Application No. FDEC-R4-69
Jul. 15, 2022

Nuclear Regulation Authority

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Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings Inc.
President Tomoaki Kobayakawa

Partial Revision of the Application for approval to amend the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility

TEPCO partially revise Application for approval to amend the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility, which submitted on Dec. 21, 2021 (Application No. FDEC-R3-175) and partially revised on Apr. 28, 2022 (Application No. FDEC-R4-23) and May 13, 2022 (Application No. FDEC-R4-38), as per the attached document.

END

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Regard to the "Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility" and the "Annexes to the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility," the following sections shall be attached.

The amended part, the reason for the amendment, and the contents of the amendment shall be as follows:

○Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility

The following amendments are made to installation of the ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and the related facility, and discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, according to the Optimization of description.

Concurrently, other approved Implementation Plans are reflected.

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・No amendment

I Overall Process and Risk Assessment of Specified Nuclear Facility

2 Risk Assessment

2.1 Concept of Risk Assessment

Body

・No amendment

2.3 Major Risks at the Specified Nuclear Facility

2.3.7 Radioactive Waste

Body

・No amendment

2.4 Future Risk Reduction Measures of Specified Nuclear Facility

Body

・Optimization of description

Attachment-1

・Optimization of description

II Design and Equipment of the Specified Nuclear Facility

1 Items to be Considered about Design and Equipment

1.9 Treatment, Storage and Management of Radioactive Liquid Waste

Body

・No amendment

1.14 Design Considerations

Body

・No amendment

Attachment-1

・No amendment

2 Structure and Equipment of the Specified Nuclear Facility and Construction Plan

2.5 Contaminated water treatment facilities etc.

Body

・No amendment

Attachment-12

・No amendment

2.16 Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facilities and Related Facilities

2.16.1 Advance Liquid Processing System

Body

・No amendment

Attachment-2

・No amendment

Attachment-9

・No amendment

2.16.2 Additional Advance Liquid Processing System

Body

・No amendment

Attachment-4

・No amendment

Attachment-9

・No amendment

2.16.3 High-Performance Advance Liquid Processing System

Body

・No amendment

Attachment-4

・No amendment

Attachment-8

・No amendment

2.50 ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities and the Related Facility

Body

・No amendment

Attachment-1

・Optimization of description

Attachment-2

・Optimization of description

Attachment-3

・Optimization of description

Attachment-4

・Optimization of description

Attachment-5

・No amendment

Attachment-6

・Reflection of latest schedule

Attachment-7

・No amendment

III Safety of Specified Nuclear Facility

Part 2 Safety Measures on Unit 5 and 6

Chapter 6 Radioactive Waste Management

Article 88

・No amendment

Supplementary Provisions

・No amendment

Part 3 (Supplementary Explanation Regarding Safety)

1 Supplementary Explanation regarding Operation Management

1.9 Operation Management of the ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities

・Optimization of description

2 Supplementary Explanation regarding Management of Radioactive Waste, etc.

2.1 Management of Radioactive Waste, etc.

2.1.2 Management of Radioactive Liquid Waste, etc.

・No amendment

2.2 Dose Assessment

2.2.3 Dose Assessment by Radioactive Liquid Waste, etc.

・No amendment

3 Supplementary Explanation regarding Radiation Management

3.1 Radiation Protection and Management

3.1.4 Reduction of Radioactive Materials in Seawater, Seabed Sediment, Groundwater and Drainage Channels in Ports and Harbors

・No amendment

VI Promotion for Understanding of Implementation of the Implementation Plan

Body

・No amendment

○Annexes to the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility

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・No amendment

Annex 27 Supplementary Explanation of ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities

I Structural Strength of ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities

・Optimization of description

II Tolerance of nominal values for ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities

・Optimization of description

○Reference Material

・Optimization of description

End

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Table of Contents)

Current	Revised	Reason for Revision
Introduction I Overall Process and Risk Assessment of Specified Nuclear Facilities (Omission) II Design and equipment of specified nuclear facilities (Omission) 2.49 Intake Facility in Unit 3 reactor containment・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・II-2-49-1 III Safety of Specified Nuclear Facilities (Omission) Part 3 (Supplementary Explanation Regarding Safety) (Omission) 1.8 Operation Management of Groundwater Drain・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・III-3-1-8-1 2 Supplementary Explanation of the Management of Radioactive Waste, etc. (Omitted below)	Introduction I Overall Process and Risk Assessment of Specified Nuclear Facilities (Omission) II Design and equipment of specified nuclear facilities (Omission) 2.49 Intake Facility in Unit 3 reactor containment・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・II-2-49-1 2.50 ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities and Related Facility・・II-2-50-1 III Safety of Specified Nuclear Facilities (Omission) Part 3 (Supplementary Explanation Regarding Safety) (Omission) 1.8 Operation Management of Groundwater Drain・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・III-3-1-8-1 1.9 Operation Management of ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities・III-3-1-9-1 2 Supplementary explanation regarding Management of Radioactive Waste, etc. (Omitted below)	Addition in accordance with the installation of ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facility Addition in accordance with the installation of ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facility, and optimization of the description

The Japanese version shall prevail.

1

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter I, 2.1 Concept of Risk Assessment)

Current	Revised	Reason for Revision
2 Risk assessment 2.1 Concept of risk assessment (Omission) (3) Items to be considered at the time of risk assessment When implementing a risk assessment based on the aforementioned procedures, by considering the following items, organize risks at the specified nuclear power facility systematically so that they can be viewed as a whole. a. Amount and type of radioactive materials By implementation of risk assessment, considering radioactive material's quantity (inventory) and type (debris, fuel assemblies, contaminated water, etc.) from the viewpoint of the source of radioactive materials, it is possible to rationally evaluate the necessity and urgency of countermeasures and to carry out an approach for appropriate and efficient risk reduction. (Omitted below)	2 Risk assessment 2.1 Concept of risk assessment (Omission) (3) Items to be considered at the time of risk assessment When implementing a risk assessment based on the aforementioned procedures, by considering the following items, organize risks at the specified nuclear power facility systematically so that they can be viewed as a whole. a. Amount and type of radioactive materials By implementation of risk assessment, considering radioactive material's quantity (inventory) and type (debris, fuel assemblies, high levels of radioactive contaminated water generated in reactor buildings by injection of water into reactors, infiltration of rainwater, infiltration of groundwater (hereinafter "contaminated water", etc.) from the viewpoint of the source of radioactive materials, it is possible to rationally evaluate the necessity and urgency of countermeasures and to carry out an approach for appropriate and efficient risk reduction. (Omitted below)	Optimization of the description

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter I, 2.3.7 Radioactive Waste)

Current	Revised	Reason for Revision
2.3.7 Radioactive Waste As an assumed risk of radioactive waste in the specified nuclear power facility, leakage of radioactive liquid waste, such as contaminated water, to the outside of the system is considered. However, the possibility of leakage of radioactive liquid waste to the outside of the system of the specified nuclear power facility is kept sufficiently low by taking various measures as follows. The concentration of radioactive materials will decrease by continuing the water treatment of contaminated water, and the degree of impact on the environment will be reduced continually even if leakage from the facility occurs. [Measures to reduce the risk of leakage from facilities] • Conversion of pressure hose to polyethylene pipe [Measures to reduce the risk of leakage expansion] • Installation of weirs and sandbags around tanks • Making the drainage channel into the culvert • Installation of leakage detectors and monitoring cameras As for radioactive gas waste, the release of radioactive gas at the time of temperature rise in the containment vessel is considered as a risk, and this is included in the risk assessment related to water injection stop for fuel debris. For radioactive solid waste, due to its low fluidity and diffusivity, it is included in the risk evaluation related to the direct ray and skyshine ray from each facility within the site showed in I.2.2.	2.3.7 Radioactive Waste As an assumed risk of radioactive waste in the specified nuclear power facility, leakage of radioactive liquid waste, such as contaminated water, to the outside of the system is considered. However, the possibility of leakage of radioactive liquid waste to the outside of the system of the specified nuclear power facility is kept sufficiently low by taking various measures as follows. The concentration of radioactive materials will decrease by continuing the water treatment of contaminated water, and the degree of impact on the environment will be reduced continually even if leakage from the facility occurs. [Measures to reduce the risk of leakage from facilities] • Conversion of pressure hose to polyethylene pipe • Through discharge of water treated by ALPS of which sum of the ratio of radioactive materials contained in contaminated water other than tritium to concentration limit stipulated in the Notification to Establish Requirements for Operational Safety and Physical Protection of Specified Nuclear Fuel Materials of the Nuclear Reactors at TEPCO's FDNPS (hereinafter "notification") is less than 1 (hereinafter "ALPS treated water"), dismantle and removal of tanks storing the ALPS treated water, etc. (hereinafter "medium/low concentration tank"). [Measures to reduce the risk of leakage expansion] • Installation of weirs and sandbags around the medium and low concentration tanks • Making the drainage channel into the culvert • Installation of leakage detectors and monitoring cameras As for radioactive gas waste, the release of radioactive gas at the time of temperature rise in the containment vessel is considered as a risk, and this is included in the risk assessment related to water injection stop for fuel debris. For radioactive solid waste, due to its low fluidity and diffusivity, it is included in the risk evaluation related to the direct ray and skyshine ray from the specified nuclear facility within the site.	Addition in accordance with the description of risk reduction measures along with discharge of ALPS treated water Optimization of the description

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter I, 2.4 Future Risk Reduction Measures)

Current	Revised	Reason for Revision
2.4 Future Risk Reduction Measures for the Specified Nuclear Facility At present, the effective dose outside the site caused by the additional discharge from the specified nuclear facility is kept low (see 2-2)). In addition, it is evaluated that the impact on the outside of the site is sufficiently low in the risk assessment assuming the event that occurs in the abnormal case of fuel debris and spent fuel containing many radioactive materials (see 2-3). There are various risks to be tackled over short and medium term, which are represented in the items, such as further activities towards the steady state of the plant, efforts to reduce radiation dose and prevent the spread of contamination for the entire power station, and fuel removal from spent fuel pool, and these are shown in Table 2.4-1. Table 2.4-1 summarizes the representative risks considered, measures and target timing planned to be implemented for risk reduction for each item, and confirmation was made based on the viewpoint of confirming the appropriateness of the risk reduction measures shown in 2.1. To reduce the risk of the entire specified nuclear facility, particularly as a matter of immediate concern, efforts will be made (1) reduction in the amount of contaminated water generated and reduction in the amount of contaminated water stored through reliable treatment (2) early removal of spent fuel from spent fuel pools with priority. Additionally, to reduce individual risks shown in the table, various measures such as measures to improve the reliability of facilities will be planned and implemented in the future. These individual measures will be confirmed based on the viewpoint of confirming the appropriateness of risk reduction measures, and the effectiveness, necessity, timing, etc., of implementation are going to be thoroughly examined and optimized from the viewpoint of expected risk reduction and safety, exposure, environmental impact, etc., and are going to be reflected in the Implementation Plan as necessary.	2.4 Future Risk Reduction Measures for the Specified Nuclear Facility At present, the effective dose outside the site caused by the additional discharge from the specified nuclear facility is kept low (see 2-2). In addition, it is evaluated that the impact on the outside of the site is sufficiently low in the risk assessment assuming the event that occurs in the abnormal case of fuel debris and spent fuel containing many radioactive materials (see 2-3). In the future, risk reduction measures will be carried out for various risks existing in the Fukushima Daiichi NPS which should be tackled over short and medium term, based on the latest “Medium-Term Risk Reduction Target Map for TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi NPS (hereinafter “risk map.”)” There are various risks which are represented in each item, such as further activities towards the steady state of the plant, efforts to reduce radiation dose and prevent the spread of contamination for the entire power station, and fuel removal from spent fuel pool. Measures planned to be implemented for risk reduction for each item will be confirmed based on the viewpoint of confirming the appropriateness of risk reduction measures, and the effectiveness, necessity, timing, etc., of implementation will be thoroughly examined and optimized from the viewpoint of expected risk reduction and safety, exposure, environmental impact, etc., and will be reflected in the Implementation Plan as necessary. With the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, which is to be implemented in “I 2.3.7 Radioactive Waste”, through the effective use of resources, such as the site concerning decommissioning, the entire process according to the Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap will be achieved and risk reduction measures based on the risk map will be carried out.	Optimization of the description (clarifying description of the risk reduction action in accordance with “Medium-Term Risk Reduction Target Map for TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi NPS”) Optimization of the description (clarifying description on overall concept on discharge of ALPS treated water)
	2.4.1 Attachment Attachment-1 Risk reduction measures planned to be implemented and appropriateness	Optimization of the description (Description changed on the “Risk reduction measures to be implemented and appropriateness”)

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter I, 2.4 Future Risk Reduction Measures, Attachment-1)

Current

2.4 Future risk reduction measures for specified nuclear facilities

(Omitted)

Table 2.4-1 Risk reduction measures planned to be implemented and appropriateness (1/8)

Road Map Related Items		Assumed risks	Risk reduction measures		Purpose	Target timing	Adequacy of individual measures
Plans for maintaining and continuity stable plant conditions	Reactor cooling plan	・Risk of loss of monitoring for reactor cold shutdown conditions due to medium-to long-term thermometer failure	New installation of alternative thermometers for reactor pressure vessels		Regarding existing thermometers of reactor pressure vessels, locations where temperature monitoring is possible shall be selected so that additional thermometers can be installed in preparation for failure of existing thermometers, and backup of temperature monitoring of each unit shall be maintained.	Unit 2: October 2012 Installation at one location Unit 1: A mock-up test was conducted on the pipe modification method in the middle of fiscal 2013, and the construction method was established. Unit 3: Implemented environmental improvements by March 2014, conducted on-site surveys, and implemented candidate lines	①If the thermometer fails because it cannot be maintained and the usable thermometer is no longer available, monitoring of the cooling condition becomes impossible. ②Temperature can no longer be monitored, but there is no direct impact on the risk of additional release of radioactive material. ③Since both new and old thermometers are installed in the building, the risk for external events is small. ④There is an increase in the possibility that existing thermometers will fail due to deterioration. ⑤Since there are many troubles with the thermometer of Unit 2, it is reasonable to prioritize the installation of Unit 2. The installation of Units 1 and 2 is also planned to be considered. ⑥Though there is no risk of directly increasing by implementing measures, the exposure dose increases because the dose in the installation environment is high. ⑦ Investigate the installation timing, location, and method in preparation for deterioration of the existing pressure vessel thermometers and other instruments.
			Installation of monitoring instruments in container		As for the existing thermometers in the reactor container, an alternative thermometer will be inserted from the container penetration for direct monitoring of the cold shutdown condition inside the reactor container, because maintenance and replacement will not be possible in the event of a failure.	Unit 1: installed in October 2012 Unit 2: installed in September 2012, Adjusting the timing of additional installation Unit 3: Scheduled to be installed by the end of March 2014	①If the thermometer fails due to unavailability of maintenance, and the usable thermometer runs out, monitoring of the cooling condition in the container becomes impossible. ②Temperature can no longer be monitored, but there is no direct impact on the risk of additional release of radioactive material. ③Since both new and old thermometers are installed in the building, the risk for external events is small. ④There is an increase in the possibility that existing thermometers will fail due to deterioration. ⑤Since the radiation dose in the reactor building of Unit 3 is high, it is reasonable to give priority to the installation of Units 1 and 2. Plans will be drawn up for the installation of Unit 3 as soon as possible after improving the environment so that installation work can be carried out. ⑥Though there is no risk of directly increasing by implementing measures, the exposure dose increases because the dose in the installation environment is high. ⑦ Investigate the timing, location, and method of installation in preparation for deterioration of existing containment thermometers and other instruments.
		・Risk of the function stop of water injection ・Risk of the release of radioactive substances outside of the system	Measures to improve reliability of cooling water source with circulating injection	Change of operation to condensate storage tank and use of polyethylene pipe for condensate storage tank reactor water injection pump pipe	Regarding the reactor water injection equipment, the increase in the water source retention amount and the earthquake resistance of the water source will be attempted by changing the water source from a temporary buffer tank to an existing condensate storage tank. In addition, by shortening the piping distance and installing new polyethylene piping, loss of water injection function and leakage risk will be reduced.	Started operation in July 2013	①Equipment of water injection to the reactor already have diversity and redundancy, and although a certain level of reliability has been ensured, the expected further reliability improvement cannot be attempted. ②The risk of additional emission of radioactive materials in the event of a shutdown of the the function of water injection to the reactor is large. ③The risk is reduced because the earthquake resistance of the water source increases by changing the water source to a condensate storage tank. ④It is considered that it can be used for a long time by appropriate maintenance even using the current equipment, and the change of the time-related risk is small. ⑤Improving the reliability of equipment of water injection to the reactor should be implemented as soon as possible to contribute to risk reduction, and it has already been implemented. ⑥Though there is no risk of directly increasing by implementing measures, the exposure dose increases because the dose in the installation environment is high. ⑦There is no risk that measures cannot be implemented.
				Measures to prevent off-site release in the event of a leak (consideration of installation of weirs, leak detection equipment, etc.)	Weirs and leak detector shall be installed to prevent off-site release and detect leaks in the pipe of the reactor water injection facility at an early stage.	Completed at the end of December 2012	①The risk of additional release of radioactive material in the event of a leak is not reduced. ②The risk of additional emission of radioactive materials in the event of a leak is large. ③The purpose is to prevent the spread of leakage, and the risk of equipment damage against external events does not change. ④The purpose is to prevent leakage from spreading, and the risk does not change in time. ⑤It is desirable to implement it as early as possible, and it has been already implemented. ⑥The risk of implementing measures is small. ⑦There is no risk that measures cannot be implemented.
				Measures to transform temprarily houses to permanent houses	The prevention of equipment failure due to external events such as typhoons, salt damage, and freezing will be attempted by placing pumps, etc., of the reactor water injection equipment in a permanently installed house, etc.	Completed at the end of December 2012	①External event risk such as freezing is not reduced. ②The risk of additional emission of radioactive materials in the event of a shutdown of the the function of water injection to the reactor is large. ③Permanent temporary housing reduces the risk of external events. ④The temporary house is to be permanently installed, and the time risk does not change. ⑤It is desirable to implement it as early as possible, and it is already implemented. ⑥The risk of implementing measures is small. ⑦There is no risk that measures cannot be implemented.
			Establishment of circulation loop in the reactor building		A circulation loop that does not pass through equipment installed outside the building, such as a water treatment facility, is formed to reduce the risk of release to the outside of the system. In addition, by using the accumulated water in the building as the cooling water as it	Completed at the end of March 2015	①Leakage risk from general circulation loop is not reduced. ②Reduce leakage risk by reducing the length of loops laid outdoors. ③Installation in the building reduces the risk of external events related to weather, etc. ④It is considered that it can be used for a long time by appropriate maintenance even in the current equipment, and the change of the time-related risk is small. ⑤As a preliminary step to constructing the circulation loop in the

Revised

2.4 Future risk reduction measures for specified nuclear facilities

(Omitted)

Attachment-1

Risk reduction measures planned to be implemented and appropriateness (1/8)

Road Map Related Items		Assumed risks	Risk reduction measures		Purpose	Response status	Adequacy of individual measures
Plans for maintaining and continuing the stable plant conditions	Reactor cooling plan	・Risk of loss of monitoring of reactor cold shutdown conditions due to medium-to long-term thermometer failure	New installation of alternative thermometers for reactor pressure vessels		Regarding existing thermometers of reactor pressure vessels, locations where temperature monitoring is possible shall be selected so that additional thermometers can be installed in preparation for failure of existing thermometers, and backup of temperature monitoring of each unit shall be maintained.	Unit 2: Completed installation in October 2012 Units 1 and 3: Reported that installation was difficult from the viewpoint of feasibility of work and feasibility of installing thermometers in April 2019 (conducted monthly thermometer reliability evaluation)	①If the thermometer fails because it cannot be maintained and the usable thermometer is no longer available, monitoring of the cooling condition becomes impossible. ②Temperature can no longer be monitored, but there is no direct impact on the risk of additional release of radioactive material. ③Since both new and old thermometers are installed in the building, the risk for external events is small. ④There is an increase in the possibility that existing thermometers will fail due to deterioration. ⑤Since there are many troubles with the thermometer of Unit 2, it is reasonable to prioritize the installation of Unit 2. The installation of Units 1 and 2 is also planned to be considered. ⑥ Though there is no risk of directly increasing by implementing measures, the exposure dose increases because the dose in the installation environment is high. ⑦Investigate the installation timing, location, and method in preparation for deterioration of the existing pressure vessel thermometers and other instruments.
			Installation of monitoring instruments in the reactor container		As for the existing thermometers in the reactor container, an alternative thermometer will be inserted from the container penetration for direct monitoring of the cold shutdown condition inside the reactor container, because maintenance and replacement will not be possible in the event of a failure.	Unit 1: Completed installation in October 2012 Unit 2: Completed installation in September 2012 Additional installation completed in August 2013 Unit 3: Completed installation in December 2015	①If the thermometer fails due to unavailability of maintenance, and the usable thermometer runs out, monitoring of the cooling condition in the container becomes impossible. ②Temperature can no longer be monitored, but there is no direct impact on the risk of additional release of radioactive material. ③Since both new and old thermometers are installed in the building, the risk for external events is small. ④There is an increase in the possibility that existing thermometers will fail due to deterioration. ⑤Since the radiation dose in the reactor building of Unit 3 is high, it is reasonable to give priority to the installation of Units 1 and 2. Plans will be drawn up for the installation of Unit 3 as soon as possible after improving the environment so that installation work can be carried out. ⑥ Though there is no risk of directly increasing by implementing measures, the exposure dose increases because the dose in the installation environment is high. ⑦ Investigate the timing, location, and method of installation in preparation for deterioration of existing containment thermometers and other instruments.
		・Risk of stopping the water injection function ・Risk of off-system release of radioactive material	Measures to improve reliability of circulating injection cooling water source	Change of operation to condensate storage tank and use of polyethylene pipe for condensate storage tank reactor water injection pump piping	Regarding the reactor water injection equipment, the increase in the water source retention amount and the earthquake resistance of the water source will be attempted by changing the water source from a temporary buffer tank to an existing condensate storage tank. In addition, by shortening the piping distance and installing new polyethylene piping, loss of water injection function and leakage risk will be reduced.	July 2013 Commencement of operation of condensate storage tanks February 2014 Completion of polyethylene piping measures for condensate storage tank reactor water injection pump pipe	①Equipment of water injection to the reactor already have diversity and redundancy, and although a certain level of reliability has been ensured, the expected further reliability improvement cannot be attempted. ②The risk of additional emission of radioactive materials in the event of a shutdown of the the function of water injection to the reactor is large. ③The risk is reduced because the earthquake resistance of the water source increases by changing the water source to a condensate storage tank. ④It is considered that it can be used for a long time by appropriate maintenance even in the current equipment, and the change of the time-related risk is small. ⑤Improving the reliability of equipment of water injection to the reactor should be implemented as soon as possible to contribute to risk reduction, and it has already been implemented. ⑥ Though there is no risk of directly increasing by implementing measures, the exposure dose increases because the dose in the installation environment is high. ⑦There is no risk that measures cannot be implemented.
				Measures to prevent off-site release in the event of a leak (consideration of installation of weirs, leak detection equipment, etc.)	Weirs and leak detector shall be installed to prevent off-site release and detect leaks in the pipe of the reactor water injection facility at an early stage.	Completed installation in December 2013	①The risk of additional release of radioactive material in the event of a leak is not reduced. ②The risk of additional emission of radioactive materials in the event of a leak is large. ③The purpose is to prevent the spread of leakage, and the risk of equipment damage against external events does not change. ④The purpose is to prevent leakage from spreading, and the risk does not change in time. ⑤It is desirable to implement it as early as possible, and it is already implemented. ⑥The risk of implementing measures is small. ⑦There is no risk that measures cannot be implemented.
				Measures to transform tempraly houses to permanent houses	The prevention of equipment failure due to external events such as typhoons, salt damage, and freezing will be attempted by placing pumps, etc., of the reactor water injection equipment in a permanently installed house, etc.	Completed installation in February 2013	①External event risk such as freezing is not reduced. ②The risk of additional emission of radioactive materials in the event of a shutdown of the the function of water injection to the reactor is large. ③Permanent temporary housing reduces the risk of external events. ④The temporary house is to be permanently installed, and the time risk does not change. ⑤It is desirable to implement it as early as possible, and it is already implemented. ⑥The risk of implementing measures is small. ⑦There is no risk that measures cannot be implemented.
			Establishment of circulation loop in the building		A circulation loop that does not pass through equipment installed outside the building, such as a water treatment facility, is formed to reduce the risk of release to the outside of the system. In addition, by using the accumulated water in the building as the cooling water as it is, a system can be constructed to increase the reactor water injection volume without depending on the treatment	Started operation in October 2016 (The accumulated water circulation cooling of the building is under consideration in conjunction with the removal of fuel debris.)	①Leakage risk from general circulation loop is not reduced. ②Reduce leakage risk by reducing the length of loops laid outdoors. ③Installation in the building reduces the risk of external events related to weather, etc. ④It is considered that it can be used for a long time by appropriate maintenance even in the current equipment, and the change of the time-related risk is small. ⑤As a preliminary step to constructing the circulation loop in the building, it is necessary to consider the water intake site including the accumulated water quality, the interference with the working environment and the containment water cut-off work, etc., and therefore investigations

Reason for Revison

Update the description of response status and optimization of the description

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter I, 2.4 Future Risk Reduction Measures, Attachment-1)

Current

				is, a system can be constructed to increase the reactor water injection volume without depending on the treatment volume of the water treatment facility, etc. or the amount of water leaked from the reactor container.		building, it is necessary to consider the water intake site including the accumulated water quality, the interference with the working environment and the containment water cut-off work, etc., and therefore investigations and studies are being carried out for implementation so that measures can be taken by the target time. ⑥In addition to the exposure risk of workers, there is a risk of high dose in the building. ⑦ Consideration should be given to monitoring the tendency of accumulated water quality, optimizing the line configuration, and improving the environment such as decontamination, so that effective measures can be taken.

Table 2.4-1 Risk reduction measures planned to be implemented and appropriateness (2/8)

Road Map Related Items		Assumed risks	Risk reduction measures	Purpose	Target timing	Adequacy of individual measures
Plans for maintaining and continuity stable plant conditions	Reactor cooling plan	・Risk of loss of inert atmosphere maintenance function in the reactor pressure vessel and container	Addition of nitrogen supply equipment to reactor pressure vessels and container	Nitrogen supply equipment is operated on one of the two normally used container and maintains sufficient performance to maintain the hydrogen concentration in the reactor container below the flammable concentration (4%). Even if the operation unit stops, there is enough time to start up the spare equipment (more than 100 hours). Therefore, there is no problem with the operation of one unit in regular use. However, for further reliability improvement, one more unit of normal nitrogen gas separation equipment will be installed.	Completed at the end of March 2013	①Although the nitrogen-enclosed equipment in the reactor container ensures redundancy by installing a nitrogen supply device equipped with an emergency power supply, when inspections involving long-term shutdowns of the normal equipment are conducted, the normal equipment becomes a single state. ②Since the redundancy of the equipment is ensured even in the present equipment installation status, and the shutdown margin time when the operation unit stops is sufficiently ensured (100 hours or more), it is considered that the possibility of hydrogen explosion is kept sufficiently low even without further reliability improvement measures at this time. ③The risk for external events is reduced by installing it on a higher ground. ④The risk of failure of the nitrogen supply equipment increases due to the aging deterioration of the equipment, but the installation of additional equipment enables more appropriate maintenance management. ⑤ Improving the reliability of the nitrogen supply equipment contributes to the risk reduction, so it is desirable to carry out it at an early stage. ⑥The risk of implementing measures is small. ⑦There is no risk that it cannot be implemented.
			Encapsulation of nitrogen gas in equipment with confirmed retention of hydrogen	Equipment for which high concentration of hydrogen retention, such as the suppression chamber (S/C) gas phase section, has been confirmed, is brought into an inert state by encapsulation of nitrogen gas or the like.	Unit 1 S/C: Completed (Considering a policy of nitrogen encapsulation) Unit 2 S/C: In response since the first half of fiscal 2013 Unit 3 S/C: Investigation of residual hydrogen in the gas phase of the enclosed space in the S/C is under way.	①The high concentration of hydrogen in the suppression chamber, which was confirmed this time, is considered to be a residue, although it occurred at the beginning of the accident. Considering the low oxygen concentration and the fact that it has been stably present in the closed space until now, hydrogen explosion is considered to be of low urgency to occur. However, this situation continues unless hydrogen purging is performed. ②Although there is a risk that radioactive material will be released in case a hydrogen explosion occurs, however this measure can be reduced, since the suppression chamber is a part of the container and there is a possibility that the residual amount of hydrogen is large depending on the volume of the closed space, ③Hydrogen purge reduces the risk of hydrogen explosion for external events. ④It is considered that the temporal risk does not increase drastically, because it has maintained a stable state until now after the accident and the contribution of radiolysis of water is thought to be small, and because the inert state is maintained by nitrogen inclusion in the container and the hydrogen concentration is monitored by the container gas management facility. ⑤Considering the related works such as the suppression chamber repair work and the field dose environment, it is necessary to carefully conduct field investigations, etc., and to implement measures as soon as possible when high concentration of hydrogen is confirmed. ⑥Since it is a high dose work in the building, it is necessary to carry out the work with monitoring the behavior of hydrogen concentration in view of the exposure risk of workers. ⑦It is necessary to examine nitrogen encapsulation method so that hydrogen purge can be safely carried out based on the situation in the field.

Table 2.4-1 Risk reduction measures planned to be implemented and appropriateness (3/8)

Road Map Related Items		Assumed risks	Risk reduction measures		Purpose	Target timing	Adequacy of individual measures
Plans for maintaining and continuity stable plant conditions	Accumulated water treatment plan	・Risk of off-system emission of radioactive material	Improvement of reliability of accumulated water treatment equipment	Use of polyethylene pipes for pressure-resistant hoses around accumulated water transfer and desalination equipment	By replacing the parts where pressure-resistant hoses are used in the accumulated water transfer and treatment facilities with more reliable polyethylene pipes, etc., the leakage risk of accumulated water and treated water, risk of damage to other facilities due to leakage water, and risk of deterioration of the working environment in the event of leakage will be reduced.	Completed at the end of December 2013	①The risk of additional emission of radioactive material from the accumulated water transfer line is not reduced. ②The risk of additional emission of radioactive materials in the event of a leak is large. ③By replacing with polyethylene pipes, etc., the risk of external events such as earthquakes will be reduced. ④By replacing with polyethylene pipes, etc., the risk of equipment deterioration damage in time is reduced. ⑤It is desirable to implement it as early as possible, and it has been already implemented. ⑥The risk of implementing measures is small. ⑦If polyethylene pipes, etc., cannot be laid, instead of it, using weirs to prevent leakage from spreading, etc.
				Expansion of tanks and replacement of RO concentrated water temporary storage tanks	Increase tanks to secure storage areas for accumulated water or treated water.	Report a plan for additional tanks every six months	①Day-to-day increasing storage of accumulated water is eliminated and there is a risk that it cannot be stored. ②The risk of additional emission of radioactive materials in the event of a leak is large. ③The purpose is to ensure storage volume, and the risk for external events does not change. ④Leakage risk increases due to aging of the tank. ⑤In order to secure a storage location, it is necessary to systematically increase the capacity, and it has already been implemented. ⑥Leakage risk increases due to the increase in accumulated and treated water storage.

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				volume of the water treatment facility, etc. or the amount of water leaked from the reactor container.		and studies are being carried out for implementation so that measures can be taken by the target time. ⑥In addition to the exposure risk of workers, there is a risk of high dose in the building. ⑦ Consideration should be given to monitoring the tendency of accumulated water quality, optimizing the line configuration, and improving the environment such as decontamination, so that effective measures can be taken.

Risk reduction measures planned to be implemented and appropriateness (2/8)

Road Map Related Items		Assumed risks	Risk reduction measures	Purpose	Response status	Adequacy of individual measures
Plans for maintaining and continuing the stable plant conditions	Reactor cooling plan	・Risk of loss of inert atmosphere maintenance function in the reactor pressure vessel and container	Addition of nitrogen supply equipment to reactor pressure vessels and container	Nitrogen supply equipment is operated on one of the two normally used container and maintains sufficient performance to maintain the hydrogen concentration in the reactor container below the flammable concentration (4%). Even if the operation unit stops, there is enough time to start up the spare equipment (more than 100 hours). Therefore, there is no problem with the operation of one unit in regular use. However, for further reliability improvement, one more unit of normal nitrogen gas separation equipment will be installed.	Completed installation in March 2013	①Although the nitrogen-enclosed equipment in the reactor container ensures redundancy by installing a nitrogen supply device equipped with an emergency power supply, when inspections involving long-term shutdowns of the normal equipment are conducted, the normal equipment becomes a single state. ②Since the redundancy of the equipment is ensured even in the present equipment installation status, and the shutdown margin time when the operation unit stops is sufficiently ensured (100 hours or more), it is considered that the possibility of hydrogen explosion is kept sufficiently low even without further reliability improvement measures at this time. ③The risk for external events is reduced by installing it on a higher ground. ④The risk of failure of the nitrogen supply equipment increases due to the aging deterioration of the equipment, but the installation of additional equipment enables more appropriate maintenance management. ⑤Improving the reliability of the nitrogen supply equipment contributes to the risk reduction, so it is desirable to carry out it at an early stage. ⑥The risk of implementing measures is small. ⑦There is no risk that it cannot be implemented.
			Encapsulation of nitrogen gas in equipment with confirmed retention of hydrogen	Equipment for which high concentration of hydrogen retention, such as the suppression chamber (S/C) gas phase section, has been confirmed, is brought into an inert state by encapsulation of nitrogen gas or the like.	Unit 1: Working since October 2012 Unit 2: Compliant since May 2013 Unit 3: Research of residual hydrogen in the gas phase of the enclosed space in the S/C is under way.	①The high concentration of hydrogen in the suppression chamber, which was confirmed this time, is considered to be a residue, although it occurred at the beginning of the accident. Considering the low oxygen concentration and the fact that it has been stably present in the closed space until now, hydrogen explosion is considered to be of low urgency to occur. However, this situation continues unless hydrogen purging is performed. ②Although there is a risk that radioactive material will be released in case a hydrogen explosion occurs, however this measure can be reduced, since the suppression chamber is a part of the container and there is a possibility that the residual amount of hydrogen is large depending on the volume of the closed space, ③Hydrogen purge reduces the risk of hydrogen explosion for external events. ④It is considered that the temporal risk does not increase drastically, because it has maintained a stable state until now after the accident and the contribution of radiolysis of water is thought to be small, and because the inert state is maintained by nitrogen inclusion in the container and the hydrogen concentration is monitored by the container gas management facility. ⑤Considering the related works such as the suppression chamber repair work and the field dose environment, it is necessary to carefully conduct field investigations, etc., and to implement measures as soon as possible when high concentration of hydrogen is confirmed. ⑥Since it is a high dose work in the building, it is necessary to carry out the work with monitoring the behavior of hydrogen concentration in view of the exposure risk of workers. ⑦It is necessary to examine nitrogen encapsulation method so that hydrogen purge can be safely carried out based on the situation in the field.

Risk reduction measures planned to be implemented and appropriateness (3/8)

Road Map Related Items		Assumed risks	Risk reduction measures		Purpose	Response status	Adequacy of individual measures
Plans for maintaining and continuing the stable plant	Accumulated water treatment plan	・Risk of off-system release of radioactive material	Improvement of reliability of contaminated water treatment equipment, etc.	Use of polyethylene pipes for pressure-resistant hoses around accumulated water transfer and desalination equipment	By replacing the parts where pressure-resistant hoses are used in the accumulated water transfer and treatment facilities with more reliable polyethylene pipes, etc., the leakage risk of accumulated water and treated water, risk of damage to other facilities due to leakage water, and risk of deterioration of the working environment in the event of leakage will be reduced.	Measures completed in August 2012	①The risk of additional emission of radioactive material from the accumulated water transfer line is not reduced. ②The risk of additional emission of radioactive materials in the event of a leak is large. ③By replacing with polyethylene pipes, etc., the risk of external events such as earthquakes will be reduced. ④By replacing with polyethylene pipes, etc., the risk of equipment deterioration damage in time is reduced. ⑤It is desirable to implement it as early as possible, and it has been already implemented. ⑥The risk of implementing measures is small. ⑦If polyethylene pipes, etc., cannot be laid, instead of it, using weirs to prevent leakage from spreading, etc.

Reason for Revison

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter I, 2.4 Future Risk Reduction Measures, Attachment-1)

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					⑦Since there is a limit to the tank installation location, it is necessary to surely implement measures to reduce the inflow of groundwater as a mitigation measure.
		Installation of weirs, etc. in tank areas	Early detection of leaks from storage tanks and prevention of expansion outside the system in the event of a large-scale leak by installing weirs, etc., in the tank area	Implemented sequentially according to tank installation	①The risk of additional release of radioactive material in the event of a leak is not reduced. ②The risk of additional emission of radioactive materials in the event of a leak is large. ③The purpose is to prevent leakage from spreading, and the risk for external events does not change. ④The purpose is to prevent leakage from spreading, and the risk does not change in time. ⑤It is desirable to implement it as early as possible, and it is already implemented. ⑥The risk of implementing measures is small. ⑦There is no risk that measures cannot be implemented.
		Installation of multi-nuclide removal equipment	By removing radionuclides (excluding tritium) contained in the treated water of the contaminated water treatment facility to a sufficiently low concentration by this facility, the environmental impact at the time of leakage will be reduced by reducing the amount of stored contaminated water and reducing the radioactive concentration of the stored water in the tank.	A-series hot test started in March 2013	① Contaminated water containing a large amount of radioactive materials is retained, and the risk of leakage is not reduced. ②The risk of additional emission of radioactive materials in the event of a leak is large. ③The risk of leakage of contaminated water containing a large amount of radioactive material from a tank or the like from an external event due to the treatment of contaminated water can be reduced. ④Due to delayed operation of the multi-nuclide removal facility, the risk of leakage of contaminated water containing a large amount of radioactive materials from tanks, etc. increases due to an increase in the amount of polluted water storage. ⑤It is necessary to conduct it as early as possible, and a hot test is being carried out. ⑥Long-term storage of secondary waste and leakage risk occur. ⑦There is no risk that measures cannot be implemented, but if they cannot be implemented, additional tanks are installed to store contaminated water.
		Sequential implementation of water cutoff and recovery from possible trenches	Retained water in the trench is collected to prevent leakage outside the system.	Considered by end of March 2013 Sequential shut-off and collection of water from possible trenches, etc. Seawater pipe trenches of Units 2 and 3: Completed removal of contaminated water in trenches within fiscal 2014	①The risk of accumulated water flowing out of the premises due to tsunami intrusion, etc., will not be reduced. ②The risk of additional emission of radioactive materials in the event of a leak is large. ③By implementing measures, the risk of accumulated water flowing out of the premises due to tsunami intrusion, etc., will be reduced. ④The diffusion of highly concentrated accumulated water in the sound part of concrete was evaluated, though the appropriate management was carried out even at present. Rollers and trenches are at risk of reaching the outer surface in 10-13 years. ⑤It is desirable to examine the feasibility of the water cut-off method and implement it sequentially from possible trenches. In parallel, tsunami measures will be implemented. ⑥Though the risk of implementing the countermeasure is small, the treatment of the accumulated water in the trench is necessary. ⑦It is necessary to examine the water stopping method, etc. based on the situation of the site.
		Countermeasures against tsunami in buildings (closing of openings in buildings and making watertight)	Closing and water tightening of the building openings will be carried out to prevent tsunamis exceeding the temporary tide breakwaters from entering through the building openings and high-concentration accumulated water accumulated in the basement of the building from leaking out of the system.	Continued study was conducted until the end of March 2013. Implement measures according to the status of study	①The risk of accumulated water flowing out of the premises due to tsunami intrusion, etc., will not be reduced. ②The risk of additional emission of radioactive materials in the event of a leak is large. ③By implementing measures, the risk of accumulated water flowing out of the premises due to tsunami intrusion, etc., will be reduced. ④The inventory in the accumulated water is going to be reduced by the continuation of the water treatment, while the change of the time risk is small, while the appropriate management is carried out at present. ⑤Considering the site conditions, it is desirable that measures be taken as soon as possible for the areas where countermeasures are necessary. ⑥The risk of implementing measures is small. ⑦It is necessary to examine the water stopping method, etc. based on the situation of the site.

