

(Summary) Report on the application of the application of the Accident Operation Manuals of Units 2 and 3, Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station at the time of the Accident

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1. Actions we have undertaken

(1) Summary of the operation after the earthquake

Concerning the operation between the occurrence of the earthquake and the seawater injection, we examined the data and report the operation for safety measures (shutdown, cooling, and containment).

(2) Selecting the Accident Operation Manuals

Regarding the existing Accident Operation Manuals (phenomenon-base, signal-base, and severe accident), we checked the assumed accident overview and selected the following manuals that we believe were used in response to the accident.

Phenomenon-base: scram trouble of the nuclear reactor, When the main steam valve is closed

Signal-base: External network accident, Loss of all AC power

Severe accident: AM (accident management) operation procedure, fire extinction system (alternative water injection procedure)

Severe accident: AM (accident management) operation procedure, Inactive gases (pressure-relief vent procedure)

(3) Comparison between the actual operation and the manuals

We have summarized an application status by comparing the accident manual we actually used and the actual operation procedure employed in terms of security measures.

2. Results of application status

Since there is no record of the procedures in response to the accident, we compared similar accident manuals and the actual operation we have done. At this moment, we believe that the operation implemented was proper in light of the status of the work site etc.

【Reference】 How to use the Accident Operation Manual

When responding to an accident that requires emergency operations (such as shutdown), it is supposed that we validate the actual operation done after the event has settled down to some extent, so that we will prioritize stabilizing the event without looking at the manuals. Moreover, at the time of an accident that requires flexible response, we do not necessarily abide by the existing manuals.

As for the response to the accident at Units 2 and 3 associated with the earthquake, there is no record whether we checked the procedures. Furthermore, the situation was far beyond to apply the existing Accident Operation Manuals (severe accident) as it originally was, in the circumstances after the tsunami attack.