


Main decommissioning works and steps

All fuel had been removed from Unit 4 SFP by December 22, 2014. Work continues toward fuel removal and debris (Note 1) retrieval from Unit 1-3.



Toward fuel removal from the spent fuel pool

Toward fuel removal from Unit 3 SFP in mid-FY2018, works are underway with safety first.

As measures to reduce the dose on the Reactor Building operating floor, the decontamination and installation of shields were completed in June and December 2016 respectively. Installation of a fuel removal cover started from January 2017 and installation of all dome roofs was completed in February 2018.

Installation of dome roofs (February 21, 2018)

Three principles behind contaminated water countermeasures:

Countermeasures for contaminated water are implemented in accordance with the following three principles:

1. Eliminate contamination sources

- Multi-nuclide removal equipment, etc.
 - Remove contaminated water from the trench (Note 3)
- (Note 3) Underground tunnel containing pipes.

2. Isolate water from contamination

- Pump up groundwater for bypassing
- Pump up groundwater near buildings
- Land-side impermeable walls
- Waterproof pavement

3. Prevent leakage of contaminated water

- Enhance soil by adding sodium silicate
- Sea-side impermeable walls
- Increase the number of (welded-joint) tanks



Multi-nuclide removal equipment (ALPS), etc.

- This equipment removes radionuclides from the contaminated water in tanks and reduces risks.
- Treatment of contaminated water (RO concentrated salt water) was completed in May 2015 via multi-nuclide removal equipment, additional multi-nuclide removal equipment installed by TEPCO (operation commenced in September 2014) and a subsidy project of the Japanese Government (operation commenced in October 2014).
- Strontium-treated water from equipment other than ALPS is being treated in ALPS.



Land-side impermeable walls

- Land-side impermeable walls surround the buildings and reduce groundwater inflow into the same.
- Freezing started on the sea side and part of the mountain side from March 2016 and on 95% of the mountain side from June 2016. Freezing of the remaining unfrozen sections advanced with a phased approach and freezing of all sections started in August 2017.
- In March 2018, the land-side impermeable walls were considered completed except for a portion of the depths based on a monitoring result showing that the underground temperature had declined below 0°C in almost all areas and on the mountain side, the difference between the inside and outside increased to approx. 4-5 m. The multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including subdrains and facing, have stably controlled the groundwater level. Consequently, a water-level management system to isolate the buildings from groundwater was considered to have been established. The Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment held on March 7 confirmed the effect of the land-side impermeable walls based on these evaluation results.



Sea-side impermeable walls

- Impermeable walls are being installed on the sea side of Units 1-4, to prevent contaminated groundwater from flowing into the sea.
- The installation of steel pipe sheet piles was completed in September 2015 and they were connected in October 2015. These works completed the closure of the sea-side impermeable walls.



Progress status

- ◆ The temperatures of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) and Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) of Units 1-3 have been maintained within the range of approx. 10-20°C¹ over the past month. There was no significant change in the density of radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Buildings in the air². It was evaluated that the comprehensive cold shutdown condition had been maintained.
- * 1 The values varied somewhat, depending on the unit and location of the thermometer.
- * 2 In February 2018, the radiation exposure dose due to the release of radioactive materials from the Unit 1-4 Reactor Buildings was evaluated as less than 0.00069 mSv/year at the site boundary. The annual radiation dose from natural radiation is approx. 2.1 mSv/year (average in Japan).

Increase in the capacity of the subdrain treatment system


As one of the multi-layered contaminated water management measures, in addition to water-proof pavement (facing) to prevent rainwater infiltrating into the ground, etc., facilities to enhance the subdrain treatment system are being installed and preparation for the operational launch be completed by the end of March. The facilities will increase the treatment capacity and improve reliability. In particular, the facilities will reduce groundwater pumped-up from the bank area and transferred to buildings even during heavy rain when the pumped-up groundwater volume is increased, while raising the operation rate of the subdrain treatment system and stably maintaining the groundwater level to reduce the generated contaminated water. Appropriate operation of these facilities will be ensured.

Evaluation of the land-side impermeable walls and future contaminated water management


The Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment held on March 7 clearly recognized the effect of the land-side impermeable walls to shield groundwater and confirmed that a water-level management system, including the functions of subdrains, etc., to stably control groundwater and isolate the buildings from groundwater had been established. The Committee evaluated that the land-side impermeable walls allowed for a significant reduction in the amount of contaminated water generated. The multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including treatment of stagnant water in buildings and declining of subdrain water level, will continue. In addition, rainwater prevention measures to suppress rainwater inflow from damaged roof parts will be implemented and investigations and countermeasures for inflow routes to buildings through embedded structures, etc. will be conducted to further reduce the generated contaminated water.

Installation of an opening on the west side of the Unit 2 Reactor Building

For Unit 2, toward fuel removal from the spent fuel pool, the dose and dust density, etc. on the operating floor will be measured before examining measures, etc. to prevent any influence on the surrounding environment. Following the completion of preparation, installation of an opening to access the inside of the operating floor will start from April. Dust scattering during the installation work will be suppressed by purifying the room air spraying anti-scattering agent, etc. Work will continue with safety first.



Status on the Reactor Building west side



Review of the management method for the dose of eye lens

The high radiosensitivity of eye lens has been widely recognized. Respecting the recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP)*, the management value will voluntarily be decreased to 50 mSv/year from April. This decrease is intended to increase safety for onsite workers.

* The ICRP recommended a decrease of the eye lens dose limit based on the latest epidemiological study

Preparation for Unit 3 fuel removal

To help remove fuel from the Unit 3 spent fuel pool around mid-FY2018, a test operation is underway. Training to handle fuel using actual machines will be provided to improve operation skills for fuel removal and rubble will be removed before removing the fuel.

Operational launch of the administrative building in the Okuma Analysis and Research Center

The Japan Atomic Energy Agency's Okuma Analysis and Research Center held an opening ceremony for its administrative building on March 15, 2018 whereupon the building went into operation. Construction of the 1st building and the detailed design of the 2nd building will continue. The administrative building will be used to examine the plans and procedures related to analysis and provide training for analysis, etc. toward the operational launch of these facilities.

Completion of destination switching of the A drainage channel

Rainwater, etc. in the area where the multi-nuclide removal equipment and other facilities are installed had been drained through A drainage channel to the outside of the port. However, to reduce the risk of water draining outside the port, the destination of the channel was switched to the inside of the port on March 26. This switching aims to manage drained water within the port. The monitoring detected no significant variation to date.