Table 2.4-1 Risk reduction measures planned to be implemented and appropriateness (4/8)

Road Map Related Items		Assumed risks	Risk reduction measures	Purpose	Target timing	Adequacy of individual measures
Plans for maintaining and continuity stable plant conditions	Accumulated water treatment plan	・Risk of increased generation of accumulated water	Recovery of sub drain	Reduction of groundwater inflow into the building will be attempted by restoring the facility (sub-drain) for pumping up groundwater around the building and lowering the groundwater level.	From fiscal 2013: Sub-drain recovery	①Since the amount of groundwater inflow into the building does not decrease, the risk of increase of contaminated water is not reduced. ②The risk of additional emission of radioactive materials in the event of a leak is large. ③The purpose is to reduce groundwater inflow, and the risk for external events does not change. ④Although the inventory of accumulated water will be reduced by continuing water treatment, The risk of leakage of accumulated water in the building increases because the inflow of groundwater to the building cannot be reduced. ⑤It is necessary to carry out it as soon as possible, and a restoration plan is under consideration. ⑥ Though the risk of implementing countermeasures is small, remediation of sub-drain water is necessary. ⑦ As other measures to reduce the inflow of groundwater, the groundwater inflow will be suppressed by operating the groundwater bypass at an early stage.
			Installation of groundwater bypass	Since the groundwater around the building flows from the mountain side toward the sea side, the groundwater level around the building is gradually lowered by pumping up the groundwater at	Conducted step by step as soon as ready	①Since the amount of groundwater inflow into the building does not decrease, the risk of increase of contaminated water is not reduced. ②The risk of additional emission of radioactive materials in the event of a leak is large. ③The purpose is to reduce groundwater inflow, and the risk for

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	Expansion of medium-and low-concentration tanks and replacement of RO concentrated water temporary storage tanks	Increase the number of low- and medium-concentration tanks to secure a storage area for ALPS treated water.	Completion of installation of medium to low density tanks with target capacity in December 2020 (1,370,000 m^3 in total)	①Day-to-day increasing storage of ALPS treated water is eliminated and there is a risk that it cannot be stored. ②The risk of additional emission of radioactive materials in the event of a leak is large. ③The purpose is to ensure storage volume, and the risk for external events does not change. ④Leakage risk increases due to aging of mediu- and low -concentration tanks. ⑤In order to secure a storage location, it is necessary to systematically increase the capacity, and it has already been implemented. ⑥Leakage risk increases due to the increase in accumulated and treated water storage. ⑦Since there is a limit to the site where the medium-and low-concentration tanks are installed, it is necessary to surely implement measures to reduce the inflow of groundwater as a mitigation measure.
	Installation of weirs, etc. in medium-and low-concentration tank areas	Early detection of leaks from storage tanks and prevention of large-scale leaks from spreading outside the system by installing weirs, etc., in medium-and low-concentration tank areas	Implemented sequentially according to the installation of medium- and low- concentration tanks. Measures have been implemented to prevent leakage of medium and low-density tanks of the target capacity (1,370,000 m^3).	①The risk of additional release of radioactive material in the event of a leak is not reduced. ②The risk of additional emission of radioactive materials in the event of a leak is large. ③The purpose is to prevent leakage from spreading, and the risk for external events does not change. ④The purpose is to prevent leakage from spreading, and the risk does not change in time. ⑤It is desirable to implement it as early as possible, and it is already implemented. ⑥The risk of implementing measures is small. ⑦There is no risk that measures cannot be implemented.
	Installation of multi-nuclide removal equipment	By removing the radionuclides (excluding tritium) contained in the treated water of the contaminated water treatment facility to a sufficiently low concentration, this facility will reduce the amount of polluted water storage and the environmental impact in the case of leakage by reducing the radioactivity concentration of the medium- and low-concentration tank storage water.	Existing ALPS: Full-scale operation started in March 2022 Additional ALPS: Full-scale operation started in October 2017 High-performance ALPS: hot-tested in October 2014	①Contaminated water containing a large amount of radioactive materials is retained, and the risk of leakage is not reduced. ②The risk of additional emission of radioactive materials in the event of a leak is large. ③The risk of leakage of contaminated water containing a large amount of radioactive material from a medium- and low-concentration tank or the like from an external event due to the treatment of contaminated water can be reduced. ④Due to delayed operation of the multi-nuclide removal facility, the risk of leakage of contaminated water containing a large amount of radioactive materials from medium- and low- concentration tanks, etc. increases due to an increase in the amount of polluted water storage. ⑤It is necessary to conduct it as early as possible, and a hot test is being carried out. ⑥Long-term storage of secondary waste and leakage risk occur. ⑦There is no risk that measures cannot be implemented, but if they cannot be implemented, a medium- and low-concentration tank will be added to store contaminated water.
	Sequential implementation of water cutoff and recovery from possible trenches	Retained water in the trench is collected to prevent leakage outside the system.	The action of cutoff and recovery has been implemented in order of possible trenches, etc. Removal of contaminated water in the trench of seawater piping completed Unit 2: June 2015 (transfer of accumulated water in the trench completed) March 2017 (vertical shaft filling completed) Unit 3: July 2015 (transfer of accumulated water in the trench completed) August 2015 (vertical shaft filling completed) Unit 4: December 2015 (accumulated water transfer in the trench completed, vertical shaft filling completed) Unit 1: Response	①The risk of accumulated water flowing out of the premises due to tsunami intrusion, etc., will not be reduced. ②The risk of additional emission of radioactive materials in the event of a leak is large. ③By implementing measures, the risk of accumulated water flowing out of the premises due to tsunami intrusion, etc., will be reduced. ④Though the appropriate management is carried out even at present, there is a risk that the trench part reaches the outer surface in 10-13 years, when the diffusion of high-concentration accumulated water in the sound part of concrete is evaluated. ⑤It is desirable to examine the feasibility of the water cut-off method and implement it sequentially from possible trenches. In parallel, tsunami measures will be implemented. ⑥Though the risk of implementing the countermeasure is small, the treatment of the accumulated water in the trench is necessary. ⑦It is necessary to examine the water stopping method, etc. based on the situation of the site.

Risk reduction measures planned to be implemented and appropriateness (4/8)

Road Map Related Items		Assumed risks	Risk reduction measures	Purpose	Response status	Adequacy of individual measures
Plans for maintaining and continuingstable plant conditions	Accumulated water treatment plan	・Risk of off-system release of radioactive material	Countermeasures against tsunami in buildings (closing of openings in buildings and making watertight)	Closing and watertightening of the building openings will be carried out to prevent tsunamis exceeding the temporary tide breakwaters from entering through the building openings and high-concentration accumulated water accumulated in the basement of the building from leaking out of the system.	January 2022: Closing of the openings to the building (total of 127 locations) completed.	①The risk of accumulated water flowing out of the premises due to tsunami intrusion, etc., will not be reduced. ②The risk of additional emission of radioactive materials in the event of a leak is large. ③By implementing measures, the risk of accumulated water flowing out of the premises due to tsunami intrusion, etc., will be reduced. ④The inventory in the accumulated water is going to be reduced by the continuation of the water treatment, while the change of the time risk is small, while the appropriate management is carried out at present. ⑤Considering the site conditions, it is desirable that measures be taken as soon as possible for the areas where countermeasures are necessary. ⑥The risk of implementing measures is small. ⑦It is necessary to examine the water stopping method, etc. based on the situation of the site.

Reason for Revison

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter I, 2.4 Future Risk Reduction Measures, Attachment-1)

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				the high plateau on the building mountain side and changing its flow channel to bypass the sea, thereby reducing the amount of groundwater inflow into the building.		external events does not change. ④Though the inventory in the accumulated water is going to be reduced by the continuation of the water treatment, the leakage risk of the accumulated water in the building increases, because the inflow of the groundwater to the building cannot be reduced. ⑤Since there is no interference work, it is desirable to carry out it as early as possible. ⑥The groundwater level around the building is too low due to the operation of the pumping well, and it is necessary to respond to the risk of contaminated water flowing out of the building and the risk of contaminated groundwater being drawn into the pumping well of the bypass and released into the sea area. ⑦When groundwater inflow to the building does not decrease as expected even when pumping wells are operated, it is necessary to secure water treatment and storage locations.

Table 2.4-1 Risk reduction measures planned to be implemented and appropriateness (5/8)

Road Map Related Items		Assumed risks	Risk reduction measures	Purpose	Target timing	Adequacy of individual measures
Plans for maintaining and continuity stable plant conditions	For electrical system equipment Improved reliability	・Risk of power shutdown due to a single failure	Installation of high-voltage buses in turbine buildings and change of suppliers of critical loads	Reliability is improved by making it possible to supply the critical load supplied by one system from the high-voltage bus in the two systems installed on the second floor of the turbine building.	Installation of high-pressure bus in the turbine building: Completed by the end of February 2013 Change in suppliers of critical loads: Completed at the end of July 2013	①As for the important loads that are powered by one system, some functions can be maintained by small generators in the event of a loss of power, but the risk of loss of function will not be reduced. ②In addition to contributing to the further improvement of the reliability of highly important reactor water injection equipment, the additional release risk of radioactive materials due to fuel damage can be reduced because power can be supplied from two systems for some of the dynamic components of the spent fuel pool facilities. ③Power loss risk against tsunami is reduced by being able to be supplied from high-voltage bus lines in the premises installed on the second floor of the turbine building. ④In the long term, the risk of loss of power to critical loads due to ageing degradation failures of electrical installations increases. ⑤It is desirable to implement it as early as possible, and it is already implemented. ⑥The risk of implementing measures is small. ⑦There is no risk that measures cannot be implemented.
		・Risk of loss of power caused by flood of tsunami	Improved waterproofing of common pool buildings	Improve the waterproof property as a tsunami countermeasure for the common pool building where common diesel generators A.B are installed in the plant.	Completed at the end of September 2013	①The risk of loss of the power supply function of the common diesel generator in the plant due to the penetration of tsunami into the common pool building will not be reduced. ②The risk of additional emission of radioactive materials due to fuel damage will be reduced because the power supply function of the common diesel generator in the plant can be maintained by preventing the intrusion of tsunamis into the common pool building. ③Risk of loss of power supply function of common diesel generators in the plant due to tsunami can be reduced. ④There is no change in the risk over time. ⑤It is desirable to carry out it as early as possible, and the examination is proceeding for the implementation. ⑥The risk of implementing measures is small. ⑦It is necessary to examine the method based on the situation of the site.
		・estoration delay risk during power loss	Securing materials for small generators, power supply panels, cables, etc.	In preparation for abnormal situations involving a total loss of AC power due to tsunamis or earthquakes, materials such as outdoor lighting necessary for restoration work of important facility will be secured.	Completed at the end of March 2013	①There is a risk that emergency restoration work for important equipment will be delayed due to the absence of outdoor lighting, etc. in the event of an abnormality accompanied by a total loss of AC power supply due to tsunamis or earthquakes. ②Though there is no additional release risk of radioactive materials, there is a risk that emergency restoration work of important facility will be delayed due to the absence of illumination in the event of an abnormality such as a total loss of AC power supply. ③There is no risk to external events for securing restoration materials. ④There is no change in the risk over time. ⑤It is desirable to implement it as early as possible, and it is already implemented. ⑥The risk of implementing measures is small. ⑦There is no risk that measures cannot be implemented.
			Seismic isolation building for in-house high-voltage bus M/C (including emergency D/G M/C) Installation of remote monitoring and operation equipment	It will enable remote monitoring and operation from the Seismic Isolation Building and will enable early detection of abnormalities.	Completed at the end of December 2012	①There is a risk that recovery work will be delayed due to delayed detection of abnormalities, etc. when the power supply is lost. ②The risk of additional emission of radioactive materials due to damage to fuel, etc., will be reduced because it is possible to prevent the long-term loss of the power supply function of important loads of reactor water injection facilities, etc. by implementing measures. ③Implementation of countermeasures will reduce the risk of long-term loss of the power supply function for external events.

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		・Risk of increased generation of accumulated water	Recovery of sub drain	Reduction of groundwater inflow into the building will be attempted by restoring the facility (sub-drain) for pumping up groundwater around the building and lowering the groundwater level.	Sep. 2015: Sub-drain began operation	①Since the amount of groundwater inflow into the building does not decrease, the risk of increase of contaminated water is not reduced. ②The risk of additional emission of radioactive materials in the event of a leak is large. ③The purpose is to reduce groundwater inflow, and the risk for external events does not change. ④Though the inventory in the accumulated water is going to be reduced by the continuation of the water treatment, the leakage risk of the accumulated water in the building increases, because the inflow of the groundwater to the building can not be reduced. ⑤It is necessary to carry out it as soon as possible, and a restoration plan is under consideration. ⑥Though the risk of implementing countermeasures is small, remediation of sub-drain water is necessary. ⑦As other measures to reduce the inflow of groundwater, the groundwater inflow will be suppressed by operating the groundwater bypass at an early stage.
		・Risk of increased generation of accumulated water	Installation of groundwater bypass	Since the groundwater around the building flows from the mountain side toward the sea side, the groundwater level around the building is gradually lowered by pumping up the groundwater at the high plateau on the building mountain side and changing its flow channel to bypass the sea, thereby reducing the amount of groundwater inflow into the building.	May 2014: Groundwater bypass began operation	①Since the amount of groundwater inflow into the building does not decrease, the risk of increase of contaminated water is not reduced. ②The risk of additional emission of radioactive materials in the event of a leak is large. ③The purpose is to reduce groundwater inflow, and the risk for external events does not change. ④Though the inventory in the accumulated water is going to be reduced by the continuation of the water treatment, the leakage risk of the accumulated water in the building increases, because the inflow of the groundwater to the building can not be reduced. ⑤Since there is no interference work, it is desirable to carry out it as early as possible. ⑥The groundwater level around the building is too low due to the operation of the pumping well, and it is necessary to respond to the risk of contaminated water flowing out of the building and the risk of contaminated groundwater being drawn into the pumping well of the bypass and released into the sea area. ⑦When groundwater inflow to the building does not decrease as expected even when pumping wells are operated, it is necessary to secure water treatment and storage locations.

Risk reduction measures planned to be implemented and appropriateness (5/8)

Road Map Related Items		Assumed risks	Risk reduction measures	Purpose	Response status	Adequacy of individual measures
Plans for maintaining and continuity stable plant conditions	For electrical system equipment Improved reliability	・Due to a single failure Power shutdown risk	Installation of high-voltage buses in turbine buildings and change of suppliers of critical loads	Reliability is improved by making it possible to supply the critical load supplied by one system from the high-voltage bus in the two systems installed on the second floor of the turbine building.	Completed installation of high-pressure bus in the turbine building in May 2013 Completed change in suppliers of critical loads in July 2013	①As for the important loads that are powered by one system, some functions can be maintained by small generators in the event of a loss of power, but the risk of loss of function will not be reduced. ②In addition to contributing to the further improvement of the reliability of highly important reactor water injection equipment, the additional release risk of radioactive materials due to fuel damage can be reduced because power can be supplied from two systems for some of the dynamic components of the spent fuel pool facilities. ③Power loss risk against tsunami is reduced by being able to be supplied from high-voltage bus lines in the premises installed on the second floor of the turbine building. ④In the long term, the risk of loss of power to critical loads due to ageing degradation failures of electrical installations increases. ⑤It is desirable to implement it as early as possible, and it is already implemented. ⑥The risk of implementing measures is small. ⑦There is no risk that measures cannot be implemented.
		・Risk of loss of power caused by flood of tsunami	Improved waterproofing of common pool buildings	Improve the waterproof property as a tsunami countermeasure for the common pool building where common diesel generators A.B are installed in the plant.	Completed countermeasures in September 2013	①The risk of loss of the power supply function of the common diesel generator in the plant due to the penetration of tsunami into the common pool building will not be reduced. ②The risk of additional emission of radioactive materials due to fuel damage will be reduced because the power supply function of the common diesel generator in the plant can be maintained by preventing the intrusion of tsunamis into the common pool building. ③Risk of loss of power supply function of common diesel generators in the plant due to tsunami can be reduced. ④There is no change in the risk over time. ⑤It is desirable to carry out it as early as possible, and the examination is proceeding for the implementation. ⑥The risk of implementing measures is small. ⑦It is necessary to examine the method based on the situation of the site.
		・Restoration delay risk during power loss	Securing materials for small generators, power supply panels, cables, etc.	In preparation for abnormal situations involving a total loss of AC power due to tsunamis or earthquakes, materials such as outdoor lighting necessary for restoration work of important facility will be secured.	Completed countermeasures in March 2013	①There is a risk that emergency restoration work for important equipment will be delayed due to the absence of outdoor lighting, etc. in the event of an abnormality accompanied by a total loss of AC power supply due to tsunamis or earthquakes. ②Though there is no additional release risk of radioactive materials, there is a risk that emergency restoration work of important facility will be delayed due to the absence of illumination in the event of an abnormality such as a total loss of AC power supply. ③There is no risk to external events for securing restoration materials. ④There is no change in the risk over time. ⑤It is desirable to implement it as early as possible, and it is already implemented. ⑥The risk of implementing measures is small. ⑦There is no risk that measures cannot be implemented.

Reason for Revison

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter I, 2.4 Future Risk Reduction Measures, Attachment-1)

Current

						④There is no change in the risk over time. ⑤It is desirable to carry out as early as possible, and it has already been completed. ⑥The risk of implementing measures is small. ⑦There is no risk that measures cannot be implemented.

Table 2.4-1 Risk reduction measures planned to be implemented and appropriateness (6/8)

Road Map Related Items		Assumed risks	Risk reduction measures	Purpose	Target timing	Adequacy of individual measures
Plans to reduce the radiation dose and prevent the spread of pollution throughout the entire power plant	Prevention plan for marine pollution spread	・Risk of radioactive materials emission into the sea through its leak into groundwater	Impervious wall installation	Prevent contaminated groundwater from flowing into the ocean through permeable layers in the ground if contaminated water in the building runs out into groundwater	Completed in mid-fiscal 2014	①The risk of contaminated water leaking into the ocean, etc. when contaminated water leaks into groundwater is not reduced. ②If contaminated water runs out into groundwater, the additional release risk of radioactive material is large. ③If the contaminated water storage facility in the site is damaged, the risk for external events can be reduced because the impervious wall serves as a stop to the contaminated water outflow. ④The purpose is to stop the outflow of contaminated water, and there is no temporal change of the risk. ⑤Since there is no interference work, it is desirable to install it at an early stage, and it has already been implemented. ⑥The amount of stored water in the premises increases due to the water pumped up by groundwater drain. ⑦There is no risk that measures cannot be implemented.
		・Risk of the spread of radioactive materials in ports to the sea	Dredging, Covering, etc. of Inner Sea Seeds of Ports	For the purpose of removing contaminated soil from the seabed and securing navigation routes and berths for large ships for the purpose of improving the environment in ports, dredging and covering of seabed soil in ports will be carried out. The dredged soil will be temporarily accumulated outside the route and berth area, and the accumulated soil will be covered to prevent re-diffusion.	Start from mid-FY2013 onward	①The risk of sea bed soil in the harbor re-diffusing due to waves, etc., and discharging it outside the harbor is not reduced. ②The additional release risk of radioactive materials is large when the seabed soil is re-diffused due to waves, etc. ③Implementation of countermeasures reduces the risk of re-diffusion of seabed soil due to external events. ④The purpose is to prevent the diffusion of seabed soil, and there is no temporal change in the risk. ⑤Investigate the timing of vessel navigation and maritime work congestion in ports and harbors. ⑥The risk becomes small by choosing the construction method in which the sea bed soil does not re-diffuse. ⑦There is no risk that measures cannot be implemented.
Plan for radioactive waste management and reduction of radiation dose at the boundary of the site	Rubble, etc.	・Risk of on-site exposure	Expansion of facilities for temporary storage of rubble cover Or additional shielding of temporary storage area A	To achieve a site boundary dose of less than 1 mSv/year due to rubble and contaminated water, etc. that have occurred since the occurrence of the accident stored in the facility, additional storage facilities for rubble, etc. will be installed. These operations also reduce the atmospheric dose throughout the site, which also improves the working environment.	Completed at the end of March 2013	①Required for "Items to Take Measures", and if no measures are taken, it will be difficult to achieve the target of less than 1 mSv/year of the boundary dose at the site as of the end of March 2013. ②The purpose is to achieve the target of the site boundary dose, and the risk of additional emission of radioactive materials is small. ③By implementing countermeasures, the risk of scattering of rubble, etc. caused by tornadoes, etc. is reduced. ④The purpose is to achieve the target of the site boundary dose, and there is no change in the risk over time. ⑤The target is to be achieved by the end of fiscal 2012, and the work is already being carried out. ⑥Exposure to workers, etc. is generated by implementing measures. Therefore, it is necessary to appropriately implement dose control, etc. ⑦If measures cannot be taken, the site boundary dose of less than 1 mSv/year as of the end of March 2013 could not be achieved due to rubble and contaminated water, etc. that have occurred since the occurrence of the accident stored in the facility. It should be noted that alternative measures are difficult because of time constraints. In addition, since the storage facility installation location is limited, it is necessary to reduce the volume of radioactive waste, etc., without fail.
			Installation of earth-covering logging temporary storage tanks		Completed at the end of March 2013	
	Secondary waste from Water treatment	・Risk of on-site exposure ・Outside the system of radioactive materials Release risk	Installation of temporary storage facilities for spent cesium adsorption towers (facilities No. 3 and No. 4)		Facility No.3: In April 2013 Facility No.4: Started	
			Shielding the adsorption tower storage facility and replacement the adsorption tower		Shielding installation: Completed in early March 2013 Replacement: Completed at the end of September 2013	
	Gaseous Waste	・Outside the system of radioactive materials Release risk	Closing the Blow Out Panel of Unit 2	Control the emission of radioactive materials from the reactor building to the atmosphere by closing the blow-out panel of the reactor building of Unit 2.	Completed at the end of March 2013	①If measures are not taken, the state in which radioactive materials are released from the reactor building will continue. ②There is no change in the additional release risk if there is no change in the state of the reactor. ③Implementation of countermeasures reduces the risk of external events such as storms. ④There is no change in the risk over time. ⑤Though it is necessary to carry out it early, it is carried out after the installation of the air conditioning equipment is completed, because the worsening of the working environment in the reactor building is feared by closing the blow-out panel. ⑥Since the worsening of the working environment in the reactor building is a concern by implementing countermeasures, it is necessary to install air conditioning equipment to improve them. ⑦It is necessary to examine the method based on the situation of the site, etc..
			Installation of covers for taking out spent fuel at Units 3 and 4, and installation and operation of ventilation equipment with filters	When fuel is taken out of the spent fuel pool, covers and ventilation equipment shall be installed to control the emission of radioactive materials into the atmosphere due to the soaring of radioactive materials during operation.	Unit 3: Started taking out in the first half of fiscal 2015 Unit 4: Take-off started in November 2013	①If measures are not taken, the risk of releasing radioactive materials will not be reduced due to soaring associated with spent fuel unloading operations. ②The risk of additional emission of radioactive materials due to soaring associated with spent fuel unloading operations is large. ③Installation of the cover can reduce the risk of deterioration of workability due to wind and rain. ④There is no change in the risk over time. ⑤It is necessary to carry out it at an early stage, and the construction is already carried out. ⑥Exposure to workers, etc. is generated by implementing measures. Therefore, it is necessary to appropriately implement dose control, etc. ⑦It is necessary to examine methods, etc. based on the situation of the site, and there is a risk that the removal work of spent fuel will be delayed depending on the situation of the site.

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			Seismic isolation building for in-house high-voltage bus M/C (including emergency D/G M/C) Installation of remote monitoring and operation equipment	It will enable remote monitoring and operation from the Seismic Isolation Building and will enable early detection of abnormalities.	Completed countermeasures in January 2013	①There is a risk that recovery work will be delayed due to delayed detection of abnormalities, etc. when the power supply is lost. ②The risk of additional emission of radioactive materials due to damage to fuel, etc., will be reduced because it is possible to prevent the long-term loss of the power supply function of important loads of reactor water injection facilities, etc. by implementing measures. ③Implementation of countermeasures will reduce the risk of long-term loss of the power supply function for external events. ④There is no change in the risk over time. ⑤It is desirable to carry out as early as possible, and it has already been completed. ⑥The risk of implementing measures is small. ⑦There is no risk that measures cannot be implemented.

Risk reduction measures planned to be implemented and appropriateness (6/8)

Road Map Related Items		Assumed risks	Risk reduction measures	Purpose	Response status	Adequacy of individual measures
Plans to reduce the radiation dose and prevent the spread of pollution throughout the entire power plant	Prevention plan for marine pollution spread	・Risk of radioactive materials emission into the sea through its leak into groundwater	Impervious wall installation	Prevent contaminated groundwater from flowing into the ocean through permeable layers in the ground if contaminated water in the building runs out into groundwater	Octber 2015: Completion of Countermeasures	①The risk of contaminated water leaking into the ocean, etc. when contaminated water leaks into groundwater is not reduced. ②If contaminated water runs out into groundwater, the additional release risk of radioactive material is large. ③If the contaminated water storage facility in the site is damaged, the risk for external events can be reduced because the impervious wall serves as a stop to the contaminated water outflow. ④The purpose is to stop the outflow of contaminated water, and there is no temporal change of the risk. ⑤Since there is no interference work, it is desirable to install it at an early stage, and it has already been implemented. ⑥The amount of stored water in the premises increases due to the water pumped up by groundwater drain. ⑦There is no risk that measures cannot be implemented.
		・Risk of the spread of radioactive materials in ports to the sea	Dredging, Covering, etc. of Inner Sea Seeds of Ports	For the purpose of removing contaminated soil from the seabed and securing navigation routes and berths for large ships for the purpose of improving the environment in ports, dredging and covering of seabed soil in ports will be carried out. The dredged soil will be temporarily accumulated outside the route and berth area, and the accumulated soil will be covered to prevent re-diffusion.	December 2016: Completion of Countermeasures	①The risk of sea bed soil in the harbor re-diffusing due to waves, etc., and discharging it outside the harbor is not reduced. ②The additional release risk of radioactive materials is large when the seabed soil is re-diffused due to waves, etc. ③Implementation of countermeasures reduces the risk of re-diffusion of seabed soil due to external events. ④The purpose is to prevent the diffusion of seabed soil, and there is no temporal change in the risk. ⑤Investigate the timing of vessel navigation and maritime work congestion in ports and harbors. ⑥The risk becomes small by choosing the construction method in which the sea bed soil does not re-diffuse. ⑦There is no risk that measures cannot be implemented.
Plan for radioactive waste management and reduction of radiation dose at the boundary of the site	Rubble, etc.	・Risk of on-site exposure	Expansion of facilities for temporary storage of rubble cover Or additional shielding of temporary storage area A	To achieve a site boundary dose of less than 1 mSv/year due to rubble and contaminated water, etc. that have occurred since the occurrence of the accident stored in the facility, additional storage facilities for rubble, etc. will be installed. These operations also reduce the atmospheric dose throughout the site, which also improves the working environment.	June 2015: Installed	①Required for "Items to Take Measures", and if no measures are taken, it will be difficult to achieve the target of less than 1 mSv/year of the boundary dose at the site as of the end of March 2013. ②The purpose is to achieve the target of the site boundary dose, and the risk of additional emission of radioactive materials is small. ③By implementing countermeasures, the risk of scattering of rubble, etc. caused by tornadoes, etc. is reduced. ④The purpose is to achieve the target of the site boundary dose, and there is no change in the risk over time. ⑤The target is to be achieved by the end of fiscal 2012, and the work is already being carried out. ⑥ Exposure to workers, etc. is generated by implementing measures. Therefore, it is necessary to appropriately implement dose control, etc. ⑦If measures cannot be taken, the site boundary dose of less than 1 mSv/year as of the end of March 2013 could not be achieved due to rubble and contaminated water, etc. that have occurred since the occurrence of the accident stored in the facility. It should be noted that alternative measures are difficult because of time constraints. In addition, since the storage facility installation location is limited, it is necessary to reduce the volume of radioactive waste, etc., without fail.
			Installation of earth-covering logging temporary storage tanks		December 2012: Installed	
	Water treatment secondary Waste	・Risk of on-site exposure ・Outside the system of radioactive materials emission risk	Installation of temporary storage facilities for spent cesium adsorption towers (facilities No. 3 and No. 4)		Facility No.3: February 2014 Installed F0acility No. 4: June 2013 Installed	
			Shielding the adsorption tower storage facility and replacement the adsorption tower		Shielding installtion: Completed cinstllation in March 2013 Replacement: Replaced in March 2014	
	Gas Waste	・Outside the system of radioactive materials Release risk	Closing the Blow Out Panel of Unit 2	Control the emission of radioactive materials from the reactor building to the atmosphere by closing the blow-out panel of the reactor building of Unit 2.	Closing completed in March 2013	①If measures are not taken, the state in which radioactive materials are released from the reactor building will continue. ②There is no change in the additional release risk if there is no change in the state of the reactor. ③Implementation of countermeasures reduces the risk of external events such as storms. ④There is no change in the risk over time. ⑤Though it is necessary to carry out it early, it is carried out after the installation of the air conditioning equipment is completed, because the worsening of the working environment in the reactor building is feared by closing the blow-out panel. ⑥Since the worsening of the working environment in the reactor building is a concern by implementing countermeasures, it is necessary to install air conditioning equipment to improve them. ⑦It is necessary to examine the method based about the site, etc..
			Installation of covers for taking out spent fuel at Units 3 and 4, and installation and operation of ventilation equipment with filters	When fuel is taken out of the spent fuel pool, covers and ventilation equipment shall be installed to control the emission of radioactive materials into the atmosphere due to the soaring of radioactive materials during operation.	Unit 3: Fuel removal cover installed completed in Febraury 2018 Unit 4: Installation of cover for fuel removal completed in November 2013 Unit 3: Installation of ventilating air conditioning equipment completed in June 2018 Unit 4: Installation of ventilation air conditioning equipment completed in October 2013	①If measures are not taken, the risk of releasing radioactive materials will not be reduced due to soaring associated with spent fuel unloading operations. ②The risk of additional emission of radioactive materials due to soaring associated with spent fuel unloading operations is large. ③Installation of the cover can reduce the risk of deterioration of workability due to wind and rain. ④There is no change in the risk over time. ⑤It is necessary to carry out it at an early stage, and the construction is already carried out. ⑥ Exposure to workers, etc. is generated by implementing measures. Therefore, it is necessary to appropriately implement

Reason for Revison

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter I, 2.4 Future Risk Reduction Measures, Attachment-1)

Current

	On-site decontamination plan	・Risk of on-site exposure	Formulation and implementation of on-site decontamination plans	As the process exposure is reduced by reducing the atmospheric dose in the site, the no-mask area, etc. will be enlarged to reduce the workload of workers.	Progressively planned and implemented	①If no measures are taken, the atmospheric dose on the site will not be reduced. ②The purpose is to control the exposure, and the risk of additional emission of radioactive materials is small. ③Risk for external events is small. ④There is no change in the risk over time. ⑤Since the object range is wide and there are some places where the atmospheric dose is very high, it is necessary to carry out systematically by stepping on the stage. At present, based on the recognition, the area in which the effect is comparatively expected is selected, and the work is carried out. ⑥Implementation of measures increases the exposure of workers, etc. Therefore, it is necessary to appropriately implement dose control, etc. ⑦It is necessary to examine the decontamination method according to the dose in the field.

Table 2.4-1 Risk reduction measures planned to be implemented and appropriateness (7/8)

Road Map Related Items		Assumed risks	Risk reduction measures		Purpose	Target timing	Adequacy of individual measures
Fuel removal plan from the spent fuel pool	Spent fuel pools of Units 1 to 4	・Risk of loss of cooling function	Measures for Improving Reliability of Spent Fuel Pool Circulation Cooling Facilities in Units 1 to 4	Making backup supply	Regarding SFP cooling, cooling and purification of pools are continually being carried out using cooling equipment installed after the earthquake. Since an event in which the cooling function temporarily stops occurred due to a failure of the equipment installed last year, etc., spare parts will be secured and power supplies will be multiplexed to prevent these recurrences.	Completed at the end of March 2013	①The risk of temporary loss of cooling function due to power shutdown, etc., is not reduced. ②The additional release risk of radioactive material from spent fuel in the event of a long-term loss of cooling function is large. ③Risks for external events continue. ④In the long term, the risk of loss of power to critical loads due to ageing degradation failures of electrical installations increases. ⑤It is desirable to implement it as early as possible, and it is already implemented. ⑥The risk of implementing measures is small. ⑦There is no risk that measures cannot be implemented.
				On-site power supply (M/C) multiplexing		Completed at the end of March 2013	
			Transfer of fuel from Units 1 to 4 Spent Fuel Pool to Common Pool		About 3000 fuel assemblies were stored in the spent fuel pools of Units 1 to 4 (Units 1: 392, Units 2: 615, Units 3: 566, Units 4: 1533). To remove these decay heat, a spent fuel pool circulation cooling system has been installed after the earthquake. Since these cooling facilities were installed immediately after the earthquake, measures have been taken to ensure that the cooling function can continue by implementing measures to improve reliability, etc. If these functions are stopped for a long time, the decay heat of spent fuel may cause the spent fuel to melt and release radioactive materials into the atmosphere in the worst case. For this reason, spent fuel is transferred to a common pool with a more reliable cooling function, low atmospheric dose, and easy to manage, and stored and managed.	Unit 3: Started taking out in the first half of fiscal 2015 Unit 4: Take-off started in November 2013 Units 1 and 2: The plan will be narrowed down or revised or changed according to the judgment points. Unit 1 (shortest): Start of take-out in the first half of fiscal 2017 Unit 2 (minimum): Launch in the second half of fiscal 2017	①When the cooling function of spent fuel is stopped for a long time, the risk of spent fuel melting and releasing radioactive materials into the atmosphere is not reduced in the worst case due to the decay heat of spent fuel. ②The risk of additional release of radioactive material from spent fuel in the event of prolonged loss of cooling function is large. ③Receiving spent fuel in the spent fuel pools of Units 1 to 4 into the common pool reduces the risk of loss of cooling function due to the impacts of external events such as earthquakes and tsunamis in the spent fuel pools. ④Risk increases over time due to degradation of cooling equipment. On the other hand, the decay energy of spent fuel decreases by continuing the cooling function for a long time, and the time until it reaches the control value becomes longer even if the equipment stops and the water temperature of the pool rises. ⑤Removal of rubble, etc., from the upper part of the reactor building, installation of fuel removal covers and fuel handling equipment, etc. are necessary for extracting spent fuel, and these must be done in advance. As soon as these preparations are completed, it is necessary to carry out them at an early stage. ⑥In order to transfer spent fuel to a common pool, etc., it is necessary to take measures to prevent fuel from falling during transfer, etc. In addition, if it is a high dose atmosphere, it is also necessary to consider decontamination, etc. work, and it is necessary to appropriately carry out exposure control, etc. for workers. ⑦If removal becomes impossible due to the impacts of rubble or deformation of the fuel handle, the fuel debris removal process in the post-process may be affected. Therefore, these handling methods are being investigated.
	Common pool	・Lack of storage capacity Risk	Fuel transfer from common pools to temporary storage facilities		The common pool already has 6377 storage units against 6840 storage units. In the future, to receive spent fuel from the spent fuel pool, the spent fuel, which has been sufficiently cooled, will be transferred to the dry cask to secure the fuel receiving capacity of the common pool.	Implemented in stages from June 2013 onward	①If measures are not taken, it becomes difficult to transfer fuel from the spent fuel pool, and the risk, etc., in the event of loss of cooling function in the spent fuel pool will not be reduced. ②The additional release risk of radioactive material from spent fuel in the event of a long-term loss of cooling function is large. ③The risk of tsunami is reduced by transferring to a dry cask and moving to a high-level temporary storage facility. ④If measures are not taken, it becomes difficult to transfer fuel from the spent fuel pool, and the risk, etc., in the event of loss of cooling function in the spent fuel pool will not be reduced. ⑤It is necessary to carry out systematically to secure free space for the removal of spent fuel. ⑥Take measures to prevent fuel from falling during cask transfer, etc. ⑦It is the handling work which has been proven from the past, but it is necessary to examine the process control so that the delay by the congestion of fuel dispensing work and acceptance work in the common pool does not occur.
		・Risk of corrosion of damaged casks	Cask transfer from cask storage building to common pool		The cask storage building has a dry fuel cask that has been stored since before the earthquake. The cask is exposed to seawater and other water due to the impacts of the earthquake, and there are concerns about the effects of corrosion and other factors. In	Completed in May 2013	①If measures are not taken, the materials of concern, such as the integrity of the sealing function, will not be removed. ②Spent fuel (a total of 408 tubes in nine casks) is already stored in the dry fuel cask, and the control function of radioactive material release from the stored spent fuel cannot be confirmed unless the integrity of the sealing function, etc. of the cask is confirmed and maintained. ③If tsunamis, etc., occur again, seawater, etc., may flood the cask

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						dose control, etc. ⑦It is necessary to examine methods, etc. based on the situation of the site, and there is a risk that the removal work of spent fuel will be delayed depending on the situation of the site.
	On-site decontamination plan	・Risk of on-site exposure	Formulation and implementation of on-site decontamination plans	The process exposure is reduced by reducing the atmospheric dose in the site. In addition, the no-mask area, etc. will be enlarged to reduce the workload of workers.	Since May 2018, decontamination, paving, and other measures have enabled 96% of the entire premises to be worked with general work clothing and light equipment such as dust masks.	①If no measures are taken, the atmospheric dose on the site will not be reduced. ②The purpose is to control the exposure, and the risk of additional emission of radioactive materials is small. ③Risk for external events is small. ④There is no change in the risk over time. ⑤Since the object range is wide and there are some places where the atmospheric dose is very high, it is necessary to carry out systematically by stepping on the stage. At present, based on the recognition, the area in which the effect is comparatively expected is selected, and the work is carried out. ⑥Implementation of measures increases the exposure of workers, etc. Therefore, it is necessary to appropriately implement dose control, etc. ⑦ It is necessary to examine the decontamination method according to the dose in the field.

Risk reduction measures planned to be implemented and appropriateness (7/8)

Road Map Related Items		Assumed risks	Risk reduction measures		Purpose	Response status	Adequacy of individual measures
Fuel removal plan from the spent fuel pool	Spent fuel pools of Units 1 to 6	Risk of loss of cooling function	Measures for Improving Reliability of Spent Fuel Pool Circulation Cooling Facilities in Units 1 to 4	Making backup supply	Regarding SFP cooling, cooling and purification of pools are continually being carried out using cooling equipment installed after the earthquake. Since an event in which the cooling function temporarily stops occurred due to a failure of the equipment installed last year, etc., spare parts will be secured and power supplies will be multiplexed to prevent these recurrences.	Cuntereasures completed in April 2013	①The risk of temporary loss of cooling function due to power shutdown, etc., is not reduced. ②The additional release risk of radioactive material from spent fuel in the event of a long-term loss of cooling function is large. ③ Risks for external events continue. ④In the long term, the risk of loss of power to critical loads due to ageing degradation failures of electrical installations increases. ⑤It is desirable to implement it as early as possible, and it is already implemented. ⑥The risk of implementing measures is small. ⑦There is no risk that measures cannot be implemented.
				On-site power supply (M/C) multiplexing		Units 1 and 2: Countermeasures completed in March 2013 Units 3 and 4: Countermeasures completed in June 2013	
			Transfer of fuel from Units 1 to 6 Spent Fuel Pool to Common Pool		About 3000 fuel assemblies were stored in the spent fuel pools of Units 1 to 4 (Unit 1: 392, Unit 2: 615, Unit 3: 566, Unit 4: 1533). To remove these decay heat, a spent fuel pool circulation cooling system has been installed after the earthquake. Since these cooling facilities were installed immediately after the earthquake, measures have been taken to ensure that the cooling function can continue by implementing measures to improve reliability, etc. If these functions are stopped for a long time, the decay heat of spent fuel may cause the spent fuel to melt and release radioactive materials into the atmosphere in the worst case. For this reason, spent fuel is transferred to a common pool with a more reliable cooling function, low atmospheric dose, and easy to manage, and stored and managed. About 3000 fuel assemblies were stored in the spent fuel pools of Units 5 and 6 (Unit 5: 1,542, Unit 6: 1,654). To remove these decay heat, existing spent fuel pool cooling system have cooled these spent fuel pools. Comply with the decision on decommissioning, the spent fuels in the spent fuel pools of Units 5 and 6 will be transferred to common pool as far as it won't affect the works in the Units 1 and 2.	Unit 1: Fuel removal will start from FY2027 to FY2028 Unit 2: Fuel removal will start from FY2024 to FY2026 Unit 3: Fuel removal completed in February 2021 Unit 4: Fuel removal completed in December 2014 Unit 5: Fuel removal will start from FY 2024. Unit 6: Fuel removal will start from FY 2022.	①When the cooling function of spent fuel is stopped for a long time, the risk of spent fuel melting and releasing radioactive materials into the atmosphere is not reduced in the worst case due to the decay heat of spent fuel. ②The risk of additional release of radioactive material from spent fuel in the event of prolonged loss of cooling function is large. ③Receiving spent fuel in the spent fuel pools of Units 1 to 4 into the common pool reduces the risk of loss of cooling function due to the impacts of external events such as earthquakes and tsunamis in the spent fuel pools. ④ Risk increases over time due to degradation of cooling equipment. On the other hand, the decay energy of spent fuel decreases by continuing the cooling function for a long time, and the time until it reaches the control value becomes longer even if the equipment stops and the water temperature of the pool rises. ⑤Removal of rubble, etc., from the upper part of the reactor building, installation of fuel removal covers and fuel handling equipment, etc. are necessary for extracting spent fuel, and these must be done in advance. As soon as these preparations are completed, it is necessary to carry out them at an early stage. ⑥In order to transfer spent fuel to a common pool, etc., it is necessary to take measures to prevent fuel from falling during transfer, etc. In addition, if it is a high dose atmosphere, it is also necessary to consider decontamination, etc. work, and it is necessary to appropriately carry out exposure control, etc. for workers. ⑦If removal becomes impossible due to the impacts of rubble or deformation of the fuel handle, the fuel debris removal process in the post-process may be affected. Therefore, these handling methods are being investigated.
	Common pool	・Risk of insufficient storage capacity	Fuel transfer from common pool to temporary storage facilities		The common pool already has 6377 storage units against 6840 storage units. In the future, to receive spent fuel from the spent fuel pool, the spent fuel, which has been sufficiently cooled, will be transferred to the dry cask to secure the fuel receiving capacity of the common pool.	Implemented in stages from June 2013 onward	①If measures are not taken, it becomes difficult to transfer fuel from the spent fuel pool, and the risk, etc., in the event of loss of cooling function in the spent fuel pool will not be reduced. ②The additional release risk of radioactive material from spent fuel in the event of a long-term loss of cooling function is large. ③The risk of tsunami is reduced by transferring to a dry cask and moving to a high-level temporary storage facility. ④If measures are not taken, it becomes difficult to transfer fuel from the spent fuel pool, and the risk, etc., in the event of loss of cooling function in the spent fuel pool will not be reduced. ⑤It is necessary to carry out systematically to secure free space

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Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter I, 2.4 Future Risk Reduction Measures, Attachment-1)

Current

				addition, although it is confirmed that there is no abnormality in the dose and temperature measurements during patrol, the regular monitoring system is in a situation where it cannot be used. Therefore, these casks are transferred to the common pool to check the soundness of the cask body.		storage building, affecting the integrity of the sealing function of the cask, etc. ④The integrity of the sealing function of the cask may be impaired due to the progress of corrosion, etc. ⑤The plan is to carry out these restoration works sequentially as soon as the preparation for transferring the cask from the cask storage building and the preparation of the common pool on the receiving side are completed. ⑥Take measures to prevent the cask from falling during transfer, etc., when transferring the cask. ⑦Monitoring should be considered.
		・Risk of loss of cooling function	Common pool M/C installation	Improve reliability and maintain cooling function by restoring M/C(A)(B) for power supply facilities in common pool.	Completed at the end of July 2013	①The risk of temporary loss of cooling function due to power shutdown, etc., is not reduced. ②The additional release risk of radioactive material from spent fuel in the event of a long-term loss of cooling function is large. ③Risks for external events continue. ④In the long term, the risk of loss of power to critical loads due to ageing degradation failures of electrical installations increases. ⑤It is desirable to implement it as early as possible, and it is already implemented. ⑥The risk of implementing measures is small. ⑦There is no risk that measures cannot be implemented.

Table 2.4-1 Risk reduction measures planned to be implemented and appropriateness (8/8)

Road Map Related Items		Assumed risks	Risk reduction measures	Purpose	Target timing	Adequacy of individual measures
Plan for dismantling radioactive waste processing and disposal of nuclear reactor facilities	Plan for the processing and disposal of radioactive waste	・Risk of capacity shortage of waste storage	Installation of miscellaneous solid waste incineration facilities	Incineration facilities shall be installed to incinerate and reduce the volume of radioactive solid waste, etc. generated on the premises.	Completed installation in the second half of fiscal 2014	①If measures are not taken, the amount of radioactive solid waste to be stored will increase, and operations related to storage and management will continue. ②There is an increase in radioactive solid waste, etc., but the risk of additional emission of radioactive materials is small. ③Storage materials may be scattered due to external events such as fire. ④If measures are not taken, the storage risk of radioactive solid wastes, etc., increases in time. ⑤Countermeasures are necessary from the construction of the building and require time for a long period of time. It is already in design at present, and the work is proceeding toward the start of service in the second half of H26. ⑥There is a possibility of releasing radioactive materials into the atmosphere from incinerating radioactive solid waste, etc. Therefore, appropriate treatment facilities shall be installed and emission control shall be carried out to confirm that there is no effect on the outside of the site. ⑦If measures cannot be taken, the storage area should be secured continuously.
Other	Fire prevention measures	・Risk of fire spreading near power stations and in-plant	Formation and maintenance of fire belts Formulation and implementation of fire prevention measures in power stations	To protect important facilities at power stations from large-scale fires near power stations, fire prevention belts will be formed, and measures will be formulated and implemented to protect important facilities from fires in power stations and prevent the spread of fires.	Completed at the end of March 2013 2013 Dec.	①In the event of a large-scale fire inside and outside the power plant site, there is a possibility of loss of function of the facility and soaring of radioactive materials. ②There is an additional release risk of radioactive material from a large-scale fire. ③By implementing countermeasures, the risk can be reduced against external events such as large-scale fires. ④Risk does not change over time. ⑤It is necessary to carry out systematically. ⑥Cutting of new forests is required for the formation of fire prevention belts, and secure of storage area and countermeasures against spontaneous ignition of felled trees are required. ⑦It is necessary to investigate and implement measures according to the situation of the site (monitoring by cameras, installation of fire reports, patrols, etc.), to strive for early detection of fires, and to construct a system that enables quick initial extinguishing of fires.

