation of the groundwater bypass

- From April 9, 2014, the operation of 12 groundwater bypass pumping wells commenced sequentially to pump up groundwater. The release then started from May 21, 2014, in the presence of officials from the Intergovernmental Liaison Office for the Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Issue of the Cabinet Office. Up until November 26, 2019, 511,898 m<sup>3</sup> of groundwater had been released. The pumped-up groundwater was temporarily stored in tanks and released after TEPCO and a third-party organization had confirmed that its quality met operational targets.
- Pumps are inspected and cleaned as required based on their operational status.

### ➤ Operation of the Water Treatment Facility special for Subdrain & Groundwater drains

- To reduce the level of groundwater flowing into the buildings, work began to pump up groundwater from wells (subdrains) around the buildings on September 3, 2015. The pumped-up groundwater was then purified at dedicated facilities and released from September 14, 2015, in the presence of officials from the Intergovernmental Liaison Office for the Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Issue of the Cabinet Office. Up until November 26, 2019, a total of 815,431 m<sup>3</sup> had been drained after TEPCO and a third-party organization had confirmed that its quality met operational targets.
- Due to the rising level of the groundwater drain pond after the sea-side impermeable walls had been closed, pumping started on November 5, 2015. Up until November 26, 2019, a total of approx. 224,031 m<sup>3</sup> had been pumped up and a volume of under 40 m<sup>3</sup>/day is being transferred from the groundwater drain to the Turbine Buildings (average for the period October 24 – November 20, 2019).
- As one of the multi-layered contaminated-water management measures, in addition to waterproof pavement (facing: as of the end of October 2019, approx. 94% of the planned area had been completed) to prevent rainwater infiltrating the ground, facilities to enhance the subdrain treatment system were installed and went into operation from April 2018,

increasing the treatment capacity from 900 to 1,500 m<sup>3</sup>/day and improving reliability. Operational efficiency was also improved to treat up to 2,000 m<sup>3</sup>/day for almost one week during the peak period.

- To maintain the level of groundwater pumped up from the subdrains, work to install additional subdrain pits and recover those already in place is underway. The additional pits are scheduled to begin operation sequentially from a pit for which work was completed (12 of 14 pits went into operation). For recovered pits, work for all three pits scheduled was completed, all of which went into operation from December 26, 2018. Work to recover another pit started from November 2019 (No. 49 pit).
- To eliminate the need to suspend water pumping while cleaning the subdrain transfer pipe, the pipe will be duplicated. Installation of the pipe and ancillary facilities was completed.
- Since the subdrains went into operation, the inflow into buildings tended to decline to under 150 m<sup>3</sup>/day when the subdrain water level declined below T.P. 3.0 m but increased during rainfall.




Figure 2: Correlation between inflow such as groundwater and rainwater into buildings and the water level of Unit 1-4 subdrains

### ➤ Construction status of the land-side impermeable walls and status of groundwater levels around the buildings

- An operation to maintain the land-side impermeable walls and prevent the frozen soil from thickening further continued from May 2017 on the north and south sides and started from November 2017 on the east side, where sufficiently thick frozen soil was identified. The scope of the maintenance operation was expanded in March 2018.
- In March 2018, construction of the land-side impermeable walls was completed, except for a portion of the depth, based on a monitoring result showing that the underground temperature had declined below 0°C in almost all areas, while on the mountain side, the difference in internal and external water levels increased to approx. 4-5 m. The 21st Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated-Water Treatment, held on March 7, 2018, evaluated that alongside with the function of subdrains and other measures, a water-level management system to stably control groundwater and redirect groundwater from the buildings had been established and allowed the amount of contaminated water generated to be reduced significantly.
- A supplementary method was implemented for the unfrozen depth and it was confirmed that the temperature of this portion had declined below 0°C by September 2018. From February 2019, a maintenance operation started throughout all sections.
- The groundwater level in the area inside the land-side impermeable walls has been declining every year. On the mountain side, the difference between the inside and outside increased to approx. 4-5 m. The water level in the bank area has remained low (T.P. 1.6-1.7 m) compared to the ground surface (T.P. 2.5 m).




Figure 3: Closure parts of the land-side impermeable walls (on the mountain side)

### ➤ Operation of multi-nuclide removal equipment


- Regarding the multi-nuclide removal equipment (existing and high-performance), hot tests using radioactive water were underway (for existing equipment, System A: from March 30, 2013, System B: from June 13, 2013, System C: from September 27, 2013; and for high-performance equipment, from October 18, 2014). The additional multi-nuclide removal equipment went into full-scale operation from October 16, 2017.
- As of November 21, 2019, the volumes treated by existing, additional and high-performance multi-nuclide removal equipment were approx. 420,000, 604,000 and 103,000 m<sup>3</sup>, respectively (including approx. 9,500 m<sup>3</sup> stored in the J1(D) tank, which contained water with highly concentrated radioactive materials at the System B outlet of the existing multi-nuclide removal equipment).
- To reduce the risks of strontium-treated water, treatment using existing, additional and high-performance multi-nuclide removal equipment has been underway (existing: from December 4, 2015; additional: from May 27, 2015; high-performance: from April 15, 2015). Up until November 21, 2019, approx. 652,000 m<sup>3</sup> had been treated.

### ➤ Toward reducing the risk of contaminated water stored in tanks

- Treatment measures comprising the removal of strontium by cesium-adsorption apparatus (KURION) (from January 6, 2015), the secondary cesium-adsorption apparatus (SARRY) (from December 26, 2014) and the third cesium-adsorption apparatus (SARRY II) (from July 12, 2019) have been underway. Up until November 21, 2019, approx. 554,000 m<sup>3</sup> had been treated.

### ➤ Measures in the Tank Area

- Rainwater, under the release standard and having accumulated within the fenced-in area of the contaminated-water tank area, was sprinkled on site after eliminating radioactive materials using rainwater-treatment equipment since May 21, 2014 (as of November 25, 2019, a total of 143,117 m<sup>3</sup>).



- \*1: Water amount for which the water-level gauge indicates 0% or more
- \*2: To detect storage increases more accurately, the calculation method was reviewed as follows from February 9, 2017: (The revised method was applied from March 1, 2018) [(Inflow of groundwater/rainwater into buildings) + (other transfer) + (chemical injection into ALPS)]
- \*3: The storage amount increased due to transfer to buildings in association with the decommissioning work. (The transferred amount comprised ①Transfer of RO concentrated water from groundwater drains to Turbine Building: approx. 80 m³/day, ②Transfer from wells and groundwater drains: approx.50 m³/day, ③Transfer from Unit 5/6 SPT to Process Main Building: approx. 20 m³/day, others)
- \*4: Changed from December 13, 2018 from rainfall in Namie to that within the site.
- \*5: Since January 17, 2019, Unit 3 C/B contaminated water has been managed in addition to contaminated water storage in buildings. For the inflow of groundwater, rainwater, and others to buildings and increase in storage have been reflected since January 24, 2019.
- \*6: Considered attributable to the increased inflow of groundwater, rainwater, and others to buildings due to the decline in the level of contaminated water in buildings. (January 17, April 22, May 16 and 30, June 13 and 27, 2019)
- \*7: Water-level gauges were replaced (February 7 – March 7, 2019)
- \*8: Calculation methods for water volume and the capacity of tanks, which had varied in each tank area, were unified in all areas. By this unification, the calculated increase in treated water and variation in Sr-treated water, and others changed. However, the actual treated volumes were approx. 2200 m³/week for treated water and approx. 1100 m³/week for Sr-treated water and others (July 11, 2019).