Construction status

Transfer of non-irradiated fuel assemblies in Units 5 and 6 to the outside of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS

In Unit 5 and 6, 596 non-irradiated fuel assemblies are stored. To advance decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as planned, 360 of 596 non-irradiated fuel assemblies will be transferred to the Fuel Fabrication Plant from FY2018. The transfer will have no influence on the environment because the fuel assemblies will be decontaminated on site. Work will start when preparation is completed and the fuel assemblies will be transferred after communicating the necessary information to the local communities.

Major initiatives – Locations on site



* Data of Monitoring Posts (MP1-MP8.)

Data (10-minute values) of Monitoring Posts (MPs) measuring the airborne radiation rate around site boundaries showed 0.404 – 1.757 $\mu\text{Sv/h}$ (February 28 – March 27, 2018).

We improved the measurement conditions of monitoring posts 2 to 8 to measure the air-dose rate precisely. Construction works, such as tree-clearing, surface soil removal and shield wall setting, were implemented from February 10 to April 18, 2012.

Therefore monitoring results at these points are lower than elsewhere in the power plant site.


The radiation shielding panels around monitoring post No. 6, which is one of the instruments used to measure the radiation dose at the power station site boundary, were taken off from July 10-11, 2013, since further deforestation, etc. had caused the surrounding radiation dose to decline significantly.

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I. Confirmation of the reactor conditions


1. Temperatures inside the reactors

Through continuous reactor cooling by water injection, the temperatures of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) bottom and the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) gas phase were maintained within the range of approx. 10 to 20°C for the past month, though it varied depending on the unit and location of the thermometer.



2. Release of radioactive materials from the Reactor Buildings

As of February 2018, the density of radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Building Units 1-4 in the air and measured at the site boundary was evaluated at approx. 8.4×10^{-12} Bq/cm³ for Cs-134 and 6.1×10^{-11} Bq/cm³ for Cs-137, while the radiation exposure dose due to the release of radioactive materials there was less than 0.00069 mSv/year.



Note: Different formulas and coefficients were used to evaluate the radiation dose in the facility operation plan and monthly report. The evaluation methods were integrated in September 2012. As the fuel removal from the spent fuel pool (SFP) commenced for Unit 4, the radiation exposure dose from Unit 4 was added to the items subject to evaluation since November 2013. The evaluation has been changed to a method considering the values of continuous dust monitors since FY2015, with data to be evaluated monthly and announced the following month.

3. Other indices

There was no significant change in indices, including the pressure in the PCV and the PCV radioactivity density (Xe-135) for monitoring criticality, nor was any abnormality in the cold shutdown condition or criticality sign detected.

Based on the above, it was confirmed that the comprehensive cold shutdown condition had been maintained and the reactors remained in a stabilized condition.

II. Progress status by each plan

1. Contaminated water countermeasures

To tackle the increase in stagnant water due to groundwater inflow, fundamental measures to prevent such inflow into the Reactor Buildings will be implemented, while improving the decontamination capability of water treatment and preparing facilities to control the contaminated water

➤ Operation of the groundwater bypass

- From April 9, 2014, the operation of 12 groundwater bypass pumping wells commenced sequentially to pump up

groundwater. The release started from May 21, 2014 in the presence of officials from the Intergovernmental Liaison Office for the Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Issue of the Cabinet Office. Up until March 27, 2018, 362,716 m³ of groundwater had been released. The pumped-up groundwater was temporarily stored in tanks and released after TEPCO and a third-party organization had confirmed that its quality met operational targets.

- Pumps are inspected and cleaned as required based on their operational status.
- Water Treatment Facility special for Subdrain & Groundwater drains
 - To reduce the level of groundwater flowing into the buildings, work began to pump up groundwater from wells (subdrains) around the buildings on September 3, 2015. The pumped-up groundwater was then purified at dedicated facilities and released from September 14, 2015 onwards. Up until March 27, 2018, a total of 509,368 m³ had been drained after TEPCO and a third-party organization had confirmed that its quality met operational targets.
 - Due to the level of the groundwater drain pond rising after the sea-side impermeable walls had been closed, pumping started on November 5, 2015. Up until March 28, 2018, a total of approx. 173,424 m³ had been pumped up and a volume of approx. less than 10 m³/day is being transferred from the groundwater drain to the Turbine Buildings (average for the period February 22 - March 21, 2018).
 - As one of the multi-layered contaminated water management measures, in addition to water-proof pavement (facing) to prevent rainwater infiltrating into the ground, etc., facilities to enhance the subdrain treatment system are being installed and preparation for the operational launch will be completed by the end of March. The facilities will increase the treatment capacity and improve reliability.
 - In particular, the facilities will reduce groundwater pumped-up from the bank area and transferred to buildings even during heavy rain when the pumped-up groundwater volume is increased, while raising the operation rate of the subdrain treatment system and stably maintaining the groundwater level to reduce the generated contaminated water.
 - Appropriate operation of these facilities will be ensured.
 - To maintain the level of groundwater pumped up from subdrains, work to install additional subdrain pits and recover existing subdrain pits is underway. They will go into operation sequentially from a pit for which work is completed (the number of pits which went into operation: 12 of 15 additional pits, 0 of 4 recovered pits).
 - To eliminate the suspension of water pumping while cleaning the subdrain transfer pipe, the pipe will be duplicated. Installation of the pipe and an ancillary facility is underway.
 - Since the subdrains went into operation, the inflow into buildings tended to decline to less than 150 m³/day when the subdrain water level declined below T.P. 3.0 m, while the inflow increased during rainfall.




Figure 1: Correlation between inflow such as groundwater and rainwater into buildings and the water level of Unit 1-4 subdrains

➤ Construction status of the land-side impermeable walls

- In the land-side impermeable walls, a maintenance operation to prevent the frozen soil from getting any thicker continues from May 2017 on the north and south sides and started from November 2017 on the east side, where frozen soil of sufficient thickness was identified.
- The Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment held on March 7 clearly recognized the effect of the land-side impermeable walls to shield groundwater and confirmed that a water-level management system, including the functions of subdrains, etc., to stably control groundwater and isolate the buildings from groundwater had been established. The Committee evaluated that the land-side impermeable walls allowed for a significant reduction in the amount of contaminated water generated.
- The multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including treatment of stagnant water in buildings and decline in the subdrain water level, will continue. In addition, rainwater prevention measures to suppress rainwater inflow from damaged roof parts will be implemented and investigations and countermeasures for inflow routes to buildings through embedded structures, etc. will be conducted to further reduce the generated contaminated water.