Revised

						for the removal of spent fuel. ⑥Take measures to prevent fuel from falling during cask transfer, etc. ⑦It is the handling work which has been proven from the past, but it is necessary to examine the process control so that the delay by the congestion of fuel dispensing work and acceptance work in the common pool does not occur.
		・Risk of corrosion of damaged casks	Cask transfer from cask storage building to common pool	The cask storage building has a dry fuel cask that has been stored since before the earthquake. The cask is exposed to seawater and other water due to the impacts of the earthquake, and there are concerns about the effects of corrosion and other factors. In addition, although it is confirmed that there is no abnormality in the dose and temperature measurements during patrol, the regular monitoring system is in a situation where it cannot be used. Therefore, these casks are transferred to the common pool to check the soundness of the cask body.	Completed in May 2013	①If measures are not taken, the materials of concern, such as the integrity of the sealing function, will not be removed. ②Spent fuel (a total of 408 tubes in nine casks) is already stored in the dry fuel cask, and the control function of radioactive material release from the stored spent fuel cannot be confirmed unless the integrity of the sealing function, etc. of the cask is confirmed and maintained. ③If tsunamis, etc., occur again, seawater, etc., may flood the cask storage building, affecting the integrity of the sealing function of the cask, etc. ④The integrity of the sealing function of the cask may be impaired due to the progress of corrosion, etc. ⑤The plan is to carry out these restoration works sequentially as soon as the preparation for transferring the cask from the cask storage building and the preparation of the common pool on the receiving side are completed. ⑥Take measures to prevent the cask from falling during transfer, etc., when transferring the cask. ⑦Monitoring should be considered.
		・Risk of loss of cooling function	Common pool M/C installation	Improve reliability and maintain cooling function by restoring M/C(A)(B) for power supply facilities in common pool.	September 2013: Installetion completed	①The risk of temporary loss of cooling function due to power shutdown, etc., is not reduced. ②The additional release risk of radioactive material from spent fuel in the event of a long-term loss of cooling function is large. ③Risks for external events continue. ④In the long term, the risk of loss of power to critical loads due to ageing degradation failures of electrical installations increases. ⑤It is desirable to implement it as early as possible, and it is already implemented. ⑥The risk of implementing measures is small. ⑦There is no risk that measures cannot be implemented.

Risk reduction measures planned to be implemented and appropriateness (8/8)

Road Map Related Items		Assumed risks	Risk reduction measures	Purpose	Response status	Adequacy of individual measures
Plan for dismantling radioactive waste processing and disposal of nuclear reactor facilities	Plan for the processing and disposal of radioactive waste	・Risk of capacity shortage of waste storage	Installation of miscellaneous solid waste incineration facilities	Incineration facilities shall be installed to incinerate and reduce the volume of radioactive solid waste, etc. generated on the premises.	March 2016: Started operation	①If measures are not taken, the amount of radioactive solid waste to be stored will increase, and operations related to storage and management will continue. ②There is an increase in radioactive solid waste, etc., but the risk of additional emission of radioactive materials is small. ③Storage materials may be scattered due to external events such as fire. ④If measures are not taken, the storage risk of radioactive solid wastes, etc., increases in time. ⑤Countermeasures are required from building construction and require time for a long period of time. It is already in design at present, and the work is proceeding toward the start of service in the second half of H26. ⑥There is a possibility of releasing radioactive materials into the atmosphere from incinerating radioactive solid waste, etc. Therefore, appropriate treatment facilities shall be installed and emission control shall be carried out to confirm that there is no effect on the outside of the site. ⑦If measures cannot be taken, the storage area should be secured continuously.
Other	Fire prevention measures	・Risk of fire spreading near power stations and in-plant	Formation and maintenance of fire belts Formulation and implementation of fire prevention measures in power stations	To protect important facilities at power stations from large-scale fires in the vicinity of power stations, fire prevention belts will be formed, and measures will be formulated and implemented to protect important facilities from fires in power stations and prevent the spread of fires.	Fire belts have been set and conducted continuous maintenance. Continue to implement fire prevention measures	①In the event of a large-scale fire inside and outside the power plant site, there is a possibility of loss of function of the facility and soaring of radioactive materials. ②There is an additional release risk of radioactive material from a large-scale fire. ③By implementing countermeasures, the risk can be reduced against external events such as large-scale fires. ④Risk does not change over time. ⑤It is necessary to carry out systematically. ⑥Cutting of new forests is required for the formation of fire prevention belts, and secure of storage area and countermeasures against spontaneous ignition of felled trees are required. ⑦It is necessary to investigate and implement measures according to the situation of the site (monitoring by cameras, installation of fire reports, patrols, etc.), to strive for early detection of fires, and to construct a system that enables quick initial extinguishing of fires.

Reason for Revison

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter I, 2.4 Future Risk Reduction Measures, Attachment-1)

Current	Revised						Reason for Revison
		Plan towards securing sites	• Risk of shortage of sites for the construction of facilities for achieving the entire process of specified nuclear power facility and reducing risks in accordance with the risk map	Installation of ALPS treated water dilution and discharge facilities and related facilities	It is necessary to construct new facilities (fuel debris storage facilities, etc.) in the future to achieve the entire process of specified nuclear power facility and reduce the risk based on the risk map. For the purpose of securing the site for building the facilities, in order to dismantle the medium and low concentration tanks and reduce the volume of stored ALPS treated water, etc., ALPS treated water dilution /discharge facilities and related facilities will be installed based on the design and operation that would allow the ocean discharge of the amount of ALPS treated water exceeding the amount of contaminated water generated.	Inspections before use scheduled to be completed in mid-April 2023	①If measures are not implemented, facilities for the installation of required facilities for decommissioning cannot be provided, and the achievement of the entire process and risk reduction according to the risk map are not implemented. ②Storage of ALPS treated water before the ocean discharge will continue, but by storing in welded tanks and constructing weirs in the medium and low concentration tanks area, the risk of additional discharge of radioactive materials will remain almost the same as before the ocean discharge. ③By implementing measures, it is possible to reduce the leakage risk of contaminated water stored in the medium and low concentration tanks and ALPS treated water due to external events to outside the system. ④Due to continuous maintenance management of medium and low concentration tanks, which is caused by the increasing volume of stored ALPS treated water, the assurance of resources for relatively high risks need risk reduction such as retrieval of fuel debris will be affected, in addition to securing the site to build the facilities for decommissioning. ⑤The timing is in line with the government's fundamental policy. ⑥ALPS treated water will be discharged into the sea, which results in discharge of tritium exceeding the ratio to regulatory concentration limit 1. The effect on the environment is suppressed by the following design and operation: Confirmation of concentration in the measurement/confirmation facilities, dilution over 100 times, release amount of tritium after the dilution is less than 1,500 Bq/L, and annual tritium release amount is less than 22 trillion Bq/year. Dismantle and removal method of welded tanks needs to be established and storage management of solid waste generated are required. ⑦Since steady discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea is required for a long period of time, design and operation should be carried out taking into consideration possible equipment failures, etc.	Addition in accordance with discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter II, 1.9 Treatment, Storage and Management of Radioactive Liquid Waste)

Current	Revised	Reason for Revision
1.9 Treatment, Storage and Management of Radioactive Liquid Waste <Units 1-4> ○ Appropriate treatment for the control of the amount of waste generated and for the reduction in the concentration of radioactive materials. Regarding the radioactive liquid waste treated in the radioactive liquid waste treatment facility, the treated water should be stored. In addition, the contaminated water generated in the facility should be treated for purification such as adsorption by the contaminated water treatment facility to reduce radioactive materials. The treated water generated by the purification treatment should be stored, and the desalinated treated water should be reused for cooling water of the reactor, etc., to control the amount of new contaminated water generated. ○ Securing sufficient storage capacity Storage capacity is secured by installation of additional tanks and reducing treated water. ○ Shielding, prevention of leakage and prevention of spread of contamination. Appropriate materials for equipment should be used to prevent shielding and leakage, such as materials corresponding to the environment where the equipment is installed and the properties of internal fluid inside the equipment. The equipment should be installed in the independent section or weirs should be installed in the surrounding area to take measure to prevent the spread of contamination. ○ Reduction in the dose around the site as much as possible. By implementing the above three items and making continued improvement, the dose around the site associated with the treatment and storage of radioactive liquid waste is reduced as much as possible. ○ Structures (treatment and storage facilities) with sufficient shielding capability that are resistant to leakage and spread of contamination. For the treatment and storage facilities handling contaminated water, etc., measures such as installing shielding at places where people may approach should be taken from the viewpoint of dose reduction for workers. In addition, the relevant facilities are installed in the independent section, or weirs are set up in the surrounding area to take measures against the spread of leakage so that in the event of leakage, water leaked does not flow outside the site through the drainage channel. Detail, please refer bellow: II.2.5, II2.6, II.2.16, II.2.36, II.2.37, II.2.39, III.3.2.1 (Omitted below)	1.9 Treatment, Storage and Management of Radioactive Liquid Waste <Units 1-4> ○ Appropriate treatment for the control of the amount of waste generated and for the reduction in the concentration of radioactive materials. Regarding the radioactive liquid waste treated in the radioactive liquid waste treatment facility, the treated water should be stored. In addition, the contaminated water generated in the facility should be treated for purification such as adsorption by the contaminated water treatment facility to reduce radioactive materials. The treated water generated by the purification treatment should be stored, and the desalinated treated water should be reused for cooling water of the reactor, etc., to control the amount of new contaminated water generated. ○ Securing sufficient storage capacity Storage capacity is secured by installation of additional tanks and reducing treated water. ○ Shielding, prevention of leakage and prevention of spread of contamination. Appropriate materials for equipment should be used to prevent shielding and leakage, such as materials corresponding to the environment where the equipment is installed and the properties of internal fluid inside the equipment. The equipment should be installed in the independent section or weirs should be installed in the surrounding area to take measure to prevent the spread of contamination. ○ Reduction in the dose around the site as much as possible. By implementing the above three items and making continued improvement, the dose around the site associated with the treatment and storage of radioactive liquid waste is reduced as much as possible. ○ Structures (treatment and storage facilities) with sufficient shielding capability that are resistant to leakage and spread of contamination. For the treatment and storage facilities handling contaminated water, etc., measures such as installing shielding at places where people may approach should be taken from the viewpoint of dose reduction for workers. In addition, the relevant facilities are installed in the independent section, or weirs are set up in the surrounding area to take measures against the spread of leakage so that in the event of leakage, water leaked does not flow outside the site through the drainage channel. ○ Management of radioactive liquid waste, etc. Of radioactive liquid waste treated in the radioactive liquid waste treatment facility, when dischraging ALPS treated water that satisfy the criteria that the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of nuclides other than tritium is less than 1, the concentration of the radioactive material in the discharged water should be reduced by dilution with a large amount of seawater in order to reduce the effective dose at the site boundary as much as possible. Detail, please refer bellow: II.2.5, II2.6, II.2.16, II.2.36, II.2.50, III.3.1.9, III.3.2.1 (Omitted below)	Addition in accordance with the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter II, 1.14 Design Considerations)

Current	Revised	Reason for Revision
1.14 Design Considerations ○ The facility's design shall appropriately consider the following matters in consideration of the degree of safety importance. (1) Applicable standards and criteria Structures, systems and components with safety functions, concerning design, material selection, manufacture, and inspection, shall conform to the standards and criteria deemed appropriate in consideration of the importance of the safety functions to be performed by them. (2)Design considerations against natural phenomena • Structures, systems and components with safety functions shall be designed to appropriate seismic resisitance that classified in accordance with the guideline for reviewing seismic design. If it is impossible to satisfy the requirement, the design that takes into account the diversity is adopted as necessary. • Structures, systems and components with safety functions are designed so that the safety of the facilities is not impaired by possible natural phenomena other than earthquakes (tsunami, heavy rain, typhoon, tornado, etc.). In the designing, diversity is considered as well when necessary. Structures, systems and components with safety functions of particularly high importance are designed in consideration of the most severe case of the possible natural phenomena or the case where the accident load is appropriately combined with natural forces.	1.14 Design Considerations ○ The facility's design shall appropriately consider the following matters in consideration of the degree of safety importance. (1) Applicable standards and criteria Structures, systems and components with safety functions, concerning design, material selection, manufacture, and inspection, shall conform to the standards and criteria deemed appropriate in consideration of the importance of the safety functions to be performed by them. (2)Design considerations against natural phenomena • Structures, systems and components with safety functions are classified in terms of seismic design in consideration of the importance of the safety function, impacts on the safety caused when the function is lost due to earthquakes (impacts on public exposures), influence on the decommissioning work, etc. while using the seismic categories for facilities for processing or handling unsealed nuclear fuel materials as a guide, and are designed so that they can withstand the design seismic forces that are considered appropriate. If it is impossible to satisfy the requirement, the design that takes into account the diversity is adopted as necessary. • Structures, systems and components with safety functions are designed so that the safety of the facilities is not impaired by possible natural phenomena other than earthquakes (tsunami, heavy rain, typhoon, tornado, etc.). In the designing, diversity is considered as well when necessary. Structures, systems and components with safety functions of particularly high importance are designed in consideration of the most severe case of the possible natural phenomena or the case where the accident load is appropriately combined with natural forces.	Optimization of the description (clarifying description of the design considerations for earthquake in accordance with “Point of view of seismic motion and its application for seismic design of TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi NPS”)
(3) Design considerations for external human events • The assumed external human events include aircraft crashing, dam collapse and explosion. The aircraft crashing probability at this specific nuclear facility was evaluated for the civil aircraft, the Self-Defense Force aircraft, and the U.S. military aircraft based on accident results and others until now (No. GKHK-21-270, reevaluation results of the probability of aircraft crashing to a commercial power reactor facility (October 30, 2009). The result is approximately 3.6×10^{-8} times/reactor-year, less than 1.0×10^{-7} times/reactor-year. Therefore, there is no need to consider aircraft crashing. In addition, there is neither a river near the specific nuclear facility that could affect the specific nuclear facility due to dam collapse, or facilities for manufacturing and storing explosives that could compromise the safety of the specific nuclear facility due to explosion. • The following measures shall be taken in order to prevent illegal access by third parties to structures, systems, and components with safety functions, sabotage, and illegal transfer of nuclear materials. ① Establish areas containing structures, systems, and components with safety functions, and establish protected areas with physical barriers surrounding them to uphold approaching and access control to these areas thoroughly. ② Dsign to establish a detection facility and perform centralized monitoring, such as alarm and image monitoring. ③ Establish a communication facility with the outside.	(3) Design considerations for external human events • The assumed external human events include aircraft crashing, dam collapse and explosion, and collision of a drifted ship to harbor. The aircraft crashing probability at this specific nuclear facility was evaluated for the civil aircraft, the Self-Defense Force aircraft, and the U.S. military aircraft based on accident results and others until now (No. GKHK-21-270, reevaluation results of the probability of aircraft crashing to a commercial power reactor facility (October 30, 2009). The result is approximately 3.6×10^{-8} times/reactor-year, less than 1.0×10^{-7} times/reactor-year. Therefore, there is no need to consider aircraft crashing. In addition, there is neither a river near the specific nuclear facility that could affect the specific nuclear facility due to dam collapse, or facilities for manufacturing and storing explosives that could compromise the safety of the specific nuclear facility due to explosion. In addition, considering the clearance from the nearest route and the flow direction of the surrounding sea area, the collision of vessels passing through the route does not compromise the safety function of the specified nuclear facility. • The following measures shall be taken in order to prevent illegal access by third parties to structures, systems, and components with safety functions, sabotage (including illegal access acts such as cyberterrorism), and illegal transfer of nuclear materials. ① Establish areas containing structures, systems, and components with safety functions, and establish protected areas with physical barriers surrounding them to uphold approaching and access control to these areas thoroughly. ② Design to establish a detection facility and perform centralized monitoring, such as alarm and image monitoring. ③ Establish a communication facility with the outside.	Addition of design consideration for impact of drifted ships Optimization of the description
(Omission)	(Omission)	
(7) Consideration for preventing erroneous operation • In order to prevent operator misoperation, that the status of the facility can be accurately and swiftly grasped by instrument indications and alarm indications, in addition to paying attention to the layout of panels and the operability of operating instruments, etc, shall be taken. In addition, care shall be taken to prevent errors during maintenance and inspection.	(7) Consideration for preventing erroneous operation • In order to prevent operator misoperation, appropriate measures such that the status of the facility can be accurately and swiftly grasped by instrument indications and alarm indications, in addition to paying attention to the layout of panels and the operability of operating instruments, etc, shall be taken. In addition, care shall be taken to prevent errors during maintenance and inspection.	Optimization of the description

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter II, 1.14 Design Considerations)

Current	Revised	Reason for Revision
(Omission) (Not currently listed)	(Omission) 1.14.1 Attachment Attachment-1 Impact Assessment for Collision of Ships	Addition of impact assessment on collision of drifted ships

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter II, 1.14 Design Considerations, Attachment-1)

Current	Revised	Reason for Revision
(Not currently listed)	Attachment-1 Impact Assessment for Collision of Ships (New description) (Omitted below)	Newly described on impact and design consideration of collision of drifted ships

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter II, 2.5 Contaminated Water Treatment Facilities, etc.)

Current	Revised	Reason for Rivision
2.5.2 Basic Specifications 2.5.2.1 Main Specifications 2.5.2.1.1 Contaminated water treatment facilities, storage facilities (tanks, etc.) and related facilities (transfer pipes, transfer pumps, etc.) (Omission) (46) Storage Tanks for ALPS Treated Water, etc. ※1, 3 Total capacity (nominal) 1,153,489 m^3 (expansion if necessary) Cardinal number 820 units (additional if necessary) Volume (single unit) 700m^3, 1,000m^3, 1,060m^3, 1,140m^3, 1,160m^3, 1,200m^3, 1,220m^3, 1,235m^3, 1,330m^3, 1,356m^3, 2,400m^3, 2,900m^3 /unit*2 Materials SS400, SM400A, SM400B, SM400C, SM490A, SM490C Thickness (side plate) 12mm (700m^3, 1,000m^3, 1,160m^3, 1,200m^3, 1,220m^3, 1,235m^3, 1,330m^3, 1,356m^3), 18.8mm (2,400m^3), 15mm (1,000m^3, 1,060m^3, 1,140m^3, 1,330m^3, 2,900m^3), 16mm (700m^3) ※1 Nominal capacity and operational capacity is different from nominal capacity. ※2 Operating capacity shall be up to 100% water level gauge. ※3 The nominal capacity of tanks to be added in the future (J6, K1 North, K2, K1 South, H1, J7, J4 (1160m^3), H1 East, J8, K3, J9, K4, H2, H4 North, H4 South, G1 South, H5, H6 (I), B, B South, H3, H6 (II), G6, G1, G4 South, G4 North, and G5 Area) shall be the upper limit of the operating water level. (Omitted below)	2.5.2 Basic Specifications 2.5.2.1 Main Specifications 2.5.2.1.1 Contaminated water treatment facilities, storage facilities (tanks, etc.) and related facilities (transfer pipes, transfer pumps, etc.) (Omission) (46) Storage Tanks for ALPS Treated Water, etc. ※1, 3, 4 Total capacity (nominal) 1,153,489 m^3 (expansion if necessary) Cardinal number 820 units (additional if necessary) Volume (single unit) 700m^3, 1,000m^3, 1,060m^3, 1,140m^3, 1,160m^3, 1,200m^3, 1,220m^3, 1,235m^3, 1,330m^3, 1,356m^3, 2,400m^3, 2,900m^3 /unit*2 Materials SS400, SM400A, SM400B, SM400C, SM490A, SM490C Thickness (side plate) 12mm (700m^3, 1,000m^3, 1,160m^3, 1,200m^3, 1,220m^3, 1,235m^3, 1,330m^3, 1,356m^3), 18.8mm (2,400m^3), 15mm (1,000m^3, 1,060m^3, 1,140m^3, 1,330m^3, 2,900m^3), 16mm (700m^3) ※1 Nominal capacity and operational capacity is different from nominal capacity. ※2 Operating capacity shall be up to 100% water level gauge. ※3 The nominal capacity of tanks to be added in the future (J6, K1 North, K2, K1 South, H1, J7, J4 (1160m^3), H1 East, J8, K3, J9, K4, H2, H4 North, H4 South, G1 South, H5, H6 (I), B, B South, H3, H6 (II), G6, G1, G4 South, G4 North, and G5 Area) shall be the upper limit of the operating water level. ※4 A portion of the K4 area tanks is used as measurement/confirmation tank in "II 2.50 ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities and Related Facilities". (Omitted below)	Addition in accordance with the installation of ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facility

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Current

Attachment 12

Policy on Design and Confirmation of Medium-and Low-Concentration Tanks

(Omission)

Appendix 6

Table 2 Weir Contents of Foundation Outer Weir in Each Tank Installation Area (1/2)

Installation Location	Tank Installation Cardinal number	Assumed leakage		Foundation perimeter weir Weir volume (m^3)	(planned value)			
		Cardinal number	Capacity (m^3)		Foundation circumference Area inside the weir (m^2)	Tank Proprietary area (m^2)	Pooled Area (m^2)	Foundation perimeter weir Height (m)
			①	②※1	③	④	⑤※2	⑥※3
(Omission)								
K4	35	1.75	1,750	2,190 or more	5,145	2,944	2,201	0.995 or more
(Omission)								

※1 ②=⑤×⑥
Since the height of the weir around the foundation differs depending on the location in J2, H3, G4 North, the weir content is shown in the sum. Since the G3 West and G7 share the outer peripheral weir of the foundation, the estimated leakage capacity and the weir capacity of the outer peripheral weir of the foundation are shown in total.
※2 ⑤=③-④
※3 ⑥=① ⑤ +0.2 (20cm margin)
The height of the weir around the foundation of J2, H3 is calculated by calculating the height of the weir capable of storing the assumed leakage volume, and adding 20 centimeters to each of the heights.
※4 J2, H3, G3 north and G4 north have different basal altitudes depending on the location, so the planned values are shown.
※5 Rainwater recovery tank for 1 of 40 units
※6 Rainwater recovery tank for 1 of 12 tanks
※7 12 of 41 units are post-RO fresh water receiving tanks (RO treated water storage tanks and evaporation concentrated water storage tanks)

(Omission)

Appendix 7

Effective dose by direct rays and sky-shine rays from low- and midum level concentration tanks (cylinder form)

(Omission)

2.1.11 K4 Area

Evaluation result of the direct rays and skyshine rays at the dose evaluation point (No. 70) of its vicinity was 0.0001 mSv/y and that indicats low impact to the site boundary dose. Evaluation results of the direct rays and skyshine rays at the highest dose evaluation point on the site boundary, indicates lower than that of its vicinity, and it finds that the impact to the site boundary is also small.

Revised

Attachment 12

Policy on Design and Confirmation of Medium-and Low-Concentration Tanks

(Omission)

Appendix 6

Table 2 Weir Contents of Foundation Outer Weir in Each Tank Installation Area (1/2)

Installation Location	Tank Installation Cardinal number	Assumed leakage		Foundation perimeter weir Weir volume (m^3)	(planned value)			
		Cardinal number	Capacity (m^3)		Foundation circumference Area inside the weir (m^2)	Tank Proprietary area (m^2)	Pooled Area (m^2)	Foundation perimeter weir Height (m)
			①	②※1	③	④	⑤※2	⑥※3
(Omission)								
K4	35※8	1.75	1,750	2,190 or more	5,145	2,944	2,201	0.995 or more
(Omission)								

※1 ②=⑤×⑥
Since the height of the weir around the foundation differs depending on the location in J2, H3, G4 North, the weir content is shown in the sum. Since the G3 West and G7 share the outer peripheral weir of the foundation, the estimated leakage capacity and the weir capacity of the outer peripheral weir of the foundation are shown in total.
※2 ⑤=③-④
※3 ⑥=① ⑤ +0.2 (20cm margin)
The height of the weir around the foundation of J2, H3 is calculated by calculating the height of the weir capable of storing the assumed leakage volume, and adding 20 centimeters to each of the heights.
※4 J2, H3, G3 north and G4 north have different basal altitudes depending on the location, so the planned values are shown.
※5 Rainwater recovery tank for 1 of 40 units
※6 Rainwater recovery tank for 1 of 12 tanks
※7 12 of 41 units are post-RO fresh water receiving tanks (RO treated water storage tanks and evaporation concentrated water storage tanks)
※8 30 out of 35 tanks are measurement/confirmation tanks in "II 2.50 ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities and Related Facilities."

(Omission)

Appendix 7

Effective dose by direct rays and sky-shine rays from low- and midum level concentration tanks (cylinder form)

(Omission)

2.1.11 K4 Area※

Evaluation result of the direct rays and skyshine rays at the dose evaluation point (No. 70) of its vicinity was 0.0001 mSv/y and that indicats low impact to the site boundary dose. Evaluation results of the direct rays and skyshine rays at the highest dose evaluation point on the site boundary, indicates lower than that of its vicinity, and it finds that the impact to the site boundary is also small.
※Some tanks in the K4 tank area are usable as tamks for measurement/comfirmation tanks described in “II 2. 50 ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and the related facility”.

Reason for Rivision

Addition in accordance with the installation of ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facility

Addition in accordance with the installation of ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facility

<table>
<tr><th>Current</th><th>Revised</th><th>Reason for Rivision</th></tr>
<tr>
<td>
Appendix 8

(Omission)

(Supplementary Appendix) Number of Storage Tanks for RO Concentrated Water, ALPS Treated Water, etc., Sr Treated Water and Concentrated Liquid Waste by Area
<table>
<tr><th>Area</th><th>Tank Nominal Capacity [m³]</th><th>(39) Storage Tanks for RO concentrated water</th><th>(46) Storage Tanks for ALPS Treated Water, etc.</th><th>(60) Storage Tanks for Sr treated water</th><th>(61) Storage Tanks for Concentrated liquid waste</th></tr>
<tr><td colspan="6">(Omission)</td></tr>
<tr><td>K4</td><td>1,000</td><td></td><td>35</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="6">(Omission)</td></tr>
</table>
(Omission)

Reference material

Assessment to the Midium- and Low- Concentration Tanks as Sesimic S Class Facility

For reference, an assessment to the medium- and low-concentration tanks on the areas of J2, J3, J4, J6, K1 north, K2, K1 south, H1 east, J8, K3, J9, H4 North, H4 south, G1 South, H5, H6 (I), H3, and H6 (II) is conducted as sesimic S class facility. The overturning assessment was conducted comparing culculated overturning moment by an earthquake and stable moment by deadweight. The result reveald that the overturning moment by an earthquake is smaller than the stable moment by deadweight, and no overturning will be occurred.

(Omitted below)
</td>
<td>
Appendix 8

(Omission)

(Supplementary Appendix) Number of Storage Tanks for RO Concentrated Water, ALPS Treated Water, etc., Sr Treated Water and Concentrated Liquid Waste by Area
<table>
<tr><th>Area</th><th>Tank Nominal Capacity [m³]</th><th>(39) Storage Tanks for RO concentrated water</th><th>(46) Storage Tanks for ALPS Treated Water, etc.</th><th>(60) Storage Tanks for Sr treated water</th><th>(61) Storage Tanks for Concentrated liquid waste</th></tr>
<tr><td colspan="6">(Omission)</td></tr>
<tr><td>K4</td><td>1,000</td><td></td><td>35※</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="6">(Omission)</td></tr>
</table>
※ 30 tanks of K4 area will be used as measurement/confirmation tank in "II 2.50 ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities and Related Facilities".

(Omission)

Reference material

Overturning Assessment to the Midium- and Low- Concentration Tanks
when Applied 3.6Ci of Static Seismic Force

For reference, an assessment to the medium- and low-concentration tanks on the areas of J2, J3, J4, J6, K1 north, K2, K1 south, H1 east, J8, K3, J9, H4 North, H4 south, G1 South, H5, H6 (I), H3, and H6 (II) is conducted when applied 3.6Ci of static seismic force. The overturning assessment was conducted comparing culculated overturning moment by an earthquake and stable moment by deadweight. The result reveald that the overturning moment by an earthquake is smaller than the stable moment by deadweight, and no overturning will be occurred.

(Omitted below)
</td>
<td>
Addition in accordance with the installation of ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facility

Optimization of the description
</td>
</tr>
</table>

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter II, 2.16.1 Advance Liquid Processing System)

Current

2.16.1.2 Basic specifications
2.16.1.2.1 Main specifications
(1) Advance Liquid Processing System

(Omission)

(34) Pipe

(Omission)

Main pipe specifications (3/4)

Name	Specifications	
From the outlet of the advance liquid processing system to treated water storage tanks or tanks※ (polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 100A Polyethylene 1.0MPa 1.15MPa 40℃
(polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 100A Equivalent to 150A Equivalent to 200A Polyethylene 0.98MPa 40℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	150A/Sch.40 100A/Sch.40 SUS316L 0.98MPa 40℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	100A/Sch.40 SUS316L 1.0MPa 40℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	40A/Sch.40 65A/Sch.40 100A/Sch.40 150A/Sch.40 200A/Sch.40 STPG370+ lining 0.98MPa 40℃
From the transfer pump outlet for the advance liquid processing system to the inlet of the advance liquid processing system (polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 100A Polyethylene 0.98MPa 40℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	65A/Sch.80 100A/Sch.80 STPG370 1.15MPa 40℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	100A/Sch.40 STPG370+ lining 0.98MPa 40℃

※Storage tank for ALPS treated water, etc., RO concentrated water or Sr treated water

Main pipe specifications (4/4)

Name	Specifications	
From the entrance of the building for the advance liquid processing system to the storage tank for soda carbonate (polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 65A Polyethylene 0.5MPa 60℃
From the carbonated soda storage tank to the coprecipitation tank (steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	125A/Sch.40 65A/Sch.40 50A/Sch.40 40A/Sch.40 25A/Sch.40 SUS316L 0.5MPa 40℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness	65A/Sch.40

Revised

2.16.1.2 Basic specifications
2.16.1.2.1 Main specifications
(1) Advance Liquid Processing System

(Omission)

(34) Pipe

(Omission)

Main pipe specifications (3/4)

Name	Specifications	
From the outlet of the advance liquid processing system to※2 treated water storage tanks※1 (polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 100A Polyethylene 1.0MPa 1.15MPa 40℃
(polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 100A Equivalent to 150A Equivalent to 200A Polyethylene 0.98MPa 40℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	150A/Sch.40 100A/Sch.40 SUS316L 0.98MPa 40℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	100A/Sch.40 SUS316L 1.0MPa 40℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	40A/Sch.40 65A/Sch.40 100A/Sch.40 150A/Sch.40 200A/Sch.40 STPG370+ lining 0.98MPa 40℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	100A/Sch.20S SUS316LTP 0.98MPa 40℃
(pressure-resistant hose)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 100A Synthetic rubber 0.98MPa 40℃

Main pipe specifications (4/4)

Name	Specifications	
From the transfer pump outlet for the advance liquid processing system to the inlet of the advance liquid processing system (polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 100A Polyethylene 0.98MPa 40℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	65A/Sch.80 100A/Sch.80 STPG370 1.15MPa 40℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure	100A/Sch.40 STPG370+ lining 0.98MPa

Reason for Revision

Addition of main pipe specifications in accordance with the installation of ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facility

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter II, 2.16.1 Advance Liquid Processing System)

Current

		40A/Sch.40
	Material	SUS316L
	Max. working pressure	0.5MPa
	Max. working temperature	60℃
(pressure-resistant hose)	Nominal diameter	Equivalent to 40A
	Material	EPDM
	Max. working pressure	0.5MPa
	Max. working temperature	40℃ 60℃

(Omitted below)

Revised

	Max. working temperature	40℃
From the entrance of the building for the advance liquid processing system to the storage tank for soda carbonate (polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter	Equivalent to 65A
	Material	Polyethylene
	Max. working pressure	0.5MPa
	Max. working temperature	60℃
From the carbonated soda storage tank to the coprecipitation tank (steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness	125A/Sch.40 65A/Sch.40 50A/Sch.40 40A/Sch.40 25A/Sch.40
	Material	SUS316L
	Max. working pressure	0.5MPa
	Max. working temperature	40℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness	65A/Sch.40 40A/Sch.40
	Material	SUS316L
	Max. working pressure	0.5MPa
	Max. working temperature	60℃
(pressure-resistant hose)	Nominal diameter	Equivalent to 40A
	Material	EPDM
	Max. working pressure	0.5MPa
	Max. working temperature	40℃ 60℃

※1: Storage tank for ALPS treated water, etc., RO concentrated water or Sr treated water
※2: Parts of the pipe to the K4 Area Tank shall also be used as "II 2 50 ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities and Related Facility ".

(Omitted below)

Reason for Revision

Addition in accordance with the installation of ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facility

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter II, 2.16.1 Advance Liquid Processing System, Attachment-2)

Current	Revised	Reason for Revision
Attachment-2 Assessment Result of Structural Strength and Seismic Resistance of Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facilities, etc. (Omission) 1.2.6 Pipe 1.2.6.1 Structural strength assessment 1.2.6.1.1 Pipe (steel pipe) 1.2.6.1.1.1 Evaluation point (Omission)  Legend symbols PE: Polyethylene pipe Numbers correspoinds to the numbers of 1.2.6.1.1.3 *Materials indicated are shown to the extent that the materials not be changed. Materials composition is subject to change. Figure-1 Schemetic diagram of pipes (11/18) (Omitted below)	Attachment-2 Assessment Result of Structural Strength and Seismic Resistance of Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facilities, etc. (Omission) 1.2.6 Pipe 1.2.6.1 Structural strength assessment 1.2.6.1.1 Pipe (steel pipe) 1.2.6.1.1.1 Evaluation point (Omission)  Legend symbols PE: Polyethylene pipe Numbers correspoinds to the numbers of 1.2.6.1.1.3 *Materials indicated are shown to the extent that the materials not be changed. Materials composition is subject to changeShould the material structure be changed Figure-1 Schametic diagram of pipes (11/18) (Omitted below)	Modification of the schematic diagram of pipess in accordance with the installation of ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facility

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter II, 2.16.1 Advance Liquid Processing System, Attachment-9)

Current	Revised	Reason for Revision
Attachment-9 Confirmation Items of Advance Liquid Processing System Major confirmation items related to the multinuclide removal facility are shown in Table-1 to 14. (Omitted below)	Attachment-9 Confirmation Items of Advance Liquid Processing System Major confirmation items related to the multinuclide removal facility are shown in Table-1 to 14. The main items to be checked regarding pipes (steel pipes, polyethylene pipes, pressure-resistant hoses) that are used in conjunction with ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facility are shown in "II 2 50 ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities and Related Facility". (Omitted below)	Addition in accordance with the installation of ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facility

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter II, 2.16.2 Additional Advance Liquid Processing System)

Current	Revised	Reason for Revision
2.16.2.2 Basic specifications 2.16.2.2.1 System Specifications (1) Extended multi-nuclide removal facility (4) Piping Main pipe specifications (Omission) Main pipe specifications (Omission) Main pipe specifications (Omission)	2.16.2.2 Basic specifications 2.16.2.2.1 System Specifications (1) Extended multi-nuclide removal facility (4) Piping Main pipe specifications (1/8) (Omission) Main pipe specifications (2/8) (Omission) Main pipe specifications (3/8) (Omission)	Optimization of the description

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Current	Revised	Reason for Revision
Main pipe specifications | Name	Specifications	
---	---	---
From the sample tank outlet to storage tanks for ALPS treated water, etc., RO concentrated water and Sr treated water (steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	100A/Sch.40 80A/Sch.40 50A/Sch.40 SUS316L 0.98MPa 0℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	100A/Sch.40 SUS316L 0.98MPa 60℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	100A/Sch.40 STPG370 + lining 0.98MPa 40℃
(polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 200A Equivalent to 100A Polyethylene Hydrostatic head 40℃
(polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 100A Polyethylene 0.98MPa 40℃
From the transfer pump skid for additional ALPS to the inlet valve skid of the additional multi-nuclide removal facility (polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 100A Polyethylene 0.98MPa 40℃ | (Omission)	Main pipe specifications (4/8) | Name	Specifications	
---	---	---
From the sample tank outlet to storage tanks[※2] for ALPS treated water, etc., RO concentrated water and Sr treated water (steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	100A/Sch.40 80A/Sch.40 50A/Sch.40 SUS316L 0.98MPa 0℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	100A/Sch.40 SUS316L 0.98MPa 60℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	100A/Sch.40 STPG370 + lining 0.98MPa 40℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	100A/Sch.20S SUS316LTP 0.98MPa 40℃
(polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 200A Equivalent to 100A Polyethylene Hydrostatic head 40℃
(polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 100A Polyethylene 0.98MPa 40℃
(pressure-resistant hose)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 100A Synthetic rubber 0.98MPa 40℃
From the transfer pump skid for additional ALPS to the inlet valve skid of the additional multi-nuclide removal facility (polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 100A Polyethylene 0.98MPa 40℃	 Main pipe specifications (5/8) (Omission) Main pipe specifications (6/8) (Omission)	Optimization of the description Addition in accordance with the installation of ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facility Optimization of the description

Current

Main pipe specifications

Name	Specifications	
From the carbonated soda storage tank to the entrance of the building for the advance liquid processing system (steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	65A/Sch.40 SUS316L Hydrostatic head 60℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	80A/Sch.40 65A/Sch.40 50A/Sch.40 SUS316L 0.5MPa 60℃
(pressure-resistant hose)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 65A PTFE Hydrostatic head 60℃
(polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 75A Polyethylene 0.5MPa 60℃

※ Some of the piping specifications (nominal diameter, thickness, and material) may not be used depending on the site construction status.