Figure 4: Status of contaminated water storage

- Examination to stabilize Zeolite on the basement floor of the central waste treatment building
  - For Zeolite sandbags on the basement floor of the Process Main Building, the dose effect during floor exposure was assessed using the investigative results in September 2019.
  - The assessment results showed that at the nearby site boundaries there would be little effect on the radiation dose with an increase of about  $10^{-4}$  mSv/year from the normal dose rate, but at the opening on the 1st floor of the building the dose rate could increase by 14 mSv/h from the present level. Zeolite samples will be taken in January 2020.
  - In December 2019, the High-Temperature Incinerator Building (HTI) will also be investigated to assess the same effect.
  - Based on the investigative results, stable methods of managing Zeolite sandbags in these buildings will be examined.
- Detection of declining water level in the Unit 1/2 exhaust stack drain sump pit
  - The Unit 1/2 exhaust stack drain sump pit is a facility to store rainwater flowing into the Unit 1/2 exhaust stack. Accumulated water has been transferred by a pump as required since September 2016.
  - Following heavy rain in October 2019, the data of water levels in the pit was checked on November 26, 2019. It showed that the water level had been declining when the transfer pump did not operate since October 12.
  - The densities of Cs-134 and Cs-137 in the nearby subdrain pits (Nos. 206 and 207) remained within the normal variation range (about  $10^1$ - $10^3$  Bq/L) before and after the decline. There was no significant variation in the onsite drain channel monitor and the seawater radiation monitor, nor was any influence on the outside environment identified at the present time.
  - As measures to alleviate any influence based on potential outflow from the pit, the water level of the sump pit was set as low as possible and water level monitoring was enhanced.
  - After dismantling of the exhaust stack was completed, a lid will be installed on the top of the stack to prevent inflow of

rainwater from the exhaust stack to the pit.

- Oozing at the secondary side throttle valve of the multi-nuclide removal equipment (A) cross-flow filter
  - On November 7, 2019, a puddle was detected within the fenced-in area of the multi-nuclide removal equipment (A) and system water was oozing and dropped (approx. 100mm × 50mm × depth 1mm, two points) from the gland for the secondary side throttle valve (two points) of the cross flow filter, a pretreatment device. (Reference: the recent water quality analytical results at the same part of System C, Cs134:  $4.24 \times 10^2$  Bq/L, Cs137:  $5.81 \times 10^3$  Bq/L, gross  $\beta$  radioactivity density:  $1.17 \times 10^4$  Bq/L)
  - After tightening the valve, the oozing ceased and the dripping water was eliminated.
  - The oozing was considered attributable to a loosened gland due to frequent valve operation. After being covered, the part will be monitored continuously and tightened as necessary.

## 2. Fuel removal from the spent fuel pools

*Work to help remove spent fuel from the pool is progressing steadily while ensuring seismic capacity and safety. The removal of spent fuel from the Unit 4 pool commenced on November 18, 2013 and was completed by December 22, 2014*

- Main work to help spent fuel removal at Unit 1
  - From January 22, 2018, toward fuel removal from the spent fuel pool (SFP), work began to remove rubble on the north side of the operating floor. Once removed, the rubble is stored in solid waste storage facilities or elsewhere depending on the dose level.
  - To create an access route for preparatory work to protect the SFP, work to remove four sections of X-braces (one each on the west and south sides and two on the east side, respectively) started from September 19, 2018 and all planned four sections had been removed by December 20.
  - From March 18, 2019, the removal of small rubble in the east-side area around the SFP started using pliers and suction equipment, while from July 9, small rubble removal on the south side of the SFP started.
  - The well plug, which was considered misaligned from its normal position due to the influence of the hydrogen explosion at the time of the accident, was investigated for the period July 17 – August 26, 2019, by taking photos using a camera, measuring the air dose rate and collecting 3D images.
  - A prior investigation on September 27, 2019 confirmed the lack of any obstacle which may affect the plan to install the cover over the SFP. The investigation also confirmed the absence of any heavy object such as a concrete block, which was detected in Unit 3 and the fact that panel- and bar-shaped rubble pieces were scattered on the rack.
  - Toward fuel removal from Unit 1, the condition of the fallen roof on the south side and contamination on the reactor well plug were investigated.
  - Based on the results of these investigations, the fallen overhead crane and other items removal is required to more careful work, taking dust scattering into consideration. Thus, in addition to existing plan(Plan A), Plan B which initially install a large cover over the Reactor Building and then remove rubble inside the cover for safer and more secure removal, are being examined.
- Main work to help spent fuel removal at Unit 2
  - On November 6, 2018, before the investigation toward formulating a work plan to dismantle the Reactor Building rooftop and other tasks, work to move and contain the remaining objects on the operating floor (1st round) was completed.
  - On February 1, 2019, an investigation to measure the radiation dose on the floor, walls and ceiling inside the operating floor and confirm the contamination status was completed. After analyzing the investigative results, the “contamination density distribution” throughout the entire operating floor was obtained, based on which the air dose rate inside the operating floor could be evaluated. A shielding design and measures to prevent radioactive material scattering will be examined.
  - From April 8, 2019, work to move and contain the remaining objects on the operating floor (2nd round) started, such

as materials and equipment which may hinder installation of the fuel-handling facility and other work. The 2nd round mainly included moving the remaining small objects and placing them in the container. The work also included cleaning the floor to suppress dust scattering and was completed on August 21.

- From September 10, 2019, work to move and contain the remaining objects on the operating floor (3rd round) started, such as materials and equipment which may hinder the installation of the fuel-handling facility and other work. The 3rd round mainly includes moving and containing the remaining large objects as well as transporting containers and remaining objects temporarily stored inside the operating floor outside.
- For fuel removal methods, based on the investigative results inside the operating floor from November 2018 to February 2019, a method to access from a small opening installed on the south side was selected with aspects such as dust management and lower work exposure in mind (the method previously examined had involved fully dismantling the upper part of the building).
- **Main process to help fuel removal at Unit 3**
  - Regarding the fuel-handling machine (FHM) and crane, consecutive defects have occurred since the test operation started on March 15, 2018.
  - On August 8, 2018, an alarm was issued during the pre-operation inspection of the FHM, whereupon operation was suspended. This was attributable to disconnection due to rainwater ingress corrosion into the cable connection. Abnormalities were also detected in several control cables.
  - On August 15, 2018, an alarm on the crane was triggered during work to clear materials and equipment, whereupon the crane operation was suspended.
  - On September 29, 2018, to determine the risks of defects in fuel-handling facilities, a safety inspection (operation check and facility inspection) started. For 14 defects detected in the safety inspection, measures were completed on January 27, 2019.
  - On February 8, 2019, a function check after cable replacement was completed.
  - On February 14, 2019, review of recovery measures in the event of defects started and training for fuel removal using dummy fuel and the transport container got underway. During the training, seven defects were detected, although it was confirmed that these did not constitute safety problems that could lead to fuel or rubble falling.
  - From March 15, 2019, the rubble removal training inside the pool started.
  - From April 15, 2019, the removal of 514 spent fuel assemblies and 52 non-irradiated fuel assemblies (a total of 566 assemblies) stored in the spent fuel pool started. Seven non-irradiated fuel assemblies were then loaded into the transport container and transported to the common pool on April 23. The first fuel removal was completed on April 25.
  - From July 4, 2019, fuel removal was resumed and up until July 21, 28 of all 566 fuel assemblies had been removed.
  - The periodical inspection of the fuel-handling facility, which started on July 24, 2019, was completed on September 2. Some defective rotations of the tensile truss and mast were detected during the following adjustment work toward resumption of the fuel removal. In response, parts were replaced and the operation checked to confirm there was no problem.
  - From September 2, 2019, rubble removal from the SFP resumed. With the progress of the removal progressed, the condition of fuel handles inside the pool was also checked (286/566).
  - During the check, 12 fuel assemblies with deformed handles were confirmed, including those previously detected. No variation was detected in the water quality of the pool and it was evaluated that there was no influence on the environment.
  - Work to repair defects detected in October 2019 will continue toward completion of fuel removal by the end of FY2020.