Figure 2: Closure of part of the land-side impermeable walls (on the mountain side)




Figure 3: Status of stagnant water storage

➤ Operation of multi-nuclide removal equipment

- Regarding the multi-nuclide removal equipment (existing and high-performance), hot tests using radioactive water were underway (for existing equipment, System A: from March 30, 2013, System B: from June 13, 2013, System C: from September 27, 2013; and for high-performance equipment, from October 18, 2014). The additional multi-nuclide removal equipment went into full-scale operation from October 16, 2017.
- As of March 22, the volumes treated by existing, additional and high-performance multi-nuclide removal equipment were approx. 370,000, 418,000 and 103,000 m³ respectively (including approx. 9,500 m³ stored in the J1(D) tank, which contained water with a high density of radioactive materials at the System B outlet of existing multi-nuclide removal equipment).
- To reduce the risks of strontium-treated water, treatment using existing, additional and high-performance multi-nuclide removal equipment has been underway (existing: from December 4, 2015; additional: from May 27, 2015; high-performance: from April 15, 2015). Up until March 22, 431,000 m³ had been treated.

➤ Toward reducing the risk of contaminated water stored in tanks

- Treatment measures comprising the removal of strontium by cesium-absorption apparatus (KURION) (from January 6, 2015) and the secondary cesium-absorption apparatus (SARRY) (from December 26, 2014) have been underway. Up until March 22, approx. 440,000 m³ had been treated.

➤ Measures in the Tank Area

- Rainwater, under the release standard and having accumulated within the fences in the contaminated water tank area, was sprinkled on site after eliminating radioactive materials using rainwater-treatment equipment since May 21, 2014 (as of March 26, 2018, a total of 97,508 m³).

➤ Drillage from the multi-nuclide removal equipment cross-flow filter drain line

- On March 2, 2018, a drillage (1 drop/ 3 seconds) and a puddle (2 cm × 2 cm × 1 mm) from the cross-flow filter (CFF) drain line pipe welding part was detected in the iron coprecipitation treatment system of the multi-nuclide removal equipment System C.
- The puddle remained in the CFF skid within the multi-nuclide removal equipment building and no external leakage was detected.

➤ Leakage of rainwater within the fences to the outer fences in the G3 west tank area

- On March 15, 2018, transferred rainwater within fences in the G3 west tank area leaked between the inner and outer fences, and a portion of the leakage infiltrated into the ground from a floor opening. The estimated water infiltration through the opening was approx. 300 L or less.
- Leakage inside the fences was approx. 6.5 m³ and the leaked water, which had remained inside the outer fences, was collected. No external leakage was detected.
- An investigation into the opening confirmed that the dose rate of the ground surface into which leakage infiltrated from the opening was below the dose rate threshold of the ground surface from which contaminated soil had been collected previously.
- The opening was covered and protected for water-proofing.

2. Fuel removal from the spent fuel pools

Work to help remove spent fuel from the pool is progressing steadily while ensuring seismic capacity and safety. The removal of spent fuel from the Unit 4 pool commenced on November 18, 2013 and was completed by December 22, 2014

➤ Main work to help spent fuel removal at Unit 1

- The installation of windbreak fences, which will reduce dust scattering during rubble removal, started on October 31, 2017 and was completed by December 19, 2017.
- As preparatory work for fuel removal from the Unit 1 spent fuel pool, rubble removal on the operating floor north side started from January 22.

- Rubble is being removed carefully by suction equipment. No significant variation was identified around the site boundaries where the density of radioactive materials was monitored and at onsite dust monitors during the above removal work.
- Removed rubble will be stored in solid waste storage facilities or elsewhere depending on the dose level.
- For future rubble removal on the operating floor south side, the spent fuel pool will be protected to prevent damage to fuel, etc. by rubble, etc. having fallen into the spent fuel pool located in the same area. Removal of a portion of the outer steel frame is being planned to ensure operability for the work.

➤ Main work to help remove spent fuel at Unit 2

- For Unit 2, toward fuel removal from the spent fuel pool, the dose and dust density, etc. on the operating floor will be measured before examining measures, etc. to prevent any influence on the surrounding environment.
- Following the completion of preparation, installation of an opening to access the inside of the operating floor will start from April.
- Dust scattering during the installation work will be suppressed by purifying the room air, spraying anti-scattering agent, etc.

➤ Main work to help remove spent fuel at Unit 3

- Installation of all dome roofs for the Unit 3 fuel removal cover was completed on February 23, 2018.
- To help remove fuel from the Unit 3 spent fuel pool in mid-FY2018, a test operation is underway.
- Training to handle fuel using actual machines will be provided to improve operation skills for fuel removal and rubble will be removed prior to removing the fuel.

3. Plans to store, process and dispose of solid waste and decommission of reactor facilities

Promoting efforts to reduce and store waste generated appropriately and R&D to facilitate adequate and safe storage, processing and disposal of radioactive waste

➤ Management status of the rubble and trimmed trees

- As of the end of February 2018, the total storage volume of concrete and metal rubble was approx. 231,500 m³ (+4,600 m³ compared to at the end of January, with an area-occupation rate of 65%). The total storage volume of trimmed trees was approx. 133,900 m³ (+100 m³, with an area-occupation rate of 76%). The total storage volume of used protective clothing was approx. 60,900 m³ (+1,600 m³, with an area-occupation rate of 86%). The increase in rubble was mainly attributable to construction to install tanks, general waste within the site, acceptance of rubble from the temporary storage area J and things from unknown locations within the site. The increase in used protective clothing was mainly attributable to acceptance of used protective clothing, etc.

➤ Management status of secondary waste from water treatment

- As of March 1, 2018, the total storage volume of waste sludge was 597 m³ (area-occupation rate: 85%) and that of concentrated waste fluid was 9,330 m³ (area-occupation rate: 87%). The total number of stored spent vessels, High-Integrity Containers (HICs) for multi-nuclide removal equipment, etc., was 3,913 (area-occupation rate: 61%).

➤ Operational launch of the administrative building in the Okuma Analysis and Research Center

- The Japan Atomic Energy Agency's Okuma Analysis and Research Center held an opening ceremony for its administrative building on March 15, 2018, whereupon the building went into operation.
- Construction of the 1st building and the detailed design of the 2nd building will continue. The administrative building will be used to examine the plans and procedures related to analysis and provide training for analysis, etc. toward the operational launch of these facilities.