Main pipe specifications

Name	Specifications	
From the branch of the transfer channel of the treated water receiving tank to the inlet of the reaction/agglomeration tank ※ (steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	50A/Sch.40 STPG370 + lining 0.98MPa 60℃
From reaction/agglomeration tank outlet to precipitation tank inlet ※ (steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	150A/Sch.40 SUS316L Hydrostatic head 60℃
(pressure-resistant hose)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 150A EPDM Hydrostatic head 60℃
From the precipitation tank outlet to the supernatant water tank inlet ※ (steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	150A/Sch.40 SUS316L Hydrostatic head 60℃
(pressure-resistant hose)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 150A EPDM Hydrostatic head 60℃

※Installed in two series

Revised

Main pipe specifications (7/8)

Name	Specifications	
From the carbonated soda storage tank to the entrance of the building for the advance liquid processing system (steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	65A/Sch.40 SUS316L Hydrostatic head 60℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	80A/Sch.40 65A/Sch.40 50A/Sch.40 SUS316L 0.5MPa 60℃
(pressure-resistant hose)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 65A PTFE Hydrostatic head 60℃
(polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 75A Polyethylene 0.5MPa 60℃
From the branch of the transfer channel of the treated water receiving tank to the inlet of the reaction/agglomeration tank※3 (steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	50A/Sch.40 STPG370 + lining 0.98MPa 60℃
From reaction/agglomeration tank outlet to precipitation tank inlet※3 (steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	150A/Sch.40 SUS316L Hydrostatic head 60℃
(pressure-resistant hose)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 150A EPDM Hydrostatic head 60℃
From the precipitation tank outlet to the supernatant water tank inlet※3 (steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	150A/Sch.40 SUS316L Hydrostatic head 60℃
(pressure-resistant hose)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 150A EPDM Hydrostatic head 60℃

Reason for Revision

Optimization of the description

Optimization of the description

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter II, 2.16.2 Additional Advance Liquid Processing System)

Current

Main pipe specifications

Name	Specifications	
From the outlet of the supernatant water tank to the merge section of the transfer passage of the supply tank ※ (steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	50A/Sch.40 SUS316L Hydrostatic head 60℃
(pressure-resistant hose)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 50A EPDM Hydrostatic head 60℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	50A/Sch.40 32A/Sch.40 SUS316L 0.98MPa 60℃
From sedimentation tank outlet to reaction/agglomeration tank ※ (steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	50A/Sch.40 SUS316L Hydrostatic head 60℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	50A/Sch.40 40A/Sch.40 32A/Sch.40 25A/Sch.40 SUS316L 0.98MPa 60℃
From cross-flow filter circulation line branch to reaction/agglomeration tank ※ (steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	40A/Sch.40 25A/Sch.40 15A/Sch.40 SUS316L 0.98MPa 60℃
(pressure-resistant hose)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 25A EPDM 0.98MPa 60℃
From the branch of the transfer passage of the storage tank for sodium carbonate to the inlet of the reaction/agglomeration tank ※ (steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	25A/Sch.40 SUS316L 0.5MPa 60℃
(pressure-resistant hose)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 25A EPDM 0.5MPa 60℃

※Installed in two series

(Omitted below)

Revised

Main pipe specifications (8/8)

Name	Specifications	
From the outlet of the supernatant water tank to the merge section of the transfer passage of the supply tank※3 (steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	50A/Sch.40 SUS316L Hydrostatic head 60℃
(pressure-resistant hose)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 50A EPDM Hydrostatic head 60℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	50A/Sch.40 32A/Sch.40 SUS316L 0.98MPa 60℃
From sedimentation tank outlet to reaction/agglomeration tank※3 (steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	50A/Sch.40 SUS316L Hydrostatic head 60℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	50A/Sch.40 40A/Sch.40 32A/Sch.40 25A/Sch.40 SUS316L 0.98MPa 60℃
From cross-flow filter circulation line branch to reaction/agglomeration tank※3 (steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	40A/Sch.40 25A/Sch.40 15A/Sch.40 SUS316L 0.98MPa 60℃
(pressure-resistant hose)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 25A EPDM 0.98MPa 60℃
From the branch of the transfer passage of the storage tank for sodium carbonate to the inlet of the reaction/agglomeration tank※3 (steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	25A/Sch.40 SUS316L 0.5MPa 60℃
(pressure-resistant hose)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 25A EPDM 0.5MPa 60℃

※1: Some of the piping specifications (nominal diameter, thickness, and material) may not be used depending on the site construction status.
※2: Parts of the pipes to the K4 Area Tank shall also be used as "II 2.50 ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities and the Related Facility".
※3: Installed in 3:2 series

(Omitted below)

Reason for Revision

Optimization of the description

Optimization of the description
Addition in accordance with the installation of ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facility

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter II, 2.16.2 Additional Advance Liquid Processing System, Attachment-4)

Current	Revised	Reason for Revision
Attachment-4 Strength Calculation Sheet of Aditional Advance Liquid Processing System (Omission) 2.4 Main piping 2.4.1 Evaluation point Figure-4 shows the points for strength evaluation. (Omission)  Figure-4 Schematic diagram of pipes (8/14) (Omitted below)	Attachment-4 Strength Calculation Sheet of Aditional Advance Liquid Processing System (Omission) 2.4 Main piping 2.4.1 Evaluation point Figure-4 shows the points for strength evaluation. (Omission)  Figure-4 Schematic diagram of pipes (8/14) (Omitted below)	Modification of the schematic diagram of pipess in accordance with the installation of ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facility

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter II, 2.16.2 Additional Advance Liquid Processing System, Attachment-9)

Current	Revised	Reason for Revision
Attachment-9 Confirmation Items of Additional Advance Liquid Processing System Major items to be confirmed for the additional advance liquid processing sytem are shown in Table-1 to 12. (Omitted below)	Attachment-9 Confirmation Items of Additional Advance Liquid Processing System Major items to be confirmed for the additional advance liquid processing sytem are shown in Table-1 to 12. The main items to be checked regarding pipes (steel pipes, polyethylene pipes, pressure-resistant hoses) that are used in conjunction with ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facility are shown in "II 2 50 ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities and Related Facility". (Omitted below)	Addition in accordance with the installation of ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facility

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter II, 2.16.3 High-Performance Advance Liquid Processing System)

Before change	After change	Reason for change
2.16.3.2 Basic Specifications 2.16.3.2.1 System Specifications (1) High-performance advance liquid processing system (Omission) (3) Piping Main pipe specifications (Omission) Main pipe specifications (Omission) Main pipe specifications (Omission) Main pipe specifications (Omission) Main pipe specifications (Omission)	2.16.3.2 Basic Specifications 2.16.3.2.1 System Specifications (1) High-performance advance liquid processing system (Omission) (3) Piping Main pipe specifications (1/8) (Omission) Main pipe specifications (2/8) (Omission) Main pipe specifications (3/8) (Omission) Main pipe specifications (4/8) (Omission) Main pipe specifications (5/8) (Omission) Main pipe specifications (6/8) (Omission)	Optimization of the description

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Before change	After change	Reason for change

Main pipe specifications

Name	Specifications	
From the sample tank outlet to storage tanks for ALPS treated water, etc., RO concentrated water and Sr treated water (steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	100A/Sch.40 80A/Sch.40 50A/Sch.40 SUS316L 0.98MPa 40℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	100A/Sch.40 STPT410+ lining 0.98MPa 40℃
(polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 200A Equivalent to 100A Polyethylene Hydrostatic head 40℃
(polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 100A Polyethylene 0.98MPa 40℃
From the transfer pump skid for the high-performance advance liquid processing system to the supply tank (steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	100A/Sch.40 150A/Sch.40 STPT410+ lining 0.98MPa 40℃
(polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 100A Polyethylene 0.98MPa 40℃

Main pipe specifications (7/8)

Name	Specifications	
From the sample tank outlet to storage tanks[※2] for ALPS treated water, etc., RO concentrated water and Sr treated water (steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	100A/Sch.40 80A/Sch.40 50A/Sch.40 SUS316L 0.98MPa 40℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	100A/Sch.40 STPT410+ lining 0.98MPa 40℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	100A/Sch.20S SUS316LTP 0.98MPa 40℃
(polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 200A Equivalent to 100A Polyethylene Hydrostatic head 40℃
(polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 100A Polyethylene 0.98MPa 40℃
(pressure-resistant hose)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 100A Synthetic rubber 0.98MPa 40℃
From the transfer pump skid for the high-performance advance liquid processing system to the supply tank (steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	100A/Sch.40 150A/Sch.40 STPT410+ lining 0.98MPa 40℃
(polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 100A Polyethylene 0.98MPa 40℃

Optimization of the description

Addition in accordance with the installation of ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facility

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter II, 2.16.3 High-Performance Advance Liquid Processing System)

Before change	After change	Reason for change
Main pipe specifications | Name	Specifications	
From the outlet of the pipe unit to the inlet of supply tank A/B (polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 100A Polyethylene 0.98MPa 40℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	100A/Sch.40 STPT410+ lining 0.98MPa 40℃
From adsorption tower unit 1 to preprocessing filter unit A/B (polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 100A Equivalent to 80A Polyethylene 1.03MPa 40℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	100A/Sch.40 STPT410+ lining 1.03MPa 40℃
From the preprocessing filter unit A to preprocessing filter unit B (polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 80A Polyethylene 1.03MPa 40℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	80A/Sch.40 STPT410+ lining 1.03MPa 40℃
From the outlet of the pretreatment filter unit A to the inlet of the pretreatment filter unit B (polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 80A Polyethylene 1.03MPa 40℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	80A/Sch.40 STPT410+ lining 1.03MPa 40℃
From the preprocessing filter unit A/B to adsorption tower unit 1 (polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 80A Polyethylene 1.03MPa 40℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	80A/Sch.40 STPT410+ lining 1.03MPa 40℃ | Note 1 Use pipes used as transfer pipes in ‘2.5 Contaminated Water Treatment Equipment, etc.’ Note 2 SUS316L material is not used for the piping around the adsorption tower containing the activated carbon and the adsorption tower under low-pH conditions. ※ Some of the piping specifications (nominal diameter, thickness, and material) may not be used depending on the site construction status. (omitted below)	Main pipe specifications (8/8) | Name	Specifications	
From the outlet of the pipe unit to the inlet of supply tank A/B (polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 100A Polyethylene 0.98MPa 40℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	100A/Sch.40 STPT410+ lining 0.98MPa 40℃
From adsorption tower unit 1 to preprocessing filter unit A/B (polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 100A Equivalent to 80A Polyethylene 1.03MPa 40℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	100A/Sch.40 STPT410+ lining 1.03MPa 40℃
From the preprocessing filter unit A to preprocessing filter unit B (polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 80A Polyethylene 1.03MPa 40℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	80A/Sch.40 STPT410+ lining 1.03MPa 40℃
From the outlet of the pretreatment filter unit A to the inlet of the pretreatment filter unit B (polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 80A Polyethylene 1.03MPa 40℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	80A/Sch.40 STPT410+ lining 1.03MPa 40℃
From the preprocessing filter unit A/B to adsorption tower unit 1 (polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 80A Polyethylene 1.03MPa 40℃
(steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	80A/Sch.40 STPT410+ lining 1.03MPa 40℃	 Note 1 Use pipes used as transfer pipes in “2.5 Contaminated Water Treatment Equipment, etc.” Note 2 SUS316L material is not used for the pipe around the adsorption tower containing the activated carbon and the adsorption tower under low-pH conditions. ※1: Some of the pipe specifications (nominal diameter, thickness, and material) may not be used depending on the site construction status. ※2: Parts of the pipes to the K4 Area Tank shall also be used as "II 2 50 ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities and the Related Facility". (omitted below)	Optimization of the description Addition in accordance with the installation of ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facility

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter II, 2.16.3 High-Performance Advance Liquid Processing System, Attachment-4)

Current	Revised	Reason for Revision
Attachment-4 Calculation sheet on the strength of the high-performance multinuclide removal facility (Omission) 2.4 Main pipe 2.4.1 Evaluation point Figure-4 shows the points for strength evaluation. (Omission)  Figure-4 Schematic diagram of pipes (8/12) (Omitted below)	Attachment-4 Calculation sheet on the strength of the high-performance multinuclide removal facility (Omission) 2.4 Main pipe 2.4.1 Evaluation point Figure-4 shows the points for strength evaluation. (Omission)  Figure-4 Schematic diagram of pipes (8/12) (Omitted below)	Modification of the schematic diagram of pipes in accordance with the installation of ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facility

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter II, 2.16.3 High-Performance Advance Liquid Processing System, Attachment-8)

Before change	After change	Reason for change
Attachment-8 Confirmation Items of High-Performance Advance Liquid Processing System The main items to be confirmed for the high-performance advance liquid processing sytem are shown in Table-1 to 13. (Omitted below)	Attachment-8 Confirmation Items of High-Performance Advance Liquid Processing System The main items to be confirmed for the high-performance advance liquid processing sytem are shown in Table-1 to 13. The main items to be checked regarding pipes (steel pipes, polyethylene pipes, pressure-resistant hoses) that are used in conjunction with ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facility are shown in "II 2 50 ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities and Related Facility". (Omitted below)	Addition in accordance with the installation of ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facility

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter II, 2.50 Diluted Release Facilities for ALPS Treatment Water and Related Facilities)

Current	Revised	Reason for Revision
(Not currently listed)	2.50 ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities and Related Facility (New described) (Omitted below)	Newly described of ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facilities

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter III, Part 2)

Current

(Radioactive liquid waste management)
Article 88
Discharge of radioactive waste into the sea shall not be made without the consent of the relevant ministerial agencies.
2. The GM of chemical analysis & evaluation group should conduct the measurement on items in the Table 88-1 with designated frequency in the same Table and inform the measurement result to the GM of release and environment monitaring group. At the same time, the GM of release and environment monitaring group should manage the following and inform the measurement results to Shift Supervisor.
(1) The 3 month average of the radioactive materials concentration in the drain water from the condenser cooling water release should not exceed the legal limit of the concentration applicable to the area outside the surrounding monitored area.
(2) Effort should be made that the radioactive material release volume (excluding Tritium) by the condenser cooling water should not exceed the release management limit stipulated in the Table 88-2.
(3) Effort should be made that the Tritium release volume by the condenser cooling water should not exceed the release management limit stipulated in the Table 88-3.
3. Shift Supervisor, when releasing the radioactive liquid waste, should oversee the drain monitor and release from the condenser cooling water release opening.

Table 88-1

Classification	Measurement Item	Kind of measuring device	Measurement frequency	Place to take sample from
Radioactive liquid waste	Concentration of radioactive materials (Major nuclides source of gamma ray	Radioactivity measuring device of the sample	Every time of discharge	・Collecting tank ・Sample tank
	Concentration of Tritium	Radioactivity measuring device of the sample	Once a month	

Table 88-2

Item	The release management target
Radioactive liquid waste (excluding Tritium)	2.5 x 10^{11} Bq / y

Table 88-3

Item	The release management limit
Tritium	2.5 x 10^{13} Bq / y

Revised

(Radioactive liquid waste management)
Article 88
Discharge of radioactive waste into the sea shall not be made without the consent of the relevant ministerial agencies.
2. The GM of chemical analysis & evaluation group should conduct the measurement on items in the Table 88-1 with designated frequency in the same Table and inform the measurement result to the GM of release and environment monitaring group. At the same time, the GM of release and environment monitaring group should manage the following and inform the measurement results to Shift Supervisor.
(1) The 3 month average of the radioactive materials concentration in the drain water from the condenser cooling water release should not exceed the legal limit of the concentration applicable to the area outside the surrounding monitored area.
(2) Effort should be made that the radioactive material release volume (excluding Tritium) by the condenser cooling water should not exceed the release management limit stipulated in the Table 88-2.
(3) Effort should be made that the Tritium release volume by the condenser cooling water should not exceed the release management limit stipulated in the Table 88-3.
3. Shift Supervisor, when releasing the radioactive liquid waste, should oversee the drain monitor and release from the condenser cooling water release opening.

Table 88-1

Classification	Measurement Item	Kind of measuring device	Measurement frequency	Place to take sample from
Radioactive liquid waste	Concentration of radioactive materials (Major nuclides source of gamma ray	Radioactivity measuring device of the sample	Every time of discharge	・Collecting tank ・Sample tank
	Concentration of Tritium	Radioactivity measuring device of the sample	Once a month	

Table 88-2

Item	The release management target
Radioactive liquid waste (excluding Tritium)	2.5 x 10^{11} Bq / y

Table 88-3

Item	The release management limit
Tritium	2.5 x 10^{13} Bq / y

※1 2.2 x 10^{13} Bq/yr. shall not be exceeded in total with discharge water in accordance with Part 1, Article 41.

Reason for Revision

Amendment related to the installation of ALPS treated water discharge/dilution facilities

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter III, Part 2)

Current	Revised	Revised reason
Supplementary Provisions Supplementary Provisions (Notification No. 2205093, May 9, 2022) (Effective Date) Article 1 This provision shall come into effect on May 9, 2022. 2. Articles 4, 5, 95, 97, and 98 shall be enforced within 30 days from the date of approval of this application for approval to amend the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility or the date of approval of the application for approval to amend the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (IV Protection of Special Nuclear Fuel Material) submitted on January 14, 2022, whichever is later. The provisions then in force shall remain applicable until that date. (Omitted below)	Supplementary Provisions Supplementary Provisions ( ) (Effective Date) Article 1 This provision shall come into force within ten days from the date of approval by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority. Supplementary Provisions (Notification No. 2205093, May 9, 2022) (Effective Date) Article 1 This provision shall come into effect on May 9, 2022. 2. Articles 4, 5, 95, 97, and 98 shall be enforced within 30 days from the date of approval of this application for approval to amend the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility or the date of approval of the application for approval to amend the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (IV Protection of Special Nuclear Fuel Material) submitted on January 14, 2022, whichever is later. The provisions then in force shall remain applicable until that date. (Omitted below)	

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility
(Chapter III, 3.1.9 Operation Management of the ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities)

Current	Revised	Reason for Revision
(Not currently listed)	1.9 Operation Management of the ALPS Treatment Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities (Newly described) (Omitted below)	Newly described in relation to Operation managenment of ALPS treated water Dilution/Discharge Facilities

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility
(Chapter III, Part 3 (Supplementary Explanation on Safety) 2.1 Management of Radioactive Waste, etc.)

Current	Revised	Reason for Revision
2.1.2 Management of Radioactive Liquid Waste, etc. 2.1.2.1 Overview (Omission) (2) Radioactive liquid waste, etc. (liquid generated after the accident) Radioactive liquid wastes generated after the accident include the following. Water has been injected into the reactors of Units 1 to 3 to cool down the reactors, but the injected water has leaked into the reactor buildings, etc., and has remained as stagnant water. The contaminated water is stored inside the buildings and tanks, etc. to prevent from leaking outside. A portion of the contaminated water is purified by the contaminated water treatment facility to reduce radioactive materials. The treated water generated by the purification process is stored in tanks, and the desalinated treated water is reused by injecting into the reactors. The treated water from the contaminated water treatment facility and the water from the outlet of the treatment facility is treated to reduce radioactive materials (except tritium) using a radionuclide removal system, and then the treated water is stored in tanks. The seawater and ground water that flowed into the turbine buildings of Units 5 and 6, and the rainwater in the weir where the concentration of radioactive materials exceeds the criteria for sprinkling water will be transferred to the storage facility (tanks) as stagnant water and stored, and part of it is treated as follows and sprinkled in the premisis ① Treated by treatment unit and desalinization equipment ② Treated by treatment equipment and desalinization equipment ③ Treated by treatment unit (Omission)	2.1.2 Management of Radioactive Liquid Waste, etc. 2.1.2.2 Overview (Omission) (2) Radioactive liquid waste, etc. (liquid generated after the accident) Radioactive liquid wastes generated after the accident include the following. Water has been injected into the reactors of Units 1 to 3 to cool down the reactors, but the injected water has leaked into the reactor buildings, etc., and has remained as stagnant water. The contaminated water is stored inside the buildings and tanks, etc. to prevent from leaking outside. A portion of the contaminated water is purified by the contaminated water treatment facility to reduce radioactive materials. The treated water generated by the purification process is stored in tanks, and the desalinated treated water is reused by injecting into the reactors. The treated water from the contaminated water treatment facility and the water from the outlet of the treatment facility is treated to reduce radioactive materials (except tritium) using a radionuclide removal system, and then the treated water is stored in tanks. The ALPS treated water that satisfies the sum of ratios to regulatory concentration limits, other than tritium less than 1 will be diluted with seawater and then discharged into the sea. The seawater and ground water that flowed into the turbine buildings of Units 5 and 6, and the rainwater in the weir where the concentration of radioactive materials exceeds the criteria for sprinkling water will be transferred to the storage facility (tanks) as stagnant water and stored, and part of it is treated as follows and sprinkled in the premisis ① Treated by treatment unit and desalinization equipment ② Treated by treatment equipment and desalinization equipment ③ Treated by treatment unit (Omission)	Addition in accordance with the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea
2.1.2.3 Radioactive Liquid Waste to be Managed and Management Methods (Omission) (5) Liquid waste management methods	2.1.2.3 Radioactive Liquid Waste to be Managed and Management Methods (Omission) (5) Liquid waste management methods ALPS treated water is analyzed for its radionuclides other than tritirum and tritirum in the measurement/confirmation facility prior to discharge, and it is confirmed that the water satisfy the criteria. In addition, ALPS treated water is discharege after diluting with seawater using dilution facility in order to reduce tritirum concentration. When analyzing radionuclides contained in ALPS treated water, the following items shall be mainly implemented in order to secure the objectivity and reliability of the analytical methods and results by establishing a system required for the said analytical work after clarifying the resources (analyzers, analysts, etc.) required for the analysis according to such as the radionuclides to be measured, in accordance with the Quality Management System Plan stipulated in Article 3, Part 1 of Chapter III of the Implementation Plan. ・In addition to procuring analysts from subcontractors that have obtained certifications such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) related to the analysis of specific nuclides, education and training will be used to manage the competence of analysts and those supervising their analysis. ・In consideration of the resources, etc. required for the analysis of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS as a whole, an analytical system will be established that clarifies the roles within the organization, including subcontractors.	Addition about the concept of analysis method, system, selection of target nuclides for measurement and evaluation in relation to ALPS treated water

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Current	Revised	Reason for Revision
	・Analytical assessments will be conducted using an analytical method based on the official method, and the validity and verification of the analytical method and quantitative evaluation of analytical data, including uncertainty of analytical results, will be conducted while obtaining the participation of a third-party analytical organization with expertise in the analysis.	
The water shall be drained after analyzing the major nuclides and confirming that the criteria are satisfied. (In the pre-drainage analysis, Sr-90 shall be assessed in the same method as in (4) Recycling.) If the criteria are not satisfied, the water shall not be drained. Investigate the cause and implement countermeasures before discharging	The water of groundwater by-pass and the treated water within and the sub-drain purification equipment shall be drained after analyzing the major nuclides and confirming that the criteria are satisfied. (In the pre-drainage analysis, Sr-90 shall be assessed in the same method as in (4) Recycling.) If the criteria are not satisfied, the water shall not be drained. Investigate the cause and implement countermeasures before discharging	
(Omission)	(Omission)	
① Pre-discharge analysis When discharging radioactive liquid waste, etc., sampling should be carried out in advance in tanks, etc., and the concentration of radioactive materials should be measured, and the waste should be discharged if it meets the following criteria, and if it does not meet the criteria, necessary treatment (purification treatment, etc.) should be carried out. The nuclides to be assessed in the analysis before discharge shall be major nuclides. Discharge to the ocean will not be carried out without the approval of the relevant ministries.	① Pre-discharge analysis When discharging radioactive liquid waste, etc., sampling should be carried out in advance in tanks, etc., and the concentration of radioactive materials should be measured, and the waste should be discharged if it meets the following criteria, and if it does not meet the criteria, necessary treatment (purification treatment, etc.) should be carried out. Discharge to the ocean will not be carried out without the approval of the relevant ministries. For ALPS treated water, it shall be confirmed that tritium concentration is less than 1 million Bq/L, and that the sum of ratios to regulatory concentration limit other than tritium is less than 1 by measurement, etc. In addition, the discharge flow rate and seawater flow rate for dilution are set so that the tritium concentration in the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) is less than 1,500Bq/L and more than 100 times diluted with seawater. The total amount of discharged tritium stipulated in Chapter III of Implementation Plan (Article 41 of Part 1 and Article 88 of Part2) shall be within the range of 22 TBq/year. The radionuclides to be measured other than TRITIRUM and concentration confirmation methods shall be stipulated in the in-house manual. The concepts of identification of radionuclides other than tritium in ALPS treated water and subsequent selection of radionuclides to be measured and evaluated are as follows. ・The sum of the total of radioactivity concentration obtained by adding carbon 14 and technetium 99 to the seven major nuclides of ALPS treated water and gross β measured values is not allowed to indicate the presence of radionuclides other than the current 64 nuclides. In addition, some nuclides subject to removal by ALPS will exist small amount for decay at the time of discharging ALPS treated water into the sea, so that it is considered that the sum of ratio to reglulatory concentration limits of radionuclides other than tritium is less than 1. ・In order to ensure that the sum of ratios to regulatory concentration limit is less than 1, a radionuclide to be measured and evaluated will be selected after thorough verification of the presence of radionuclides in contaminated water is conducted based on domestic knowledge and findings of decommissioning and buried facilities.	Sentences deleted Addition in accordance with the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea
For the water of groundwater by-pass, it shall be confirmed that Cs-134 is less than 1Bq/L, Cs-137 is less than 1Bq/L, Sr-90 is less than 5Bq/L, and the H-3 is less than 1,500Bq/L by measurement. For the treated water within the sub-drain and other remediation equipment, it shall be confirmed that Cs-134 is less than 1Bq/L, Cs-137 is less than 1Bq/L, Sr-90 is less than 3(1)	For the water of groundwater by-pass, it shall be confirmed that Cs-134 is less than 1Bq/L, Cs-137 is less than 1Bq/L, Sr-90 is less than 5Bq/L, and the tritium is less than 1,500Bq/L by measurement. For the treated water within the sub-drain and other remediation equipment, it shall be confirmed that Cs-134 is less than 1Bq/L, Cs-137 is less than 1Bq/L, Sr-90 is less than 3(1)	Optimization of the description

Current	Revised	Reason for Revision
Bq/L*, H-3 is less than 1,500Bq/L by measurement, as well as that no other artificial gamma-ray emitting have not been detected during the above measurement. (* Sr-90 shall be confirmed to be less than 1Bq/L at approx. once every 10 days) In addition to the treated water, the water pumped up to collection tanks shall be confirmed to be less than 1,500Bq/L by H-3 measurement. (Omitted below)	Bq/L*, tritium is less than 1,500Bq/L by measurement, as well as that no other artificial gamma-ray emitting have not been detected during the above measurement. (* Sr-90 shall be confirmed to be less than 1Bq/L at approx. once every 10 days) In addition to the treated water, the water pumped up to collection tanks shall be confirmed to be less than 1,500Bq/L by tritium measurement. (Omitted below)	

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Chapter III, Part 3 (Supplementary Explanation on Safety) 2.2 Dose Assessment)

Current	Revised	Reason for Revision
2.2.3 Dose Assessment by Radioactive Liquid Waste, etc. 2.2.3.1 Dose assessment method (1) Nuclides to be assessed For the treated water within sub-drain and other treatment equipment. Cs-134, Cs-137, Sr-90, H-3 (hereinafter "major nuclides") and 37 other nuclides (total 41 nuclides*) shall be regarded as nuclides to be assessed. (* For the detail of 41 nuclides, refer to "III, Part 3, 2.1.2 Control of radioactive liquid waste, etc.") (Omission) 2.2.3.2 Dose assessment in each system (1) System to be assessed Dose assessment shall be performed on the following systems. ○Drainage system ・Water in groundwater bypass ・Rainwater inside the barrier ・Treated water from sub-drains and other water treatment facilities (Omission) (2) Dose assessment for drain For the water in groundwater bypass, its effective dose is 0.22 mSv/year because the water is treated after confirming that the following operational subjects are satisfied. (Omitted below)	2.2.3 Dose Assessment by Radioactive Liquid Waste, etc. 2.2.3.1 Dose assessment method (1) Nuclides to be assessed For ALPS treated water, radionuclides other than tritium and tritium shall be assessed. The selection of radionuclides other than tritium shall be stipulated in 3.2.1.2.3 (5) “Management of Radioactive Liquid Waste, etc.” For the treated water within sub-drain and other treatment equipment. Cs-134, Cs-137, Sr-90, H-3 (hereinafter "major nuclides") and 37 other nuclides (total 41 nuclides*) shall be regarded as nuclides to be assessed. (* For the detail of 41 nuclides, refer to "III, Part 3, 2.1.2 Control of radioactive liquid waste, etc.") (Omission) 2.2.3.2 Dose assessment in each system (1) System to be assessed Dose assessment shall be performed on the following systems. ○Drainage system ・ALPS treated water ・Water in groundwater bypass ・Rainwater inside the barrier ・Treated water from sub-drains and other water treatment facilities (Omission) (2) Dose assessment for drain For ALPS treated water, the sum of ratios to regulatory concentration limt of radionuclides other than tritium shall be confirmed to be less than 1 prior to discharge by measurement, etc. The water to be discharge is diluted (100 times or more) with seawater and it will be dischraged while the tritium concentration is controlled to be less than 1,500Bq/L. Effective dose of tritium is calculated from opration limit of 1,500 Bq/L divided by tritium concentration limit stipulated in notification, and effective dose of the other nuclides other than tritium is calculated from the sum of ratios to regulatory concentration limit of 1 before dilution devided by minimum dilution ratio (100 times). So that the sum of effective dose for each nuclide is 0.035 mSv/year. For the water in groundwater bypass, its effective dose is 0.22 mSv/year because the water is treated after confirming that the following operational subjects are satisfied. (Omitted below)	Addition in accordance with discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility
(Chapter III, Part 3 (Supplementary Explanation Regarding Safety) 3.1 Radiological Protection and Management)

Current	Revised	Reason for Revision
3.1.4 Reduction of radioactive materials in seawater, seabed soil, groundwater and drainage channels in ports and harbors (Omission) 3.1.4.3 Basic Approach to Reduction Measures (Omission) (3) Measures to reduce the concentration of radioactive materials in water in drains (Omission)	3.1.4 Reduction of radioactive materials in seawater, seabed soil, groundwater and drainage channels in ports and harbors (Omission) 3.1.4.3 Basic Approach to Reduction Measures (Omission) (3) Measures to reduce the concentration of radioactive materials in water in drains (Omission) (4) Measures to reduce the radioactive concentration of seawater intake for ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facility Fig. 4 shows the conceptual diagram of the seawater intake facility. As for the water intake method, the water intake canal of Units 5 and 6 will be partitioned from the port of power station on the side of the water intake canal of Units 1 to 4 with a partition dike (the riprap sloping weir + sheet), and a part of the north side of the North Breakwater Permeation Prevention Work will be modified (partially removed), and seawater for dilution will be intake from outside the port of power station on the north side of the outlet of Units 5 and 6. By constructing partition dike, the inflow of seawater with a relatively high concentration of radioactive materials from the side of the water intake canal of Units 1 to 4 will be suppressed.	Addition of measures to reduce radioactive materials in seawater intake in accordance with the installation of ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and the related facility Addtion of installation of partitioning dikes for discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea Optimization of the description (reflection of drawings in line with actual conditions of the site)
 Fig. 1 Measures to Reduce Radioactive Materials in Seawater and Seabed Soil in the Port, and Groundwater	 Fig. 1 Measures to Reduce Radioactive Materials in Seawater and Seabed Soil in the Port, and Groundwater	

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility
(Chapter III, Part 3 (Supplementary Explanation Regarding Safety) 3.1 Radiological Protection and Management)

Current	Revised	Reason for Revision



Fig. 2 Plans for monitoring seawater inside and outside port and groundwater (sampling points)

(Omission)

Table 1. Monitoring plans for seawater, groundwater, and drainage channels inside and outside ports (analysis items, frequency)

Area	Sampling point		Analysis items and frequencies			
			Gamma ray	H-3	Gross β	Sr-90
In the Unit 1-4 water intake canal	①	Southern part of Unit 1-4 water intake canal (in front of the impermeable wall) ※1	Once a day	Once a week	Once a day	Once a week
	②	Northern part of Unit 1-4 water intake canal (north of eastern wave breaker) ※1	Once a day	Once a week	Once a day	Once a week
In the port	③	In front of shallow draft quay ※1	Once a day	Once a week	Once a day	Once a week
	④	In front of Unit 6 water intake ※1	Once a day	Once a week	Once a day	-
	⑤	Central area in the port ※1	Once a day	Once a week	Once a day	Once a week
	⑥	Northern area in the port ※1	Once a day	Once a week	Once a day	Once a week
	⑦	Eastern area in the port ※1	Once a day	Once a week	Once a day	-
	⑧	Southern area in the port ※1	Once a day	Once a week	Once a day	-
	⑨	Western area in the port ※1	Once a day	Once a week	Once a day	-
	⑩	Port entrance ※1	Once a day	Once a week	Once a day	Once a week

(Omission)



Fig. 2 Plans for monitoring seawater inside and outside port and groundwater (sampling points)

(Omission)

Table 1. Monitoring plans for seawater, groundwater, and drainage channels inside and outside ports (analysis items, frequency)

Area	Sampling point		Analysis items and frequencies			
			Gamma ray	H-3	Gross β	Sr-90
In the Unit 1-4 water intake canal	①	Southern part of Unit 1-4 water intake canal (in front of the impermeable wall) ※1	Once a day	Once a week	Once a day	Once a week
	②	Northern part of Unit 1-4 water intake canal (north of eastern wave breaker) ※1	Once a day	Once a week	Once a day	Once a week
In the port	③	In front of shallow draft quay ※1	Once a day	Once a week	Once a day	Once a week
	④	In front of Unit 5 water intake ※1	Once a day	Once a week	Once a day	-
	⑤	Central area in the port ※1	Once a day	Once a week	Once a day	Once a week
	⑥	Northern area in the port ※1	Once a day	Once a week	Once a day	Once a week
	⑦	Eastern area in the port ※1	Once a day	Once a week	Once a day	-
	⑧	Southern area in the port ※1	Once a day	Once a week	Once a day	-
	⑨	Western area in the port ※1	Once a day	Once a week	Once a day	-
	⑩	Port entrance ※1	Once a day	Once a week	Once a day	Once a week

(Omission)

Addtion of installation of partitioning dikes for discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea
Optimization of the description (reflection of drawings in line with actual conditions of the site)

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Current	Revised	Reason for Revision
	 Fig.4 Conceptual Drawing of Seawater Intake Facilities	

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility
(Chapter VI Enhancing Public Acceptance on the Implementation of the Plan)

Current	Revised	Reason for Revision
VI Enhancing Public Acceptance on the Implementation of the Plan (Omission) As for local residents, opportunities for communications shall be expanded further by executing direct information sharing and explanations from our company through the internet, insertion of the company publicity materials into publicity magazines of local governments, utilization of media such as advertisements in local papers, and mutual communication activities. Also, indirect information deliveries shall be made by news and newspaper articles through mass media, such as press releases and periodic press conferences. In these activities, impact of the understanding promotion and its progress shall be obtained by analyzing trend of local voices heard during these mutual communication activities, and efforts shall be made for further understanding promotion.	VI Enhancing Public Acceptance on the Implementation of the Plan (Omission) As for local residents, opportunities for communications shall be expanded further by executing direct information sharing and explanations from our company through the internet, insertion of the company publicity materials into publicity magazines of local governments, utilization of media such as advertisements in local papers, and mutual communication activities such as tours and visits at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. Also, indirect information deliveries shall be made by news and newspaper articles through mass media, such as press releases and periodic press conferences. In these activities, impact of the understanding promotion and its progress shall be obtained by analyzing trend of local voices heard during these mutual communication activities, and efforts shall be made for further understanding promotion.	Optimization of the description
To local governments which act as windows to local residents, through notifications based on "Agreement for securing safety of surrounding areas of nuclear power stations" and "Agreement on reporting and communication related to nuclear power stations," both of which have been executed with each municipality*2, information is delivered periodically about progress of plant decommissioning, etc., and promptly about unplanned shutdown of cooling system for nuclear fuel or unplanned shutdown of the nitrogen injection facility. Also, responses shall be made actively for "Committee of persons in charge of notification and communication" and "Fukushima prefecture safety oversight council regarding decommissioning of nuclear power plants," for both of which Fukushima prefecture serves as a secretariat, delivering explanations from the planning stage about the decommissioning and activities for the implementation plan, while hearing opinions from the members of the committee and the council sincerely. In addition, invitations shall be made for local governments, etc., for visits directly to the plant field.	To local governments which act as windows to local residents, through notifications based on "Agreement for securing safety of surrounding areas regarding execution of decommissioning, etc. of TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station" and "Agreement of securing safety of surrounding municipalities regarding execution of decommissioning, etc. of TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station," both of which have been executed with each municipality*2, information is delivered periodically about progress of plant decommissioning, etc., and promptly about shutdown of cooling functions for nuclear fuel or shutdown of the nitrogen injection facility. Also, responses shall be made actively for "Committee of persons in charge of notification and communication" and "Fukushima prefecture safety oversight council regarding decommissioning of nuclear power plants," for both of which Fukushima prefecture serves as a secretariat, delivering explanations from the planning stage about the decommissioning and activities for the implementation plan, while hearing opinions from the members of the committee and the council sincerely. In addition, invitations shall be made for local governments, etc., for visits directly to the plant field.	
(Omission) For the understanding promotion activities, while the activities are going on, improvement and reviews are to be conducted continuously for further understanding promotion, with efforts to make it better based on instructions and proposals from the Social Comunication Office *3 as a direct report to the president.	(Omission) For the understanding promotion activities, while the activities are going on, improvement and reviews are to be conducted continuously for further understanding promotion, with efforts to make it better based on instructions and proposals from Corporate Communications Office*3 of Public Relations & Corporate Communications Unit and D&D Information & Planning Management Office*4.	Additon of D&D Information & Planning Management Office
*1: Unplanned shutdown of the fuel cooling system (water injection facility of reactor pressure vessel/ container, nitrogen injection facility of reactor pressure vessel, spent fuel pool facilities, PCV gas management facilities), wide-spanning outage of on-site electric power source, concern of contaminated water leakage to outside of the premise, etc.	*1: Unplanned shutdown of the fuel cooling system (water injection facility of reactor pressure vessel/ container, nitrogen injection facility of reactor pressure vessel, spent fuel pool facilities, PCV gas management facilities), wide-spanning outage of on-site electric power source, concern of contaminated water leakage to outside of the premise, etc.	
*2. Fukushima Prefecture, Okuma Town, Futaba Town, Naraha Town, Tomioka Town, Hirono Town, Namie Town, Iwaki City, Tamura City, Minamisoma City, Kawamata Town, Kawauchi Village, Katsurao Village and Iitate Village	*2. Fukushima Prefecture, Okuma Town, Futaba Town, Naraha Town, Tomioka Town, Hirono Town, Namie Town, Iwaki City, Tamura City, Minamisoma City, Kawamata Town, Kawauchi Village, Katsurao Village and Iitate Village	
*3: Established on April 10, 2013 as a direct report to the president, with the objective of making appropriate communications toward the society, activities to foster social sensitivity through training, etc., and activities of conversation leveraging risk communicators, and proposals are	*3: With the objective of making appropriate communications toward the society, and activities of public hearings/publicity leveraging risk communicators who belong to Corporate Communications Office are conducted, and proposals are made to each department inside the company for the appropriate information disclosures at the time of troubles	Optimization of the description

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Current	Revised	Reason for Revision
made to each department inside the company for the appropriate information disclosures at the time of troubles	*4: An organization established on August 1, 2021, directly under the Chief Decommissioning Officer as the headquarters within the Fukushima Daiichi Decontamination and Decommissioning Engineering Company, in order to enable information dissemination and facility installation in response to local perspectives at the event of troubles, medium-scale disasters and emergencies, as well as upon making progress in the decommissioning activities.	Additon in accordance with establishment of D&D Information & Planning Management Office

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Annexes)

Current	Revised	Revised Reason
Annexes of the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility Annex (Omission) Annex 26 Supplementary information on Intake Facilities in Unit 3 reactor containment I. Structural Strength and Seismic resistance of Intake Facilities in Unit 3 reactor containment Annex 28 Supplementary infomation on Fuel Removing Facility from the Spent Fuel Pool of Unit 2 I Supplementary explanation material for Fuel Removing Platform II Ventilation Equipment　Ventilation Air Volume III Calculation Form for Seismic Resistance of Shields Installed on the Floor of the Operating Floor of the Reactor Building IV 1/2Ss450 Assessment for Fuel Handling Machine and Fuel Removing Platform of Unit 2 V Calculation Form for Exposure Assessment in Case of Damage to Fuel Handling Machine of Unit 2	Annexes of the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility Annex (Omission) Annex 26 Supplementary information on Intake Facilities in Unit 3 reactor containment I. Structural Strength and Seismic resistance of Intake Facilities in Unit 3 reactor containment Annex 27 Supplementary information on the ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities I Structural Strength of ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities II Tolerance of nominal values for ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities Annex 28 Supplementary infomation on Fuel Removing Facility from the Spent Fuel Pool of Unit 2 I Supplementary explanation material for Fuel Removing Platform II Ventilation Equipment　Ventilation Air Volume III Calculation Form for Seismic Resistance of Shields Installed on the Floor of the Operating Floor of the Reactor Building IV 1/2Ss450 Assessment for Fuel Handling Machine and Fuel Removing Platform of Unit 2 V Calculation Form for Exposure Assessment in Case of Damage to Fuel Handling Machine of Unit 2	Addition in accordance with the installation of ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Annex 27 Supplementary information on the ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities)

Current	Revised	Rivised Reason
(Not currently listed)	Annex 27 Supplementary information on the ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities (Newly described) (Omitted below)	New description to the installation of ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Reference Material)

Current	Revised	Reason for Revision
(Not currently listed)	Reference Material Action in response to "Basic Policy on handling of ALPS treated water at the Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings' Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station" (Newly described) (Omitted below)	Additon of reference material

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Reference Material, Attachment-1)

Current	Revised	Reason for Revison
(Not currently listed) (Omitted below)	Attachment-1 Action in Response to the Basic Policy of the Government (Newly described) (Omitted below)	Additon of action in response to the basic policy of the government

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Comparison Table of amendments in the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station as Specified Nuclear Facility (Reference Material, Attachment-2)

Current	Revised	Reason for Revision
(Not currently listed) (Omitted below)	Attachment-2 Radiological Impact Assessment Report Regarding the Discharge of ALPS Treated Water into the Sea (Design stage / Revised version) (Newly described) (Omitted below)	Addtion of radiological impact assessment report regarding the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea (design stage / revised version)

The Japanese version shall prevail.

2.4 Future Risk Reduction Measures of Specified Nuclear Facility

(Refer to comparison table for any amendments)

Risk Reduction Measures to be Implemented and Appropriateness

(Refer to comparison table for any amendments)

2.50 ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities and the Related Facility

2.50.1 Basic Design

2.50.1.1 ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities

2.50.1.1.1 Purpose of Installation

The tanks* on the premises of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS store the water, which radionuclides other than tritium has been removed to a sufficiently low concentration by ALPS (hereinafter "ALPS treated water, etc.").

The purpose of this facility shall be to dilute ALPS treated water, etc. with seawater and discharge into the sea after confirming that the water satisfies the concentration where sum of the ratios of regulatory required concentration of radionuclides, excluding tritium is less than 1 (hereinafter "ALPS treated water.").

*: The Reverse Osmosis membrane (hereinafter "RO") concentrated water storage tanks, the ALPS treated water, etc. storage tanks, and Sr treated water storage tanks.

RO concentrated water storage tanks initially stored the concentrated salt water transferred from the RO device, but after the completion of the treatment of the concentrated water, RO concentrated water storage tanks store ALPS treated water, Sr treated storage tanks initially stored water treated by RO concentrated salt water treatment facility (already closed down), but after the completion of the treatment of the water treated by RO concentrated salt water treatment facility, Sr treated storage tanks store ALPS treated water, etc.

2.50.1.1.2 Required function

(1) The amount of discharge into the sea shall be capable of exceeding the amount of contaminated water generated (the amount increased by the inflow of groundwater and rainwater).
(2) In order to confirm that the water to be diluted/discharged is ALPS treated water, it shall be capable of homogenous the radionuclides concentration in each tank in a tank group in the status of measurement/confirmation.
(3) ALPS treated water can be diluted with seawater and drained to discharge facility.
(4) The facilities have a function to immediately halt the discharge of the ALPS treated water into the sea in case an abnormal matter happens.
(5) The facilities have a function to dilute the ALPS treated water 100 times or more so that the level of tritium concentration in diluted ALPS treated water after diluting with seawater is below 1,500Bq/L.

2.50.1.1.3 Design Policy

(1) Processing of radioactive liquid waste

ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities mainly consist of measurement/confirmation facility, transfer facility, and dilution facility.

At the measurement/confirmation facility, the radioactive material concentration in each tank and between the tanks in a tank group is made homogeneous, and then sample collection and analysis are performed to confirm that the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of radionuclides other than tritium contained in ALPS treated water is less than 1 and the tritium concentration.

Thereafter, ALPS treated water is transferred to the dilution facility by the transfer facility, diluted with seawater, and then drained to the discharge facility.

a. Homogenization of Radioactivity Concentrations of In-Tank ALPS Treated Water Prior to Discharge into the Sea

In the measurement confirmation facility, the concentration of radioactive materials in the tank group is made almost homogenous by circulating water in the tank group using circulation pumps before sampling so that representative samples can be obtained. In addition, agitation equipment shall be installed in each tank to promote homogenization.

b. Adjusting and monitoring the mixing and dilution rate of ALPS treated water to seawater

In order to reduce the effective dose at the site boundary as much as achievable, dilution shall be designed so that the tritium concentration in the water discharged after diluting the ALPS treated water with seawater (the "discharge water") is less than 1,500Bq/L, which is the upper limit of operation, and the dilution ratio by seawater is 100 times or more. The mixing and diluting conditions in ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities is evaluated using the analysis code.

In addition, the mixing and diluting ratio shall be adjusted and monitored so that the tritium concentration in the released water is less than 1, 500Bq/L, the upper limit of operation.

c. Detecting Abnormalities and Halting the Discharge of ALPS Treated Water into the Ocean

In preparation for the occurrence of an event that may lead to ocean release of ALPS treated water in an unintentional manner due to a failure along with other abnormalities during the service period, emergency isolation valves shall be installed in the transfer facility, and when it is judged that the operational condition deviates from the normal operating state, they shall be closed by an interlock, and the discharge into the sea of ALPS treated water shall be designed to manually be halted by the operator as required.

d. Prevention of leakage and uncontrolled release of radioactive materials

Since ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facility handles ALPS treated water as radioactive liquid waste, the following items shall be considered in order to prevent both of the occurrence of the leakage and the spread of contamination. However, among the those facilities, the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) shall be designed to ensure water tightness so that no significant outflow to other than the discharge facility will occur, since only the discharge water is handled at normal times.

(a) In order to prevent the occurrence of leakage, appropriate materials to the environment installed and the properties of internal fluids shall be used for equipment, etc.

(b) In the event of a leak of liquid radioactive material, early detection of the leak shall be enabled, and the leak liquid shall be easily removed.