#### ➤ Progress status of dismantling work for the Unit 1/2 exhaust stack

- Dismantling of the 4th block started from October 27, 2019.
- On November 15, 2019, during work to install the dismantling equipment to the top of the exhaust stack, an insert guide made excessive contact with the stack when the steel tower dismantling equipment rotated and swung due to a temporary gust of wind and one of the four insert guides of the steel tower dismantling equipment fell. This had no

influence on the workers and facilities, nor did it cause any safety problem.

- After dismantling of the 4th block, the subdrain, which is temporarily suspended due to work interference, will be restored.
- In parallel with that, the efforts will be made to improve so that safer work can be done with reviewing the work to date.

### 3. Retrieval of fuel debris

- **Construction of an access route for the internal investigation of the Unit 1 PCV**
  - To further enhance dust-density monitoring during the construction of an access route at Unit 1, a dust monitor for the work was installed near the PCV head on November 7, 2019.
  - From November 25, 2019, work resumed for proven cutting hours to collect more data on dust densities, including that from the newly installed dust monitor. Based on the results, optimization of the management method during work will be examined, also taking the influence on the surrounding environment into consideration. At the same time, dust reduction measures will be examined.
- **Check of the condition of the Unit 1 PCV head**
  - To enhance the dust-density monitoring during construction of an access route for the internal investigation of the Unit 1 PCV, a dust monitor for the work was installed near the PCV head.
  - During the installation, the condition of the PCV head was checked using a camera. The image obtained showed no significant damage or large deformation detected on the PCV head and its flange.

### 4. Plans to store, process and dispose of solid waste and decommission of reactor facilities

*Promoting efforts to reduce and store waste generated appropriately and R&D to facilitate adequate and safe storage, processing and disposal of radioactive waste*

- **Management status of the rubble and trimmed trees**
  - As of the end of October 2019, the total storage volume of the concrete and metal rubble was approx. 278,900 m<sup>3</sup> (+2,700 m<sup>3</sup> compared to at the end of September with an area-occupation rate of 70%). The total storage volume of trimmed trees was approx. 134,100 m<sup>3</sup> (slight increase, with an area-occupation rate of 76%). The total storage volume of used protective clothing was approx. 52,600 m<sup>3</sup> (-2,300 m<sup>3</sup>, with an area-occupation rate of 77%). The increase in rubble was mainly attributable to tank-related construction, while the decrease in used protective clothing was attributable to the incinerator operation.
- **Management status of secondary waste from water treatment**
  - As of November 7, 2019, the total storage volume of waste sludge was 597 m<sup>3</sup> (area-occupation rate: 85%), while that of concentrated waste fluid was 9,357 m<sup>3</sup> (area-occupation rate: 91%). The total number of stored spent vessels, High-Integrity Containers (HICs) for multi-nuclide removal equipment and other vessels, was 4,538 (area-occupation rate: 71%).

### 5. Reduction in radiation dose and mitigation of contamination

*Effective dose-reduction at site boundaries and purification of port water to mitigate the impact of radiation on the external environment*

- **Status of groundwater and seawater on the east side of Turbine Building Units 1-4**
  - At No. 1-6, the H-3 density had been increasing from around 1,000 Bq/L to 6,000 Bq/L since August 2019 and then declined. It currently stands at around 1,100 Bq/L.
  - At No. 1-9, the density of gross  $\beta$  radioactive materials has been repeatedly increasing and declining from around 20 Bq/L since April 2019 and currently stands at around 20 Bq/L.
  - At No. 1-14, the H-3 density has been repeatedly increasing and declining from around 1,300 Bq/L since July 2019 and currently stands at around 4,400 Bq/L. Since August 15, 2013, pumping of groundwater continued (at the well point between the Unit 1 and 2 intakes: August 15, 2013 – October 13, 2015 and from October 24; at the repaired well: October 14-23, 2015).

- At No. 2-3, the H-3 density had been declining from around 6,000 Bq/L since August 2019, then increasing and currently stands at around 10,000 Bq/L. The density of gross  $\beta$  radioactive materials at the same point had been increasing from around 8,000 Bq/L since April 2019, increasing to around 15,000 Bq/L, then declining and currently stands at around 12,000 Bq/L.
- At No. 2-5, the H-3 density had been declining from around 2,300 Bq/L to less than 120 Bq/L since June 2019, then repeatedly increasing and declining and currently stands at less than 110 Bq/L. The density of gross  $\beta$  radioactive materials at the same point had been declining from around 65,000 Bq/L to around 500 Bq/L since September 2019, then increasing and currently stands at around 20,000 Bq/L.
- At No. 2-6, the density of gross  $\beta$  radioactive materials had been increasing from around 100 Bq/L since May 2019 and currently stands at around 210 Bq/L. Since December 18, 2013, pumping of groundwater continued (at the well point between the Unit 2 and 3 intakes: December 18, 2013 - October 13, 2015; at the repaired well: from October 14, 2015).
- The densities of radioactive materials in drainage channels have remained constant, despite increasing during rainfall.
- In the Unit 1-4 intake open channel area, densities of radioactive materials in seawater have remained below the legal discharge limit, while increasing in Cs-137 and Sr-90 below the legal discharge limit during rainfall. They have also been declining following the completed installation and the connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls. The density of Cs-137 has remained slightly higher in front of the south side impermeable walls and slightly lower on the north side of the east breakwater since March 20, 2019, when the silt fence was transferred to the center of the open channel due to mega float-related construction.
- In the area within the port, densities of radioactive materials in seawater have remained below the legal discharge limit, while increasing in Cs-137 and Sr-90 below the legal discharge limit during rainfall. They have remained below the level of those in the Unit 1-4 intake open channel area and been declining following the completed installation and connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls.
- In the area outside the port, regarding the densities of radioactive materials in seawater, those of Cs-137 and Sr-90 declined and remained low after steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls were installed and connected.

➤ Change in the method to calculate the exposure dose in the “evaluation results of the additional release amount from Reactor Buildings”

- TEPCO monthly announces the additional release amount from the Unit 1-4 Reactor Buildings and the exposure dose at site boundaries related to the release in the “evaluation results of additional release amount from the Unit 1-4 Reactor Buildings.”
- From the announcement material of November 2019 (evaluation results of October 2019), the contents were reviewed to help easily understand the influence related to the release on the public.
- In addition to the review, the evaluation method of the exposure dose was changed to calculate the actual situation more precisely. Specifically, for the contribution of Units 5 and 6, the method was changed from uniformly adding the evaluation value of the expected release amount during operation to that related to the release from Units 1-4 to adding the evaluation value based on the measurement results of particle materials to that related to the release from Units 1-4.