4. Reduction in radiation dose and mitigation of contamination

Effective dose-reduction at site boundaries and purification of port water to mitigate the impact of radiation on the external environment





Figure 5: Seawater density around the port

- Completion of destination switching of the A drainage channel
 - Rainwater, etc. in the area where the multi-nuclide removal equipment and other facilities are installed had been drained through A drainage channel to the outside of the port. However, to reduce the risk of water draining outside the port, the destination of the channel was switched to the inside of the port on March 26. This switching aims to manage drained water within the port.
 - The monitoring detected no significant variation to date.

5. Outlook of the number of staff required and efforts to improve the labor environment and conditions

Securing appropriate staff long-term while thoroughly implementing workers' exposure dose control. Improving the work environment and labor conditions continuously based on an understanding of workers' on-site needs

- Staff management
 - The monthly average total of people registered for at least one day per month to work on site during the past quarter from November 2017 to January 2018 was approx. 11,000 (TEPCO and partner company workers), which exceeded the monthly average number of actual workers (approx. 8,300). Accordingly, sufficient people are registered to work on site.
 - It was confirmed with the prime contractors that the estimated manpower necessary for the work in April 2018 (approx. 4,470 per day: TEPCO and partner company workers) would be secured at present. The average numbers of workers per day per month (actual values) were maintained, with approx. 4,900 to 7,000 since FY2015 (see Figure 6).
 - The number of workers from both within and outside Fukushima Prefecture has increased. The local employment ratio (TEPCO and partner company workers) as of February has remained constant at around 60%.
 - The monthly average exposure dose of workers remained at approx. 0.81 mSv/month during FY2014, approx. 0.59 mSv/month during FY2015 and approx. 0.39 mSv/month during FY2016. (Reference: Annual average exposure dose 20 mSv/year $\hat{=}$ 1.7 mSv/month)
 - For most workers, the exposure dose was sufficiently within the limit and allowed them to continue engaging in radiation work.



* Calculated based on the number of workers from August 3-7, 24-28 and 31 (due to overhaul of heavy machines)

Figure 6: Changes in the average number of workers per weekday for each month since FY2015 (actual values)




Figure 7: Changes in monthly individual worker exposure dose (monthly average exposure dose since March 2011)

- Measures to prevent infection and expansion of influenza and norovirus
 - Since November, measures for influenza and norovirus have been implemented, including free influenza vaccinations (subsidized by TEPCO HD) in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (from October 25 to November 24, 2017) and medical clinics around the site (from November 1, 2017 to January 31, 2018) for partner company workers. As of January 31, 2018, a total of 6,864 workers had been vaccinated. In addition, a comprehensive range of other measures is also being implemented, including daily actions to prevent infection and expansion (measuring body temperature, health checks and monitoring infection status) and response after detecting possible infections (swiftly taking potential patients off site and entry controls, mandatory wearing of masks in working spaces, etc.).
- Status of influenza and norovirus cases
 - Until the 12th week of 2018 (March 19-25, 2018), 301 influenza infections and 11 norovirus infections were recorded. The totals for the same period for the previous season showed 391 influenza cases and 16 norovirus infections.
- Review of the management method for the dose of eye lens
 - The high radiosensitivity of eye lens has been widely recognized. Respecting the recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP)*, the management value will voluntarily be decreased to 50 mSv/year from April.
 - This decrease is intended to increase safety for onsite workers.

* The ICRP recommended a decrease of the eye lens dose limit based on the latest epidemiological study

6. Status of Units 5 and 6

➤ Status of spent fuel storage in Units 5 and 6

- Regarding Unit 5, fuel removal from the reactor was completed in June 2015. 1,374 spent fuel assemblies and 168 non-irradiated fuel assemblies are stored in the spent fuel pool (storage capacity: 1,590 assemblies).
- Regarding Unit 6, fuel removal from the reactor was completed in November 2013. 1,456 spent fuel assemblies and 198 non-irradiated fuel assemblies (180 of which were transferred from the Unit 4 spent fuel pool) are stored in the spent fuel pool (storage capacity: 1,654 assemblies) and 230 non-irradiated fuel assemblies are stored in the storage facility of non-irradiated fuel assemblies (storage capacity: 230 assemblies).

➤ Status of stagnant water in Units 5 and 6

- Stagnant water in Units 5 and 6 is transferred from Unit 6 Turbine Building to outdoor tanks and sprinkled after undergoing oil separation and RO treatment and confirming the density of radioactive materials.


➤ Transfer of non-irradiated fuel assemblies in Units 5 and 6 to the outside of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS

- In Unit 5 and 6, 596 non-irradiated fuel assemblies are stored.
- To advance decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as planned, 360 of 596 non-irradiated fuel assemblies will be transferred to the Fuel Fabrication Plant from FY2018.
- The transfer will have no influence on the environment because the fuel assemblies will be decontaminated on site.
- Work will start when preparation is completed and the fuel assemblies will be transferred after communicating the necessary information to the local communities.

Status of seawater monitoring within the port (comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

“The highest value” → “the latest value (sampled during March 19-27)”; unit (Bq/L); ND represents a value below the detection limit

Source: TEPCO website Analysis results on nuclides of radioactive materials around Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station <http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/f1/smp/index-j.html>



Cesium-134: 3.3 (2013/10/17) → ND(0.34) Below 1/9
Cesium-137: 9.0 (2013/10/17) → 0.40 Below 1/20
Gross β: **74** (2013/ 8/19) → ND(17) Below 1/4
Tritium: 67 (2013/ 8/19) → ND(1.8) Below 1/30

Cesium-134: ND(0.59)
Cesium-137: 0.78
Gross β: ND(16)
Tritium: ND(1.7) *

Cesium-134: 3.3 (2013/12/24) → ND(0.60) Below 1/5
Cesium-137: 7.3 (2013/10/11) → 0.91 Below 1/8
Gross β: **69** (2013/ 8/19) → ND(16) Below 1/4
Tritium: 68 (2013/ 8/19) → ND(1.7) Below 1/40

Cesium-134: 4.4 (2013/12/24) → ND(0.30) Below 1/10
Cesium-137: **10** (2013/12/24) → ND(0.37) Below 1/20
Gross β: **60** (2013/ 7/ 4) → ND(17) Below 1/3
Tritium: 59 (2013/ 8/19) → ND(1.8) Below 1/30