(c) Alarms such as detection of a leakage should be displayed in the Seismic Isolation Building Central Monitoring Room to ensure that the abnormality is communicated to the operators and appropriate measures can be taken.

e. Dose reduction

The ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities shall be designed considering the shielding function in designing the equipment, etc., according to the nature of the radioactive liquid waste to be handled.

(2) Applicable Codes and Standards

Regarding the design, selection of materials, manufacture, and test/inspection of structures, systems, and components constituting ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities, reliability shall be ensured by applying the Rules on Design/Construction for Nuclear Power Plants (JSME) for Power Generation, the technical standards of the Society of Civil Engineers along with others, and the Japanese Industrial Standards (JIS), etc.

(3) Design considerations against natural phenomena

a. Design considerations against earthquakes

Structures, systems and components constituting ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities shall be classified in terms of seismic design, referring to the seismic class classification of fuel fabrication facilities, and use facilities that handle unsealed nuclear fuel materials, while considering the importance of their safety functions, influences on safety (influences on public exposure) in the event of loss of a function due to an earthquake, and influences on decommissioning activities, and shall be designed to withstand the seismic force for design that is considered appropriate.

In evaluating the seismic resistance of major components, it is basic to comply with the Technical Codes for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Stations (JEAC4601), etc., however the evaluation methods and evaluation standards shall be adopted according to the actual conditions.
Polyethylene pipes and pressure resistant hoses shall ensure seismic resistance by the flexibility of the materials.

b. Design considerations against natural phenomena other than earthquakes (tsunamis, heavy rainfall, typhoons, tornadoes, etc.)

The ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities shall be designed so that the safety of the facility will not be impaired by natural phenomena (tsunami, heavy rainfall, typhoon, tornado, etc.) that are assumed to be other than earthquakes.

(4) Design considerations for external anthropogenic events

The ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities shall be designed so that the safety of the facility will not be compromised by any postulated external anthropogenic events. In addition, appropriate measures shall be taken to protect against unauthorized access by third parties.

(5) Design considerations against fires

The ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facility shall be designed so that the safety of the facility will not be compromised by fire with appropriate combination of measures to prevent the occurrence of fire, to detect and extinguish the fire, and to mitigate the consequences of the fire.

(6) Design considerations for environmental conditions

Structures, systems and components for ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities shall be designed to be compatible with all assumed environmental conditions, including ageing events.

(7) Design considerations for operations

The ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities shall be designed to prevent misoperation by operators, and shall be designed so that operators can easily operate the facilities required to cope with these events even in situations where abnormal events or natural phenomena that could affect the operation of the facility have occurred.

(8) Design considerations for reliability

The ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facility shall be designed to ensure high reliability so that "unintentional ocean release of ALPS treated water" will not occur due to human error and/or equipment failure. In addition, even if "unintentional ocean release of ALPS treated water" occurs,

the quantity shall be designed to be extremely small.

(9) Design considerations for testability

Structures, systems and components constituting ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities shall be designed so that each function can be tested/inspected by appropriate methods to confirm the integrity and capability.

(10) Other Design considerations

a. Consideration for soundness

The ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities shall be designed to enable efficient maintenance according to the degree of importance of each component.

b. Consider for monitoring and operation

The ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facility shall be designed to enable remote control and monitoring of operation status by monitoring and control equipment in the central monitoring room of the Seismic Isolation Building.

c. Consideration for long-term shutdowns

Among the ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities, either which are dynamic components or have functions for the components that immediately shuts down in the event of an abnormality shall be installed two series in parallel so that the facilities will not be shut down for a long time due to events such as a failure. In addition, power shall be designed to be receivable from two different in-house high-voltage bus lines.

2.50.1.1.4 Major Components

ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities consists of measurement/confirmation facility, transfer facility, and dilution facility.

(1) Measurement/confirmation facility

Measurement/confirmation facility consists of measurement/confirmation tanks, agitation equipment, circulation pumps, circulation pipes, and receiving pipes, for the purpose of homogenizing the radioactive material concentration of ALPS treated water and sampling prior to discharge.

Since the measurement/confirmation tanks require at least about 10,000 m^3 of capacity to discharge ALPS treated water into the sea in view of the current amount of contaminated water generated and the time required to measure and evaluate the amount of radioactive materials contained in ALPS

treated water, 10 of the K4 area tanks shown in the multi-nuclide process water storage tanks of "II 2.5 Contaminated Water Treatment Facilities, etc." will be used as a single tank group in three tank groups (30 tanks), and each tank group will be distributed to the receiving, measurement/confirmation, and discharge processes of ALPS treated water.
Agitation equipment is installed one by one in the tank for measurement and confirmation, and agitation in the tank is performed.
Two circulation pumps are installed to circulate and agitate water inside one group of tanks (10 tanks).
Incidentally, both circulation pumps and agitators shall ensure sufficient processing capacity for homogenization of the concentration of radioactive materials in the K4 area tank.

(2) Transfer facility
The transfer facility consists of ALPS treated water transfer pump and pipes to transfer the water, which has been verified as ALPS treated water in the measurement/confirmation facility, to the dilution facility.
ALPS treated water transfer pumps shall consist of two units, the operational unit and the stand-by unit, and transfer ALPS treated water to the dilution facility.
Also, emergency isolation valves-2 shall be provided at one location behind the seawall and emergency isolation valves-1 shall be provided in front of seawater pipe header as a countermeasure against tsunamis so that the transfer can be halted immediately in the event of an abnormality.

(3) Dilution facility
The dilution facility consists of seawater transfer pumps, seawater pipes (including seawater pipe header), discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) for the purpose of diluting the ALPS treated water with seawater, transferring it to the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage), and drained away to the discharge facility.
The seawater transfer pumps transfer seawater from the water intake canal of Unit 5 to the discharge vertical shaft. Furthermore, the dilution facility shall ensure a capacity to dilute the ALPS treated water 100 times or more so that tritium concentration of the ALPS treated water transferred by transfer facility shall be sufficiently below 1,500Bq/L.

2.50.1.1.5 Items to be checked during service period
The ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities shall be capable of transferring the ALPS treated water through the transfer facility to the dilution facility and dilute it with seawater before draining away to discharge facility.
In addition, in the case of abnormality occurrence, the facility shall immediately halt the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea.

The Japanese version shall prevail.

2.50.1.2 Discharge Facility

2.50.1.2.1 Purpose of Installation

The purpose of this facility shall be to discharge the drained water from ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities (water satisfies the concentration where sum of the ratios to regulatory concentration limit of all radionuclides including tritium is below one by dilution with seawater) into the sea which is about 1km away from the shore by the water head difference between discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage) and sea level.

2.50.1.2.2 Required Function

The drained water from ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities (the water satisfies the concentration where sum of the ratios to regulatory concentration limit of all radionuclides including tritium is below one by dilution with seawater) can be discharged into the sea which is about 1km offshore.

2.50.1.2.3 Design Policy

Design shall be as follows in accordance with the “items to be taken”

(1) Applicable codes and standards

Reliability shall be ensured by applying domestic and overseas private standards such as technical standards and Japanese Industrial Standards (JIS) of the Society of Civil Engineers, etc. for the design, selection of materials and manufacture for each facility constituting the water discharge facility.

(2) Design considerations against natural phenomena

a. Design considerations against earthquakes

The facilities constituting the water discharge facility shall be classified in terms of seismic design and shall be designed to withstand the seismic capacity for design that is considered appropriate, in consideration of the handling of the wastewater from the diluted ALPS treatment water discharge facility (water diluted with seawater and having the sum of ratio to regulatory concentration limit including tritium falling below one).

b. Design considerations against natural phenomena (tsunamis, heavy rainfall, typhoons, tornadoes, etc.) that are assumed other than earthquakes

The discharge facilities shall be designed so that safety of the facilities will not be impaired by assumed natural phenomena (tsunamis, typhoons) other than earthquakes.

(3) Design Considerations against Fires

Water spraying equipment shall use non-flammable or flame-retardant materials as practically possible to prevent the occurrence of fire.

Incidentally, the risk of fire is very low because seawater is filled inside the facility.

(4) Design Considerations for Environmental Condition

The equipment constituting the discharge facility shall be designed to be compatible with all envisaged environmental conditions including ageing events.

(5) Design Considerations for Testability

The discharge facility shall be designed so that the required functions can be verified.

(6) Other Design Considerations

a. Hydraulic Design

The design shall be such that water in the discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage) is transferred to the outlet at a distance of about 1km using the difference in water head between the discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage) and the sea surface. In addition, the wall height of the discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage) shall be designed in consideration of hydraulic loss in the discharge facility and water level rise due to surging, etc.

b. Structure

The structure shall be so constructed that it is less susceptible to earthquakes by installing water discharge facilities on the bedrock. In addition, the water discharge tunnel shall be installed inside the bedrock, and the shield method shall be adopted in consideration of safety during construction in excavation of the sea bottom and durability during service. In addition, the water-tightness is ensured by providing sealing material on the lining plate made of reinforced concrete which constitutes the water discharge tunnel.

c. Consideration for Soundness

The structure is established after confirming that both the long-term load and the short-term load are within the allowable stresses. And, it is confirmed that the floating of the structure does not occur. In addition, crack width and salt damage on the reinforced concrete skeleton is checked, and appropriate reinforcement covering is set, and thus it is confirmed that the durability during the service period is ensured. In addition, as with general civil engineering structures, maintenance and management shall be carried out based on the inspection long-term plan.

In addition, as with general civil engineering structures, maintenance and management shall be

carried out based on the inspection long-term plan.

2.50.1.2.4 Major Facility

Discharge facility shall be composed of discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage), discharge tunnel and discharge outlet for the purpose of discharge of the water overflowed over the weir in the discharge vertical shaft, flowing from discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) to discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage) into the sea which is about 1km offshore.

2.50.1.2.5 Items to be Checked during the Service Period

By activating sea water transfer pumps, the treated water shall be released into the sea through the discharge tunnel and discharge outlet by the difference in water head between the discharge shaft (down-stream storage) and the sea level.

2.50.2 Basic Specifications

2.50.2.1 Main Specifications of ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facility

2.50.2.1.1 Measurement/confirmation facility

(1) Circulation pump (finished product)

Number of units	2
Capacity	160 m^3/h (per unit)

(2) Agitating facility (finished product)

Number of units	30

(3) Measurement/confirmation tank※

Total Volume (Nominal)	30, 000 m^3
Number of units	30
Volume (single unit)	1, 000m^3 per unit
Material	SS400
Thickness (side plate)	15mm

※: A portion of the K4 area tanks, which are out of storage tanks for ALPS treated water, etc. in “II 2.5 Contaminated water treatment facilities, etc.”, shall be used for diversion. Note that the nominal capacity is the upper limit of the operating water level.

(4) Pipe

Main pipe specifications (1/3)

Name	Specification	
From measurement/confirmation tank outlet to circulation pump inlet (Steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	200A／Sch.20S SUS316LTP 0.49MPa 40°C
(Polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 200A Polyethylene 0.49MPa 40°C
(Pressure resistant hose)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 200A Synthetic rubber 0.49MPa 40°C
(Expansion joint)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 200A Synthetic rubber 0.49MPa 40°C
From circulation pump outlet to measurement/confirmation tank inlet (Steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	125A／Sch.20S 150A／Sch.20S 200A／Sch.20S SUS316LTP 0.98MPa 40°C
(Polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 150A Polyethylene 0.98MPa 40°C
(Expansion joint)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 125A Synthetic rubber 0.98MPa 40°C

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Main pipe specifications (2/3)

Name	Specification	
From the outlet of ALPS to treated water storage tanks*1 and other tanks*2 (Polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 100A Polyethylene 0.98MPa 40°C
(Steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	100A/Sch. 20S SUS316LTP 0.98MPa 40°C
(Pressure resistant hose)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 100A Synthetic rubber 0.98MPa 40°C
From outlet of sampling tanks to storage tank of ALPS treated water, and RO concentrated water storage tanks or Sr treated water storage tanks*2 (Steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	100A/Sch. 20S SUS316LTP 0.98MPa 40°C
(Polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 100A Polyethylene 0.98MPa 40°C
(Pressure resistant hose)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 100A Synthetic rubber 0.98MPa 40°C

*1: Multi-nuclide treated water storage tank, RO concentrated water storage tank or Sr treated water storage tank.

*2: Among the pipes to measurement/confirmation tanks (also used as multi-nuclide treated water storage tanks), the pipes specified above shall also be used as "II 2 16.1 Multi-nuclide removal facility" and "II 2 16.2 Extended Multi-nuclide removal facility".

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Main pipe specifications (3/3)

Name	Specification	
From outlet of sampling tanks to ALPS, and RO concentrated water storage tanks or Sr treated water storage tanks*3 (Steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	100A/Sch. 20S SUS316LTP 0.98MPa 40°C
(Polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 100A Polyethylene 0.98MPa 40°C
(Pressure resistant hose)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 100A Synthetic rubber 0.98MPa 40°C

*3: Among the pipes to measurement/confirmation tanks (also used as multi-nuclide treated water storage tanks), the pipes specified above shall also be used as "II 2 16.3 Multi-nuclide removal facility".

2.50.2.1.2 Transfer facility

(1) ALPS treated water transfer pump (finished product)

Number of units	2 (1 for stand-by)
Capacity	30 m^3/h (per unit)

(2) ALPS treated water flowmeter

Number of units	4 (2 for stand-by) ※
Method for measurement	Differential pressure type
Range for measurement	0 ~ 40 m^3/h

(3) Radiation monitor

Number of units	2 (1 for stand-by)
Type	Scintillation detector
Measuring range	10^{-1} ~ 10^5 s^{-1}

(4) Emergency isolation valve-1 (finished product)

Number of Units	2 (1 for stand-by)

(5) Emergency isolation valve-2 (finished product)

Number of Units	2 (1 for stand-by)

(6) ALPS treated water Flow Control Valve (finished product)

Number of Units	2 (1 for stand-by)

※: Number of differential pressure transmitter is shown. Number of orifice plates and pipes for pressure sensing are 2 each (1 for stand-by.)

(6) Pipe

Main pipe specifications (1/2)

Name	Specification	
Between measurement/confirmation tanks (Steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	200A／Sch.20S SUS316LTP 0.49MPa 40°C
(Polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 200A Polyethylene 0.49MPa 40°C
(Pressure resistant hose)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 200A Synthetic rubber 0.49MPa 40°C
From the measurement/confirmation tank outlet to the ALPS treated water transfer pump inlet (Steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	80A／Sch.20S 150A／Sch.20S SUS316LTP 0.49MPa 40°C
(Polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 100A Equivalent to 150A Polyethylene 0.49MPa 40°C
(Expansion joint)	Nominal diameter Material Max. working pressure Max. working temperature	Equivalent to 100A Equivalent to 80A Synthetic rubber 0.49MPa 40°C

Main piping specifications (2/2)

Name	Specifications	
From the ALPS treated water transfer pump outlet to emergency isolation velve-1 (Steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness	40A／Sch.20S 100A／Sch.20S 150A／Sch.20S
	Material	SUS316LTP
	Max. working pressure	0.98MPa
	Max. working temperature	40°C
(Polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter	Equivalent to 100A
	Material	Polyethylene
	Max. working pressure	0.98MPa
	Max. working temperature	40°C
(Expansion joint)	Nominal diameter	Equivalent to 40A
	Material	Synthetic rubber
	Max. working pressure	0.98MPa
	Max. working temperature	40°C
From the emergency isolation velve-1 to the seawater pipe header inlet connection (Steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness	100A／Sch.20S
	Material	SUS316LTP
	Max. working pressure	0.60MPa
	Max. working temperature	40°C
(Polyethylene pipe)	Nominal diameter	Equivalent to 100A
	Material	Polyethylene
	Max. working pressure	0.60MPa
	Max. working temperature	40°C
(Expansion joint)	Nominal diameter	Equivalent to 100A
	Material	Synthetic rubber
	Max. working pressure	0.60MPa
	Max. working temperature	40°C

2.50.2.1.3 Dilution facility

(1) Seawater transfer pump (finished product)

Number of units	3 (1 for stand-by)
Capacity	7,086 m^3/h (per unit)

(2) Sea water flowmeter

Number of units	3 (1 for stand-by)
Method for measurement	Differential pressure type
Range for measurement	0 ~ 10,000m^3/h

(3) Discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage)

Number of units	1
Main dimensions	Length 34,500mm x Width 16,900mm × Height 6,000mm (Inner space)
Structure	Reinforced concrete (Concrete: 40N/mm^2, Rebar: SD345)

(4) Pipe

Main pipe specifications

Name	Specification	
From seawater transfer pump outlet to seawater pipe header inlet connection (Steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness	800A／12.7mm 900A／12.7mm
	Material	STPY400
	Max. working pressure	0.60MPa
	Max. working temperature	40°C
(Steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness	900A/13mm
	Material	SUS329J4L
	Max. working pressure	0.60MPa
	Max. working temperature	40°C
(Expansion joint)	Nominal diameter	Equivalent to 800A Equivalent to 900A
	Material	Synthetic rubber
	Max. working pressure	0.60MPa
	Max. working temperature	40°C
Seawater pipe header (Steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness	1800A／16mm 2200A／16mm
	Material	SM400B
	Max. working pressure	0.60MPa
	Max. working temperature	40°C
From seawater pipe header outlet to discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) (Steel pipe)	Nominal diameter/thickness	1800A／16mm
	Material	SM400B
	Max. working pressure	0.60MPa
	Max. working temperature	40°C
(Expansion joint)	Nominal diameter	Equivalent to 1800A
	Material	Synthetic rubber
	Max. working pressure	0.60MPa
	Max. working temperature	40°C

2.50.2.2 Major Specifications of Discharge Facilities

(1) Discharge vertical shaft (Down-stream storage)

Number of units	1
Main dimensions	Length 4,600mm × Width 10,000mm × Height 17,200mm (Inner space)
Structure	Reinforced concrete construction (Concrete: 24N/mm^2, Rebar: SD345)

(2) Discharge tunnel

Number of units	1
Main dimensions	Length: 1,034m Inner diameter: 2,590mm
Structure	Reinforced concrete (Concrete: 42N/mm^2, Rebar: SD345)

(3) Discharge outlet

Number of units	1
Main dimensions	Length 8,000mm × Width 11,000mm × Height 8,300mm (Inner space)
Structure	Reinforced concrete construction (Concrete: 30N/mm^2, Rebar: SD345)

2.50.3 Attachments

Attachment-1: System overview and schematic diagram

Attachment-2: Specific measures to ensure safety of ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities and Related Facility

Attachment-3: Description on structural strength and seismic resistance of ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities

Attachment-4: Items to be checked for ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities and Related Facility

Attachment-5: Description on Design of Discharge Vertical Shaft (upper-stream storage) and Discharge Facility

Attachment-6: Construction schedule

Attachment-7: Items for consideration on testability



(a) System Overview

Figure-1 Overview of ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities and Related Facility (1/3)

The Japanese version shall prevail.



(b) Layout overview (overall)

Figure-1 Overview of ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities and Related Facility (2/3)



(c) Layout overview (sea side)

Figure-1 Overview of ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities and Related Facility (3/3)

The tanks for measurement and confirmation are divided into group A, group B, and group C, and each tank group repeats ① the receiving process, ② the measurement and confirmation process, and ③ the discharge process.

The situation in the figure shows group A (discharge step), group B (measurement and confirmation step), and group C (receiving step).

For the receiving and discharge processes, open the connection valve of the measurement/confirmation tanks (between five tanks) to receive and transfer.



(a) Schematic diagram of measurement/confirmation facility system

Figure-2 Schematic diagram ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities (1/2)

The Japanese version shall prevail.



(b) Schematic diagram of transfer facility system

(c) Schematic diagram of dilution facility system

Figure-2 Schematic diagram of ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities

(2/2)



Figure-3 Schematic diagram of discharge facility system

Attachment-2

Specific measures to ensure safety of ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities and Related Facility

Although the liquid handled by ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities is ALPS treated water, it contains radioactive materials. Therefore, for this facility, measures required to satisfy the regulatory standards, such as the matters to be taken related measures, shall be taken. In particular, specific safety measures shall be established and implemented for homogenization of radioactive material concentration by measurement/confirmation facility, mixing and dilution of ALPS treated water by seawater, prevention of "unintentional discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea," prevention of leakage occurrence, prevention and detection of leakage and expansion of the leakage, and considerations in design for operation by operators.

1. Processing, storage and management of radioactive solid waste

For the handling of solid waste generated as a result of the installation of ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facility, the responses for treatment, storage and management of radioactive solid waste for the entire power plant shall be followed. (Refer to "II 1.8 Processing, Storage and Management of Radioactive Solid Waste.")

2. Treatment, storage and management of radioactive liquid waste

2.1 Homogenization of Radioactivity Concentrations of In-Tank ALPS Treated Water Prior to Ocean Discharge

In the receiving process, the concentration of radioactive materials contained in ALPS treated water received in the measurement/confirmation tanks varies according to the storage tanks of the transfer source. Therefore, in the measuring/confirming process prior to discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, all ten tanks of a tank group in the process are connected and the water in the tanks is homogenized by facilities including circulating pumps and agitators before sampling, and the concentration of radioactive materials contained in ALPS treated water in the tank group is analyzed and evaluated.

In addition, the circulation/agitation time required for homogenization will be appropriately set through a circulation/agitation verification test using sodium tertiary phosphate as a reagent.

Furthermore, in the analysis after homogenizing ALPS treated water, tritium and radionuclides other than tritium are analyzed and evaluated, and the tritium concentration in the treated water is confirmed, and after confirming that the sum of ratios to regulatory concentration limit of nuclides other than tritium is less than 1, the permissibility of discharge of the ALPS treated water is judged.

The Japanese version shall prevail.

2.2 Adjusting and monitoring the mixing/dilution ratio of ALPS treated water to seawater

The dilution of ALPS treated water is carried out by injecting ALPS treated water into the seawater pipe headers through which seawater for dilution flows.

The injected ALPS treated water is mixed with the surrounding seawater while flowing down in the seawater pipe to reduce the radioactive material concentration.

(1) Adjustment of mixing/dilution ratio

To reduce the effective dose at the site boundary as much as possible, the following dilution and evaluations shall be conducted so that the concentration of tritium contained in the released water is less than 1,500Bq/L, which is the upper limit of operation, and the dilution ratio by seawater is 100 times or more.

(2) Volume of seawater for dilution of ALPS treated water

Depending on the tritium concentration measured in the measurement/confirmation process, set the flow rate of ALPS treated water up to 500 m^3/day using ALPS treated water transfer pumps, ALPS treated water flow control valves, ALPS treated water flow meters, etc.

In addition, in order to make the concentration of tritium contained in discharged water less than 1,500 Bq/L, which is the upper limit of operation, and to make the diluting ratio 100 times or more, three seawater transfer pumps with a capacity of 170,000 m^3/day will be installed, and two or more seawater transfer pumps will be operated constantly in accordance with the flow rate of ALPS treated water, thereby securing the necessary amount of seawater. In addition, under normal operation, when ALPS treated water flow rate is set at 500 m^3/day and the number of operating seawater transfer pumps is set at two, the maximum tritium concentration of ALPS treated water released into the sea is set at 1 million Bq/L in order to reduce the tritium concentration in the discharged water to less than 1,500 Bq/L, which is the upper limit of operation, because it is the most severe operating condition in terms of the dilution ratio.

(3) Assessment of Mixing/Dilution Condition of ALPS Treated Water by Analysis Code

ALPS treated water shall be mixed and diluted with seawater for dilution in the seawater pipe header and the seawater pipes, and then the water is discharged into the sea as the discharge water.

To confirm the mixed dilution condition of ALPS treated water in seawater pipe header and seawater pipes, the mixing/dilution effectiveness is evaluated by numerical simulations using an analytical code (see Attachment-1 for analysis details.)

a. Evaluation Method

(a) Evaluation Concept

To confirm that ALPS treated water is sufficiently mixed and diluted in the seawater pipe headers

and seawater pipes, the distribution of the mass fraction of ALPS treated water advected and diffused into the seawater for dilution shall be evaluated.

(b) Analytical Code

In evaluating mixing/dilution conditions, the basic equations (mass conservation equation, momentum conservation equation, energy conservation equation) for fluid behavior can be solved to analyze and evaluate fluid motion (flow velocity, pressure) and temperature in three-dimensional space, and STAR-CCM+ code verified by turbulence experiments along with others is used.

In addition to the function of obtaining the fluid flow (flow velocity, pressure, and temperature) by three-dimensional numerical fluid calculation, the analytical code has an advection and diffusion analysis function of the fluid. Therefore, it is possible to analyze and evaluate the situation in which ALPS treated water injected into the diluting seawater is mixed and diffused.

(c) Evaluation conditions

Among the operating conditions assumed during normal operation, ALPS treated water flow rate shall be 500 m^3/day, the planned maximum flow rate, and the seawater flow rate shall be 340,000 m^3/day, the minimum flow rate.

Regarding diffusion of ALPS treated water in seawater pipe header and seawater pipes, diffusion by turbulence is considered. Since a turbulent diffusion coefficient (turbulent Schmidt number), which is determined experimentally, is dominant for turbulent diffusion behavior in the analysis, the value of turbulent Schmidt number of which the effect to turbulent diffusion behavior is small is set from literature survey.

(d) Criterion for Judgment

Maximum mass fraction of ALPS treated water at outlet of seawater pipe shall be 1.0 % or less (dilution ratio shall be 100 times or more).

(e) Evaluation Results

Since the largest mass fraction of ALPS treated water at the end of the rising part of seawater pipe is 0.28% from the injection position of ALPS treated water, and the dilution ratio of 100 times or more in the seawater pipe is feasible, the judgement criterion at the outlet of seawater pipe is satisfied.

On the other hand, in the seawater pipes, there are some areas where the dilution ratio is about 1/2 of the assumed dilution ratio. Therefore, to satisfy the upper operational limit of tritium concentration of less than 1,500Bq/L including such areas, the mixing dilution ratio, which will be described later, shall be adjusted and monitored.

(4) Adjustment and monitoring of mixing/dilution rate

Adjustment and monitoring of the mixing and diluting ratio are conducted in the following manner so that the concentration of tritium contained in the released water is less than 1,500Bq/L, the upper limit of operation.

a. Adjustment of mixing dilution rate

Adjusting the mixing dilution rate of ALPS treated water to seawater shall be designed to control ALPS treated water flow rate because the seawater transfer pumps operate at the rated capacity.

Specifically, the tritium concentration of the measured and confirmed ALPS treated water is registered in advance in the monitoring and control device at the operation for discharge, and the opening of ALPS treated water flow rate control valve is automatically adjusted so that the specified mixing/dilution rate is obtained based on the operational values of the tritium concentration and the tritium concentration after dilution.

・Formula for calculating the flow rate of ALPS treated water (operational)

$$\text{ALPS treated water flow rate (operational value)} = \frac{\text{seawater flow rate} \times \text{tritium concentration after dilution of seawater (operational value)}}{\text{tritium concentration of ALPS treated water} - \text{tritium concentration after dilution of seawater (operational value)}}$$

b. Monitoring of mixing/dilution rate

The tritium concentration after dilution by seawater shall be designed by monitoring ALPS treated water flow rate and seawater flow rate.

・Tritium concentration evaluation formula

$$\text{Tritium concentration after diluting seawater} = \frac{\text{ALPS treated water tritium concentration} \times \text{ALPS treated water flow rate})}{\text{ALPS treated water flow rate} + \text{seawater flow rate}}$$

It is designed to prevent discharge of water into the sea with the tritium concentration exceeds 1,500Bq/L, by setting the condition where the tritium concentration after dilution by seawater is 1,500Bq/L as the upper limit of the flow rate of ALPS treated water, and activating an alarm and closing the emergency isolation valve when it reaches the upper limit.

・Formula for calculating the flow rate of ALPS treated water (upper limit)

$$\text{ALPS treated water flow rate (upper limit)} = \frac{\text{seawater flow rate} \times \text{tritium concentration after dilution of seawater (1, 500Bq/L)}}{\text{tritium concentration of ALPS treated water} - \text{tritium concentration after dilution of seawater (1, 500Bq/L)}}$$

The Japanese version shall prevail.

2.3 Detecting Abnormalities and Halting the Discharge of ALPS Treated Water into the Sea

In preparation for an event that may lead to "Unintentional discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea," emergency isolation valves are installed in the transfer facility, and when it is judged that the facility will deviate from the normal operating state, the valves are closed by interlock, and the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea is halted by the operator as required.

(1) Interlocks

When the following conditions are met, the emergency isolation valves are operated to halt the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea.

a. Discharge of ALPS treated water shall be done after setting the flow rate of seawater and the transfer rate of ALPS treated water in the dilution facility, but an interlock for closing the emergency isolation valves shall be provided in case the prescribed flow rate of seawater cannot be secured or exceeds the prescribed ALPS treated water transfer rate.

b. Provide an interlock for closing the emergency isolation valve, in case an abnormality is detected by the radiation monitor※ installed in ALPS treated water transfer line.

※: In the measurement/confirmation facility, the sum of ratios to regulatory concentration limit of radionuclides (other than tritium) shall be confirmed to be less than 1. However, a radiation monitor shall be installed in the transfer facility for case of an abnormality.

(2) Shutdown by operator operation

When an event such as a natural phenomenon that may affect the ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facilities occurs, when an abnormal value is detected in the sea area monitoring, or when the shift supervisor confirms it necessary, the discharge of ALPS treated water to the sea is manually halted.

(3) Configuration of the Components

To ensure reliable operation of the emergency isolation valves, two valves shall be arranged in series to the transfer path of ALPS treated water. The emergency isolation valves arranged in series are provided with a stand-by system arranged in parallel each so that the components will not be inoperable for a long time due to a failure.

(4) Arrangement

Emergency isolation valves shall be located so that ALPS treated water can be stopped discharging promptly when the abovementioned interlocks are activated. Namely, the emergency isolation valves are arranged doubly in series, the emergency isolation valves-2 at downstream side shall be provided in front of the seawater pipe headers to minimize the volume of discharge of ALPS treated water until the valve closed. In addition, the emergency isolation valve-1 at upstream side shall be provided

in the seawall in consideration of the possibility of components damage caused by tsunami.

2.4 Prevention of leakage and spread of radioactive materials.

(1) Leakage prevention

a. The circulation pumps and ALPS treated water transfer pumps shall use materials with excellent corrosion resistance such as duplex stainless steel, and the shaft seal shall adopt a mechanical seal that is resistant to leakage.

b. Transfer pipes for ALPS treated water are manufactured by corrosion resistant polyethylene pipes, pressure resistant hoses, carbon steel pipes with sufficient thickness or stainless steel pipes are used. The inner surfaces of the carbon steel pipes for main lines are coated with the corrosion resistance. In addition, the parts requiring flexibility shall be rubber expansion joints having corrosion resistance.

c. Of the transfer pipes laid outdoors, the joints of polyethylene pipes and polyethylene pipes shall be fusion-spliced to prevent leakage.

(2) Leakage detection and prevention of leakage expansion

a. For circulation pumps, ALPS treated water transfer pumps, and emergency isolation valves, etc., the following measures shall be taken.

- To detect leaks as soon as possible and prevent the spread of leaks, weirs shall be provided around the components, and leak detectors shall be installed inside the weirs. In addition, during facility operation, operator walk-down inspections will be conducted to detect leaks at an early stage.
- Alarms for leak detection shall be displayed in the Seismic Isolation Building Centralized Monitoring Room so that operators can monitor the status of operational monitoring parameters such as flow rate and take appropriate measures such as pump operation or shutdown.

b. ALPS treated water transfer pipes, etc., shall take the following measures.

- Regarding transfer pipes laid outdoors, weirs or steel covers are installed at locations where flange connections such as interconnection between steel pipes or between polyethylene pipes and steel pipes to prevent leakage from spreading.
- Even in a leak event to avoid release of radioactive materials into the environment through drainage channels, isolate the transfer pipe from the channels as much as possible. In addition, the polyethylene pipes used for the transfer pipe shall be constructed to prevent the leak from spreading by attaching an exterior pipe (joints are with waterproof covers) on the outside of the pipes.
- Early detection of leakage from transfer pipe shall be secured by operator walk-down inspection during operation.
- A steel cover shall be installed around a vent valve installed in the transfer pipe, and a leak detector

shall be installed at each flange. Alarms for leak detection shall be displayed in the Seismic Isolation Building Centralized Monitoring Room, and the status of operational monitoring parameters such as flow rate shall be monitored by operators so that appropriate measures such as pump operation and shutdown can be taken.

2.5 Exposure reduction

As ALPS treated water contains radionuclides other than tritium as less than 1 of the sum of ratios to regulatory concentration limit, even if it is stored in a tank with a capacity of 1,000 m^3 each, the air dose equivalent rate of the tank area by this as a radiation source is evaluated to be 1μSv/h or less at most, so that the shielding function need not be considered in designing the components, etc.

3. Radiation protection, etc., around the premises by controlling the release of radioactive materials, etc.

The dose assessment of radioactive liquid waste by ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities by the drainage is as described in “III Part 3, 2.2.3 Dose assessment by radioactive liquid waste etc.”

4. Control of Exposure Doses of Workers, etc.

The control of the exposure dose of workers to the ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and the related facility, shall be in accordance with the management of the exposure dose of workers entire the power plant (See “II 1.12 Control of Exposure Doses of Workers, etc.”) along with others.

5. Emergency measures

Emergency measures for ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and the related facility shall be in accordance with the emergency measures for the entire power plant. (See “II 1.13 Emergency Measures.”)

6. Design consideration

6.1 Compliant Criteria and Standards

Since the structures, systems and components constituting ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and the related facility are regarded as equivalent to waste processing facilities, etc. in the "NRA Ordinance Prescribing Technical Standards for Commercial Power Reactors and their Auxiliary Facilities," in consideration of the importance of safety functions that they should perform, the provisions of Class 3 components of the Nuclear Facility Standard Design and Construction Standard (JSME S NC1) shall apply to containers and steel pipes containing ALPS treated water in their design, selection, manufacture and inspection of materials, and domestic and overseas private standards such as Japanese Industrial Standards (JIS), (Public Corporation) Civil Engineering Society, etc. shall also

apply to components, etc. other than these, as required. In addition, the Japanese Industrial Standard (JIS) fiscal year designation of materials specified in JSME Standard may not be considered from the viewpoint of material procurability in the scope of technical validity.

Specific specifications and standards are as follows.

- JIS G 3454 Carbon steel pipes and tubes for pressurized pipes
- JIS G 3457 Arc-welded carbon steel pipes for pipes
- JIS G 3459 Stainless steel pipes for pipes
- JIS G 3468 Welded large diameter stainless steel pipes for pipes
- JWWA K 144 Polyethylene pipes for water distribution
- Concrete Standard Specification (Design Edition; established in 2017) (PIIA) Japan Society of Civil Engineers
- Concrete Standard Specification (Design Edition; established in 2012) (PIIA) Japan Society of Civil Engineers
- Concrete Standard Specification (Structural Performance Check Edition; established in 2002) (PIIA) Japan Society of Civil Engineers
- Road Bridge Specifications/Explanation I Common Edition 2012 (PIIA) Japan Road Association
- Road Bridge Specification/Explanation IV Substructure Edition 2012 (PIIA) Japan Road Association
- Road Bridge Specification and Explanation V Seismic Design Edition 2012 (PIIA) Japan Road Association
- Utility Conduit Design Guidelines 1986 (PIIA) Japan Road Association
- Hydraulic Formula Collection 2018 (PIIA) Japan Society of Civil Engineers
- Precast Rainwater Underground Storage Facility Technical Manual (revised edition; 2020) (PIIF) Japan Institute of Wastewater Engineering and Technology
- Design and Construction Guidelines for Reinforced Concrete Using Epoxy Resin Painted Reinforcement (Revised Edition; 2013) (PIIA) Japan Society of Civil Engineers
- Design of Civil Engineering Structures at Thermal and Nuclear Power Stations (Additional and Revised Edition) (Foundation) Electric Power Civil Engineering Society
- Tunnel Standard Specification [Common Edition] • Explanation/ [Shield Method Edition] • Explanation (established in 2016) (PIIA) Japan Society of Civil Engineers
- Tunnel Standard Specification [Open Cutting Method]/Explanation (established in 2016) (PIIA) Society of Civil Engineers
- Technical Standards and Explanations of Port Facilities 2018 (PIIA) Japan Port and Harbor Association
- Handbook for design of tunnel lining structure with internal water pressure (established in 1999) (PIIF) Advanced Construction Technology Center

The Japanese version shall prevail.

- Standard Segment for Shield Method, jointly edited by Japan Society of Civil Engineers and Japan Institute of Wastewater Engineering and Technology (established in 2001)
- Documents of Public Works Research Institute, Method/Guideline for Seismic Design of Large-scale Underground Structures (Draft) – March, 1992, Seismic Research Institute, Aseismatic and Disaster Prevention Department, Public Works Research Institute, Construction Ministry
- Guideline and Exposition of Aseismatic Measures for Wastewater Facilities – 2014 Edition, (PIIA) Japan Institute for Wastewater Engineering and Technology
- Examples of Aseismatic Calculation for Wastewater Facilities Treatment Facility and Pump Yard Edition – 2015 Edition, (PIIA) Japan Institute for Wastewater Engineering and Technology
- Examples of Aseismatic Calculation for Wastewater Facilities Piping Facility Edition – 2015 Edition, (PIIA) Japan Institute for Wastewater Engineering and Technology

6.2 Design considerations against natural phenomena

(1) Design considerations against earthquakes

Design considerations against the seismic behavior of ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facility are described in "Attachment-3 Description on structural strength and seismic resistance of ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities" and "Attachment-5 Description on Design of Discharge Vertical Shaft (upper-stream storage) and Discharge Facility."

(2) Design considerations against natural phenomena (tsunamis, heavy rainfall, typhoons, tornadoes, etc.) that are assumed other than earthquakes

Design considerations against non-seismic natural phenomena for ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and associated facility are as follows.

a. Tsunami

Of the ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities, the facility for measurement/ confirmation and a part of the transfer facility, excluding the dilution facility, shall be installed at locations higher than approximately T.P. 33.5m or more where tsunamis are considered not to reach.

In addition, when warning such as tsunami warnings is issued, the transfer facility and dilution facility shall be designed so that operators can manually shut down from the seismic isolation building centralized monitoring room in consideration of possible damage of components by tsunami.

Incidentally, the emergency isolation valve-1 will be installed inside the Japan Trench Tsunami Breakwater, which will be installed in the area of T.P. about 11.5m, from the viewpoint of mitigating the impact of tsunamis.

As flooding against tsunamis is unavoidable, the water discharge facility shall be designed to have wave pressure resistance according to the restorability.

b. Heavy rainfall

Among ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities, electric components such as circulation pumps, ALPS treated water transfer pumps and control panels shall be installed indoors that are less susceptible to heavy rains.

c. Deposited Snow

The multi-nuclide transfer facility building and the electrical component building east side of Units 5 and 6 shall be designed against snow load based on the Building Standards Act Enforcement Order and the Building Standards Act Enforcement Rules of Fukushima Prefecture to prevent damage to the components due to snow cover.

d. Lightning Strike

Among the ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities, the multi-nuclide transfer facility buildings and the electric facilities installed in the electrical component buildings east side of Units 5 and 6 shall be designed to prevent damage from lightning strikes by grounding.

e. Typhoons (strong winds, storm surges)

Among the ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities, circulation pumps and ALPS treated water transfer pumps will be installed in the multi-nuclide transfer facility building, which is less possible to be damaged by typhoons (strong winds). In addition, in the case of components such as transfer pipes installed outdoors, a design shall be made so that they will not fall over by fixation measures such as foundation bolts.

For the design of the discharge shaft (upper-stream storage) and the discharge facility the effects of rising sea levels due to typhoons (storm surges) shall be considered, and the design allows the operator to manually halt the discharge into the sea from the seismic isolation building central monitoring room because there is a risk that it cannot be released to the sea 1km away from the coast if a storm surge warning is issued.

f. Tornado

The ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities shall be designed so that the operator can manually shut down the facility remotely from the central monitoring room of the Seismic Isolation Building, considering the possibility of damage to the facility due to the tornado if a hazardous wind watch is issued.

g. Freezing

For the ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities, when the transfer of water is stopped, there

is a concern that the outdoor polyethylene pipe is broken by freezing. Therefore, heat insulating material is placed to the polyethylene pipe laid outdoors to prevent freezing.
Incidentally, the heat insulating material shall be hard polyurethane or others with high air tightness and heat insulation, and enough thickness that does not freeze be ensured.

h. Ultraviolet ray

Polyethylene tubes laid at outdoor among ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities are fitted with a heat insulating material to which carbon black, which is effective in preventing degradation of ultraviolet rays, is added to prevent degradation due to ultraviolet rays. Alternatively, when a heat insulating material without carbon black added is used, a coating material to which carbon black is added or a material which is hardly deteriorated by ultraviolet rays (such as a steel plate) is attached.

i. High temperature

Polyethylene used as a material for ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities is sufficiently unlikely to degrade the material due to heat because the temperature of ALPS treated water is at almost ordinary temperature.

j. Biological events

For the ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities, intrusion of marine organisms (e.g. jelly fish) as well as intrusion of small animals through penetrations of the building and so on are assumed. However, the former is designed to prevent intrusion by the breakwaters in the northern side and the partition dike installed in the southern side of water intake canal of units 5 and 6, and the latter is designed to prevent intrusion by applying sealing materials to the penetrations of the building and the openings of the electric channel, etc.

k. Others

The ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities shall be designed so that the operator can manually shut down the facilities remotely from the central monitoring room of the Seismic Isolation Building if there is a risk of damage to the facilities due to volcanoes, forest fires, etc. in addition to the natural phenomena mentioned above.

6.3 Design considerations against external anthropogenic events

As for consideration on major external anthropogenic events against ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities, the design considerations for external anthropogenic events throughout the plant shall be followed. (Refer to “II 1.14 Design Considerations”).
The following external anthropogenic events are also considered in the design, since the operation of

the discharge into the sea is carried out through telecommunication line.

(1) Electromagnetic interferences

The ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities shall be designed to be unaffected by disturbances due to electromagnetic interferences by installing line filters and insulation circuits in the power supply receiving section that enters the control panel, installing line filters and insulated circuits in the signal input/output section from outside, and applying optical cables in the communication line.

(2) Unauthorized access (including cyberterrorism)

To prevent unauthorized access (including cyberterrorism) acts, the system shall be designed to block all the unauthorized access from outside so that oversight and control devices related to the operation of the ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities will not be subject to unauthorized access (including cyberterrorism) through telecommunications lines.

6.4 Design considerations against fires

ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and the related facility shall be designed to prevent the occurrence of fires, to detect and extinguish fires, and to reduce the consequences of fires without compromising the safety of the facilities by taking the after-mentioned measures. Incidentally, the vertical discharge shaft (upper-stream storage) and the discharge facility are made of reinforced concrete structure, and the risk of fire is very low.

