Partial damage to temperature gauge cables for the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) found during the Fukushima Daiichi NPS Unit 3 Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) internal investigation


November 30, 2017



# Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc.

### Situation of temperature gauges at the bottom of the Unit 3 RPV based on the internal investigation (1/3)

- There are two routes for temperature gauges at the bottom of the RPV, one inside the pedestal (12 temperature gauges<sup>\*</sup>) and one outside the pedestal (6 temperature gauges<sup>\*</sup>). \* Three along the inside route and six along the outside route are used to monitor the limiting conditions of operation stipulated in the implementation plan.
- **Damage to the inside pedestal route (12 temperature gauges)** was seen in images taken during the internal investigation.
- Damage was found on cables inside the PCV between the relay terminal platform and measuring points



#### Situation of temperature gauges at the bottom of the Unit 3 TEPCO RPV based on the internal investigation (2/3)

<Assumed causes of the damage>

temperature gauge cables found damaged are made of a metallic sheath and wires that have a melting point of more than  $1,000^{\circ}$ C.

It is assumed that the cables experienced thermal cutting by high-temperature molten objects that fell onto the cables from the RPV bottom.

The 12 temperature gauges along the route leading inside the pedestal are considered to be "broken" because thermal cutting of the cables has rendered them unable to measure the temperatures at the bottom of the RPV.


### <Status of reactor cooling>

There are many uncertainties surrounding the location of fuel debris, however it is assumed that during the accident, molten fuel debris fell to the bottom of the RPV or PCV and landed on structures located between the bottoms of the RPV and PCV during the fall.

**This fuel debris is being kept cool in a stable manner** by continuously injecting enough cooling water to sufficiently offset the amount of thermal heat being generated by the fuel debris.

**It has been confirmed** from not only temperature readings taken at the RPV and PCV, but also temperature gauges installed in the PCV after the accident, PCV gas management equipment dust monitors and the measured concentrations of hydrogen and xenon 135 that the overall state of cooling is being maintained and that the fuel debris is cool.


## Situation of temperature gauges at the bottom of the Unit 3 RPV based on the internal investigation (3/3)



- We will also deliberate how to shock the state of seeling going forward based on the resu
- We will also deliberate how to check the state of cooling going forward based on the results of the PCV internal investigation etc.

### Reference: Temperature measurements along the route inside the pedestal

Temperature readings that have been obtained from the 12 temperature gauges along the route inside the pedestal infer the following in regards to the current circuit configuration and temperature measuring points.



<sup>•:</sup> Temperature measuring point (implementation plan)

### Reference: Trends for current temperatures at the bottom of the Unit 3 RPV