Cesium-134: 3.5 (2013/10/17) → ND(0.23) Below 1/10
Cesium-137: 7.8 (2013/10/17) → ND(0.38) Below 1/20
Gross β: **79** (2013/ 8/19) → ND(17) Below 1/4
Tritium: 60 (2013/ 8/19) → ND(1.8) Below 1/30

Cesium-134: 5.0 (2013/12/2) → ND(0.28) Below 1/10
Cesium-137: 8.4 (2013/12/2) → ND(0.27) Below 1/30
Gross β: **69** (2013/8/19) → ND(17) Below 1/4
Tritium: 52 (2013/8/19) → ND(1.8) Below 1/20


Cesium-134: **32** (2013/10/11) → ND(0.54) Below 1/50
Cesium-137: **73** (2013/10/11) → 3.4 Below 1/20
Gross β: **320** (2013/ 8/12) → 17 Below 1/10
Tritium: 510 (2013/ 9/ 2) → 9.1 Below 1/50
From February 11, 2017, the location of the sampling point was shifted approx. 50 m south of the previous point due to the location shift of the silt fence.

Cesium-134: 2.8 (2013/12/2) → ND(0.48) Below 1/5
Cesium-137: 5.8 (2013/12/2) → 0.80 Below 1/7
Gross β: **46** (2013/8/19) → ND(17) Below 1/2
Tritium: 24 (2013/8/19) → ND(2.2) Below 1/10

Cesium-134: ND (0.58)
Cesium-137: 3.4
Gross β: ND (17)
Tritium: 9.7 *

Cesium-134: ND (0.70)
Cesium-137: 3.3
Gross β: ND (17)
Tritium: 12 *

	Legal discharge limit	WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality
Cesium-134	60	10
Cesium-137	90	10
Strontium-90 (strongly correlate with Gross β)	30	10
Tritium	60,000	10,000



Cesium-134: ND (0.66)
Cesium-137: 3.7
Gross β: ND (17)
Tritium: 18 *

* Monitoring commenced in or after March 2014. Monitoring inside the sea-side impermeable walls was finished because of the landfill.

Cesium-134: 5.3 (2013/8/ 5) → ND(0.51) Below 1/10
Cesium-137: 8.6 (2013/8/ 5) → ND(0.48) Below 1/10
Gross β: **40** (2013/7/ 3) → ND(17) Below 1/2
Tritium: 340 (2013/6/26) → ND(1.7) Below 1/200

Note: The gross β measurement values include natural potassium 40 (approx. 12 Bq/L). They also include the contribution of yttrium 90, which radioactively balance strontium 90.


Summary of TEPCO data as of March 28, 2018

Status of seawater monitoring around outside of the port (comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

(The latest values sampled during March 19-27)

Unit (Bq/L); ND represents a value below the detection limit; values in () represent the detection limit; ND (2013) represents ND throughout 2013

	Legal discharge limit	WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality
Cesium-134	60	10
Cesium-137	90	10
Strontium-90 (strongly correlate with Gross β)	30	10
Tritium	60,000	10,000



Note: Because safety of the sampling points was unassured due to the influence of Typhoon No. 10 in 2016, samples were taken from approx. 330 m south of the Unit 1-4 release outlet. Samples were also taken from a point approx. 280m south from the same release outlet from January 27, 2017 and approx. 320m from March 23, 2018

Summary of TEPCO data as of March 28, 2018

TEPCO Holdings Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Site

Appendix 2
March 29, 2018

- Rubble storage area
- Rubble storage area (planned)
- Trimmed trees area
- Mid-/ low-level contaminated water tank (existing)
- Mid-/ low-level contaminated water tank (planned)
- High-level contaminated water tank (existing)
- High-level contaminated water tank (planned)
- Secondary waste from water treatment (existing)
- Secondary waste from water treatment (planned)
- Multi-nuclide removal equipment
- Water treatment facility special for Subdrain & Groundwater drain
- Temporary Cask Custody Area
- Used protective clothing



Inside the rubble storage tent



Rubble (container storage)



Rubble storage tent



Temporary soil-covered type storage facility



Rubble (outdoor accumulation)



Solid waste storage facility




Rubble (outdoor accumulation)



Temporary trimmed trees storage pool



Trimmed trees (outdoor accumulation)



Tank installation status



Temporary waste sludge storage



Spent absorption vessel temporary storage (multi-nuclide removal equipment, etc.)

Spent absorption vessel temporary storage

Provided by ©2016 DigitalGlobe, Inc., NTT DATA Corporation



Progress toward decommissioning: Fuel removal from the spent fuel pool (SFP)

Immediate target Commence fuel removal from the Unit 1-3 Spent Fuel Pools

Unit 1

Regarding fuel removal from Unit 1 spent fuel pool, there is a plan to install a dedicated cover for fuel removal over the top floor of the Reactor Building (operating floor). All roof panels and wall panels of the building cover were dismantled by November 10, 2016. Removal of pillars and beams of the building was completed on May 11, 2017. Modification of the pillars and beams of the building cover and installation of building cover were completed by December 19. Rubble removal from the operating floor north side started from January 22, 2018. Rubble is being removed carefully by suction equipment. No significant variation was identified around site boundaries where the density of radioactive materials was monitored and at onsite dust monitors during the above removal work.



<Installation status (January 22)>



October 2015



November 2017

Scope of rubble removal (north side)

Unit 2

To facilitate removal of fuel assemblies and retrieval of debris in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool, the scope of dismantling and modification of the existing Reactor Building rooftop was examined. From the perspective of ensuring safety during the work, controlling impacts on the outside of the power station, and removing fuel rapidly to reduce risks, we decided to dismantle the whole rooftop above the highest floor of the Reactor Building.

Examination of the following two plans continues: Plan 1 to share a container for removing fuel assemblies from the pool and retrieving fuel debris; and Plan 2 to install a dedicated cover for fuel removal from the pool.




Image of Plan 1




Image of Plan 2

Unit 3

Prior to the installation of a cover for fuel removal, removal of large rubble from the spent fuel pool was completed in November 2015. To ensure safe and steady fuel removal, training of remote control was conducted at the factory using the actual fuel-handling machine which will be installed on site (February – December 2015). Measures to reduce dose on the Reactor Building top floor (decontamination, shields) were completed in December 2016. Installation of a cover for fuel removal and a fuel-handling machine is underway from January 2017.