- To prevent the occurrence of fires and to reduce the consequences of fires, not only using non-flammable or flame-retardant materials as much as possible※, but combustibles shall be eliminated as much as possible around the facilities. And components always required two series of operations at the time of ocean discharge shall be installed distant as much as possible between the components for ensuring that the functions of each component will not be impaired at the same time by the fire.
- For this facility, operator walk-down inspections shall be conducted for the earlier detection of fires. Also, the components installed indoors, like circulation pumps, ALPS treated water transfer pumps and areas around electric appliances, are designed to detect fires with fire detectors. In addition, fire extinguishers will be installed near each facility to enable initial fire extinguishing and to facilitate fire extinguishing activities. Furthermore, guidance signs for evacuation will be installed in the multi-nuclide transfer facility building and the east electrical component building of Units 5 and 6.

※: Including wrapping of flammable materials used in parts of pipe with non-flammable or flame-retardant materials.

6.5 Design considerations for environmental conditions

Design considerations on the materials used in the ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and

the related facility for environmental conditions are as follows:

(1) Pressure and temperature

Components with appropriate maximum allowable working pressure and maximum allowable working temperature based on the pressure and temperature assumed in normal operation and in the event of an abnormal event shall be selected for the ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities.

(2) Considerations against Corrosion

Among ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities, for components used to store or to pass ALPS treated water, duplex stainless steel with excellent corrosion resistance, stainless steel with corrosion resistance, polyethylene, synthetic rubber or carbon steel with sufficient wall thickness along with others shall be used. In addition, for components used to store or to pass seawater, duplex stainless steel with excellent corrosion resistance, carbon steel with corrosion-resistant paint along with others shall be used.

(3) Radiation

For polyethylene, etc., used as a material for the ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities, after evaluating a period in which there is no significant change in material properties due to radiation, replacement, etc. shall be performed beforehand when it is used beyond the said period.

(4) Cracks and salt damage

The discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) and the water discharge facility are inspected for crack width and salt damage occurring in the reinforced concrete structure, and appropriate reinforcement covering is set to confirm that durability during the service period is ensured.

6.6 Design considerations for operator operation

Design considerations for operation by operators of the ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities are as follows:

(1) Monitoring and operating terminals, etc. that aggregate the information required for the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea shall be designed to prevent operator’s misoperation and be easily operated by providing indications uniformity (identification by visual elements such as color and shape) in the status indication and operating methods of components.

(2) To prevent misoperation and misjudgment, double action for important operations such as discharge/transfer and process shutdown shall be required by design. Incidentally, the operation related to the release permission shall be designed to require operation with a key switch in addition to the double action.

The Japanese version shall prevail.

(3) When the results of tritium analysis confirmed in the measurement/confirmation process are registered in the monitoring/control device, a design shall be made to prevent manual calculation and transcription errors by conducting mechanical readings such as scanners. In addition, if the tritium concentration after dilution of seawater fails to satisfy 1,500Bq/L according to the tritium concentration registered in the monitoring/control device and the flow rate of the seawater transfer pumps during operation, the drainage concentration less than 1,500Bq/L shall be designed to satisfy by providing an interlock that does not proceed to the next process.

(4) For the case that an appropriate tank group is not selected from the three tank groups for measurement/confirmation in the process of receiving, measuring, confirming, and discharging ALPS treated water, an interlock will not be provided for the next process so that ALPS treated water prior to measurement and confirming will not be released.

(5) In ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities, emergency isolation valves with a function to shut off discharge into the sea shall be installed for the event that an abnormality that deviates from normal operation is detected, and an interlock for closing the valves shall be provided to enable immediate shutdown of discharge into the sea without manual operation by operators.

6.7 Design considerations for reliability

Design considerations for the reliability of the ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities are as follows:

- The measurement/confirmation tanks are composed of three tank groups, and valves which serve as a boundary between the tank groups are made to be a series duplex in order to prevent mixing water between tank groups.
- For ALPS treated water flowmeter, the differential pressure transmitter and transmission system shall be duplicated so that it enables to confirm whether or not the mixed dilution of ALPS treated water into seawater is carried out within the set value.
- Motor driven emergency isolation valve-1 and an air-actuated emergency isolation valve-2 shall be equipped, which enable to provide multiplicity with respect to the shut-off mechanism and diversity with respect to the driving power source, as well as a fail-closed design is in place to ensure that discharge can be halted in case a loss of external power supply or the like.

6.8 Design considerations for testability

Design considerations for the testability of ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and the associated facility are given in “Attachment-7 Items for consideration on testability.”

The Japanese version shall prevail.

7. Appendix

Appendix-1 Description for Mixing/Dilution Ratio of ALPS Treated Water

End

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Appendix-1

Description for Mixing/Dilution Ratio of ALPS Treated Water

Regarding mixing/dilution of ALPS treated water, ALPS treated water at the flow rate of 500 m^3 per day at maximum will be diluted 100 times or more with seawater, and the result of confirming this mixing/dilution behavior is described.

1. Analytical codes and conditions

For the mixing/dilution behavior, the dilution effect assumed in the analytical model shown in Figure-1 was evaluated using the analytical codes and conditions in Table-1.

Table-1 List of analytical codes and conditions

Condition		Contents
1. Analytical code and analytical model		
(1)	Analytical code	STAR-CCM+ (ver.11)
(2)	Basic formula	Incompressible mass conservation formula, momentum conservation formula (The Reynolds-averaged Navier–Stokes equations (RANS equations)
(3)	Turbulent flow model	Realizable k-ε Model
(4)	Handling of the vicinity of the wall surface	Wall function model
(5)	Discretization method	Finite volume method
(6)	Mass advection and diffusion model	Chemical species advection diffusion model
2. Boundary conditions		
(1)	Dilution seawater inlet	170,000 m^3/day, the number of seawater piping inlets in operation: 2
(2)	ALPS treated water inlet	500 m^3/day
(3)	Seawater pipe outlet	Pressure boundary (atmospheric pressure)
3.Fluid property		
(1)	Temperature	20ºC
(2)	Seawater	Density: 1025 kg/m^3, Viscosity: 1.080 x 10^{-3} Pa · s
(3)	ALPS treated water	Density: 998.2 kg/m^3, Viscosity: 1.002 x 10^{-3} Pa · s

The Japanese version shall prevail.

In the mixing/dilution analysis of ALPS treated water, a turbulent flow model needs to be applied, and the Reynolds-averaged Navier–Stokes equations (RANS equations), which is general in Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD), was adopted as a basic formula.
For a turbulent flow model in the RANS equations, eddy viscosity model that has been used in many CFD analyses is used, among which, the turbulent flow model of the k-ε system, which has been used in many cases, was adopted.
In the analysis, the turbulent diffusion behavior governed by the experimentally determined turbulent diffusion coefficient (turbulent Schmidt number) has a large effect on the concentration of injected pure water.
For this reason, the turbulent Schmidt number, which is close to the upper limit, was set based on the literature[*1, *2 and *3] surveys so that the turbulent diffusion becomes small (the local concentration of injected pure water becomes high) to implement analysis.
Density and viscosity of ALPS treated water (pure water) and seawater were set based on the following:

(Density): Pure water, Japan Society of Mechanical Engineers, vapor table (1999) CD-ROM version
Seawater, equation of state of seawater UNESCO (1981)

(Viscosity): Pure water, Japan Society of Mechanical Engineers, Vapor table (1999) CD-ROM version
Seawater: Nakamura, Standard Symbols for Ship Hydrodynamics and Water Density, Kinematic Viscosity Coefficient, Shipbuilding Association Journal No. 429 (1965).

*1: Gualtieri, G., et al., Fluids, 2, 17 (2017)
*2: Tominaga, Y., et al, Atmospheric Environment, 42, 37 (2007)
*3: Flesch, T, K., et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology, 111 (2002)



Figure-1 Analytical shape model (1/2)

The Japanese version shall prevail.



Figure-1 Analytical shape model (2/2)

The Japanese version shall prevail.

2. Results of mixing/dilution in the seawater piping

The analytical results for mixing/dilution in the seawater piping are shown in Figures-2 to 6 and Table-2.

Two out of the three seawater pipes are in operation at rated flow rates respectively.



Figure-2 Calculation results of mixing/dilution in the seawater pipe

In Figure-2, it was confirmed that the injected water (ALPS treated water) put into the seawater piping header from the ALPS treated water transfer piping was mixed with surrounding seawater while flowing down in the seawater piping.

To see the analysis results in more detail, the section to be evaluated was set in the transverse direction of seawater pipe as shown in Figure-3, and the mass concentration of injected water (ALPS treated water) in each section to be assessed was evaluated (see Figure-4 and 5.)

The Japanese version shall prevail.



Figure-3 Location and name of sections to be evaluated



Figure-4 Mass distribution of sections to be evaluated

The Japanese version shall prevail.



Figure-5 Calculation results of mixed dilution in seawater pipe

The maximum values of mass concentration in each section to be assessed in the Figure-5 are shown in Table-2, and the shift in each value is shown in Figure-6.

Table-2 Maximum concentration of injected water at the section

Name	Maximum concentration value at the section (%)
00: Treated water injection location	100
01: Header throttle inlet	14.26
02: Header throttle outlet	4.16
03: Down elbow inlet	1.79
04: Down elbow outlet	0.90
05: Horizontal elbow inlet	0.84
06: Horizontal elbow outlet	0.71
07: Middle of the lower horizontal part of seawater pipe	0.46
08:Riser elbow inlet	0.37
09: Riser elbow outlet	0.33
10: Middle of the rise part of seawater pipe	0.30
11: End of the rise of seawater pipe	0.28



Figure-6 Transition in mass concentration of injected water

Based on this result, it was concluded that the injected water was diluted by 100/0.280 ≒ 357 times even in the maximum concentration part of the seawater piping heading to the discharge shaft (upper-stream storage), and it was confirmed that the dilution effect of over 100 times that is the target of this facility was obtained at the 04: Down elbow outlet.

It was also confirmed that the maximum concentration at the furthest down-stream of the section to be assessed, 11: end of the rise of seawater pipe, was 0.28%, which was 2 times of the theoretical average value of 0.14%.

3. Summary

The behavior of mixing/dilution of ALPS treated water inside the seawater piping was checked using CFD analysis. As the result, even in the maximum value of 500 m^3/day of the ALPS treated water flow rate, though it remained at about 2 times of the average value at the maximum concentration part of the piping terminal part, it was confirmed that the dilution effect over 100 times could be obtained in the seawater piping.

End

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Attachment-3

Description on structural strength and seismic resistance of ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities

Structural strength and seismic resistance shall be assessed for components constituting ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities in accordance with the basic policy for assessment on structural strength and seismic resistance.

1. Basic Policy

1.1 Basic policy for structural strength assessment

Since the structures, systems and components constituting ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities are positioned as equivalent to waste treatment facilities, etc. in the "Ordinance on Technical Standards for Commercial Power Reactors and their auxiliary facilities", the containers and steel pipes containing ALPS treated water shall be evaluated by applying the provisions of Class 3 component of the Nuclear Facility Standard Design and Construction Standard (JSME S NC1) for Power Generation, considering the importance of safety functions that they should fulfil in their design, selection, manufacture and inspection. Incidentally, steel pipes containing only seawater are also evaluated according to Class 3 component.

Polyethylene pipes conforming to ISO standards or JWWA standards shall be evaluated as having structural strength by the use under the applicable conditions. In addition, pressure-resistant hoses and expansion joints are evaluated to have structural strength at pressure and temperature when used within the manufacturer's specifications. The environmental conditions (maximum working temperature and maximum working pressure) of polyethylene pipes, pressure-resistant hoses, and expansion joints in ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities are as follows, and pipes shall be selected that satisfy these conditions.

Table-1 Environment condition of polyethylene pipes, pressure resistant hoses and expansion joints

Type of pipes	Sections used	Max. working pressure (MPa)	Max. working temperature (ºC)
Polyethylene pipes	Receiving pipes	0.98	40
	Circulation pipes	0.49/0.98	40
	Transfer pipes	0.49/0.60/0.98	40
Pressure resistant hoses	Receiving pipes	0.98	40
	Circulation pipes	0.49	40
	Transfer pipes	0.49	40
Expansion joints	Receiving pipes	0.49/0.98	40
	Circulation pipes	0.49/0.60/0.98	40
	Transfer pipes	0.60	40

The Japanese version shall prevail.

1.2 Basic policy for seismic resistance

ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities are positioned as seismic class C, based on the concept of seismic design presented by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority on September 8, 2021, because the effective dose in case its safety function is lost is evaluated to be less than 1μSv, even if the external exposure dose from direct and skyshine radiation is combined with the internal exposure dose when the leaked ALPS treated water partially evaporates and transfers into the atmosphere.

The ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and the related facility shall ensure the required strength against the seismic motion required for the seismic class C facilities. In evaluating seismic resistance, as shown in Table-2, in principle, 1.0Ci for structures (including indirect supporting structures) and 1.2Ci horizontally designed seismic intensity for components shall be applied. In addition, in evaluating the seismic resistance of major components and steel pipes, structural strength assessment shall be conducted in accordance with the Technical Codes for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Stations (JEAC4601) along with others, but evaluation methods and evaluation standards shall be adopted in accordance with the actual conditions. Pressure-resistant hoses, polyethylene pipes, etc., used in ALPS treatment water dilution/discharge facilities shall be seismic-resistant by the flexibility of materials.

Table-2 Seismic Class Classification by Component Criticality

Component \ Seismic class	C
(1) Measurement/Confirmation Facility	Measurement/Confirmation tanks Peripheral weir ※1 of the base Circulation pump Main Pipe ※2
(2) Transfer Facility	ALPS treated water transfer pumps Main Pipe ※2
(3) Dilution Facility	Sea water transfer pump Seawater pipe header Main Pipe ※2 Discharge Vertical Shaft (upper-stream storage) ※3
(4) Discharge Facility※3	Discharge Vertical Shaft (downs-stream storage) Discharge tunnel Discharge outlet

※1: Assessment on horizontal design seismic intensity required for class B structures

※2: Support intervals evaluated by the constant pitch span method for steel pipes (including valves)

※3: For details, refer to Attachment-5 Description on Design of Discharge Vertical Shaft (upper-stream storage) and Discharge Facility

The Japanese version shall prevail.

2. Method and result of structural strength assessment

2.1 Main pipe (steel pipe excluding seawater pipe header)

The structural assessment points are shown in Figures-1 to 5.



Figure-1 Schematic diagram of pipe (1/5)
(Measurement/Confirmation Facility)

The Japanese version shall prevail.



Figure-2 Schematic diagram of pipe (2/5)
(Measurement/Confirmation Facility)



Figure-3 Schematic diagram of pipe (3/5)
(Measurement/Confirmation Facility)

The Japanese version shall prevail.



Figure-4 Schematic diagram of piping (4/5)

(Transfer Facility)

The Japanese version shall prevail.



<Specification of pipes from seawater transfer pumps to seawater pipe header>

	Nominal diameter	Material
Pipe a	800A	STPY400
Pipe b	900A	STPY400
Pipe c	900A	SUS329J4L

Figure-5 Schematic diagram of piping (5/5)
(Transfer Facility, Dilution Facility)

2.2 Evaluation method

It is ensured that the minimum thickness of the steel pipe satisfies the required thickness determined by Formula (PPD-1.3) of the Design and Construction Standard PPD-3411 or Table PPD-3411-1 of the Design and Construction Standard PPD-3411 (3).

The required thickness of the pipe shall be a larger one in the values listed below.

a. A pipe under pressure on its inner surface

Pipe thickness required for calculation: $t = \frac{PD_0}{2S\eta+0.8P}$

P : Maximum working pressure (MPa)

D_0 : Outer diameter of the pipe (mm)

S : Allowable tensile stress of the material at maximum working temperature (MPa)

η : Efficiency of the longitudinal joint

b. Minimum thickness required by design and construction standards for carbon steel pipes: t_r

Values obtained from Table PPD-3411-1 of Design and Construction Standard PPD-3411 (3).

2.3 Evaluation results

Evaluation results are given in Table-3. It is assessed that these satisfy the required thickness and have sufficient structural strength.

Table-3 Assessment results of structural strength of main pipe

(steel pipes excluding seawater piping header)

Evaluated components	Outer diameter (mm)	Material	Maximum working pressure (MPa)	Maximum working temperature (°C)	Required thickness (mm)	Minimum thickness (mm)
Pipe (1)	114.3	SUS316LTP	0.98	40	0.48	3.50
Pipe (2)	216.3	SUS316LTP	0.49	40	0.46	5.68
Pipe (3)	139.8	SUS316LTP	0.98	40	0.59	4.37
Pipe (4)	165.2	SUS316LTP	0.98	40	0.69	4.37
Pipe (5)	216.3	SUS316LTP	0.98	40	0.91	5.68
Pipe (6)	165.2	SUS316LTP	0.49	40	0.35	4.37
Pipe (7)	89.1	SUS316LTP	0.49	40	0.19	3.50
Pipe (8)	48.6	SUS316LTP	0.98	40	0.21	2.50
Pipe (9)	114.3	SUS316LTP	0.60	40	0.30	3.50
Pipe (10)	1828.8	SM400B	0.60	40	9.11	14.20

3. Main pipe (seawater piping header)

The structural strength evaluation locations are shown in Figure-6.



Figure-6 Structural strength evaluation locations for seawater piping header

3.1 Straight pipes

3.1.1 Structural strength evaluation method

It is ensured that the minimum thickness of the steel pipe satisfies the required thickness determined by formula (PPD-1.3) of the Design and Construction Standard PPD-3411 or the Table PPD-3411-1 of Design and Construction Standard PPD-3411 (3).

The required thickness of the pipe shall be a larger one in the values listed below.

a. A pipe under pressure on its inner surface

The thickness required for the pipe calculation: $t = \frac{PD_0}{2S\eta+0.8P}$

P : Maximum working pressure (MPa)

D_0 : Pipe outer diameter (mm)

S : Allowable tensile stress of materials at the maximum working temperature (MPa)

η : Efficiency of longitudinal joint

b. Minimum required thickness by design and construction standards for carbon steel pipes: t_r

Values determined from Table PPD-3411-1 of the design and construction standard PPD-3411 (3)

3.1.2 Structural strength evaluation result

The evaluation result is shown in Table-4. It is evaluated that the pipe satisfies the required thickness and has sufficient structural strength.

Table-4 Structural strength evaluation result for the straight pipe of the seawater piping header

Evaluated part	Outer diameter (mm)	Material	Maximum working pressure (MPa)	Maximum working temperature (°C)	Required thickness (mm)	Minimum thickness (mm)
(1) Main pipe	2235.2	SM400B	0.60	40	11.14	14.20
(2) Outlet pipe	1828.8	SM400B	0.60	40	9.11	14.20
(3) Seawater nozzle pipe	914.4	SM400B	0.60	40	4.56	14.20
(4) ALPS treated water injection pipe	114.3	STPG370	0.60	40	3.40	5.25
(5) Vent pipe	114.3	STPG370	0.60	40	3.40	5.25
(6) Drain tube	114.3	STPG370	0.60	40	3.40	5.25
(7) Maintenance hole for inspection	609.6	SM400B	0.60	40	3.80	14.20

3.2 Reducer

3.2.1 Structural evaluation method

It is ensured that the minimum thickness of the reducer satisfies the required thickness as determined by formulas (PPD-1.8 and PPD-1.9) of Design and Construction Standard PPD-3415.1.

The required thickness of the pipe shall be a larger one in the values listed below.

a. Cone part

$$\text{The thickness required for calculation: } t = \frac{PD_i}{2cos\theta(S\eta - 0.6P)}$$

P : Maximum working pressure (MPa)

D_i : The inner diameter of the section perpendicular to the shaft of the conical part connecting to the rounded part of the hem (mm)

θ : 1/2 of the apex angle of the cone (degrees)

S : Allowable tensile stress of the materials at the maximum working temperature (MPa)

η : Efficiency of longitudinal joint

b. The rounded part of its roundness

$$\text{The thickness required for calculation: } t = \frac{PD_iW}{4cos\theta(S\eta - 0.1P)}$$

$$\text{Where, } W = \frac{1}{4}\left(3 + \sqrt{\frac{D_i}{2rcos\theta}}\right)$$

D_i : The inner diameter of the section perpendicular to the shaft of the conical part connecting to the rounded part of the hem (mm)

θ : 1/2 of the apex angle of the cone (degrees)

S : Allowable tensile stress of the materials at the maximum working temperature (MPa)

η : Efficiency of longitudinal joint

r : The inner radius of the bottom part of its roundedness (mm)

3.2.2 Structural strength evaluation result

The evaluation result is shown in Table-5. It is evaluated that the pipe satisfies the required thickness and has sufficient structural strength.

Table-5 Structural strength evaluation result for reducers

Evaluated component	Evaluation part	Material	Maximum working pressure (MPa)	Maximum working temperature (°C)	Required thickness (mm)	Minimum thickness (mm)
Seawater pipe header	Reducer	SM400B	0.60	40	6.77	14.20

3.3 End plate

The end plate of the seawater piping header is saucer-shaped based on the condition of Design and Construction Standard PPD-3415.2 (1).

3.3.1 Structural strength evaluation

It is ensured that the minimum thickness of the end plate of the seawater piping header satisfies the required thickness determined by formula (PPD-1.12) of Design and Construction Standard PPD-3415.2.

The thickness required for the end plate shall be as follows.

The thickness required for calculation: $t = \frac{PRW}{2S\eta - 0.2P}$

Where, $W = \frac{1}{4}\left(3 + \sqrt{\frac{R}{r}}\right)$

P : Maximum working pressure (MPa)

R : Inner radius of the center of the end plate (mm)

S : Allowable tensile stress of the materials at the maximum working temperature (MPa)

η : Efficiency of longitudinal joint

r : Inner radius of the rounded part at the corner of the saucer-shaped end plate (mm)

3.3.2 Structural strength evaluation result

The evaluation result is shown in Table-6. It is evaluated that the pipe satisfies the required thickness and has sufficient structural strength.

Table-6 Structural strength evaluation result for end plate

Evaluated component	Evaluation Part	Material	Maximum working pressure (MPa)	Maximum working temperature (°C)	Required thickness (mm)	Minimum thickness (mm)
Seawater pipe header	End plate	SM400B	0.60	40	10.19	13.40

The Japanese version shall prevail.

3.4 Hole reinforcement

3.4.1 Structural evaluation method

The necessity of the hole reinforcement provided in the seawater piping header shall be evaluated by the Design and Construction Standard PPD-3422. When the hole reinforcement is required, it is ensured that the necessary area determined by the Design and construction standards PPD-3424 (1) shall be satisfied.

The hole reinforcement of the seawater piping header is not required if either of the hole diameters determined by the Design and Construction Standard PPD-3422 is satisfied.

(1) Hole diameter 64 mm or less and hole diameter of 1/4 or less of pipe inner diameter

(2) Excluding what is listed in item (1), hole diameter is 200 mm or less, and hole diameter is equal to or less than d as determined in Figures PPD-3422-1 and PPD-3422-2

It shall be ensured that the total area effective for reinforcement satisfies the area required for the hole requiring reinforcement.



: Area effective for hole reinforcement (main pipe) A_1

: Area effective for hole reinforcement (branch pipe) A_2

: Area effective for hole reinforcement (weld) A_3

: Area effective for hole reinforcement (stiffener) A_4

: Area required for hole reinforcement A_r

Figure-7 Mounting type of nozzle stub

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Area required for hole reinforcement: $A_r = 1.07 \bullet d \bullet t_{r^3} \bullet (2 - sin\theta)$

d : Hole diameter (mm)

t_{r^3} : Thickness required by the provisions of PPD-3411 (mm)

θ : Intersection angle between branch pipe and main pipe centerlines (degrees)

Total area required for hole reinforcement: $A_0 = A_1 + A_2 + A_3 + A_4$

Effective area of the main pipe for hole reinforcement: $A_1 = (\eta \bullet t_s - F \bullet t_{sr}) \bullet (2 \bullet L_A - d)$

Effective area of the nozzle for hole reinforcement: $A_2 = 2 \bullet (t_n - t_{nr}) \bullet cosec\theta \bullet L_N \bullet \frac{S_n}{S_s}$

Effective area of the fillet for hole reinforcement: $A_3 = (L_1)^2 \bullet sin\theta \bullet \frac{S_e}{S_s}$

Effective area of the stiffener for hole reinforcement: $A_4 = (D_{0e} - D_{0n} \bullet cosec\theta) \bullet t_e \bullet \frac{S_e}{S_S} + (L_2)^2 \bullet \frac{S_e}{S_S}$

η : Efficiency of the joint

t_s : Thickness of main pipe (mm)

t_{sr} : Thickness of main pipe required by calculation (mm)

t_n : Thickness of nozzle stub (mm)

t_{nr} : Thickness of nozzle stub required by calculation (mm)

t_e : Minimum thickness of the stiffener (mm)

L_A : Range effective for reinforcement separated by a straight line parallel to the hole centerline (mm)

L_N : Range effective for reinforcement separated by a line parallel to the main pipe surface (mm)

S_n : Allowable tensile stress of the nozzle stub material at the maximum working temperature (MPa)

S_S : Allowable tensile stress of the main pipe material at the maximum working temperature (MPa)

S_e : Allowable tensile stress of the stiffener material at the maximum working temperature (MPa)

L_1 : The leg length of the fillet part of the nozzle or the narrow-side length of the reinforced nozzle stub (mm)

L_2 : Leg length of the fillet of the stiffener (mm)

D_{0b} : Outer diameter of nozzle stub (mm)

D_{0n} : Outer diameter of the stiffener (mm)

d : Diameter of the hole appearing in the cross section (mm)

θ : Intersection angle between branch pipe and main pipe centerlines (degrees)

F : Values obtained by figure PPD-3424-1

3.4.2 Structural strength evaluation result

The evaluation result is shown in Table-6.

It is evaluated that the total area effective for reinforcement satisfies the necessary area and has sufficient structural strength.

Table-6 Structural strength evaluation result for hole reinforcement

Evaluated component	Evaluation part	Nozzle diameter	Evaluated point	Ar (mm^2)	A_0 (mm^2)
Seawater pipe header	(3) Seawater nozzle pipe	900A	Nozzle stub	6.35×10^3	1.33×10^4
	(4) ALPS treated water injection pipe	100A	Nozzle stub	7.44×10^2	2.47×10^3
	(5) Vent pipe	100A	Nozzle stub	7.44×10^2	2.47×10^3
	(6) Drain pipe	100A	Nozzle stub	7.44×10^2	2.47×10^3
	(7) Maintenance hole for inspection	600A	Nozzle stub	4.17×10^3	8.35×10^3

3.5 Mounting strength of the stiffener

3.5.1 Structural evaluation method

The load to be borne by the welded zone determined by the Design and Construction Standard PPD-3424 (8) shall be evaluated, and it shall be confirmed that the strength of the welded zone is sufficient.

Load to be borne by the weld: $W = d \bullet t_{sr} \bullet S_s - (\eta \bullet t_s - F \bullet t_{sr}) \bullet (2 \bullet L_A - d) \bullet S_s$

d : Diameter of the hole appearing in the cross section (mm)

t_s : Thickness of main pipe (mm)

t_{sr} : The thickness of main pipe required by calculation (mm)

S_s : Allowable tensile stress of the main pipe material at the maximum working temperature (MPa)

η : Efficiency of the joint

F : Value obtained based on the figure PPD-3424-1

L_A : Range effective for reinforcement separated by a straight line parallel to the hole centerline (mm)

2.5.2 Structural strength evaluation result

The evaluation result is shown in Table-8. It is evaluated that the strength of the welded zone is sufficient because the load to be borne by the welded part is zero or less.

Table-8 Structural strength evaluation result for stiffener mounting strength

Evaluated component	Evaluation part	Nozzle diameter	Evaluated locations	W (N)
Seawater pipe header	(3) Seawater nozzle tube	900A	Nozzle stub	-7.26×10^4
	(4) ALPS treated water injection pipe	100A	Nozzle stub	-8.51×10^3
	(5) Vent pipe	100A	Nozzle stub	-8.51×10^3
	(6) Drain pipe	100A	Nozzle stub	-8.51×10^3
	(7) Maintenance hole for inspection	600A	Nozzle stub	-4.76×10^4

4. Concept to classify the seismic resistance classes

The ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities are classified as seismic class C, because its effective dose as a result of evaluating the radiation impact on the public in the event of the loss of its safety function is less than 1μSv, even if the external exposure dose by direct and skyshine ray is combined with the internal exposure dose when the leaked ALPS treated water partially evaporates and transfers into the atmosphere.

4.1 Degree of Radiation Impact on the Public Due to Function Loss

For the tanks for measuring/confirming the diluted release facility of ALPS treated water, a dose assessment was carried out to confirm the radiation impact on the public due to the loss of function. The evaluation conditions, in accordance with the evaluation conditions described in Appendix-12 of Attachment-7 of "II 2.5 Contaminated Water Treatment Facilities, etc.", ※ are to set the analytical results (July 2013) of the ALPS treated water as the radioactive concentration of the water in the tanks.

※: In order to prevent not to receive water, of which the sum of ratios to regulatory concentration limit of radionuclides other than tritium is 1 or more, in the measurement/confirmation tanks, the following design and operational measures shall be taken.

- The pipes used for transfer to the measurement/confirmation tanks is a transfer pipes for ALPS, etc., and there is no possibility that Sr treated water, etc. mixes due to the piping configuration.
- It has been confirmed that the radioactivity concentration in the G1 area tank, which was transferred closest to the facility using transfer pipes for ALPS, etc., has the sum of ratios to regulatory concentration limit of radionuclides* other than tritium of less than 1.
- For the measurement/confirmation tanks of ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities, transfer of water that has been confirmed or evaluated to be less than 1 in the sum of ratios to regulatory concentration limit of radionuclides* other than tritium in a sample tank of ALPS or in a storage tank for ALPS treated water.

*: Seven radionuclides of Cs-134, Cs-137, Sr-90, Co-60, Sb-125, Ru-106, I-129

4.1.1 Exposure assessment due to direct ray/skyshine ray in the leaked water

Assuming that the sliding of the tanks due to the earthquake damaged the connecting pipes or other component(s) and all the storage water in the measurement/confirmation tanks leaked out, in addition to that, the water continued to exist on one large cylinder that has the same volume and height as the tank group, the exposure dose from the direct ray and skyshine ray at the nearest dose assessment point (No. 70) would be less than 1 μSv / year. Therefore, there would be almost no radiation impact on the public.

The Japanese version shall prevail.

4.1.2 Exposure assessment due to vapor transfer of leaked water

It is assumed that the sliding of the tanks due to the earthquake damaged the connecting pipes or other components and the leaked water spread over the entire storable area of the foundation outer barrier of the measurement/confirmation tank, and the vaporized water diffused from the leaked water containing tritium. On the above condition, assuming that it took two weeks to recover the leaked water, the internal exposure dose of tritium ingested by breathing by the residents living at the nearest dose evaluation point (No. 70) would be sufficiently lower than 1 μSv. Therefore, there would be almost no radiation impact on the public.

4.2 Mitigation measure such as immediate responses

The measurement/confirmation tanks of the ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities shall be connected between the tanks by flexible connecting pipes, and the connecting valves shall be normally operated as open. The following measures shall be taken to prevent or mitigate the impacts outside the premises caused by the expansion of leaks, assuming that there is a risk of ALPS treated water leaking from the ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities or a leak due to an earthquake.

- In the event of an earthquake with a seismic intensity of 5-lower or higher, discharge into the sea will be halted by remote control from the seismic isolation building centralized monitoring room. At the same time, the outlet-side motor-operated valves of the measurement/confirmation facility will be closed to check for leaks based on the tank water level. In addition, priority patrols will be made on all facilities, including outdoor ALPS treated water transfer pipes, to check for any abnormalities in the facilities.
- Foundation perimeter weirs shall be installed to prevent the seismic class C tanks along with the other components from being damaged by the earthquake and the stored water from significantly leaking out of the premises. For such weirs, the required strength shall be ensured for the horizontal design seismic intensity required for the class B structures.
- If the storage water leaks and retains inside the foundation perimeter weirs, the leaked water shall be recovered by temporary pump, high-pressure suction vehicles, etc. The recovered leaked water is transferred to a sound tank and building.
- As far as possible, ALPS treated water transfer pipes shall be isolated from the drain channel, and the polyethylene pipes used for the transfer pipes shall be constructed to prevent leakage from spreading by attaching the exterior pipes (joints are waterproof covers) to the exterior of the polyethylene pipes.

Attachment-4

Items to be checked for ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities and Related Facility

Major items to be checked for ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facility are shown in Tables-1 to 7.

Table-1 Items to be checked (circulation pumps, ALPS treated water transfer pumps, agitation equipment, seawater transfer pumps)

Items to be checked	Checking point	Contents of check	Acceptance criteria
Structural strength/ seismic resistance	Appearance check	Check the appearance of each part.	No significant defects.
	Installation check	Check the installation conditions of the components.	Carried out construction and installation in accordance with the Implementation Plan.
	Leakage check※1	Check no leakage from the pressure resistant parts under the working pressure.	No significant leakage from the pressure resistant parts.

※1: Not applicable to the agitation equipment because it is the rotation machinery with propeller wings installed in the water of the measurement/confirmation tanks and there is no leakage point to be confirmed.
For the seawater transfer pumps, it shall be within the scope that can be implemented on site, and the quality records shall be checked as necessary.

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Table-2-1 Items to be checked (main pipes (steel pipes))

Items to be checked	Checking point	Contents of check	Acceptance criteria
Structural strength/ seismic resistance	Materials check	Confirm the record of main materials described in the Implementation Plan.	In accordance with the Implementation Plan.
	Dimensions check	Confirm the record of outer diameter and thickness described in the Implementation Plan.	In accordance with the Implementation Plan.
	Appearance check※1	Check the appearance of each part.	No significant defects.
	Installation check※1	Check the installation conditions of the pipes.	Carrying out construction and installation in accordance with the Implementation Plan.
	Pressure resistance/leakage check※1	After holding for a certain period of time at 1.25 times the maximum working pressure, confirm that the components withstand the pressure and that there is no leakage from the pressure resistant parts.	Withstanding 1.25 times the maximum working pressure with no abnormalities. In addition, no leakage from the pressure resistant parts.

※1: It shall be within the scope that can be implemented on site, and the quality records shall be checked as necessary.

Table-2-2 Items to be checked (main pipes (polyethylene pipes))

Items to be checked	Checking point	Contents of check	Acceptance criteria
Structural strength/ seismic resistance	Materials check	Confirm the record of main materials described in the Implementation Plan.	In accordance with the Implementation Plan.
	Dimensions check	Confirm the record of outer diameter described in the Implementation Plan.	In accordance with the Implementation Plan.
	Appearance check※1	Check the appearance of each part.	No significant defects.
	Installation check※1	Check the installation conditions of the pipes.	Carrying out construction and installation in accordance with the Implementation Plan.
	Pressure resistance/leakage check※1	After holding for a certain period of time at the maximum working pressure, confirm that the components withstand the pressure and that there is no leakage from the pressure resistant parts.	Withstanding the maximum working pressure with no abnormalities. In addition, no leakage from the pressure resistant parts.

※1: It shall be within the scope that can be implemented on site, and the quality records shall be checked as necessary.

Table-2-3 Items to be checked (main pipes (pressure resistant hose))

Items to be checked	Checking point	Contents of check	Acceptance criteria
Structural strength/ seismic resistance	Materials check	Confirm the record of main materials described in the Implementation Plan.	In accordance with the Implementation Plan.
	Dimensions check	Confirm the record of outer diameter described in the Implementation Plan.	In accordance with the Implementation Plan.
	Appearance check※1	Check the appearance of each part.	No significant defects.
	Installation check※1	Check the installation conditions of the pipes.	Carrying out construction and installation in accordance with the Implementation Plan.
	Pressure resistance/leakage check※1	After holding for a certain period of time at 1.25 times the maximum working pressure, confirm that the components withstand the pressure. Additionally, confirm that there is no leakage from the pressure resistant parts.	Withstanding 1.25 times the maximum working pressure with no abnormalities. In addition, no leakage from the pressure resistant parts.

※1: It shall be within the scope that can be implemented on site, and the quality records shall be checked as necessary.

Table-2-4 Items to be checked (main pipes (expansion joint))

Items to be checked	Checking point	Contents of check	Acceptance criteria
Structural strength/ seismic resistance	Materials check	Confirm the record of main materials described in the Implementation Plan.	In accordance with the Implementation Plan.
	Dimensions check	Confirm the record of outer diameter described in the Implementation Plan.	In accordance with the Implementation Plan.
	Appearance check※1	Check the appearance of each part.	No significant defects.
	Installation check※1	Check the installation conditions of the pipes.	Carrying out construction and installation in accordance with the Implementation Plan.
	Pressure resistance/leakage check※1	After holding for a certain period of time at 1.25 times the maximum working pressure, confirm that the components withstand the pressure and that there is no leakage from the pressure resistant parts.	Withstanding 1.25 times the maximum working pressure with no abnormalities. In addition, no leakage from the pressure resistant parts.

※1: It shall be within the scope that can be implemented on site, and the quality records shall be checked as necessary.

Table-3-1 Items to be checked (leakage detectors and alarms)

Items to be checked	Checking point	Contents of check	Acceptance criteria
Structural strength	Appearance check	Check the appearance of each part.	No significant defects.
	Installation check	Check the installation positions and conditions of the components.	Carrying out construction and installation in accordance with the Implementation Plan.
Function	Leakage alarm check	Check the alarm activation by a leakage signal.	Alarm activation by a leakage signal.

Table-3-2 Items to be checked (ALPS treated water flow meter, seawater flow meter)

Items to be checked	Checking point	Contents of check	Acceptance criteria
Structural strength	Appearance check	Check the appearance of each part.	No significant defects.
	Installation check	Check the installation positions and conditions of the components.	Carrying out construction and installation in accordance with the Implementation Plan.
Performance	Performance calibration check	Check that the flow meter indication is correct for the reference input.	The flow meter indication is within the allowable range.

Table-3-3 Items to be checked (radiation monitor)

Items to be checked	Checking point	Contents of check	Acceptance criteria
Structural strength	Appearance check	Check the appearance of each part.	No significant defects.
	Installation check	Check the installation positions and conditions of the components.	Carrying out construction and installation in accordance with the Implementation Plan.
Function	Alarm check	Check that the alarm is activated by signal "High"※1.	Alarm activation by signal "High"※1.
Performance	Source calibration check	Measure the dose equivalent rate using a standard source and confirm that the calibration of each detector is correct.	The net dose equivalent rate to the reference dose equivalent rate is within the allowable range.
	Calibration check	Check that the radiation monitor indication is correct for the reference input.	The radiation monitor indication is within the allowable range.

※1: Signal names differ depending on the radiation monitor.

Table-4-1 Items to be checked (measurement/confirmation tanks)※1

Items to be checked	Checking point	Contents of check	Acceptance criteria
Structural strength/ seismic resistance	Materials check	Confirm the materials to be used with a certificate of material. Check the delivery documents and product specifications for the connecting pipe and connecting valve.	Using the materials described in the Implementation Plan. The product specifications (maximum working pressure) of the connecting pipes and connecting valves shall be equal to or higher than the water head pressure of the tanks.
	Dimensions check	Check the main dimensions (plate thickness, inner diameter, and height).	In accordance with the Implementation Plan.
	Appearance check	Check the appearance of the tank body (including paint conditions), connecting pipes and connecting valves.	No significant defects.
	Installation check	Check the assembly and installation.	No abnormality in the assembly condition and installation condition.
		Check the unevenness of the tank foundation.	No abnormal unevenness.
	Pressure resistance/leakage check	Perform pressure resistance and leakage tests based on design and construction standards.	No significant leakage from any part and no drawdown in water level.
	Ground bearing force check	Check the bearing force of the foundation of the tanks in the bearing force tests.	Satisfying the necessary bearing force.
Functions and performance	Alarm check	Check that that alarm is activated by the signal "High-High"※2 associated with tank's water level.	Alarm activation by the signal "High-High"※2 associated with tank's water level.
	Dimensions check※3	Check the inner capacity of the weir around the foundation.	Satisfying the capacity inside weir equivalent to the required capacity.
	Appearance check	Check the appearance of the weir around the foundation.	No significant defects.
	Storage function	Confirm tanks can store water without leakage.	No leakage from the tanks and attached components (connecting pipes, connecting valves, manholes, drain valves).

※1: Check the historical records to be used in conjunction with "II 2 5 Contaminated Water Treatment Facility, etc." (pre-use inspection completed).

※2: The signal name varies depending on tank.

※3: This item is confirmed with the inner capacity of the weir at K4 tank area in "II 2.5 Attachment-12, Appendix-6, Table-2".

Table-4-2 Items to be checked (Measurement/Confirmation Tank inlet pipes (steel pipes)) ※1

Items to be checked	Checking point	Contents of check	Acceptance criteria
Structural strength/ seismic resistance	Materials check	Confirm the main materials described in the Implementation Plan with a certificate of material or delivery document.	In accordance with the Implementation Plan.
	Dimensions check	Confirm the main dimensions described in the Implementation Plan with a certificate of material or delivery document.	In accordance with the Implementation Plan.
	Appearance check	Check the appearance of each part by witness or with records.	No abnormalities in appearance.
	Installation check	Check the installation of components in accordance with drawing by witness or with records.	Carrying out the construction and installation based on drawing.
	Pressure resistance/leakage check Remark1	(1) After holding for a certain period of time at 1.25 times the maximum working pressure, confirm that the components withstand the pressure and that there is no leakage from the pressure resistant parts by witness or with records.	Withstanding 1.25 times the maximum working pressure with no deformation of structures. In addition, no leakage from the pressure resistant parts.
		(2) Confirm no leakage from the pressure resistant parts under working pressure by witness or with records.	No leakage from pressure resistant parts.
Functions and performance	Check of water flow	Check that water flow is possible.	Possible to flow water.

※1: Check the historical records to be used in conjunction with “II 2 5 Contaminated Water Treatment Facility, etc.” (pre-use inspection completed).

※2: Alternative inspection such as torque check is carried out for flange part of pipes where leakage inspection at pressure resistant parts cannot be conducted under the working pressure.

Remark 1: Pressure resistance/Leakage check shall be confirmed by either (1) or (2).

Table-5 Items to be checked (Water discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage)

Items to be checked	Checking point	Contents of check	Acceptance criteria
Structural strength/ seismic resistance	Materials check	Confirm the materials described in the Implementation Plan with a certificate of material or delivery document.	In accordance with the Implementation Plan.
	Dimensions check	Check the main dimensions (inner space) described in the Implementation Plan to ensure the required volume.	In accordance with the Implementation Plan.
	Appearance check※1	Check the appearance	No significant defects.
	Installation and assembly check	Check the installation and assembly of components in accordance with drawing by witness or with records.	Carrying out the construction and installation based on drawing.
	Pressure resistance check	After holding the water level in the storage for a certain period of time, confirm that the components withstand the pressure and that there is no leakage from the pressure resistant parts by witness or with records.	Withstanding water pressure with no deformation of structures. In addition, no leakage from the pressure resistant parts.

※1: It shall be within the scope that can be implemented on site, and the quality records shall be checked as necessary.