Figure 5: Groundwater density on the Turbine Building east side




Figure 6: Seawater density around the port

6. Outlook of the number of staff required and efforts to improve the labor environment and conditions

*Securing appropriate staff long-term while thoroughly implementing workers' exposure dose control. Improving the work environment and labor conditions continuously based on an understanding of workers' on-site needs*

➤ Staff management

- The monthly average total of personnel registered for at least one day per month to work on site during the past quarter from July to September 2019 was approx. 8,800 (TEPCO and partner company workers), which exceeded the



monthly average number of actual workers (approx. 6,500). Accordingly, sufficient personnel are registered to work on site.

- It was confirmed with the prime contractors that the estimated manpower necessary for the work in December 2019 (approx. 3,770 per day: TEPCO and partner company workers) would be secured at present. The average numbers of workers per day per month (actual values) were maintained, with approx. 3,400 to 5,600 since FY2017 (see Figure 7).
- The number of workers from within and outside Fukushima Prefecture increased. The local employment ratio (TEPCO and partner company workers) as of October 2019 has remained constant at around 60%.
- The monthly average exposure dose of workers remained at approx. approx. 0.39, 0.36 and 0.32 mSv/month during FY2016, FY2017 and FY2018 respectively. (Reference: Annual average exposure dose 20 mSv/year  $\div$  1.7 mSv/month)
- For most workers, the exposure dose was sufficiently within the limit and allowed them to continue engaging in radiation work.




Figure 7: Changes in the average number of workers per weekday for each month since FY2017 (actual values)




Figure 8: Changes in monthly individual worker exposure dose (monthly average exposure dose since March 2011)

➤ Status of heat stroke cases

- In FY2019, measures to further prevent heat stroke commenced from April to cope with the hottest season.
- In FY2019, 13 workers suffered heat stroke due to work up until November 25 (in FY2018, eight workers up until the end of November). Ongoing measures will be taken to prevent heat stroke.
- This fiscal year, the number of heat stroke patients increased by five compared to the figure last year; supposedly due

to lack of heat adaptability caused by soaring temperatures after the rainy season, the time in the morning when temperature increased due to stronger sunlight, the difference in temperature from the previous day and other factors.

- As heat stroke cases have occurred in October for the third consecutive year since FY2016, attention was called in preparation with the significant temperature difference in October in mind and there were no heat stroke cases in October FY2019.
- In F2020, in addition to continuing the ongoing measures, the necessary prevention rules will be reviewed and the method to call attention will be examined based on the factors and characteristics of heat stroke occurrence in FY2019 to further improve the work environment.

\* WBGT (heat index): Index using three perspectives of humidity, radiation heat and temperature, which significantly affect the heat balance of human bodies

➤ Measures to prevent infection and expansion of influenza and norovirus

- Since November, measures for influenza and norovirus have been implemented, including free influenza vaccinations (subsidized by TEPCO HD) in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (from November 13 to December 13, 2019) for partner company workers. As of November 22, 2019, a total of 1,565 workers had been vaccinated. Free influenza vaccinations will also be provided at medical clinics around the site (from December 2, 2019 to January 30, 2020). In addition, a comprehensive range of other measures is also being implemented, including daily actions to prevent infection and expansion (measuring body temperature, health checks and monitoring infection status) and response after detecting possible infections (swift exit of possible patients and control of entry, mandatory wearing of masks in working spaces, etc.).

➤ Status of influenza and norovirus cases

- Until the 47th week of 2019 (November 18-24, 2019), three influenza infections and no norovirus infections were recorded. The totals for the same period for the previous season showed no case of influenza and three norovirus infections.

7. Others

➤ Bending of fuel rods during decontamination of non-irradiated fuel assemblies at Unit 6

- Non-irradiated fuel assemblies stored at Unit 6 are being decontaminated sequentially to transport to the factory of the manufacturer. As part of this work, fuel assemblies are also being dismantled.
- On November 25, 2019, during disassembling and decontamination of non-irradiated fuel assemblies (new fuel assemblies which had not been used as fuel in the reactor) on the operation floor of Unit 6, a non-irradiated fuel rod was caught under the lift for carrying non-irradiated fuel rods to the decontamination equipment and deformed.
- Though the fuel rod was deformed, no damage was detected at the cladding tube, nor any abnormality when measuring the surface contamination density. At the same time, no significant variation was identified in radiation monitors of the relevant area or dust monitors around the building and there was no influence on the outside environment.
- The cause will be investigated to examine appropriate measures.


➤ Breakage of a drive shaft for the Unit 6 residual heat removal pump (B) pressure suppression chamber suction valve

- On October 19, 2019, a seat pass was detected at the Unit 6 residual heat removal system (B) pump pressure suppression chamber suction valve. When the valve was manually tightened using a Wilkey, the hand wheel shaft (manual operation handle shaft) broke.
- It was determined that the residual heat removal system (B) could not meet the function to feed fuel pool water among the required functions of important safety equipment. The residual heat removal system (A) could satisfy that function and this event had no influence on the environment.
- The cause will be investigated to examine appropriate measures.

# Status of seawater monitoring within the port (comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

“The highest value” → “the latest value (sampled during November 18-26)”; unit (Bq/L); ND represents a value below the detection limit

Source: TEPCO website Analysis results on nuclides of radioactive materials around Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station <http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/f1/smp/index-j.html>



Cesium-134: 3.3 (2013/10/17) → ND(0.35) Below 1/9  
Cesium-137: 9.0 (2013/10/17) → 0.81 Below 1/10  
Gross β: **74** (2013/ 8/19) → ND(13) Below 1/5  
Tritium: 67 (2013/ 8/19) → 1.8 Below 1/30

Cesium-134: 4.4 (2013/12/24) → ND(0.25) Below 1/10  
Cesium-137: **10** (2013/12/24) → 0.53 Below 1/10  
Gross β: **60** (2013/ 7/ 4) → 14 Below 1/4  
Tritium: 59 (2013/ 8/19) → 1.9 Below 1/30

Cesium-134: 5.0 (2013/12/2) → ND(0.34) Below 1/10  
Cesium-137: 8.4 (2013/12/2) → ND(0.31) Below 1/20  
Gross β: **69** (2013/8/19) → ND(13) Below 1/5  
Tritium: 52 (2013/8/19) → 1.9 Below 1/20

Cesium-134: 2.8 (2013/12/2) → ND(0.56) Below 1/5  
Cesium-137: 5.8 (2013/12/2) → ND(0.37) Below 1/10  
Gross β: **46** (2013/8/19) → 15 Below 1/3  
Tritium: 24 (2013/8/19) → ND(2.6) Below 1/9

Cesium-134: ND(0.50)  
Cesium-137: 1.8  
Gross β: 15  
Tritium: 2.5 \*1


Cesium-134: 3.3 (2013/12/24) → ND(0.43) Below 1/7  
Cesium-137: 7.3 (2013/10/11) → 0.69 Below 1/10  
Gross β: **69** (2013/ 8/19) → ND(13) Below 1/5  
Tritium: 68 (2013/ 8/19) → ND(1.6) Below 1/40

Cesium-134: 3.5 (2013/10/17) → ND(0.29) Below 1/10  
Cesium-137: 7.8 (2013/10/17) → 0.36 Below 1/20  
Gross β: **79** (2013/ 8/19) → ND(13) Below 1/6  
Tritium: 60 (2013/ 8/19) → ND(1.7) Below 1/30

Cesium-134: **32** (2013/10/11) → ND(0.53) Below 1/60  
Cesium-137: **73** (2013/10/11) → 2.9 Below 1/20  
Gross β: **320** (2013/ 8/12) → 16 Below 1/20  
Tritium: 510 (2013/ 9/ 2) → 3.7 Below 1/100  
From February 11, 2017, the location of the sampling point was shifted approx. 50 m south of the previous point due to the location shift of the silt fence.