Installation of the fuel removal cover was completed on February 23, 2018. Work will continue with safety first toward fuel removal around mid-FY2018.



Installation of dome roof (February 21)




Image of entire fuel handling facility inside the cover

Unit 4

In the Mid- and Long-Term Roadmap, the target of Phase 1 involved commencing fuel removal from inside the spent fuel pool (SFP) of the 1st Unit within two years of completion of Step 2 (by December 2013). On November 18, 2013, fuel removal from Unit 4, or the 1st Unit, commenced and Phase 2 of the roadmap started.

On November 5, 2014, within a year of commencing work to fuel removal, all 1,331 spent fuel assemblies in the pool had been transferred. The transfer of the remaining non-irradiated fuel assemblies to the Unit 6 SFP was completed on December 22, 2014. (2 of the non-irradiated fuel assemblies were removed in advance in July 2012 for fuel checks)


This marks the completion of fuel removal from the Unit 4 Reactor Building. Based on this experience, fuel assemblies will be removed from Unit 1-3 pools.

* A part of the photo is corrected because it includes sensitive information related to physical protection.



Fuel removal status

Common pool




An open space will be maintained in the common pool (Transfer to the temporary cask custody area)

Progress to date

- The common pool has been restored to a condition allowing it to re-accommodate fuel to be handled (November 2012)
- Loading of spent fuel stored in the common pool to dry casks commenced (June 2013)
- Fuel removal from the Unit 4 spent fuel pool began to be received (November 2013 - November 2014)

Temporary cask⁽²⁾ custody area



Spent fuel is accepted from the common pool

Operation commenced on April 12, 2013; from the cask-storage building, transfer of 9 existing dry casks completed (May 21, 2013); fuel stored in the common pool sequentially transferred.

<Glossary>

(*) Operating floor: During regular inspection, the roof over the reactor is opened while on the operating floor, fuel inside the core is replaced and the core internals are inspected.

(*) Cask: Transportation container for samples and equipment, including radioactive materials.


Immediate target Identify the plant status and commence R&D and decontamination toward fuel debris retrieval

Investigation into TIP Room of the Unit 1 Reactor Building

- To improve the environment for future investigations inside the PCV, etc., an investigation was conducted from September 24 to October 2, 2015 at the TIP Room⁽¹⁾. (Due to high dose around the entrance in to the TIP Room, the investigation of dose rate and contamination distribution was conducted through a hole drilled from the walkway of the Turbine Building, where the dose was low)
- The investigative results identified high dose at X-31 to 33 penetrations⁽²⁾ (instrumentation penetration) and low dose at other parts.
- As it was confirmed that work inside the TIP room would be available, the next step will include identification of obstacles which will interfere the work inside the TIP Room and formulation of a plan for dose reduction.

Investigation in the leak point detected in the upper part of the Unit 1 Suppression Chamber (S/C⁽³⁾)

Investigation in the leak point detected in the upper part of Unit 1 S/C from May 27, 2014 from one expansion joint cover among the lines installed there. As no leakage was identified from other parts, specific methods will be examined to halt the flow of water and repair the PCV.



Leak point





Image of the S/C upper part investigation



Status of investigation inside the PCV

Prior to fuel debris retrieval, an investigation inside the PCV will be conducted to inspect the status there including the location of fuel debris.

[Investigative outline]

- In April 2015, a device, which entered the inside of the PCV through a narrow access opening (bore: φ 100 mm), collected information such as images and airborne dose inside the PCV 1st floor.
- In March 2017, the investigation using a self-propelled investigation device, conducted to inspect the spreading of debris to the basement floor outside the pedestal, took images of the PCV bottom status for the first time. The status inside the PCV will continue to be examined based on the collected image and dose data.





Image of hanging of dosimeter and camera



Image near the bottom

* Indices related to the plant are values as of 11:00, March 28, 2018

Investigations inside PCV	1st (Oct 2012)	2nd (Apr 2015)	3rd (Mar 2017)
	- Acquiring images - Measuring air temperature and dose rate - Measuring water level and temperature - Sampling stagnant water - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation	Confirming the status of PCV 1st floor - Acquiring images - Measuring air temperature and dose rate - Replacing permanent monitoring instrumentation	Confirming the status of PCV 1st basement floor - Acquiring images - Measuring air temperature and dose rate - Sampling deposit - Replacing permanent monitoring instrumentation
Leakage points from PCV	- PCV vent pipe vacuum break line bellows (identified in May 2014) - Sand cushion drain line (identified in November 2013)		

Capturing the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons

Period	Evaluation results
Feb - May 2015	Confirmed that there was no large fuel in the reactor core.

<Glossary>
 (*1) TIP (Traversing In-core Probe)
 (*2) Penetration: Through-hole of the PCV
 (*3) S/C (Suppression Chamber): Suppression pool, used as the water source for the emergent core cooling system.
 (*4) SFP (Spent Fuel Pool):
 (*5) RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel)
 (*6) PCV (Primary Containment Vessel)



Immediate target Identify the plant status and commence R&D and decontamination toward fuel debris retrieval

Installation of an RPV thermometer and permanent PCV supervisory instrumentation

- (1) Replacement of the RPV thermometer
 - As the thermometer installed at the Unit 2 RPV bottom after the earthquake had broken in February 2014, it was excluded from the monitoring thermometers.
 - In April 2014, removal of the broken thermometer failed and was suspended. Rust-stripping chemicals were injected and the broken thermometer was removed in January 2015. A new thermometer was reinstalled in March. The thermometer has been used as a part of permanent supervisory instrumentation since April.
- (2) Reinstallation of the PCV thermometer and water-level gauge
 - Some of the permanent supervisory instrumentation for PCV could not be installed in the planned locations due to interference with existing grating (August 2013). The instrumentation was removed in May 2014 and new instruments were reinstalled in June 2014. The trend of added instrumentation will be monitored for approx. one month to evaluate its validity.
 - The measurement during the installation confirmed that the water level inside the PCV was approx. 300mm from the bottom.