Table-6 Items to be checked (discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage), discharge tunnel, discharge outlet)

Items to be checked	Checking point	Contents of check	Acceptance criteria
Structural strength/ seismic resistance	Material check	Confirm the materials described in the Implementation Plan with a certificate of material or delivery document.	In accordance with the Implementation Plan.
	Dimension check	Check the dimensions of components and main dimensions (inner space) described in the Implementation Plan.	In accordance with the Implementation Plan.
	Appearance check ※1	Check the appearance.	No significant defects.
	Installation and assembly check※2	Check the installation and assembly of components in accordance with drawing by witness or with records.	Carrying out the construction and installation based on drawing.

※1: It shall be within the scope that can be implemented on site, and the quality records shall be checked as necessary.
In addition, it shall be within the scope that can be implemented on site, since seawater will be filled in the discharge tunnel in the middle of construction.

※2: Confirm that the discharge outlet is installed at a point 1km from the coast by the record (location information).

Table-7-1 Items to be checked (measurement/confirmation facility)

Items to be checked	Checking point	Contents of check	Acceptance criteria
Function/ performance	Agitation operation check	Start the agitation equipment and check that the inside of the tank is agitated.	Water flow is occurring on the tank water surface during operation of agitation equipment. The current value is within the proper range.
Function/ performance	Water flow and flow rate check※1	Start the circulation pump and check that water can flow.	For pumps, flow rate is no less than $140m^3/h$※2. In addition, there shall be no abnormal noise, odor, vibration, etc. For piping, possible to water flow.

※1: For receiving pipe, check the water flow as a single piece, check for foreign matter in the pipe prior to installation, and check the torque at the fastening section for any abnormal condition.

※2: Set based on actual results of circulation agitation demonstration tests.

Table-7-2 Items to be checked (transfer facility)

Items to be checked	Checking point	Contents of check	Acceptance criteria
Function/ performance	Emergency isolation check	Check that the emergency isolation valve actuates according to the input signal.	The emergency isolation valve shall actuate according to the operation signal.
Function/ performance	Water flow and flow rate check※1	Start ALPS treated water transfer pump and control the flow control valve to confirm that water can flow.	The flow rate can be controlled by the set flow rate ※2. For pumps, there shall be no abnormal noise, odor, abnormal vibration, etc. For piping, possible to water flow.

※1: For pipes for which water flow cannot be confirmed during operation of ALPS treated water transfer pump, heck the water flow as a single piece, check for foreign matter in the pipe prior to installation, and check the torque at the fastening section for any abnormal condition.

※2: Since the flow rate of ALPS processed water is variable, it should be set within the max. $19m^3/h$.

Table-7.3 Items to be checked (dilution facility, discharge Facility)

Items to be checked	Checking point	Contents of check	Acceptance criteria
Function/ performance	Water flow and flow rate check※1	Start the sea water transfer pump and check that water can flow.	For pumps, the capacity shall be equal to or greater than the capacity specified in the implementation plan. In addition, there shall be no abnormal noise, odor, vibration, etc. For piping, water discharge shaft (upstream water tank), and water discharge facility, possible to water flow.

Appendix 1: Basic Specifications of Measurement/Confirmation Tanks

Appendix 2: Installation Location of Leakage Detector of ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities

End

Appendix-1

Basic Specifications of Measurement/Confirmation Tanks

Measurement/confirmation tanks

Tank capacity		m^3	1,000
Main dimensions	Inner diameter	mm	10,000
	Shell plate thickness	mm	15
	Bottom plate thickness	mm	25
	Height	mm	14,565
Nozzle stub thickness	100A	mm	8.6
	200A	mm	12.7
	600A	mm	16.0
Material	Shell plate/bottom plate	—	SS400
	Nozzle stub	—	STPT410, SS400

	Connecting pipe (pressure resistant hose (finished product))	Connecting valve (finished product)
Nominal diameter	Equivalent to 200 A	Equivalent to 200 A
Material	EPDM synthetic rubber	FCD450-10
Max. working pressure	1.0 MPa	1.0 MPa
Max. working temp.	50°C	50°C

	Inlet pipe (steel pipe)
Thickness	8.6 mm (100 A)
Material	STPT410
Max. working pressure	1.0 MPa
Max. working temp.	50°C

The Japanese version shall prevail.



Installation Location of Leakage Detector of ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facility

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Attachment-5

Description on Design of Discharge Vertical Shaft (upper-stream storage) and Discharge Facility

Evaluation shall be conducted on the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) and the discharge facility (discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage), discharge tunnel and discharge outlet).

1. Design contents

1.1 Basic policy on design

The discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) and the discharge facility shall be evaluated in accordance with the following:

- Concrete Standard Specification (Design Edition; established in 2017) (PIIA) Japan Society of Civil Engineers
- Concrete Standard Specification (Design Edition; established in 2012) (PIIA) Japan Society of Civil Engineers
- Concrete Standard Specification (Structural Performance Check Edition; established in 2002) (PIIA) Japan Society of Civil Engineers
- Road Bridge Specifications/Explanation I Common Edition 2012 (PIIA) Japan Road Association
- Road Bridge Specification/Explanation IV Substructure Edition 2012 (PIIA) Japan Road Association
- Road Bridge Specification and Explanation V Seismic Design Edition 2012 (PIIA) Japan Road Association
- Utility Conduit Design Guidelines 1986 (PIIA) Japan Road Association
- Hydraulic Formula Collection 2018 (PIIA) Japan Society of Civil Engineers
- Precast Rainwater Underground Storage Facility Technical Manual (revised edition; 2020) (PIIF) Japan Institute of Wastewater Engineering and Technology
- Design and Construction Guidelines for Reinforced Concrete Using Epoxy Resin Painted Reinforcement (Revised Edition; 2013) (PIIA) Japan Society of Civil Engineers
- Design of Civil Engineering Structures at Thermal and Nuclear Power Stations (Additional and Revised Edition) (Foundation) Electric Power Civil Engineering Society
- Tunnel Standard Specification [Common Edition] • Explanation/ [Shield Method Edition] • Explanation (established in 2016) (PIIA) Japan Society of Civil Engineers
- Tunnel Standard Specification [Open Cutting Method]/Explanation (established in 2016) (PIIA) Society of Civil Engineers
- Technical Standards and Explanations of Port Facilities 2018 (PIIA) Japan Port and Harbor Association

The Japanese version shall prevail.

- Handbook for design of tunnel lining structure with internal water pressure (established in 1999) (PIIF) Advanced Construction Technology Center
- Standard Segment for Shield Method, jointly edited by Japan Society of Civil Engineers and Japan Institute of Wastewater Engineering and Technology (established in 2001)
- Documents of Public Works Research Institute, Method/Guideline for Seismic Design of Large-scale Underground Structures (Draft) – March, 1992, Seismic Research Institute, Aseismatic and Disaster Prevention Department, Public Works Research Institute, Construction Ministry
- Guideline and Exposition of Aseismatic Measures for Wastewater Facilities – 2014 Edition, (PIIA) Japan Institute for Wastewater Engineering and Technology
- Examples of Aseismatic Calculation for Wastewater Facilities Treatment Facility and Pump Yard Edition – 2015 Edition, (PIIA) Japan Institute for Wastewater Engineering and Technology
- Examples of Aseismatic Calculation for Wastewater Facilities Piping Facility Edition – 2015 Edition, (PIIA) Japan Institute for Wastewater Engineering and Technology

1.2 Basic Policy on Seismic Resistance

In view of handling the drainage water from ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facility (water satisfies the concentration value 1 where the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentration limit of all radionuclides including tritium diluted with seawater), discharge facility is classified as seismic class C according to the degree of radiological impact on the public due to the loss of function of the facility, etc. Therefore, the facilities shall be designed to withstand the seismic force required for facilities of the seismic class C.

2. Design method

2.1 Evaluation conditions

2.1.1 Tolerant stress intensity of the materials used

Among the materials used in the discharge facility, concrete shall be ordinary concrete, and the design strength is 24N/mm^2, 30N/mm^2, r0N/mm^2, 42N/mm^2. Reinforcing bar shall be SD345.

The tolerant stress intensity for each material used are shown in Table-1 to 2.

Table-1 Tolerant stress intensity of concrete

Design strength	Long term		Short term	
	Compressive (N/mm^2)	Shearing (N/mm^2)	Compressive (N/mm^2)	Shearing (N/mm^2)
24	9.0	0.45	13.5	0.675
30	11.0	0.50	16.5	0.750
40	14.0	0.55	21.0	0.825
42	16.0	0.73	24.0	1.095

Table-2 Tolerant stress intensity of reinforcing bar

Material used	Long term	Short term
	Compressive/tensile (N/mm^2)	Compressive/tensile (N/mm^2)
SD345	200	300

2.1.2 Soil Constants

The soil constants used in the design are shown in Table-3.

Table-3 Soil constants

Number of layers	Soil	Unit volume weight γ (kN/m^2)	Adhesive force C (kN/m^2)	Internal frictional angle φ (°)	Modulus of deformation E0 (kN/m^2)
1	Embankment	18.0	0	30.0	17,700
2	Sandstone	18.4	0	38.6	94,400
3	Mudstone	17.1	1,500	0	506,000

The Japanese version shall prevail.

2.1.3 Groundwater level

T.P. +2.5m

2.1.4 Unit volume weight

The unit volume weight of the materials used in the design is shown in Table-4.

Table-4 Unit volume weight

Material	Unit volume weight (kN/m^3)
Reinforced concrete	24.5
Steel	77.0
Ground	See Table-3

2.1.5 Environmental conditions of the structures

The environmental conditions of the structures shall be corrosive environmental conditions, and the limit value of the crack width shall be from 0.035c to 0.05c (mm). However, c is the distance from concrete surface to the reinforcement surface.

2.1.6 Load

Long and short-term loads are considered in the design.

The seismic force acting on the skeleton is calculated by the seismic intensity method in principle.

$$P=K \cdot W$$

P: Seismic force

K: Designed horizontal seismic intensity

W: Skeleton weight

2.2 Evaluation method

By checking Table-5, it is confirmed that the soundness during the service period is ensured. The checking items are set based on the required performance to meet the intended use of the structure.

Table 5 Items to be checked for the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) and the discharge facility

Items to be checked		Discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage)	Discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage)	Discharge tunnel	Discharge outlet	Checking item
Long-term	Structure	○	○	○	○	Within tolerant stress intensity
	Structure (Waves)	-	-	○	○	Within tolerant stress intensity
	Crack	○	○	○	○	The crack width shall not exceed the tolerant crack width.
	Salt damage	○	○	○	○	The chloride ion concentration at the steel position does not reach the generation limit of steel corrosion.
	Floating	○	○	-	○	No floating shall occur.
Short-term		○	○	○	○	Within Tolerant stress intensity to earthquake

2.3 Evaluation results

2.3.1 Discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage)

The applied stress of discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) is compared with the tolerant stress of it, and the checking results of part where the ratio of the applied stress to the tolerant stress is the maximum are shown in Table-6.

The structure is designed after confirming that the load is within the tolerant stress intensity for long-term load and short-term load. And, it is confirmed that the floating of the structure does not occur. In addition, the crack width and salt damage on the skeleton made of reinforced concrete are checked to confirm that the durability during the service period is ensured.

Furthermore, as with general civil engineering structures, maintenance and management shall be carried out based on the long-term inspection plan.

Table-6 Checking results of discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage)

Target part	Load case	Target materials	Stress	Applied stress (N/mm^2)	Tolerant stress (N/mm^2)	Applied stress/ tolerant stress
Bottom plate	Short-term	Reinforcing bar	Bending moment	108	300	0.36
Side wall	Short-term	Reinforcing bar	Bending moment	117	300	0.39
Partition wall	Short-term	Reinforcing bar	Bending moment	177	300	0.59
Top plate	Long-term	Concrete	Shearing force	0.14	0.55	0.26

2.3.2 Discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage)

The applied stress of the discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage) is compared with the tolerant stress, and the checking results of part where the ratio of the applied stress to the tolerant stress is the maximum are shown in Table-7.

The structure is designed after confirming that the load is within the tolerant stress intensity for long-term load and short-term load. And, it is confirmed that the floating of the structure does not occur. In addition, the crack width and salt damage on the skeleton made of reinforced concrete are checked to confirm that the durability during the service period is ensured.

Furthermore, as with general civil engineering structures, maintenance and management shall be carried out based on the long-term inspection plan.

Table-7 Checking results of discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage)

Target part	Load case	Target materials	Stress	Applied stress (N/mm^2)	Tolerant stress (N/mm^2)	Applied stress/ tolerant stress
Bottom plate	Long-term	Reinforcing bar	Bending moment	98	200	0.49
Side wall	Long-term	Reinforcing bar	Bending moment	148	200	0.74

2.3.3 Discharge tunnel

The applied stress of the discharge tunnel is compared with the tolerant stress, and the checking results of part where the ratio of the applied stress to the tolerant stress is the maximum are shown in Table-8.

The structure is designed after confirming that the load is within the tolerant stress intensity for long-term load and short-term load. And, the crack width and salt damage on the lining board made of reinforced concrete are checked to confirm that the durability during the service period is ensured.

The Japanese version shall prevail.

In addition, as with general civil engineering structures, maintenance and management shall be carried out based on the long-term inspection plan.

Table-8 Checking results of discharge tunnel

Target part	Load case	Target materials	Stress	Applied stress (N/mm^2)	Tolerant stress (N/mm^2)	Applied stress/ tolerant stress
Lining board (starting section)	Long-term	Reinforcing bar	Bending moment	78	200	0.39
Lining board (deepest section)	Long-term	Reinforcing bar	Bending moment	91	200	0.46

2.3.4 Discharge outlet

The applied stress of the discharge outlet is compared with the tolerant stress, and the checking results of part where the ratio of the applied stress to the tolerant stress is the maximum are shown in Table-9.

The structure is designed after confirming that the load is within the tolerant stress intensity for long-term load and short-term load. And, it is confirmed that the floating of the structure does not occur. In addition, the crack width and salt damage on the skeleton made of reinforced concrete are checked to confirm that the durability during the service period is ensured.

Furthermore, as with general civil engineering structures, maintenance and management shall be carried out based on the long-term inspection plan.

Table-9 Checking results of discharge outlet

Target part	Load Case	Target materials	Stress	Working stress (N/mm^2)	Allowable stress (N/mm^2)	Working stress/allowable stress
Bottom plate	Long-term	Concrete	Shearing force	0.23	0.50	0.46
Side wall	Long-term	Concrete	Shearing force	0.24	0.50	0.48

Appendix 1: Description for checking durability

Appendix 2: Description for checking floating

Appendix 3: Schematic diagram of discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) and discharge facility (discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage), discharge tunnel and discharge outlet)

End

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Appendix 1

Description for checking durability

Methods and results of checking for durability of discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) and the discharge facility (discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage), discharge tunnel and discharge outlet) are shown as follows:

1. Checking Method

1.1 Crack width

Checking for cracks shall confirm that the generated bending crack width w is not more than the allowable bending crack width wa. The checking formula is shown below.

$$w / wa \leqq 1.0$$

The calculation formula is shown below.

$$w = 1.1 k_1 k_2 k_3 \{4c + 0.7(c_s - \phi)\} \left[\frac{\sigma_{se}}{E_s} \left(\text{ or } \quad \frac{\sigma_{pe}}{E_p} \right) + \varepsilon'_{csd} \right]$$

w: Bending crack width (mm)

k1: Coefficient representing the effect of surface shape of reinforcing bar on crack width (= 1.0)
Epoxy-coated reinforcing bar is used in the discharge shaft (upper-stream storage). 1.1

k2: Coefficient representing the effect of quality of concrete on crack width

k2 = 15 / (f'c + 20) + 0.7

f'c: Concrete compressive strength (N/mm^2)

k3: Coefficient representing the effect of the number of stages of tension reinforcing bar

k3 = 5(n+2)/ (7n+8)

n: Number of stages of tension reinforcing bar

c: Covering depth for reinforcing bar (mm). Here, depth to main reinforcing bar

Cs: Distance between the centers of reinforcing bar (mm)

φ: Diameter of tension reinforcing bar and nominal diameter of reinforcing bar (mm)

ε' csd: Value to consider the increase of crack width due to shrinkage and creep, etc. of concrete.
(Approx. 150 × 10^{-6} is used for the ε'$_{csd}$ when checking for corrosion of reinforcing bar.)

σ se: Value of increase in stress intensity of reinforcing rod near the surface (N/mm^2)

Es: Young's modulus of reinforcing rod (N/mm^2)

The Japanese version shall prevail.

1.2 Salt damage

The durability shall be checked using a simple design method. The basic concept of the checking is shown below.

- Under a given environmental condition, the combination of design value Cd of covering depth and design diffusion coefficient Dd for chloride ion is appropriately set to satisfy the checking of salt damage.
- In order to satisfy the set design diffusion coefficient Dd, the combination of bending crack width w and water-cement ratio W/C of concrete shall be appropriately set.

The conformity standards shall be as shown in Table-1.

Table-1 Conformity standard for each component

Component	Conformity standards	Remarks
Discharge shaft (upper-stream storage)	Concrete Standard Specification (Structural Performance Check Edition; established in 2002)	Because of the use of epoxy-coated reinforcing rod
Discharge shaft (Down-stream storage)	Concrete Standard Specification (Design Edition; established in 2017)	
Discharge tunnel	Concrete Standard Specification (Design Edition; established in 2017)	
Discharge Outlet	Technical Standards and Explanations of Port Facilities 2018	

Calculate the design value Cd of chloride ion concentration at the reinforcing rod position and confirm that it does not reach the limit concentration Clim of generation of steel corrosion. The checking formula is shown below.

$$\gamma i \cdot Cd / Clim \leqq 1.0$$

γi: Structure coefficient (= 1.0)

Cd: Design value of the chrome ion concentration at the reinforcing bar position (kg/m^3)

Clim: Limit concentration of generation of corrosion in reinforcing bar (kg/m^3)

The chloride ion concentration Cd is calculated by the following formula.

・Discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage)

$$C_d = \gamma_{cl} \cdot \left\{1 - erf\left(0.1 \Big/ 2\sqrt{t}\left(c \Big/ \sqrt{D_d} + c_{ep} \Big/ \sqrt{D_{epd}}\right)\right)\right\}$$

γ_{cl}: Safety factor considering Cd variations

Dd: Design diffusion coefficient

C_{ep}: Expected epoxy film thickness (mm)

D_{epd}: Designed values of apparent diffusion coefficients for chloride ions (cm^2/year) when

The Japanese version shall prevail.

infiltration of chloride ions into the epoxy-resin coating is regarded as diffusion phenomena. Typically 2.0×10^{-6} cm^2/year.

・Discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage), discharge tunnel and discharge outlet

$$C_d = \gamma_{cl} \cdot C_0 \cdot \left\{1 - \mathrm{erf}\left(0.1 \cdot C_d \Big/ 2 \cdot \sqrt{D_d \cdot t}\right)\right\} + C_i$$

γ_{cl}: Safety factor considering Cd variations

C_0: Chloride ion concentration on concrete surface (kg/m^3)

Dd: Design diffusion coefficient

Design diffusion coefficient Dd is calculated by the following formula.

・Discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage)

$$D_d = \gamma_c \cdot D_k + \left(\frac{w}{l}\right) \cdot \left(\frac{w}{w_a}\right)^2 \cdot D_0$$

γ_c: Material factor of concrete (= 1.0)

D_k: Characteristic value of diffusion factor for chloride ion in concrete (cm^2/year)

D_0: Factor that represents the effect of cracking on the transfer of saline in concretes (cm^2/year)
(= 200 cm^2/ year)

w/l: Ratio of crack width to crack interval

w: Crack width (mm)

wa: Limit value of crack width against corrosion of steel material (mm)

・Discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage), discharge tunnel and discharge outlet

$$D_d = \gamma_c \cdot D_k + \lambda \cdot \left(\frac{w}{l}\right) \cdot D_0$$

γ_c: Material factor of concrete (= 1.0)

D_k: Characteristic value of diffusion factor for chloride ion in concrete (cm^2/year)

D_0: Factor that represents the effect of cracking on the transfer of saline in concretes (cm^2/year)
(= 400 cm^2/year)

w/l: Ratio of crack width to crack interval

λ: Coefficient representing the impact of cracking on the diffusion coefficient due to the presence of cracking

The Japanese version shall prevail.

The designed value cd of the covering depth is obtained by the following equation taking the construction error Δc_e into account in advance.

$$cd = c - \Delta c_e$$

c: Covering depth on the design drawing

The chloride ion concentration C_0 on the concrete surface shall be based on the regional classification in the "Concrete Standard Specification" shown in Table-2 and the distance from the coast.

Table-2 C_0 of Chloride ionic density on concrete surfaces

		Splash zone	Distance from the shore (km)				
			Shore line	0.1	0.25	0.5	1.0
Areas with high levels of airborne salt	Hokkaido, Tohoku, Hokuriku, Okinawa	13.0	9.0	4.5	3.0	2.0	1.5
Areas with low levels of airborne salt	Kanto, Tokai, Kinki, Chugoku, Shikoku, Kyushu		4.5	2.5	2.0	1.5	1.0

At the discharge outlet, it shall be established based on the following equation in "Technical Standards and Explanations of Port Facilities".

$$C_0 = -6.0x + 15.1$$

C_0: chloride ion concentration in surface (kg/m^3) not to be less than 6.0 kg/m^3

x: Distance from sea level (H.W.L) to bottom surface of member (m)

C_0=15.1 kg/m^3 is to be applied at the discharge outlet installed below the surface.

The limit concentration Clim of generation of steel corrosion shall be set according to the water-cement ratio and the type of cement. Ordinary portland cement and blast furnace cement class B are applied, and Clim is determined by the following equation.

・Ordinary portland cement

Discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) Clim= 1.2

Discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage) Clim =-3.0 (W/C) + 3.4

・Blast furnace cement class B (discharge tunnel)

$$Clim = -2.6(W/C) + 3.1$$

Clim=2.0kg/m^3 of the discharge outlet shall be set based on "the technical standards of the port facility and the explanation."

The Japanese version shall prevail.

The diffusion coefficient Dk for chloride ions in concrete is obtained from the prediction equation with the apparent diffusion coefficient according to the water-cement ratio and the type of cement. Ordinary portland cement and blast furnace cement class B are applied, and Dk is determined by the following equation.

・Ordinary portland cement

Discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream-storage) $\log10Dk = -3.9 (W/C)^2 + 7.2 (W/C) - 2.5$

Discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage) $\log10Dk = 3.0 (W/C) - 1.8$

・B-category blast furnace cement

$$\log10D_k = 2.5(W/C) - 1.8$$

The values in Table-3 shall be used for the design conditions to be used for the durability check.

Table-3 Design conditions used for durability checking

		Discharge shaft (upper-stream storage)	Discharge shaft (down-stream storage)	Discharge Tunnel	Discharge Outlet
Durable years	Years	30			
Cement type	-	Ordinary portland cement	Ordinary portland cement	Blast furnace cement class B	Blast furnace cement class B
Chloride ion on surface	C_0 (kg/m^3)	13.0	13.0	9.0	15.1
Limit concentration of generation of corrosion	C_{lim} (kg/m^3)	1.20	1.84	2.19	2.00
Diffusion coefficient	D_k (cm^2/year)	0.69	0.58	0.05	0.28
Water-cement ratio	W/C	0.42	0.52	0.35	0.50

2. Checking Results

2.1 Crack width

2.1.1 Discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage)

Comparing the generated bending crack width of the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) with the allowable bending crack width, Table-4 shows the results of checking the part where the ratio of the generated bending crack width to the allowable bending crack width is the maximum.

Table-4 Checking results of discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage)

Target part	Generated bending crack width (mm)	Allowable bending crack width (mm)	Generated bending crack width/allowable bending crack width
Bottom plate	0.19	0.27	0.70
Side wall	0.20	0.27	0.74
Partition wall	0.06	0.27	0.22
Top plate	0.04	0.15	0.27

The Japanese version shall prevail.

2.1.2 Discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage)

Comparing the generated bending crack width of the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) with the allowable bending crack width, Table-5 shows the results of checking the part where the ratio of the generated bending crack width to the allowable bending crack width is the maximum.

Table-5 Checking results of discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage)

Target part	Generated bending crack width (mm)	Allowable bending crack width (mm)	Generated bending crack width/allowable bending crack width
Bottom plate	0.34	0.50	0.68
Side wall	0.39	0.50	0.78

2.1.3 Discharge tunnel

Comparing the generated bending crack width of the discharge tunnel with the allowable bending crack width, Table-6 shows the results of checking the part where the ratio of the generated bending crack width to the allowable bending crack width is the maximum.

Table 6 Checking results of discharge tunnel

Target part	Generated bending crack width (mm)	Allowable bending crack width (mm)	Generated bending crack width/allowable bending crack width
Lining board (starting section)	0.14	0.18	0.76
Lining board (deepest section)	0.15	0.18	0.84

2.1.4 Discharge outlet

Comparing the generated bending crack width of the discharge outlet with the allowable bending crack width, Table-7 shows the results of checking the part where the ratio of the generated bending crack width to the allowable bending crack width is the maximum.

Table-7 Checking results of discharge outlet

Target part	Generated bending crack width (mm)	Allowable bending crack width (mm)	Generated bending crack width/allowable bending crack width
Bottom plate	0.26	0.40	0.66
Side wall	0.30	0.40	0.76

2.2 Salt damage

2.2.1 Discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage)

Comparing the chloride ion concentration at the reinforcing rod position of the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) with the limit concentration of generation of corrosion of reinforcing rod, Table-8 shows the results of checking the part where the ratio of the chloride ion concentration to the limit concentration of generation of corrosion of reinforcing rod reaches the maximum at the position of reinforcing rod.

Table-8 Checking results of discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage)

Target part	Chloride ion concentration at the reinforcing rod position (kg/m^3)	Limit concentration of generation of corrosion of reinforcing rod (kg/m^3)	Chloride ion concentration at the reinforcing rod position/ limit concentration of generation of corrosion of reinforcing rod
Bottom plate	0.06	1.20	0.05
Side wall	0.06	1.20	0.05
Partition wall	0.04	1.20	0.03
Top plate	0.16	1.20	0.13

2.2.2 Discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage)

Comparing the chloride ion concentration at the reinforcing rod position of the discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage) with the limit concentration of generation of corrosion of reinforcing rod, Table-9 shows the results of checking the part where the ratio of the chloride ion concentration to the limit concentration of generation of corrosion of reinforcing rod reaches the maximum at the position of reinforcing rod.

Table-9 Checking results of discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage)

Target part	Chloride ion concentration at the reinforcing rod position (kg/m^3)	Limit concentration of generation of corrosion of reinforcing rod (kg/m^3)	Chloride ion concentration at the reinforcing rod position/ limit concentration of generation of corrosion of reinforcing rod
Bottom plate	0.94	1.84	0.51
Side wall	1.66	1.84	0.90

2.2.3 Discharge tunnel

Comparing the chloride ion concentration at the reinforcing rod position of the discharge tunnel with the limit concentration of generation of corrosion of reinforcing rod, Table-10 shows the results of checking the part where the ratio of the chloride ion concentration to the limit concentration of generation of corrosion of reinforcing rod reaches the maximum at the position of reinforcing rod.

Table-10 Checking results of discharge tunnel

Target part	Chloride ion concentration at the reinforcing rod position (kg/m^3)	Limit concentration of generation of corrosion of reinforcing rod (kg/m^3)	Chloride ion concentration at the reinforcing rod position/ limit concentration of generation of corrosion of reinforcing rod
Lining board (starting section)	1.81	2.19	0.83
Lining board (deepest section)	2.02	2.19	0.92

2.2.4 Discharge outlet

Comparing the chloride ion concentration at the reinforcing rod position of the discharge outlet with the limit concentration of generation of corrosion of reinforcing rod, Table-11 shows the results of checking the part where the ratio of the chloride ion concentration to the limit concentration of generation of corrosion of reinforcing rod reaches the maximum at the position of reinforcing rod.

Table-11 Checking results of discharge outlet

Target part	Chloride ion concentration at the reinforcing rod position (kg/m^3)	Limit concentration of generation of corrosion of reinforcing rod (kg/m^3)	Chloride ion concentration at the reinforcing rod position/ limit concentration of generation of corrosion of reinforcing rod
Bottom plate	1.93	2.00	0.97
Side wall	1.95	2.00	0.98

End

Appendix 2

Description for checking floating

Methods and results of checking for floating of discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) and discharge facility (discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage) and discharge outlet) are shown.

1. Checking method

1.1 Calculation formula

Consideration of floating shall be carried out by the following equation.

$$Fs = W/U$$

$$U = Vw \cdot \gamma w$$

U: Buoyancy (kN)

W: Vertical load (kN)

Vw: Volume below ground water level (m^3)

γw: Unit volume weight of water (seawater) (kN/m^3)

1.2 Consideration Conditions

Table-1 shows the safety factor against the floating.

Table-1 Safety factor against floating

Load condition in storage (seawater load)	In service
Safety factor against the floating	1.20

The Japanese version shall prevail.

2. Checking Results

2.1 Discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage)

Table-2 shows the checking results of floating of discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) under conditions where the calculated values are stricter.

Table-2 Checking results of floating of discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage)

	At all times
Calculated value	1.48
Safety factor for the floating	1.20

2.2 Discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage)

Table-3 shows the checking results of floating of discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage) under conditions where the calculated values are stricter.

Table-3 Checking results of floating of the discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage)

	At all times
Calculated value	1.68
Safety factor for the floating	1.20

2.3 Discharge outlet

Table-4 shows the checking results of floating of discharge outlet under conditions where the calculated values are stricter.

Table-4 Checking results of floating of discharge outlet

	In waves
Calculated value	1.99
Ascent safety factor	1.20

End

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Appendix 3

Schematic diagram of discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) and discharge facility (discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage), discharge tunnel and discharge outlet)

A schematic diagram of the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) and discharge facility (discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage), discharge tunnel and discharge outlet) is shown.

1. Discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage)

Schematic diagrams of the dimensions, installation and assembly of the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) are shown in Figures-1 to 3.



Figure-1 Top view of the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage)



Figure-2 A-A cross-sectional view

The Japanese version shall prevail.



Figure-3 B-B cross-sectional view

2. Discharge facility

2.1 Discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage)

Schematic diagrams with the dimensions of the discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage) are shown in Figures-4 to 6.



Figure-4 Top view of the discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage)



Figure-5 A-A cross-sectional view

The Japanese version shall prevail.



Figure-6 B-B cross-sectional view

2.2 Discharge tunnel

Schematic diagrams of the dimensions, installation and assembly of the discharge tunnel are shown in Figures-7 to 9.



Figure-7 Cross-sectional view of discharge tunnel



Figure-8 Typical cross-sectional view of segment (circumferential direction)



Figure-9 Typical cross-sectional view of segment (axial direction)

2.3 Discharge outlet

A schematic diagram of the dimensions of the discharge outlet is shown in Figures-10 to 12.



Figure-10 Top view of discharge outlet



Figure-11 A-A cross-sectional view

The Japanese version shall prevail.



Figure-12 B-B cross sectional view

End

Attachment-6

Construction schedule



※: Currently under review and may be changed in the future.

: On-site installation and assembly

①: When tests related to structure, strength, or leakage are ready to be conducted

②: When the equipment assembly is completed.

③: When the construction work related to the construction plan is completed

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Attachment-7

Items for consideration on testability

The components installation is designed considering future maintenance. For facility maintenance management, a long-term inspection plan is prepared, and the inspection is carried out based on the inspection plan.
The components to be installed this time is adjusted to the pre-use inspection item, and the following is considered for the inspection of the representative components:

(1) ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities

a. Tank

· External and internal inspections

It shall be designed to enable internal inspection with installing an access port for inspection in the top plate and side part of the tank.

b. Pipe

· External and flange inspection

It shall be designed to enable inspection of replacement such as gasket at a flange (seal) part.

c. Flowmeter

· Performance correction check

It shall be designed to enable checking an output value for a reference input value, and calibration within an instrument error.

d. Emergency isolation valve (including logic circuit)

· Emergency isolation check

It shall be designed to enable confirming an activation signal of an emergency isolation valve occur by an input signal.

· Replacement and operation inspections

It shall be designed to make the valve body replaceable.

e. Seawater pipe header

· It shall be designed to enable internal inspection by installing a maintenance hole for inspection.

f. Pump and valve

· External/disassembly inspections, replacement, and function check

It shall be designed to enable disassembly inspection and replacement.

The Japanese version shall prevail.

g. Discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage)

· External and internal inspections

It shall be designed to enable internal inspection by installing an inspection port for inspection in the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage).

Furthermore, spare parts are secured for components, such as seawater transfer pump and orifice type flowmeter, that meets the following conditions:

· Components flooded by Japan Trench Tsunami excluding pipe

· Components, which is essential for operation of facilities, without back-up series/components

· Components that takes more than half a year

(2) Discharge facility

a. Discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage), discharge tunnel, and discharge port

· External and internal inspections

It shall be designed to enable internal inspection from the discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage) or discharge port.

· Request function check

The discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage), discharge tunnel, and discharge port are filled with seawater as an integrated structure, and the structure that is connected with the tide level of the open sea is adopted. Based on these, it shall be designed to enable confirming that there is no significant water level fluctuation in the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) and that the required functions are satisfied.

End

1.9 Operation Management of the ALPS Treatment Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities

1.9.1 Overview

When discharging ALPS treated water, which satisfies criteria of less than 1 for sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of radioactive nuclide except tritium, out of the radioactive liquid waste treated in the radioactive liquid waste treatment facility, concentration of radioactive materials shall be lowered by diluting it with large amount of sea water in order to lower the effective dose as low as achievable at the premise boundary. Therefore, operation management of the ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facility shall satisfy following items.

- To enable collection of representative samples, operation duration of the circulation and agitation is appropriately set based on the circulation agitation demonstration test using sodium triphosphate as a reagent. And, in order to reduce inhomogeneous concentration of tritium in the tank before the circulation and agitation, ALPS treated water to be received in the measurement/confirmation facility shall be planned not to have large difference in tritium concentration.
- To dilute the ALPS treated water 100 times or more by seawater, operation shall be controlled to keep flow rate of the ALPS treated water 500 m^3/day at a maximum (minimum flow rate (annual average) shall be equal or more than generated volume of the contaminated water) based on the tritium concentration measured and confirmed in the measurement/confirmation process, using ALPS treated water transfer pumps, ALPS treated water flow rate control valves, ALPS treated water flowmeter, etc.; and two or more seawater transfer pumps (170 thousand m^3/day/unit) shall always be kept in operation. Further, to confirm the expected dilution in discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) and the secure operation under the operation procedure, discharge shall be carried out cautiously with small volume in the early stage.
- To make mixing/diluting effect large enough to lower the tritium concentration in the seawater after the dilution to less than 1,500 Bq/L, upper limit of the tritium concentration in the ALPS treated water to be discharged into the sea shall be 1 million Bq/L, the tritium concentration (operational value) of discharged water is set based on uncertainty throughout the sea discharging process and results of numerical simulations.
- To keep annual discharge amount of tritium, stay within the range of 22 trillion Bq, annual discharge plan of the ALPS treated water shall be prepared each fiscal year and the discharge shall follow the plan. Further, annual discharge plan shall be reviewed periodically with consideration of whole risk for decommissioning.

To satisfy these items, specific operation management of the ALPS treatment water dilution/discharge facility shall be carried out as follows.

1.9.2 Operation management of ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facility

In the ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facility, three processes of (1) receiving, (2) measurement/confirmation, and (3) discharge of ALPS treated water are carried out. (see Figure-1).



Figure-1 Process overview of ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facility

1.9.2.1 Operation process of ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facility

Process overview of (1) Receiving, (2) Measurement/confirmation, and (3) Discharge is as follows.

(1) Receiving process

Execution of "Receiving Process" of the monitoring/control device make the valve lining-up for the measurement/confirmation facility, and the ALPS treated water is received in the tank for measurement/confirmation.

(2) Measurement/confirmation process

Execution of “Measurement/confirmation Process” of the monitoring/control device make the valve lining-up of the measurement/confirmation facility, and starts up agitation equipment and circulation pumps, making water quality of tanks homogenized. Water is sampled for analysis after the predetermined operation period is elapsed for the circulation and agitation.

(3) Discharge process

Execution of “ALPS treated water Transfer Process” after starting up seawater transfer pumps by monitoring/control device and after registration of tritium concentration measurement results of ALPS treated water in (2) measurement/confirmation process, make the valve lining-up of the measurement/confirmation facility and the transfer facility, and the ALPS treated water is discharged.

Discharge operation is by a key switch so that any erroneous operation is prevented.

The Japanese version shall prevail.

1.9.2.2 Operation of tank groups for the measurement/confirmation facilities

For measurement/confirmation facility, the operation is carried out in 3 tank groups with 10 tanks as 1 group. Each of 3 tank groups in turn goes through processes of (1) Receiving, (2) Measurement/confirmation, and (3) Discharge as mentioned above rotationally. (See Figure-2)



	Group A	Group B	Group C
1st cycle	Receiving	—	—
2nd cycle	Measurement/confirmation	Receiving	—
3rd cycle	Discharge	Measurement/confirmation	Receiving
4th cycle	Receiving	Discharge	Measurement/confirmation
•••	Measurement/confirmation	Receiving	Discharge

Figure-2 Example of receiving, measurement/confirmation, and discharge process rotation

The Japanese version shall prevail.

1.9.2.3 Basic procedures in receiving, measurement/confirmation, and discharge processes

(1) Receiving, (2) measurement/confirmation, and (3) discharge processes mentioned in 1.9.2.2 shall be operated according to the procedure shown in Figure-3. An interlock is embedded to block proceeding to the next process without completing the prior process, by checking the completion by monitoring/control device.



Figure-3 Procedures of receiving, measurement/confirmation, and discharge process

The Japanese version shall prevail.

1.9.2.4 Operation procedures of measurement/confirmation process

In the measurement/confirmation process, once a target tank group is selected using the monitoring/control device and the process is executed, the rest will move on automatically based on the measurement/confirmation process flow (see Figure-4). Figures-5 to 7 show status of facility in the measurement/confirmation process.

In this process, to enable collection of representative samples, based on the prior demonstration test results, operation duration of circulation/agitation for measurement/confirmation tanks shall be in principle two rounds or more of tank water volume. However, validations shall be made as appropriate after the start of the actual service, and if the circulation and agitation can be confirmed to be enough, this will not always be the case.



Figure-4 Flow of measurement/confirmation process

The Japanese version shall prevail.



Figure-5 Status of facility in the measurement/confirmation process (before start-up)



Figure-6 Status of facility in the measurement/confirmation process (from start-up to operation)



Figure-7 Status of facility in the measurement/confirmation process (from operation to shutdown)

1.9.2.5 Operation procedures of the discharge process

In the discharge process, tritium concentration of the ALPS treated water is registered in the monitoring/control device, and the ALPS treated water transfer flow rate is set within the range of maximum 500 m^3/day (minimum flow rate (annual average) is equal to or more than generated volume of the contaminated water) so that the tritium concentration contained in the seawater after the dilution becomes less than the operation limit of 1,500 Bq/L.

The tritium concentration confirmed in the analysis of measurement/confirmation process is read mechanically by a scanner, etc., in order to prevent human errors, and is registered in monitoring/control device. The monitoring/control device automatically calculates the ALPS treated water transfer flow rate from the registered tritium concentration and sea water flow rate.

From the preparation of the dilution facility to the start of the ALPS treated water discharge, the discharge process flow (see Figure-8) shall be followed.

The monitoring/control device determines go/no-go of the discharge from the viewpoint of whether the tritium concentration after the dilution against seawater dilution volume satisfies the operation limit. The operation shift team proceeds to discharge operation using the key switch after confirming by the monitoring/control device the subject ALPS treated water is OK to discharge and discharge operation is ready.



Figure-8 Flow of discharge process

Because tritium concentration of ALPS treated water stored in the storage tanks of ALPS treated water, etc. varies from 150 thousand to 2,160 thousand Bq/L (as of April 2021), exceeding the operation limit of 1,500 Bq/L, dilution by seawater is required.

As the seawater transfer pumps are to be operated with steady flow rate, dilution ratio adjustment shall be carried out using equipment such as ALPS treated water transfer pumps, ALPS treated water flow rate control valves and ALPS treated water flowmeters. Here, to secure enough mixing and dilution effect as obtained from the numerical simulation, two or more seawater transfer pumps shall be planned to be operated.

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Tritium concentration after the dilution by seawater shall be assessed from ALPS treated water tritium concentration measured and confirmed by the measurement/confirmation facility, ALPS treated water flow rate, and seawater flow rate as shown in Figure-9. On the other hand, in the actual operations, predetermined dilution rate shall be realized by adjusting opening of ALPS treated water flow rate control valves based on assessment of tritium concentration after the seawater dilution for which a target value (operational value) is determined in advance, as shown in Figure-10.

○ **Assessment formula for tritium concentration**

$$\text{Tritium concentration after dilution with seawater (assessment value)} = \frac{\text{Tritium concentration of ALPS treated water} \times \text{ALPS treated water flow rate}}{\text{ALPS treated water flow rate} + \text{Seawater flow rate}}$$



Figure-9 Assessment formula for tritium concentration after the seawater dilution

○ **Calculation formula of ALPS treated water flow rate**

$$\text{ALPS treated water flow rate (operational value)} = \frac{\text{Seawater flow rate} \times \text{Tritium concentration after the seawater dilution (operational value)}}{\text{Tritium concentration in ALPS treated water} - \text{Tritium concentration after the seawater dilution (operational value)}}$$



Figure-10 Adjustment of dilution ratio (ALPS treated water flow rate)

The Japanese version shall prevail.

As certain uncertainties and dispersion have been identified in the study for discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, tritium concentration after the seawater dilution (operational value) shall be set so that tritium concentration at the time of discharge will not exceed 1,500 Bq/L even if all the uncertainties and dispersion work for the higher side of the tritium concentration, as shown in Figure-11.



(a) Adjustment of ALPS treated water flow rate considering uncertainty and dispersion



(b) Calculation example of tritium concentration considering uncertainty and dispersion

Figure-11 Dilution ratio adjustment considering uncertainties and dispersion

Figures-12 to 16 show facilities status in the discharge process.

The Japanese version shall prevail.



Figure-12 Facilities status in the discharge process (before start-up)



Figure-13 Facilities status of the discharge process (start-up dilution facility)



Figure-14 Facilities status of the discharge process (from tritium concentration input to FCV opening set)



Figure-15 Facilities status of the discharge process (from discharge operation to ALPS treated water transfer start)



Figure-16 Facilities status of the discharge process (from discharge completion to facility shutdown)

1.9.3 Measures to abnormal occurrence, etc.

Other than shutdown after normal operations, ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facility shall make an emergency shutdown of the discharge into the sea by automatic activation of the emergency isolation valves or by manual operation by operators when such an event occurs that can lead to "unintentional discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea."

In addition to the above, discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea shall be shut down as required when performance of facilities required to prevent or end "unintentional discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea" cannot be confirmed through inspections, etc., and its immediate recovery is determined to be difficult.