Cesium-134: 0.87  
Cesium-137: 13  
Gross β: 22  
Tritium: 27 \*1

|  | Legal discharge limit | WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality |
|--|-----------------------|---|
| Cesium-134                                     | 60                    | 10  |
| Cesium-137                                     | 90                    | 10  |
| Strontium-90 (strongly correlate with Gross β) | 30                    | 10  |
| Tritium  | 60,000                | 10,000                                    |



Cesium-134: 5.3 (2013/8/ 5) → ND(0.42) Below 1/10  
Cesium-137: 8.6 (2013/8/ 5) → ND(0.57) Below 1/10  
Gross β: **40** (2013/7/ 3) → 13 Below 1/3  
Tritium: 340 (2013/6/26) → 1.7 Below 1/200

- \*1: Monitoring commenced in or after March 2014. Monitoring inside the sea-side impermeable walls was finished because of the landfill.
- \*2: For the point, monitoring was finished from December 12, 2018 due to preparatory work for transfer of mega float.
- \*3: For the point, monitoring point was moved from February 6, 2019 due to preparatory work for transfer of mega float.
- \*4: For the point, monitoring was finished from April 3, 2019 due to preparatory work for transfer of mega float.

Note: The gross β measurement values include natural potassium 40 (approx. 12 Bq/L). They also include the contribution of yttrium 90, which radioactively balance strontium 90.

Summary of TEPCO data as of November 27, 2019

# Status of seawater monitoring around outside of the port (comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

(The latest values sampled during November 18-26)

Unit (Bq/L); ND represents a value below the detection limit; values in ( ) represent the detection limit; ND (2013) represents ND throughout 2013

|  | Legal discharge limit | WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality |
|--|-----------------------|---|
| Cesium-134                                     | 60                    | 10  |
| Cesium-137                                     | 90                    | 10  |
| Strontium-90 (strongly correlate with Gross β) | 30                    | 10  |
| Tritium  | 60,000                | 10,000                                    |

【Northeast side of port entrance(offshore 1km)】

Cesium-134: ND (2013) → ND (0.70)  
 Cesium-137: ND (2013) → ND (0.89)  
 Gross β: ND (2013) → ND (14)  
 Tritium: ND (2013) → ND (0.85)

【East side of port entrance (offshore 1km)】

Cesium-134: ND (2013) → ND (0.78)  
 Cesium-137: 1.6 (2013/10/18) → ND (0.70) Below 1/2  
 Gross β: ND (2013) → ND (14)  
 Tritium: 6.4 (2013/10/18) → ND (0.85) Below 1/7

【Southeast side of port entrance(offshore 1km)】

Cesium-134: ND (2013) → ND (0.62)  
 Cesium-137: ND (2013) → ND (0.62)  
 Gross β: ND (2013) → ND (14)  
 Tritium: ND (2013) → ND (0.85)

Cesium-134: ND (2013) → ND (0.44)  
 Cesium-137: ND (2013) → ND (0.53)  
 Gross β: ND (2013) → ND (14)  
 Tritium: 4.7 (2013/ 8/18) → ND (0.85) Below 1/5

【Port entrance】

Cesium-134: 3.3 (2013/12/24) → ND (0.43) Below 1/7  
 Cesium-137: 7.3 (2013/10/11) → 0.69 Below 1/10  
 Gross β: 69 (2013/ 8/19) → ND (13) Below 1/5  
 Tritium: 68 (2013/ 8/19) → ND (1.6) Below 1/40

【South side of south breakwater(offshore 0.5km)】

Cesium-134: ND (2013) → ND (0.63)  
 Cesium-137: ND (2013) → ND (0.69)  
 Gross β: ND (2013) → ND (14)  
 Tritium: ND (2013) → ND (0.85)

【North side of Unit 5 and 6 release outlet】

Cesium-134: 1.8 (2013/ 6/21) → ND (0.67) Below 1/2  
 Cesium-137: 4.5 (2013/ 3/17) → ND (0.53) Below 1/8  
 Gross β: 12 (2013/12/23) → 11  
 Tritium: 8.6 (2013/ 6/26) → ND (0.89) Below 1/9


Cesium-134: ND (2013) → ND (0.71)  
 Cesium-137: 3.0 (2013/ 7/15) → ND (0.59) Below 1/5  
 Gross β: 15 (2013/12/23) → 12  
 Tritium: 1.9 (2013/11/25) → ND (0.89) Below 1/2

【Near south release outlet】

Sea side impermeable wall  
 Silt fence


Note: Because safety of the sampling points was unassured due to the influence of Typhoon No. 10 in 2016, samples were taken from approx. 330 m south of the Unit 1-4 release outlet. Samples were also taken from a point approx. 280m south from the same release outlet from January 27, 2017 and approx. 320m from March 23, 2018

Note: The gross β measurement values include natural potassium 40 (approx. 12 Bq/L). They also include the contribution of yttrium 90, which radioactively balance strontium 90.



Summary of TEPCO data as of November 27, 2019

# TEPCO Holdings Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Site Layout



- Rubble storage area
- Rubble storage area (planned)
- Used protective clothing
- Trimmed trees area
- Mid-/ low-level contaminated water tank (existing)
- Mid-/ low-level contaminated water tank (planned)
- Secondary waste from water treatment (existing)
- Secondary waste from water treatment (planned)
- Waste treatment facility
- Non-controlled facility
- Analysis and research facility



Rubble storage tent



Inside the rubble storage tent



Temporary trimmed trees storage pool



Temporary soil-covered type storage facility



Rubble (outdoor accumulation)



Rubble (covered by sheet)



Solid waste storage facility



Rubble (container storage)



Temporary waste sludge storage



Spent adsorption vessel temporary storage facility

Provided by Japan Space Imaging, photo taken on June 14, 2018  
Product(C) [2018] DigitalGlobe, Inc.



## Progress toward decommissioning: Fuel removal from the spent fuel pool (SFP)

Immediate  
target


Commence fuel removal from the Unit 1-3 Spent Fuel Pools

## Unit 1

Toward fuel removal from the spent fuel pool, there is a plan to install a dedicated cover for fuel removal over the top floor of the Reactor Building (operating floor). On November 10, 2016, removal of all roof panels and wall panels of the building cover was completed.

On May 11, 2017, removal of pillars and beams of the building cover was completed. On December 19, 2017, modification of the pillars and beams of the building cover and installation of windbreak fences were completed. From March 18, 2019, removal of small rubble in the east-side area around the SFP started as an initial step using pliers and suction equipment. From July 9, 2019, small rubble removal on the south side of the SFP started.

Based on the results of these investigations, methods, including the one to initially install a large cover over the Reactor Building and then remove rubble inside the cover for safer and more secure removal in addition to the existing fuel removal method which has already been examined, are being examined because more careful work, taking dust scattering into consideration, is required to remove the fallen overhead crane and other items.




## Unit 2

Toward fuel removal from the Unit 2 spent fuel pool, based on findings from internal operating floor investigations from November 2018 to February 2019, instead of fully dismantling the upper part of the building, the decision was made to install a small opening on the south side and use a boom crane. The changed method will be established and the fuel removal process refined.