Investigative results on torus chamber walls

- The torus chamber walls were investigated (on the north side of the east-side walls) using equipment specially developed for that purpose (a swimming robot and a floor traveling robot).
- At the east-side wall pipe penetrations (five points), "the status" and "existence of flow" were checked.
- A demonstration using the above two types of underwater wall investigative equipment showed how the equipment could check the status of penetration.
- Regarding Penetrations 1 - 5, the results of checking the sprayed tracer (*) by camera showed no flow around the penetrations. (investigation by the swimming robot)
- Regarding Penetration 3, a sonar check showed no flow around the penetrations. (investigation by the floor traveling robot)



Status of investigation inside the PCV

Prior to fuel debris retrieval, an investigation inside the PCV will be conducted to inspect the status there including the location of fuel debris.

[Investigative outline]

- A robot, injected from Unit 2 X-6 penetration^(*), will access the inside of the pedestal using the CRD rail.

[Progress status]

- On January 26 and 30, 2017, a camera was inserted from the PCV penetration to inspect the status of the CRD replacement rail on which the robot will travel. On February 9, deposit on the access route of the self-propelled investigative device was removed and on February 16, the inside of the PCV was investigated using the device.
- The results of this series of investigations confirmed fallen and deformed gratings and a quantity of deposit inside the pedestal.
- On January 19, 2018, the inside of the Unit 2 PCV was investigated. During this investigation, the status under the platform was inspected by the improved telescopic-type investigative device which was used in the previous investigation (January - February 2017). From the investigative results, part of the fuel assemblies having fallen to the bottom of the pedestal was found. Deposits identified around the fuel assemblies were considered to be fuel debris. The images acquired in this investigation will be analyzed.



Capturing the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons

Period	Evaluation results
Mar - Jul 2016	Confirmed the existence of high-density materials, which was considered as fuel debris, at the bottom of RPV, and in the lower part and the outer periphery of the reactor core. It was assumed that a large part of fuel debris existed at the bottom of RPV.

<Glossary> (*) Penetration: Through-hole of the PCV (**) SFP (Spent Fuel Pool) (3) RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel) (4) PCV (Primary Containment Vessel) (5) Tracer: Material used to trace the fluid flow. Clay particles

* Indices related to plant are values as of 11:00, March 28, 2018

Investigations inside PCV	1st (Jan 2012)	2nd (Mar 2012)	3rd (Feb 2013 - Jun 2014)	4th (Jan - Feb 2017)
	- Acquiring images - Measuring air temperature	- Confirming water surface - Measuring water temperature - Measuring dose rate	- Acquiring images - Sampling stagnant water - Measuring water level - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation	- Acquiring images - Measuring dose rate - Measuring air temperature

Leakage points from PCV	Leakage status
	- No leakage from torus chamber rooftop - No leakage from all inside/outside surfaces of S/C

Immediate target Identify the plant status and commence R&D and decontamination toward fuel debris retrieval

Water flow was detected from the Main Steam Isolation Valve* room


On January 18, 2014, a flow of water from around the door of the Steam Isolation Valve room in the Reactor Building Unit 3 1st floor northeast area to the nearby floor drain funnel (drain outlet) was detected. As the drain outlet connects with the underground part of the Reactor Building, there is no possibility of outflow from the building.

From April 23, 2014, image data has been acquired by camera and the radiation dose measured via pipes for measurement instrumentation, which connect the air-conditioning room on the Reactor Building 2nd floor with the Main Steam Isolation Valve Room on the 1st floor. On May 15, 2014, water flow from the expansion joint of one Main Steam Line was detected. This is the first leak from PCV detected in the Unit 3. Based on the images collected in this investigation, the leak volume will be estimated and the need for additional investigations will be examined. The investigative results will also be utilized to examine water stoppage and PCV repair methods.

* Main Steam Isolation Valve: A valve to shut off the steam generated from the Reactor in an emergency


Investigative results into the Unit 3 PCV equipment hatch using a small investigation device

- As part of the investigation into the PCV to facilitate fuel debris retrieval, the status around the Unit 3 PCV equipment hatch was investigated using a small self-traveling investigation device on November 26, 2015.



- Given blots such as rust identified below the water level inside the PCV, there may be a leakage from the seal to the extent of bleeding. Methods to investigate and repair the parts, including other PCV penetrations with a similar structure, will be considered.

Unit 3




* Indices related to plant are values as of 11:00, March 28, 2018

Investigation inside the PCV

Prior to fuel debris retrieval, the inside of the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) was investigated to identify the status there including the location of the fuel debris.

[Investigative outline]

- The status of X-53 penetration⁽⁴⁾, which may be under the water and which is scheduled for use to investigate the inside of the PCV, was investigated using remote-controlled ultrasonic test equipment. The results showed that the penetration was not under the water (October 22-24, 2014).
- For the purpose of confirming the status inside the PCV, an investigation device was inserted into the PCV from X-53 penetration on October 20 and 22, 2015 to obtain images, data of dose and temperature and sample stagnant water. No damage was identified on the structure and walls inside the PCV and the water level was almost identical with the estimated value. In addition, the dose inside the PCV was confirmed to be lower than in other Units.
- In July 2017, the inside of the PCV was investigated using the underwater ROV (remotely operated underwater vehicle) to inspect the inside of the pedestal.
- Analysis of image data obtained in the investigation identified damage to multiple structures and the supposed core internals. Consideration about fuel removal based on the obtained information will continue.



Investigations inside PCV	1st (Oct – Dec 2015)	- Acquiring images - Measuring air temperature and dose rate - Measuring water level and temperature - Sampling stagnant water - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation (December 2015)
	2nd (Jul 2017)	- Acquiring images - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation (August 2017)
Leakage points from PCV	- Main steam pipe bellows (identified in May 2014)	

Capturing the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons

Period	Evaluation results
May – Sep 2017	The evaluation confirmed that no large lump existed in the core area where fuel had been placed and that part of the fuel debris potentially existed at the bottom of the RPV.

<Glossary>
 (*1) SFP (Spent Fuel Pool) (*2) RPV (Reactor Pressure Vessel) (*3) PCV (Primary Containment Vessel) (*4) Penetration: Through-hole of the PCV


Progress toward decommissioning: Work related to circulation cooling and stagnant water treatment line

Immediate target **Stably continue reactor cooling and stagnant water treatment, and improve reliability**

Work to improve the reliability of the circulation water injection cooling system and pipes to transfer stagnant water.