<Reference> Progress to date

Previously, potential to recover the existing overhead crane and the fuel handling machine was examined. However, the high radiation dose inside the operating floor meant the decision was taken to dismantle the upper part of the building in November 2015. Findings from internal investigations of the operating floor from November 2018 to February 2019 underlined the potential to conduct limited work there and the means of accessing from the south side had been examined.



Overview of fuel removal (bird's-eye view)


## Unit 3

Prior to the installation of a cover for fuel removal, removal of large rubble from the spent fuel pool was completed in November 2015. To ensure safe and steady fuel removal, training of remote control was conducted at the factory using the actual fuel-handling machine which will be installed on site (February – December 2015). Measures to reduce dose on the Reactor Building top floor (decontamination, shields) were completed in December 2016. Installation of a cover for fuel removal and a fuel-handling machine is underway from January 2017. Installation of the fuel removal cover was completed on February 23, 2018.

Toward fuel removal, the rubble retrieval training inside the pool, which was scheduled in conjunction with fuel removal training, started from March 15, 2019, and started fuel removal from April 15, 2019.



Installation of dome roof (February 21, 2019)

Fuel removal status  
(April 15, 2019)

## Unit 4

In the Mid- and Long-Term Roadmap, the target of Phase 1 involved commencing fuel removal from inside the spent fuel pool (SFP) of the 1<sup>st</sup> Unit within two years of completion of Step 2 (by December 2013). On November 18, 2013, fuel removal from Unit 4, or the 1<sup>st</sup> Unit, commenced and Phase 2 of the roadmap started.

On November 5, 2014, within a year of commencing work to fuel removal, all 1,331 spent fuel assemblies in the pool had been transferred. The transfer of the remaining non-irradiated fuel assemblies to the Unit 6 SFP was completed on December 22, 2014. (2 of the non-irradiated fuel assemblies were removed in advance in July 2012 for fuel checks)


This marks the completion of fuel removal from the Unit 4 Reactor Building. Based on this experience, fuel assemblies will be removed from Unit 1-3 pools.

\* A part of the photo is corrected because it includes sensitive information related to physical protection.



Fuel removal status


## Common pool



An open space will be maintained in the common pool (Transfer to the temporary cask custody area)

## Progress to date

- The common pool has been restored to a condition allowing it to re-accommodate fuel to be handled (November 2012)
- Loading of spent fuel stored in the common pool to dry casks commenced (June 2013)
- Fuel removal from the Unit 4 spent fuel pool began to be received (November 2013 - November 2014)
- Fuel removal from the Unit 3 spent fuel pool began to be received (from April 2019)

Temporary cask (\*)  
custody area

Operation commenced on April 12, 2013; from the cask-storage building, transfer of 9 existing dry casks completed (May 21, 2013); fuel stored in the common pool sequentially transferred.

## &lt;Glossary&gt;

(\*) Operating floor: During regular inspection, the roof over the reactor is opened while on the operating floor, fuel inside the core is replaced and the core internals are inspected.  
(\*) Cask: Transportation container for samples and equipment, including radioactive materials.


**Immediate target** Identify the plant status and commence R&D and decontamination toward fuel debris retrieval

### Investigation into TIP Room of the Unit 1 Reactor Building

- To improve the environment for future investigations inside the PCV, etc., an investigation was conducted from September 24 to October 2, 2015 at the TIP Room<sup>(1)</sup>. (Due to high dose around the entrance in to the TIP Room, the investigation of dose rate and contamination distribution was conducted through a hole drilled from the walkway of the Turbine Building, where the dose was low)
- The investigative results identified high dose at X-31 to 33 penetrations<sup>(2)</sup> (instrumentation penetration) and low dose at other parts.
- As it was confirmed that work inside the TIP room would be available, the next step will include identification of obstacles which will interfere the work inside the TIP Room and formulation of a plan for dose reduction.

### Investigation in the leak point detected in the upper part of the Unit 1 Suppression Chamber (S/C<sup>(3)</sup>)

Investigation in the leak point detected in the upper part of Unit 1 S/C from May 27, 2014 from one expansion joint cover among the lines installed there. As no leakage was identified from other parts, specific methods will be examined to halt the flow of water and repair the PCV.



Leak point





Image of the S/C upper part investigation

## Unit 1

Air dose rate inside the Reactor Building:  
Max. 5,150mSv/h (1F southeast area) (measured on July 4, 2012)




\* Indices related to the plant are values as of 11:00, November 27, 2019

### Status of investigation inside the PCV

Prior to fuel debris retrieval, an investigation inside the PCV will be conducted to inspect the status there including the location of fuel debris.

[Investigative outline]

- In April 2015, a device, which entered the inside of the PCV through a narrow access opening (bore:  $\phi$  100 mm), collected information such as images and airborne dose inside the PCV 1st floor.
- In March 2017, the investigation using a self-propelled investigation device, conducted to inspect the spreading of debris to the basement floor outside the pedestal, took images of the PCV bottom status for the first time. The status inside the PCV will continue to be examined based on the collected image and dose data.



<Image of investigation inside the PCV>




Image of hanging of dosimeter and camera



Image near the bottom

### Capturing the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons

| Period         | Evaluation results  |
|----------------|---|
| Feb - May 2015 | Confirmed that there was no large fuel in the reactor core. |

<Glossary>  
 (1) TIP (Traversing In-core Probe)  
 (2) Penetration: Through-hole of the PCV  
 (3) S/C (Suppression Chamber): Suppression pool, used as the water source for the emergent core cooling system.  
 (4) SFP (Spent Fuel Pool):  
 (5) RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel)  
 (6) PCV (Primary Containment Vessel)


**Immediate target** Identify the plant status and commence R&D and decontamination toward fuel debris retrieval

**Installation of an RPV thermometer and permanent PCV supervisory instrumentation**


- Replacement of the RPV thermometer
  - As the thermometer installed at the Unit 2 RPV bottom after the earthquake had broken in February 2014, it was excluded from the monitoring thermometers.
  - In April 2014, removal of the broken thermometer failed and was suspended. Rust-stripping chemicals were injected and the broken thermometer was removed in January 2015. A new thermometer was reinstalled in March. The thermometer has been used as a part of permanent supervisory instrumentation since April.
- Reinstallation of the PCV thermometer and water-level gauge
  - Some of the permanent supervisory instrumentation for PCV could not be installed in the planned locations due to interference with existing grating (August 2013). The instrumentation was removed in May 2014 and new instruments were reinstalled in June 2014. The trend of added instrumentation will be monitored for approx. one month to evaluate its validity.
  - The measurement during the installation confirmed that the water level inside the PCV was approx. 300mm from the bottom.

**Investigative results on torus chamber walls**

- The torus chamber walls were investigated (on the north side of the east-side walls) using equipment specially developed for that purpose (a swimming robot and a floor traveling robot).
- At the east-side wall pipe penetrations (five points), "the status" and "existence of flow" were checked.
- A demonstration using the above two types of underwater wall investigative equipment showed how the equipment could check the status of penetration.
- Regarding Penetrations 1 - 5, the results of checking the sprayed tracer (\*) by camera showed no flow around the penetrations. (investigation by the swimming robot)
- Regarding Penetration 3, a sonar check showed no flow around the penetrations. (investigation by the floor traveling robot)




**Unit 2**



**Status of investigation inside the PCV**

Prior to fuel debris retrieval, an investigation inside the PCV will be conducted to inspect the status there including the location of fuel debris. [Investigative outline]

- Investigative devices such as a robot will be injected from Unit 2 X-6 penetration (\*) and access the inside of the pedestal using the CRD rail.
- [Progress status]
- On January 26 and 30, 2017, a camera was inserted from the PCV penetration to inspect the status of the CRD replacement rail on which the robot will travel. On February 9, deposit on the access route of the self-propelled investigative device was removed and on February 16, the inside of the PCV was investigated using the device.
  - The results of this series of investigations confirmed fallen and deformed gratings and a quantity of deposit inside the pedestal.
  - On January 19, 2018, the status below the platform inside the pedestal was investigated using an investigative device with a hanging mechanism. From the analytical results of images obtained in the investigation, deposits probably including fuel debris were found at the bottom of the pedestal. In addition, multiple parts higher than the surrounding deposits were also detected. We presumed that there were multiple routes of fuel debris falling. Obtained data were processed in panoramic image visualization to acquire clearer images.
  - On February 13, 2019, an investigation touching the deposits at the bottom of the pedestal and on the platform was conducted and confirmed that the pebble-shaped deposits, etc. could be moved and that hard rock-like deposits that could not be gripped may exist.
  - In addition, images, etc. would help determine the contour and size of the deposits could be collected by moving the investigative unit closer to the deposits than the previous investigation.



**Capturing the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons**

| Period         | Evaluation results   |
|----------------|--|
| Mar - Jul 2016 | Confirmed the existence of high-density materials, which was considered as fuel debris, at the bottom of RPV, and in the lower part and the outer periphery of the reactor core. It was assumed that a large part of fuel debris existed at the bottom of RPV. |

<Glossary> (\*) Penetration: Through-hole of the PCV (2) SFP (Spent Fuel Pool) (3) RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel) (4) PCV (Primary Containment Vessel) (5) Tracer: Material used to trace the fluid flow. Clay particles

\* Indices related to plant are values as of 11:00, November 27, 2019

| Investigations inside PCV | 1st (Jan 2012)                                 | 2nd (Mar 2012)   | 3rd (Feb 2013 - Jun 2014)  | 4th (Jan - Feb 2017)   | 5th (Jan 2018)   | 6th (Feb 2019)  |
|---------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|---|
|                           | - Acquiring images - Measuring air temperature | - Confirming water surface - Measuring water temperature - Measuring dose rate | - Acquiring images - Sampling contaminated water - Measuring water level - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation | - Acquiring images - Measuring dose rate - Measuring air temperature | - Acquiring images - Measuring dose rate - Measuring air temperature | - Acquiring images - Measuring dose rate - Measuring air temperature - Grasping characteristics of a portion of deposit |
| Leakage points from PCV   | - No leakage from torus chamber rooftop        |  | - No leakage from all inside/outside surfaces of S/C   |  |  |   |

**Immediate target** Identify the plant status and commence R&D and decontamination toward fuel debris retrieval

### Water flow was detected from the Main Steam Isolation Valve\* room


On January 18, 2014, a flow of water from around the door of the Steam Isolation Valve room in the Reactor Building Unit 3 1st floor northeast area to the nearby floor drain funnel (drain outlet) was detected. As the drain outlet connects with the underground part of the Reactor Building, there is no possibility of outflow from the building.

From April 23, 2014, image data has been acquired by camera and the radiation dose measured via pipes for measurement instrumentation, which connect the air-conditioning room on the Reactor Building 2nd floor with the Main Steam Isolation Valve Room on the 1st floor. On May 15, 2014, water flow from the expansion joint of one Main Steam Line was detected.

This is the first leak from PCV detected in the Unit 3. Based on the images collected in this investigation, the leak volume will be estimated and the need for additional investigations will be examined. The investigative results will also be utilized to examine water stoppage and PCV repair methods.

\* Main Steam Isolation Valve: A valve to shut off the steam generated from the Reactor in an emergency

### Unit 3



\* Indices related to plant are values as of 11:00, November 27, 2019

|                           |  |  |
|---------------------------|--|--|
| Investigations inside PCV | 1st (Oct – Dec 2015)                               | - Acquiring images - Measuring air temperature and dose rate<br>- Measuring water level and temperature - Sampling contaminated water<br>- Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation (December 2015) |
|                           | 2nd (Jul 2017)                                     | - Acquiring images<br>- Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation (August 2017)  |
| Leakage points from PCV   | - Main steam pipe bellows (identified in May 2014) |  |

### Investigative results into the Unit 3 PCV equipment hatch using a small investigation device

- As part of the investigation into the PCV to facilitate fuel debris retrieval, the status around the Unit 3 PCV equipment hatch was investigated using a small self-traveling investigation device on November 26, 2015.

- Given blots such as rust identified below the water level inside the PCV, there may be a leakage from the seal to the extent of bleeding.

Methods to investigate and repair the parts, including other PCV penetrations with a similar structure, will be considered.




### Investigation inside the PCV

Prior to fuel debris retrieval, the inside of the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) was investigated to identify the status there including the location of the fuel debris.

#### [Investigative outline]

- The status of X-53 penetration<sup>(\*)4</sup>, which may be under the water and which is scheduled for use to investigate the inside of the PCV, was investigated using remote-controlled ultrasonic test equipment. The results showed that the penetration was not under the water (October 22-24, 2014).
- For the purpose of confirming the status inside the PCV, an investigation device was inserted into the PCV from X-53 penetration on October 20 and 22, 2015 to obtain images, data of dose and temperature and sample contaminated water. No damage was identified on the structure and walls inside the PCV and the water level was almost identical with the estimated value. In addition, the dose inside the PCV was confirmed to be lower than in other Units.
- In July 2017, the inside of the PCV was investigated using the underwater ROV (remotely operated underwater vehicle) to inspect the inside of the pedestal.
- Analysis of image data obtained in the investigation identified damage to multiple structures and the supposed core internals. Consideration about fuel removal based on the obtained information will continue.
- Videos obtained in the investigation were reproduced in 3D. Based on the reproduced images, the relative positions of the structures, such as the rotating platform slipping off the rail with a portion buried in deposits, were visually understood.



Status inside the pedestal

### Capturing the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons

| Period         | Evaluation results   |
|----------------|--|
| May – Sep 2017 | The evaluation confirmed that no large lump existed in the core area where fuel had been placed and that part of the fuel debris potentially existed at the bottom of the RPV. |

<Glossary>  
 (\*1) SFP (Spent Fuel Pool) (\*2) RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel) (\*3) PCV (Primary Containment Vessel) (\*4) Penetration: Through-hole of the PCV




## Immediate target

Stably continue reactor cooling and contaminated water treatment, and improve reliability

### Work to improve the reliability of the circulation water injection cooling system and pipes to transfer contaminated water.

- Operation of the reactor water injection system using Unit 3 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) as a water source commenced (from July 5, 2013). Compared to the previous systems, the reliability of the reactor water injection system was enhanced, e.g. by increasing the amount of water-source storage and enhancing durability.
- To reduce the risk of contaminated-water leakage, the circulation loop was shortened by installing a reverse osmosis (RO) device in the Unit 4 Turbine Building within the circulation loop, comprising the transfer of contaminated water, water treatment and injection into the reactors. Operation of the installed RO device started from October 7 and 24-hour operation started from October 20. Installation of the new RO device inside the building shortened the circulation loop from approx. 3 to 0.8 km.
- To accelerate efforts to reduce the radiation density in contaminated water inside the buildings, circulating purification of contaminated water inside the buildings started on the Unit 3 and 4 side on February 22 and on the Unit 1 and 2 side on April 11.
- For circulating purification, a new pipe (contaminated water purification line) divided from the water treatment equipment outlet line was installed to transfer water purified at the water treatment equipment to the Unit 1 Reactor Building and the Unit 2-4 Turbine Buildings.
- The risks of contaminated water inside the buildings will continue to be reduced in addition to reduction of its storage.