- Operation of the reactor water injection system using Unit 3 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) as a water source commenced (from July 5, 2013). Compared to the previous systems, the reliability of the reactor water injection system was enhanced, e.g. by increasing the amount of water-source storage and enhancing durability.
- To reduce the risk of contaminated-water leakage, the circulation loop was shortened by installing a reverse osmosis (RO) device in the Unit 4 Turbine Building within the circulation loop, comprising the transfer of contaminated water, water treatment and injection into the reactors. Operation of the installed RO device started from October 7 and 24-hour operation started from October 20. Installation of the new RO device inside the building shortened the circulation loop from approx. 3 to 0.8 km.
- To accelerate efforts to reduce the radiation density in stagnant water inside the buildings, circulating purification of stagnant water inside the buildings started on the Unit 3 and 4 side on February 22.
- For circulating purification, a new pipe divided from the water treatment equipment outlet line was installed to transfer water purified at the water treatment equipment to the Unit 1 Reactor Building and the Unit 2-4 Turbine Buildings.
- The risks of stagnant water inside the buildings will continue to be reduced in addition to reduction of its storage.
- The circulating purification on the Unit 1 and 2 side will go into operation in April.

* The entire length of contaminated water transfer pipes is approx. 2.1km, including the transfer line of surplus water to the upper heights (approx. 1.3km).



Progress status of dismantling of flange tanks

- To facilitate replacement of flange tanks, dismantling of flange tanks started in H1 east/H2 areas in May 2015. Dismantling of all flange tanks was completed in H1 east area (12 tanks) in October 2015, in H2 area (28 tanks) in March 2016 and in H4 area (56 tanks) in May 2017 and in H3 B area (31 tanks) in September 2017. Dismantling of flange tanks in H5 and H6 areas is underway.



Start of dismantling in H1 east area




After dismantling in H1 east area

Completion of purification of contaminated water (RO concentrated salt water)

Contaminated water (RO concentrated salt water) is being treated using seven types of equipment including the multi-nuclide removal equipment (ALPS). Treatment of the RO concentrated salt water was completed on May 27, 2015, with the exception of the remaining water at the tank bottom. The remaining water will be treated sequentially toward dismantling the tanks.

The strontium-treated water from other facilities than the multi-nuclide removal equipment will be re-purified in the multi-nuclide removal equipment to further reduce risks.



Preventing groundwater from flowing into the Reactor Buildings

Reducing groundwater inflow by pumping sub-drain water



To reduce groundwater flowing into the buildings, pumping-up of groundwater from wells (subdrains) around the buildings started on September 3, 2015. Pumped-up groundwater was purified at dedicated facilities and released after TEPCO and a third-party organization confirmed that its quality met operational targets.

Via a groundwater bypass, reduce the groundwater level around the Building and groundwater inflow into the Building

Measures to pump up groundwater flowing from the mountain side upstream of the Building to reduce the groundwater inflow (groundwater bypass) have been implemented. The pumped up groundwater is temporarily stored in tanks and released after TEPCO and a third-party organization have confirmed that its quality meets operational targets. Through periodical monitoring, pumping of wells and tanks is operated appropriately. At the observation holes installed at a height equivalent to the buildings, the trend showing a decline in groundwater levels is checked. The analytical results on groundwater inflow into the buildings based on existing data showed a declining trend.

Installing land-side impermeable walls with frozen soil around Units 1-4 to prevent the inflow of groundwater into the building

To prevent the inflow of groundwater into the buildings, installation of impermeable walls on the land side is planned. Freezing started on the sea side and at a part of the mountain side from March 2016 and at 95% of the mountain side from June 2016. Freezing of the remaining unfrozen sections advanced with a phased approach and freezing of all sections started in August 2017. In March 2018, the land-side impermeable walls were considered completed except for a portion of the depths based on a monitoring result showing that the underground temperature had declined below 0°C in almost all areas and on the mountain side, the difference between the inside and outside increased to approx. 4-5 m. The multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including subdrains and facing, have stably controlled the groundwater level. Consequently, a water-level management system to isolate the buildings from groundwater was considered to have been established. The Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment held on March 7 confirmed the effect of the land-side impermeable walls based on these evaluation results.



Freezing plant
Land-side impermeable walls
-Length: approx. 1,500m

Progress toward decommissioning: Work to improve the environment within the site


Immediate targets

- Reduce the effect of additional release from the entire power station and radiation from radioactive waste (secondary water treatment waste, rubble, etc.) generated after the accident, to limit the effective radiation dose to below 1mSv/year at the site boundaries.
- Prevent contamination expansion in sea, decontamination within the site

Optimization of radioactive protective equipment


Based on the progress of measures to reduce environmental dosage on site, the site is categorized into two zones: highly contaminated area around Unit 1-4 buildings, etc. and other areas to optimize protective equipment according to each category aiming at improving safety and productivity by reducing load during work.

From March 2016, limited operation started. From March and September 2017, the G Zone was expanded.



R zone (Anorak area)	Y zone (Coverall area)	G zone (General area)
Full face mask	Full face or half face masks	Disposable disposable mask
Anorak on coverall Or double coveralls	Coverall	General ¹⁾ Dedicated on-site wear

¹⁾ For works in buildings including water treatment facilities (small-scale removal equipment, etc.) (excluding site visits), wear a full face mask.
²⁾ For works in both areas including concentrated full water or de-treated water (including works and handling concentrated full water, etc., grab-and, on-site investigation for work planning, and site visits) and works related to tank transfer lines, wear a full face mask.
³⁾ Specified light work (grab, monitoring, delivery of goods brought from outside, etc.)



Installation of dose-rate monitors

To help workers in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station precisely understand the conditions of their workplaces, a total of 86 dose-rate monitors were installed by January 4, 2016.

These monitors allow workers to confirm real time on-site dose rates at their workplaces.

Workers are also able to check concentrated data through large-scale displays installed in the Main Anti-Earthquake Building and the access control facility.



Installation of Dose-rate monitor

Installation of sea-side impermeable walls

To prevent the outflow of contaminated water into the sea, sea-side impermeable walls have been installed.

Following the completed installation of steel pipe sheet piles on September 22, 2015, connection of these piles was conducted and connection of sea-side impermeable walls was completed on October 26, 2015. Through these works, closure of sea-side impermeable walls was finished and the contaminated water countermeasures have been greatly advanced.



Installation of steel pipe sheet piles for sea-side impermeable wall

Status of the large rest house

A large rest house for workers was established and its operation commenced on May 31, 2015.

Spaces in the large rest house are also installed for office work and collective worker safety checks as well as taking rest.

On March 1, 2016 a convenience store opened in the large rest house. On April 11, operation of the shower room started. Efforts will continue to improve convenience of workers.