\* The entire length of contaminated water transfer pipes is approx. 2.1km, including the transfer line of surplus water to the upper heights (approx. 1.3km).



### Progress status of dismantling of flange tanks

- To facilitate replacement of flanged tanks, dismantling of flanged tanks started in H1 east/H2 areas in May 2015. Dismantling of all flanged tanks was completed in H1 east area (12 tanks) in October 2015, in H2 area (28 tanks) in March 2016, in H4 area (56 tanks) in May 2017, in H3 B area (31 tanks) in September 2017, in H5 and H5 north areas (31 tanks) in June 2018, in G6 area (38 tanks) in July 2018, H6 and H6 north areas (24 tanks) in September 2018 and G4 south area (17 tanks) in March 2019.



Start of dismantling in H1 east area




After dismantling in H1 east area

### Completion of purification of contaminated water (RO concentrated salt water)

Contaminated water (RO concentrated salt water) is being treated using seven types of equipment including the multi-nuclide removal equipment (ALPS). Treatment of the RO concentrated salt water was completed on May 27, 2015, with the exception of the remaining water at the tank bottom. The remaining water will be treated sequentially toward dismantling the tanks.

The strontium-treated water from other facilities than the multi-nuclide removal equipment will be re-purified in the multi-nuclide removal equipment to further reduce risks.



### Preventing groundwater from flowing into the Reactor Buildings

#### Reducing groundwater inflow by pumping sub-drain water

To reduce groundwater flowing into the buildings, pumping-up of groundwater from wells (subdrains) around the buildings started on September 3, 2015. Pumped-up groundwater was purified at dedicated facilities and released after TEPCO and a third-party organization confirmed that its quality met operational targets.

#### Via a groundwater bypass, reduce the groundwater level around the Building and groundwater inflow into the Building

Measures to pump up groundwater flowing from the mountain side upstream of the Building to reduce the groundwater inflow (groundwater bypass) have been implemented.

The pumped up groundwater is temporarily stored in tanks and released after TEPCO and a third-party organization have confirmed that its quality meets operational targets.

Through periodical monitoring, pumping of wells and tanks is operated appropriately. At the observation holes installed at a height equivalent to the buildings, the trend showing a decline in groundwater levels is checked.




The analytical results on groundwater inflow into the buildings based on existing data showed a declining trend.

#### Installing land-side impermeable walls with frozen soil around Units 1-4 to prevent the inflow of groundwater into the building

To prevent the inflow of groundwater into the buildings, installation of impermeable walls on the land side is planned. Freezing started on the sea side and at a part of the mountain side from March 2016 and at 95% of the mountain side from June 2016. Freezing of the remaining unfrozen sections advanced with a phased approach and freezing of all sections started in August 2017.

In March 2018, construction of the land-side impermeable walls was completed, except for a portion of the depth, based on a monitoring result showing that the underground temperature had declined below 0°C in almost all areas, while on the mountain side, the difference between the inside and outside increased to approx. 4-5 m. The 21st Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment, held on March 7, 2018, evaluated that together with the function of sub-drains, etc., a water-level management system to stably control groundwater and isolate the buildings from it had been established and had allowed a significant reduction in the amount of contaminated water generated.

For the unfrozen depth, a supplementary method was implemented and it was confirmed that temperature of the part declined below 0°C by September 2018. From February 2019, maintenance operation started at all sections.



Freezing plant  
 Land-side impermeable walls  
 \*Length: approx. 1,500m

## Progress toward decommissioning: Work to improve the environment within the site


### Immediate targets

- Reduce the effect of additional release from the entire power station and radiation from radioactive waste (secondary water treatment waste, rubble, etc.) generated after the accident, to limit the effective radiation dose to below 1mSv/year at the site boundaries.
- Prevent contamination expansion in sea, decontamination within the site

### Optimization of radioactive protective equipment

Based on the progress of measures to reduce environmental dosage on site, the site is categorized into two zones: highly contaminated area around Unit 1-4 buildings, etc. and other areas to optimize protective equipment according to each category aiming at improving safety and productivity by reducing load during work.


From March 2016, limited operation started. From March and September 2017, the G Zone was expanded.



※1 Inside Unit 1-3 Reactor Buildings, Unit 1-4 Turbine Buildings, and areas of surrounding buildings that contain accumulated water.  
 ※2 Y zones with yellow dot areas are for works related to contamination such as handling concentrated salt water, etc. when the same protective equipment as in G zone is required for patrol or site visits for work planning. In addition to the area specified above, when engaging in works related to high-dose dust (dismantling of buildings, etc.) or works related to tank transfer lines such as concentrated salt water areas in G zone, the area is temporarily designated as Y zone.  
 ※3 In addition to the areas specified above, G zones also include a part of areas on the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> floors of the common pool building.

| R zone<br>(Anorak area)                       | Y zone<br>(Coverall area)        | G zone<br>(General wear)             |
|---|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Full-face mask<br>                            | Full-face or half-face masks<br> | Disposable disposable mask<br>       |
| Anorak on coverall<br>Or double coveralls<br> | Coverall<br>                     | General*3 Dedicated on-site wear<br> |

\*1 For works in buildings including water-treatment facilities (multi-nuclide removal equipment, etc.) (excluding site visits), wear a full-face mask.  
 \*2 For works in tank areas containing concentrated salt water or Sr-treated water (excluding works not handling concentrated salt water, etc., patrol, on-site investigation for work planning, and site visits) and works related to tank transfer lines, wear a full-face mask.  
 \*3 Specified light works (patrol, monitoring, delivery of goods brought from outside, etc.)



- Rubble storage area
- Trimmed trees storage area
- Rubble storage area (planned)
- Rubble storage area (before operation)
- Cesium absorption vessel storage area
- Sludge storage area
- Sludge storage area (before operation)
- Concentrated waste liquid storage area
- Used protective clothing storage area

### Installation of dose-rate monitors

To help workers in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station precisely understand the conditions of their workplaces, a total of 86 dose-rate monitors were installed by January 4, 2016.

These monitors allow workers to confirm real time on-site dose rates at their workplaces.

Workers are also able to check concentrated data through large-scale displays installed in the Main Anti-Earthquake Building and the access control facility.



Installation of Dose-rate monitor

### Installation of sea-side impermeable walls

To prevent the outflow of contaminated water into the sea, sea-side impermeable walls have been installed.

Following the completed installation of steel pipe sheet piles on September 22, 2015, connection of these piles was conducted and connection of sea-side impermeable walls was completed on October 26, 2015. Through these works, closure of sea-side impermeable walls was finished and the contaminated water countermeasures have been greatly advanced.



Installation of steel pipe sheet piles for sea-side impermeable wall

### Status of the large rest house

A large rest house for workers was established and its operation commenced on May 31, 2015.

Spaces in the large rest house are also installed for office work and collective worker safety checks as well as taking rest.

On March 1, 2016 a convenience store opened in the large rest house. On April 11, operation of the shower room started. Efforts will continue to improve convenience of workers.