Two types exist in the shutdown of the discharge into the sea, which are normal shutdown and emergency shutdown, and as Figure-17 shows, these types differ only in order of activation of the emergency isolation valves and have design of almost similar facilities with shutdown/operation instructions (see Figure-18 for detailed status of the facilities of emergency shutdown).

Following events are assumed for the normal shutdown operations.

- When a natural phenomenon etc., occurs which can impact ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and its related facility
- When abnormal values are detected in sea area monitoring
- When the Shift Supervisor determines necessary



Figure-17 Normal and emergency shutdown flows during the discharge process

The Japanese version shall prevail.



Figure-18 Facilities status of the discharge process (emergency shutdown)

Natural phenomena which may impact ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facility mentioned before are assumed as Table-1.
In order to detect these natural phenomena, operators check information of earthquakes and tsunamis through the internet, FAX from the central power feed command center, commercial television, etc., and shutdown the ALPS treated water discharge by following normal shutdown procedures of the ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities.
When the Shift supervisor determines the facility needs to be shut down in situations such that other natural phenomenon damages the facility, leading to possible “unintentional discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea,” ALPS treated water discharge shall be shut down.

Table-1 Natural phenomena which lead to shutdown of the discharge into the sea

No.	Events that lead to manual shutdown	Reason for shutdown
1	Earthquakes with a seismic intensity of 5-lower or more	To minimize the impact of functional loss of the facility caused by an earthquake
2	Tsunami advisory	Because of the risk of getting the facility on T.P. 2.5m damaged by tsunamis
3	Hazardous wind watches	Because of the risk of each facility getting damaged by tornadoes
4	High tide warning	Because of the risk of the discharge into the sea by water head as designed blocked
5	Other	Other than 1 to 4 above, to shut down the discharge into the sea when there is symptom of anomaly and the Shift supervisor determines necessary

The Japanese version shall prevail.

1.9.4 Management of annual discharge amount of tritium

In the ALPS treated water discharge into the sea, to keep the tritium discharge amount stay within the range of 22 TBq per year, management method at the time of planning and operations shall be as follows.

Annual discharge amount of tritium is to be reviewed periodically in the Government Policy. On the other hand, in the ALPS treated water discharge into the sea, with the intent of contributing to lowering overall risk of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, the annual volume of the tritium discharge is to be reviewed considering the overall risk of the decommissioning.

1.9.4.1 Management of annual discharge amount of tritium at the time of planning

In each fiscal year, at the same timing of disclosing total discharge amount of actual tritium for the fiscal year, discharge of the next fiscal year shall be planned after detailed study about contaminated water generation status (historical change), tritium concentration (historical change) at the inlet of the desalination equipment (RO), utilization plan of the premise going forward, etc. In the planning, the basic policy shall be that ALPS treated water of the lowest tritium concentration is discharged first, followed by the next lower one and so on. Based on the numerical simulation conditions of ALPS treated water mixing and dilution (see “II 2.50 ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities and Related Facility”), upper limit of the tritium concentration in the ALPS treated water discharged into the sea shall be 1 million Bq/L.

ALPS treated water to be discharged consists of “A. ALPS treated water generated daily” and “B. ALPS treated water stored in the tanks” (see Figure-19.)

As of the end of March 2022, the volume of B of which tritium concentration is lower than that of A is limited. Therefore, the water to be discharged shall mainly consist of ALPS treated water of A, and ALPS treated water of B shall be discharged in order with less than 22 TBq of total discharge amount including the other drainage stipulated in Implementation Plan III (Article 41 of Part 1 and Article 88 of Part 2). When discharging B, to reduce dispersion of tritium concentration inside the tanks before the circulation and agitation, tank groups with not much difference in tritium concentration shall be planned to be received.



Figure-19 ALPS treated water to be discharge

The Japanese version shall prevail.

In the discharge planning, to make the total annual discharge amount of tritium including the other discharge in accordance with Implementation Plan III (Article 41 of Part 1 and Article 88 of Part 2) stay within the range of 22 TBq. Annual discharge volume (6) and average tritium concentration (7) of ALPS treated water, etc. stored in the tanks shall be calculated as follows. Based on that, to satisfy (6) and (7), discharge sequence of the tank groups is planned with ALPS treated water of lower tritium concentration having higher priority and with operations in mind.

A. ALPS treated water generated daily

(1) Concentration of tritium at the inlet of the desalination (RO) equipment
× (2) Generated volume of contaminated water
= (3) Annual discharge amount of tritium regarding A

B. ALPS treated water stored in the tanks

(4) Annual discharge amount of tritium - (3) = (5) Annual discharge amount of tritium regarding B

(6) Annual discharge volume of B: Based on "Mid-and-Long-Term Decommissioning Action Plan," water volume is determined from area where the tank dismantling needs to be started.

(5) /(6) = (7) Average tritium concentration of B

Table-2 Discharge planning procedures

Type of water	Average tritium concentration [Bq/L]	Annual discharge volume [m^3/year]	Annual discharge amount of tritium [Bq/year]
A	(1) Concentration of tritium at the inlet of the desalination (RO) equipment	(2) Generated volume of contaminated water x 365 [days/year]	(3): (1) x 1000 [L/m^3] x (2) x 365 [days/year]
B	(7):(5)÷(6)÷1000[L/m^3]	(6) From the premise utilization plan	(5): (4) - (3)
Total	—	—	(4): Annual discharge amount of tritium

The Japanese version shall prevail.

1.9.4.2 Management of annual discharge amount of tritium during operations

During operations, annual volume of tritium discharge is controlled to stay within the range of 22 TBq by implementing following measures to facilities (see Figure 20.)

(1) Tritium concentration of ALPS treated water to be discharged is registered into the monitoring/control device for each discharge, and the flow rate of ALPS treated water during the discharge is monitored by the monitoring/control device and the integrating flow volume is counted/recorded. By this, tritium discharge amount of each discharge is calculated.

(2) Upper limit for the annual discharge amount of tritium can be set in the monitoring/control device, and if annual integrating amount of tritium discharge calculated by (1) threatens to exceed the set value, an interlock shall be embedded to prevent proceeding to the discharge operations so that the operations won't let the annual discharge amount of tritium exceed the range of 22 TBq.

The design allows confirmation of the data above anytime through the monitoring/control device.



Figure-20 Control method in the monitoring/control device for annual volume of discharge

The Japanese version shall prevail.

1.9.5 Adequacy of facility design and operation on ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facility

As the discharge of the ALPS treated water into the sea needs to be stable for long term, design and operation of the ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facility shall take into account anomalies such as components failures assumed during its service life. Provided above, for a case of such anomalies leading to “unintentional discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea,” adequacy shall be confirmed about measures to end the event immediately.

Meanwhile, the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) and the discharge facility are taken out from the subjects in which abnormal events are to be identified because their internal water is ALPS treated water diluted with seawater and their structure has superior seismic resistance characteristics (see “II 2.50 ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities and Related Facility.”)

1.9.5.1. Analysis of failure events

1.9.5.1.1 Definition of the top event and the abnormal event

(1) Definition of the top event

In the analysis of failure events in the ALPS treated water dilution and discharge facility, the top event is defined as “unintended discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea.” The definition assumes, at the time of discharging ALPS treated water into the sea, an event of ALPS treated water discharged into the sea without satisfying conditions stipulated in the plan.

(1) Definition of the abnormal event

Specific details (the abnormal events) of “unintended discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea,” which is defined as the top event, is defined.

Here, planned conditions for the ALPS treated water discharge into the sea are organized as shown in Table-3, and discharge without satisfying these conditions by components failures etc. (initiating events) assumable during its service period are defined as the abnormal events (see Table-4.)

Table-3 Plan for discharging ALPS treated water into the sea

No.	Planned details		Remarks
1	Water to be discharged	ALPS treated water	Sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of radioactive materials other than tritium is less than 1.
2	Discharge method	Concentration of tritium, which is difficult to remove, in the water diluted by seawater shall be less than 1,500 Bq/L.	Operation of determining ALPS treated water flow rate based on tritium concentration, which has been identified in advance, in the ALPS treated water and seawater flow rate.
		At the discharge, ALPS treated water shall be greatly diluted (100 times or more).	Based on the maximum flow rate of ALPS treated water of 500 m^3/day and the seawater transfer pump of 170,000 m^3/day per unit, even if only a single seawater transfer pump is in operation, dilution with 340 times is achievable.
3	Transfer by the transfer facility and discharge through the dilution facility		

Table-4 Definition of the abnormal event

Abnormal events	
[Definition (1)]	An event of discharging with defective measurement/confirmation of radioactive material (defective measurement/confirmation)
[Definition (2)]	An event of discharging with tritium concentration in the water diluted by seawater being 1,500 Bq/L or more, or with dilution ratio being less than 100 times (insufficient seawater dilution)
[Definition (3)]	An event of discharging without seawater dilution due to leakage out to the system (lack of seawater dilution)

1.9.5.1.2 Identifying initiating events and causes which lead to the abnormal events

In identifying initiating events and causes which lead to the abnormal events as defined in 1.9.5.1.1, the master logic diagram* (hereinafter "MLD,") which is simplified fault tree analysis, shall be used for analysis.

In the MLD analysis, considerations shall be made at each of 5 levels as shown in Table-5, and occurrence of the abnormal events is deemed prevented if measures (in design and operations) in 5 levels have been adequately implemented (see Figure-21 for an image of analysis procedures).

*: This is a top down analysis method to identify initiating events from the top event, exposing initiating events and causes which lead to the abnormal events.

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Table-5 Details of the MLD analysis at each level

	Analysis details
Level 1	Place “unintentional discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea” which is the top events
Level 2	Place 3 abnormal events which are the definition of the top events (see Figure-21)
Level 3	For the abnormal events defined in the level 2, specific events with potential of leading to the abnormal events are identified from structures, systems and components of ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities (including power source and instrumentation/control systems) which belong to ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and related facility, and which handle ALPS treated water before and during seawater dilution with focus on expected functions in each process while referring to facility specs, piping and instrumentation diagrams, interlock block diagrams, components layout and operations procedures.
Level 4	Identify a single failure of components or malfunction of it, or a single erroneous operation of an operator or an external disturbance which is expected to occur with similar frequency, all of which are expected during the service period the facility and are leading to the level 3.
Level 5	Confirm adequacy of measures in facility design and operations against the initiating events at the level 4



Figure-21 Assessment method using the master logic diagram (MLD)

The Japanese version shall prevail.

1.9.5.1.3 Analysis results of the abnormal events using MLD

Table-6 shows results of analysis using MLD

The analysis has found out the abnormal event (1) “an event of discharging with defective measurement/confirmation of radioactive material (defective measurement/confirmation)” and the abnormal event (3) “an event of discharging without seawater dilution due to leakage out to the system” won’t occur as appropriate measures (such as embedding interlock checks in measurement/confirmation process and discharge process, operations in place to close valves upstream through inspection patrols and leakage detectors, etc., at the time of leakage from components, etc.) are implemented.

On the other hand, as following events has been identified for the abnormal event (2) “an event of discharging with tritium concentration in the diluted seawater being 1,500 Bq/L or more, or with dilution ratio being less than 100 times (insufficient seawater dilution),” impact assessment shall be implemented.

- Initiating event (1) “Loss of off-site power supply”
- Initiating event (2) “Seawater transfer pump trip while two or three units of them under operation”

Table-6 Results of analysis using MLD (1/5)

Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4			Level 5	Level 6
Top event	Definition of the abnormal event (OR condition)	Specific events (OR condition)	Initiating events			Measures (AND condition)	Impact
			Timing of occurrence	Abnormality category	Contents		
"Unintentional discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea"	(1) An event of discharging radioactive materials with defective measurement/confirmation	Inadequate sampling	Measurement/ confirmation process	Human error	Selection error when selecting a tank group for water sampling (Double action input failed)	• Set up an interlock check • Check open/close status of the valves at the time of water sampling	(Prevention)
				Facility (static)	Water from tank groups other than the target tank group is mixed into the water sampling point.	• Make tank inlet valves and outlet valves dual-redundant respectively. • Check open/close status of the valves at the time of water sampling • Perform time-based maintenance for the circulation line switching valves at appropriate timings	(Prevention)
				Human error	Wrong sample for which analysis is requested	• Workers and analysts check together by matching the analysis instructions with sample bottles	(Prevention)
		Inadequate analysis	Measurement/ confirmation process	Human error	Incorrect analysis procedures	• Check by matching internal analysis results with third-party analysis results	(Prevention)
				Human error	Analytical results of wrong samples are notified to the Group Manager who is responsible for management of discharge of liquid waste, etc.	• Notify data through the core system without transcription • Analysts, etc., check trends of results	(Prevention)
				Human error	Abnormal values in the analysis results are overlooked	• Analyst detect abnormal values from the latest trends • Group Manager who is responsible for analysis and data evaluation detect abnormal values from past analysis results, etc.	(Prevention)
				Human error	Analysis results of wrong samples are notified to the Shift supervisor	• Notify data through the core system without transcription • Analysts, etc., to check trends of results	(Prevention)
		Sample homogenization insufficient	Measurement/ confirmation process	Facility (static)	Insufficient agitation and circulation due to shutdown (failure) of agitation equipment or circulating pump	• Circulation operation shutdown due to agitation equipment shutdown • Regularly check the operation status with the monitoring/control device	(Prevention)
				Facility (static)	Insufficient circulation due to lowered circulating pump flow rate	• An interlock to shut down the circulation pump is activated with the circulation pump's low flow rate signal • Regularly check the flow rate with the monitoring/control device	(Prevention)
		Wrong discharge tank	Discharge process	Human error	Selection error when selecting a tank group from which water is to be discharged (Double action input failed)	• Set up an interlock check • Compare analysis results with the target tank before the discharge operation	(Prevention)

Countermeasures → Blue: Design, Green: Operation

Table-6 Results of analysis using MLD (2/5)

Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4			Level 5	Level 6
Top event	Definition of the abnormal event (OR condition)	Specific events (OR condition)	Initiating events			Measures (AND condition)	Impact
			Timing of occurrence	Abnormality category	Contents		
"Unintentional discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea"	(2) An event of discharging with tritium concentration in the diluted seawater being 1,500 Bq/L or more, or with dilution ratio being less than 100 times	Defective dilution	Measurement/ confirmation process	Human error	When the tritium concentration is registered to the oversight/control system, a value lower than the actual value is input incorrectly (-> Making the FCV opening larger)	• Mechanically input tritium concentrations to the monitoring/control device using a scanner, etc. • More than one person to check the values mechanically imported to the oversight/control system	(Prevention)
			Discharge process	Facility (static)	Loss of off-site power supply	• In the event of loss of the power, the emergency isolation valve-1 (MO) closes automatically • In the event of loss of the power, the emergency isolation valve-2 (AO) closes automatically • Installation of tank inlet/outlet manual valves enables closing	(1) Discharge assuming a single failure of the emergency isolation valve
				Facility (static)	Failure of the power source panel (M/C) while two or three seawater transfer pumps operating	• In the event of seawater transfer pump failure, the emergency isolation valve-1 (MO) closes automatically • In the event of seawater transfer pump failure, the emergency isolation valve-2 (AO) closes automatically • When lowering of flow rate detected by a seawater flow meter exceeds a certain value, the emergency isolation valve-1 (MO) closes automatically • When lowering of flow rate detected by a seawater flow meter exceeds a certain value, the emergency isolation valve-2 (AO) closes automatically • Tank inlet/outlet manual valves enable closing • *Make arithmetic units dual-redundant*	(1) Discharge assuming a single failure of the emergency isolation valve
				Facility (dynamic)	Pump failure while 2 or 3 seawater transfer pumps operating	(Same as the above)	(1) Discharge assuming a single failure of the emergency isolation valve

Countermeasures → Blue: Design, Green: Operation

Table-6 Results of analysis using MLD (3/5)

Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4			Level 5	Level 6
Top event	Definition of the abnormal event (OR condition)	Specific events (OR condition)	Initiating events			Measures (AND condition)	Impact
			Timing of occurrence	Abnormality category	Contents		
"Unintentional discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea"	(2) An event of discharging with tritium concentration in the diluted seawater being 1,500 Bq/L or more, or with dilution ratio being less than 100 times	Defective dilution	Discharge process	Facility (static)	An error occurs in the indicated value of the seawater flow meter, but the interlock fails to activate	• Perform time-based maintenance for the seawater flow meter at appropriate timings • Activate an alarm if an instrument fails • Monitor the deviation of flow rate indication values of two or three seawater transfer pumps, and when the deviation exceeding the instrument error margin is observed, activate an alarm	(Prevention)
				Facility (static)	An abnormality occurs in the indication value of the ALPS treated water flow meter (-> Leading to an inadequate opening of the FCV), but an interlock fails to activate	• Perform time-based maintenance for the ALPS treated water flow meters at appropriate timings • Make ALPS treated water flow meters dual-redundant • Activate an alarm if an instrument fails • Set the upper limit on the flow rate according to the set dilution ratio, and activate an alarm when the upper limit is reached	(Prevention)
				Facility (static)	FCV failure (mechanical failure such as valving element failure)	• Embedding an interlock of activating the emergency isolation valves when the indicated value of the ALPS treated water flow meter does not get close to the calculated value of the monitoring/control device • [Addition] Make ALPS treated water flow meter dual-redundant • Installation of the emergency isolation valve-1 (MO) enables closing • Installation of the emergency isolation valve-2 (AO) enables closing • Tank inlet/outlet manual valves enable closing • Make arithmetic units dual-redundant	(Prevention)
				Facility (static)	Leakage occurs at the down-stream flange of the seawater flow meter	• Adopt seawater transfer pumps with sufficient capacity margin for the required functions • Execution of periodic patrol inspections	(Prevention)

Countermeasures → Blue: Design, Green: Operation

Table-6 Results of analysis using MLD (4/5)

Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4			Level 5	Level 6
Top event	Definition of the abnormal event (OR condition)	Specific events (OR condition)	Initiating events			Measures (AND condition)	Impact
			Timing of occurrence	Abnormality category	Contents		
"Unintentional discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea"	(3) An event of discharging without seawater dilution due to leakage out to the system	Leakage	Always (including inspection period)	Facility (static)	[Reference] Complete destruction of 3 tank groups*	• If a natural phenomenon shown in Table-1 occurs, the system shall be shut down.	Impact assessment from the loss of functions is carried out (see "II 2.50 ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities and Related Facility")
				Facility (static)	[Reference] Rupture of the transfer pipe*	• Execution of periodic patrol inspections • Connection between the PE pipes shall be a fusion structure. • Surrounding weirs outside of the foundation are installed around tanks with flanges • Weirs and leakage detectors are installed around circulation pumps with flanges	(Prevention)
					Leakage from a circulation pipe flange		
			Always (including inspection period)	Facility (static)	Leakage from a transfer piping flange between a tank outlet and a MO shut-off valve	• Execution of periodic patrol inspections • Connection between the PE pipes shall be a fusion structure. • Surrounding weirs outside of the foundation are installed around tanks with flanges • Weirs and leakage detectors are installed around ALPS treated water transfer pumps with flanges • A vent valve cover and a leak detector are installed on the vent valve with flange. [Additional] Make the leak detector dual-redundant	(Prevention)

*: Assuming the occurrence of an earthquake exceeding the seismic category (C class) of this facility

Countermeasures → Blue: Design, Green: Operation

Table-6 Results of analysis using MLD (5/5)

Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4			Level 5	Level 6
Top event	Definition of the abnormal event (OR condition)	Specific events (OR condition)	Initiating events			Measures (AND condition)	Impact
			Timing of occurrence	Abnormality category	Contents		
Unintentional discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea	(3) An event of discharging without seawater dilution due to leakage out to the system	Leakage	Always (including inspection period)	Facility (static)	Leakage from the transfer pipe flange between the MO isolation valve and the AO isolation valve	• Execution of periodic patrol inspections • Connection between the PE pipes shall be a fusion structure. • Weirs around MO/AO valves with flanges are installed	(Prevention)
			Always (including inspection period)	Facility (static)	Leakage from the transfer pipe flange between the AO isolation valve and the seawater piping header	• Execution of periodic patrol inspections • Connection between the PE pipes shall be a fusion structure. • Weirs around AO valves with flanges are installed	(Prevention)
			Discharge process	Facility (static)	Receiving tank overflow caused by events such as loss of driver (compression air) for the emergency isolation valve-2 (AO valve)	• Execution of periodic patrol inspections • Switching of discharge directions can be detected by the limit switch of the AO valve • Operation of the AO valve can be detected from the pressure gauge of the compression air (an interlock to shut down discharge exists) • Water level meter (electrode type) is installed in the receiving tanks	(Prevention)
			Discharge process	Facility (dynamic)	Receiving tank overflow by the prior valve sheet pass of the emergency isolation valve-2 (AO valve) on shutdown side during discharge	• Execution of periodic patrol inspections • Water level meter (electrode type) is installed in the receiving tanks • Weirs are installed around the receiving tank (a leak detector exists)	(Prevention)

Countermeasures → Blue: Design, Green: Operation

1.9.5.2 Impact assessment at the time of failure

Based on the MLD analysis in 1.9.5.1, impact is assessed for the following events which have been identified as (2) “An event of discharging with tritium concentration in the diluted seawater being 1,500 Bq/L or more, or with dilution ratio being less than 100 times (insufficient seawater dilution),” considering functional loss status of components, etc. which consist the ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities.

- Initiating event (1) “Loss of off-site power supply”
- Initiating event (2) “Seawater transfer pump trip while two or three units of them under operation*”

*: A power source panel failure and a pump failure are identified as the cause of the trip.

1.9.5.2.1 Setting of initial conditions for abnormal events

For the identified initiating events, the toughest initial conditions and components conditions from the view point of discharge volume of ALPS treated water are set as follows.

Initial conditions

As (2) “an event of discharging with tritium concentration in the diluted seawater being 1,500 Bq/L or more, or with dilution ratio being less than 100 times (insufficient seawater dilution)” occurs during discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, situation of normal operations is assumed.

Components conditions

As it is normal operations, the plan is to control ALPS treated water flow rate by FCV to be 500 m^3/day (an interlock is embedded to shut down the discharge into the sea when the 500m^3/day is exceeded), but 720m^3/day is assumed conservatively which is the components spec of a single ALPS treated water transfer pump.

2 seawater transfer pumps are assumed to be operating (340 thousand m^3/day), and even though driving power to the pumps are terminated because of the initiating events (1) or (2), continuation of the seawater dilution is expected because of the inertial force, but, conservatively, it is not assumed.

1.9.5.2.2 Components to address abnormal events and their activation conditions

Emergency isolation valves for immediate shut-off the ALPS treated water discharge into the sea and the logic circuit required for its operation shall be provided with the components required to address with abnormal events.

Response time of the signal for activate the emergency isolation valves and the time for the emergency isolation valves are fully closed, set the time so that the assessment result becomes severe.

Installation locations and activation method of the emergency isolation valves are as shown in Table -7 and Figure-22.

Table-7 Design of emergency isolation valve

Design	Emergency isolation valve-1	Emergency isolation valve-2
Location of installation	Location not subject to damage by tsunami	Placed at the furthest down-stream of ALPS treated water transfer piping to minimize the volume of discharge during activation of valve.
Operating system	MO system (Open to Close Time: 10 seconds)	AO system (Open to Close Time: 2 seconds)
Concept of design	Two series are provided and, in the event of failure and maintenance, the series can be switched by manual valve at the front and rear valves to keep the facility operation rate.	(Same as on the left)



Figure-22 Image of installation location of emergency isolation valves

The Japanese version shall prevail.

1.9.5.2.3. Assumption of a single failure, etc. in abnormal events

A single failure, etc., for which assessment results of dynamic components become the severest, are assumed for facilities required to address abnormal events. For static components, which will be used for long hours (24 hours or more) after an abnormal event occurs, its single failure, etc., are assumed.

Specifically, for both initiating events identified in the MLD analysis of 1.9.5.1, which are (1) “loss of off-site power supply” and (2) “Seawater transfer pump trip while two or three units of them under operation,” shutdown of the discharge into the sea by the emergency isolation valves is being a countermeasure for “unintentional discharge of the ALPS treated water,” and the emergency isolation valves with a function of shutting down the discharge into the sea are being the required facilities to address abnormal events. Therefore, a single failure, etc., which leads to the severest assessment results for the emergency isolation valves is assumed.

Assumption of a single failure, etc.

A single failure of the emergency isolation valve-2, which is located the furthest down-stream of the ALPS treated water transfer piping to minimize discharge volume at the time of the valve activation, and which is the AO type with the shortest time of 2 seconds from open to close, is assumed in the ALPS treated water dilution and discharge facility.



Figure-23 Image of facilities status at the time of an abnormal event and a single failure, etc.

The Japanese version shall prevail.

1.9.5.2.4 Assessment at the time of abnormal event

Here, discharge volume of ALPS treated water is assessed based on the conditions set in 1.9.5.2.1 to 1.9.5.2.3.

(1) Discharge volume of ALPS treated water caused by the initiating event (1) "Loss of off-site power supply"

An event is assumed of discharging ALPS treated water into the sea without sufficient dilution when “loss of off-site power supply” occurs due to power transmission system failure, etc. during the ALPS treated water discharge into the sea and the discharge continues by reasons such as tank water head pressure and elevation differences even though the seawater transfer pumps and ALPS treated water transfer pumps are shut down.

Should this event occur, the discharge into the sea will be terminated in 10 seconds or earlier after the loss of off-site power supply because the event will also cut the power supply to the emergency isolation valve and the emergency isolation valve-1 will be fully closed due to the fail-close function of the valve.

Assessment result

In 10 seconds until the emergency isolation valve-1 closes, approximately 1.1m^3 of ALPS treated water is discharged without sufficient dilution, calculated by adding internal water volume (approx. 1.02m^3), which is contained between the emergency isolation valve-1 and the seawater pipe header (about 130m), and the ALPS treated water volume (approx. 0.08m^3), which is conservatively postulated to be transferred by the inertial force of ALPS treated water transfer pump. (See Figure-24)



Figure-24 Image of abnormal event (1) "Loss of off-site power supply"

The Japanese version shall prevail.

(2) Discharge volume of ALPS treated water caused by the initiating event (2) “Seawater transfer pump trip when two or three units of them under operation”

Assume an event in which the seawater flow rate for diluting ALPS treated water is reduced due to the occurrence of "sea water transfer pump trip during operations of 2 or 3 units of them" etc. during the discharge of ALPS treated water.

This event is a condition in which the emergency isolation valve activates according to a signal of “seawater flow rate low” or “sea water transfer pump trip.” While the seawater transfer pump trip is activated by the power source relay and no time constant exists, seawater flow rate low has a time constant in measurement of the flow rate (4 seconds). Here, and with this time constant, “seawater flow rate low” is more conservative. Therefore, 5 seconds are assumed for the process starting from the occurrence of a pump trip due to a failure of seawater transfer pump or power source panel, then to the measurement of flow rate by the seawater flow meter and its communication to the monitoring/control device, and finally to issuance of activation signal from the monitoring/control device to the emergency isolation valve. As the assumed 5 seconds are added to the 10 seconds required to fully close the valve, the discharge into the sea will be terminated in 15 seconds or less.

Assessment result

Approximately 1.2m^3 of ALPS treated water, which is addition of internal water (approx. 1.02m^3) between the emergency isolation valve-1 and the seawater piping header (approx. 130m) and the volume to ALPS treated water (approx. 0.12m^3) transferred from the ALPS treated water transfer pump during 15 seconds of the emergency isolation valve closure motion, will be discharged without sufficient dilution. (see Figure-25)



Figure-25 Image of an abnormal event at the time of the initiating event (2) “Seawater transfer pump trip while two or three units of them under operation”

2.5 Summary

The abnormal events identified here is settled by the emergency isolation valve-1 within 15 seconds or less after the occurrence. And, as the discharge volume assessed here (approx. 1.2m^3 at a maximum) is sufficiently low compared to the currently planned ALPS treated water discharge volume (500m^3/day at a maximum), the design and operations of the ALPS treated water dilution and discharge facilities are sufficient for safety.

End

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Annex 27

Supplementary information on the ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities

The Japanese version shall prevail.

I Structural Strength of ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities

1. Methods and results of structural strength assessment

1.1 Main pipe (steel pipes other than seawater pipe headers)

Figures-1 to 5 show the evaluation points of structural strength.



Figure-1 Schematic diagram of pipe (1/5)

(Measurement/Confirmation Facility)

The Japanese version shall prevail.



Figure-2 Schematic diagram of pipe (2/5)

(Measurement/Confirmation Facility)



Figure-3 Schematic diagram of pipe (3/5)

(Measurement/Confirmation Facility)

The Japanese version shall prevail.



Figure-4 Schematic diagram of pipe (4/5)

(Transfer Facility)

The Japanese version shall prevail.



<Specification of pipes from seawater transfer pumps to seawater pipe header>

	Nominal diameter	Material
Pipe a	800A	STPY400
Pipe b	900A	STPY400
Pipe c	900A	SUS329J4L

Figure-5 Schematic diagram of pipe (5/5)
(Transfer Facility, Dilution Facility)

The Japanese version shall prevail.

1.2 Evaluation Method of Structural Strength

The required thickness of the pipe shall be the larger of the values listed below.

a. A pipe under pressure on its inner surface

Pipe thickness required for calculation: $t = \frac{PD_0}{2S\eta+0.8P}$

P : Max. working pressure (MPa)

D_0 : Outer diameter of pipe (mm)

S : Allowable tensile stress of material at maximum working temperature (MPa)

η : Efficiency of the longitudinal joint

b. Minimum required thickness for design and construction code for carbon steel pipes: t_r

Values prescribed in the table PPD-3411-1 of Design and Construction Standard PPD-3411 (3)

1.3 Evaluation Results of Structural Strength

Table-1 Evaluation Results of Structural Strength of Main Pipe (Steel Pipes other than Seawater Pipe Header)

Evaluated components	D_0 (mm)	Material	P (MPa)	S (MPa)	η	Maximum working temperature (℃)	Tolerance	Nominal thickness (mm)	Required thickness (mm)	Minimum thickness (mm)
Pipe ①	114.3	SUS316LTP	0.98	[redacted]	[redacted]	40	[redacted]	4.0	0.48	3.50
Pipe ②	216.3	SUS316LTP	0.49	[redacted]	[redacted]	40	[redacted]	6.5	0.46	5.68
Pipe ③	139.8	SUS316LTP	0.98	[redacted]	[redacted]	40	[redacted]	5.0	0.59	4.37
Pipe ④	165.2	SUS316LTP	0.98	[redacted]	[redacted]	40	[redacted]	5.0	0.69	4.37
Pipe ⑤	216.3	SUS316LTP	0.98	[redacted]	[redacted]	40	[redacted]	6.5	0.91	5.68
Pipe ⑥	165.2	SUS316LTP	0.49	[redacted]	[redacted]	40	[redacted]	5.0	0.35	4.37
Pipe ⑦	89.1	SUS316LTP	0.49	[redacted]	[redacted]	40	[redacted]	4.0	0.19	3.50
Pipe ⑧	48.6	SUS316LTP	0.98	[redacted]	[redacted]	40	[redacted]	3.0	0.21	2.50
Pipe ⑨	114.3	SUS316LTP	0.60	[redacted]	[redacted]	40	[redacted]	4.0	0.30	3.50
Pipe ⑩	1828.8	SM400B	0.60	[redacted]	[redacted]	40	[redacted]	16.0	9.11	14.20

2. Main Pipe (seawater Pipe header)

Figure-6 shows the evaluation points of structural strength.



Figure 6: Structural strength evaluation locations for seawater piping header

The Japanese version shall prevail.

2.1 Straight Pipe Part

2.1.1 Evaluation Method of Structural Strength

Confirm that the minimum thickness of the steel pipe satisfies the required thickness prescribed in the “Design and Construction Standard PPD-3411: Equation (PPD-1.3)” or “Design and Construction Standard PPD-3411 (3): Table PPD-3411-1”.

The required thickness of the pipe shall be the larger of the following values.

a. A pipe under pressure on its inner surface

The thickness required for the pipe calculation: $t = \frac{PD_0}{2S\eta+0.8P}$

P : Max. working pressure (MPa)

D_0 : Outer diameter of pipe (mm)

S : Allowable tensile stress of material at maximum working temperature (MPa)

η : Efficiency of the longitudinal joint

b. Minimum required thickness for designing and constructing carbon steel pipes: t_r

Values obtained from the table PPD-3411-1 of Design and Construction Standard PPD-3411 (3)

2.1.2 Evaluation Results of Structural Strength

Evaluation results are given in Table-2. It evaluates the pipe satisfies the required thickness and sufficient structural strength.

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Table-2 Evaluation Results of Structural Strength at Straight Pipe Part of Seawater Pipe Headers

Evaluated part	D_0 (mm)	Material	P (MPa)	S (MPa)	η	Maximum working temperature (℃)	Tolerance	Nominal thickness (mm)	Required thickness (mm)	Minimum thickness (mm)
①Main pipe	2235.2	SM400B	0.60	[redacted]	[redacted]	40	[redacted]	16.0	11.14	14.20
②Outlet pipe	1828.8	SM400B	0.60	[redacted]	[redacted]	40	[redacted]	16.0	9.11	14.20
③Sea water Nozzle pipe	914.4	SM400B	0.60	[redacted]	[redacted]	40	[redacted]	16.0	4.56	14.20
④ALPS Treated water Injection pipe	114.3	STPG370	0.60	[redacted]	[redacted]	40	[redacted]	6.0	3.40	5.25
⑤Vent pipe	114.3	STPG370	0.60	[redacted]	[redacted]	40	[redacted]	6.0	3.40	5.25
⑥Drain pipe	114.3	STPG370	0.60	[redacted]	[redacted]	40	[redacted]	6.0	3.40	5.25
⑦Inspection manhole	609.6	SM400B	0.60	[redacted]	[redacted]	40	[redacted]	16.0	3.80	14.20

2.2 Reducer

2.2.1 Evaluation Method of Structural Strength

Confirm that the minimum thickness of the reducer satisfies the required thickness prescribed in "Design and Construction Standard PPD-3415.1: Equation (PPD-1.8 and PPD-1.9)".

The required thickness of the reducer shall be the larger of the following values.

a. Cone part

The thickness required for calculation: $t = \frac{PD_i}{2cos\theta(S\eta - 0.6P)}$

P : Max. working pressure (MPa)

D_i : The inside diameter of the section perpendicular to the axis of the part where the conic part connects to the bottom part of its roundness (mm)

θ : 1/2 of the apex angle of the cone (degrees)

S : Allowable tensile stress of material at maximum working temperature (MPa)

η : Efficiency of the longitudinal joint

b. The bottom part of its roundness

The thickness required for calculation: $t = \frac{PD_iW}{4cos\theta(S\eta - 0.1P)}$

Where, $W = \frac{1}{4}\left(3 + \sqrt{\frac{D_i}{2rcos\theta}}\right)$

D_i : The inside diameter of the section perpendicular to the axis of the part where the conic part connects to the bottom part of its roundness (mm)

θ : 1/2 of the apex angle of the cone (degrees)

S : Allowable tensile stress of material at maximum working temperature (MPa)

η : Efficiency of the longitudinal joint

r : The inner radius of the bottom part of its roundedness (mm)

2.2.2 Evaluation Results of Structural Strength

Evaluation results are given in Table-3. It is evaluated to satisfy the required thickness and structural strength.

Table-3 Result of structural strength evaluation of reducer

Evaluated component	Evaluation part	Material	P (MPa)	S (MPa)	D_i (mm)	θ (degree)	η	Maximum working temperature (℃)	Tolerance	Nominal thickness (mm)	Required thickness (mm)	Minimum thickness (mm)
Seawater pipe header	Reducer	SM400B	0.60	[redacted]	2203.2	11.5	[redacted]	40	[redacted]	16.0	11.31	14.20

2.3 End plate

The end plate of seawater pipe headers is saucer-shaped in accordance with the conditions of "Design and Construction Standard PPD-3415.2(1)".

2.3.1 Evaluation method Structural strength

Confirm that the minimum thickness of the head plate of seawater pipe headers satisfies the required thickness prescribed in "Design and Construction Standard PPD-3415: Equation 2 (PPD-1.12)."

The required thickness of the head plate shall be the following values.

$$\text{The thickness required for calculation: } t = \frac{PRW}{2S\eta - 0.2P}$$

$$\text{However,} W = \frac{1}{4}\left(3 + \sqrt{\frac{R}{r}}\right)$$

P : Max. working pressure (MPa)

R : Inner radius of the center of the end plate (mm)

S : Allowable tensile stress of material at maximum working temperature (MPa)

η : Efficiency of the longitudinal joint

r : Inner radius of fillet radius of saucer-shaped end plate(mm)

2.3.2 Evaluation Results of Structural Strength

The evaluation of the saucer-shaped plate is shown in Table-4-1. In addition, the evaluation results of structural strength are shown in table-4-2. It is evaluated to satisfy the required thickness and to have sufficient structural strength.

Table-4-1 Evaluation of flat head plate

Evaluated component	Evaluation Part	Material	Outer Diameter: D_{oc} (mm)	Radius of the inner surface in the central portion: R (mm)	Inner radius of roundness: r (mm)	Three times the thickness: $3t_{co}$ (mm)	$0.06D_{oc}$ (mm)
Seawater pipe header	End plate	SM400B	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	48.0	[redacted]

Assessment: Since $D_{oc} \geqq R$, $r \geqq 3t_{co}$, $r \geqq 0.06D_{oc}$ and $r \geqq 50$mm, the mirror plate is a flat mirror plate.

Table-4-2: Evaluation results of structural strength of head plate

Evaluated component	Evaluation Part	Material	P (MPa)	S (MPa)	R (mm)	R (mm)	η	Maximum working temperature (℃)	Tolerance	Nominal thickness (mm)	Required thickness (mm)	Minimum thickness (mm)
Seawater pipe header	End plate	SM400B	0.60	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	40	[redacted]	16.0	10.19	13.40

2.4 Reinforcement of holes

2.4.1 Evaluation Method of Structural Strength

Evaluate the necessity of reinforcement of holes provided in seawater pipe headers by “Design and Construction Standard PPD-3422”, and if reinforcement of holes is required, confirm that the required area is satisfied with prescribed in “Design and Construction Standards PPD-3424 (1).”

Reinforcement of holes in seawater pipe headers is not required if either of the hole diameters required by “Design and Construction Standard PPD-3422” is satisfied.

(1) Hole diameter 64 mm or less and hole diameter of 1/4 or less of pipe inner diameter

(2) Excluding what is listed in item (1), hole diameter is 200 mm or less, and hole diameter is equal to or less than d as determined in Figures PPD-3422-1 and PPD-3422-2

Confirm that the total area effective for reinforcement satisfies the area required for reinforcement for the hole that required reinforcement.



: Area effective for hole reinforcement (main pipe) A_1

: Area effective for hole reinforcement (branch pipe) A_2

: Area effective for hole reinforcement (weld) A_3

: Area effective for hole reinforcement (stiffener) A_4

: Area required for hole reinforcement A_r

Fig. 7: Mounting type of nozzle stub

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Area required for hole reinforcement: $A_r = 1.07 \cdot \mathrm{d} \cdot t_{r^3} \cdot (2 - sin\theta)$

d : Diameter of hole (mm)
t_{r^3} : Thickness prescribed in PPD-3411 provisions (mm)
θ : Crossing angle (degree) between the center line of the branch pipe and the center line of the main pipe

Total area effective for hole reinforcement: $\mathrm{A}_0 = A_1 + A_2 + A_3 + A_4$

Area of main pipe section effective for hole reinforcement:

$A_1 = (\eta \cdot t_s - F \cdot t_{sr}) \cdot (2 \cdot L_A - d)$

Area of the nozzle stub effective for reinforcing the hole:

$A_2 = 2 \cdot (t_n - t_{nr}) \cdot cosec\theta \cdot L_N \cdot \frac{S_n}{S_s}$

Area of fillet effective for hole reinforcement: $A_3 = (L_1)^2 \cdot sin\theta \cdot \frac{S_e}{S_s}$

Area of reinforcement effective for hole reinforcement:

$$A_4 = (D_{0e} - D_{0n} \cdot cosec\theta) \cdot t_e \cdot \frac{S_e}{S_s} + (L_2)^2 \cdot \frac{S_e}{S_s}$$

η : Joint efficiency
t_s : Thickness of main pipe (mm)
t_{sr} : Required thickness for calculation of the main pipe (mm)
t_n : Thickness of nozzle stub (mm)
t_{nr} : Thickness of nozzle stub required by calculation (mm)
t_e : Minimum thickness of stiffener (mm)
L_A : Range effective for reinforcement separated by a straight line parallel to the hole centerline (mm)
L_N : Range effective for reinforcement separated by a line parallel to the main pipe surface (mm)
S_n : Allowable tensile stress of the nozzle stub material at the maximum working temperature (MPa)
S_S : Allowable tensile stress of the main pipe material at the maximum working temperature (MPa)
S_e : Allowable tensile stress of the stiffener material at the maximum working temperature (MPa)
L_1 : The leg length of the fillet part of the nozzle or the narrow-side length of the reinforced nozzle stub (mm)
L_2 : Leg length of the fillet of the stiffener (mm)
D_{0b} : Outer diameter of nozzle stub (mm)
D_{0e} : Outer diameter of the stiffener (mm)
d : Diameter of the hole appearing in the cross section (mm)
θ : Intersection angle between branch pipe and main pipe centerlines (degrees)
F : Values obtained by figure PPD-3424-1

2.4.2 Evaluation Results of Structural Strength

Evaluation results are shown in Table-5 to 9.

The total area effective for reinforcement satisfies the required area, and it has sufficient structural strength.

Table-5 Evaluation Results of Structural Strength on Hole Reinforcement

Evaluated component	Evaluation part	Evaluation point	η	t_s (mm)	t_{sr} (mm)	L_A (mm)	D (mm)	A_1 (mm^2)
Seawater pipe header	③Seawater nozzle pipe	Nozzle stub	1.0	14.2	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
	④ALPS Treated Water Injection Pipe	Nozzle stub	1.0	14.2	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
	⑤Vent pipe	Nozzle stub	1.0	14.2	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
	⑥Drain pipe	Nozzle stub	1.0	14.2	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]
	⑦Manhole	Nozzle stub	1.0	14.2	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]

Table-6 Evaluation Results of Structural Strength of Hole Reinforcement

Evaluated component	Evaluation part	Evaluation point	S_n (MPa)	S_S (MPa)	t_{nr} (mm)	t_n (mm)	L_N (mm)	θ (degree)	A_2 (mm^2)
Seawater pipe header	③Seawater nozzle pipe	Nozzle stub	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	90	[redacted]
	④ALPS Treated Water Injection Pipe	Nozzle stub	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	90	[redacted]
	⑤Vent pipe	Nozzle stub	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	90	[redacted]
	⑥Drain pipe	Nozzle stub	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	90	[redacted]
	⑦Inspection manhole	Nozzle stub	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	90	[redacted]

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Table-7 Evaluation Results of Structural Strength of Hole Reinforcement

Evaluated component	Evaluation part	Evaluation point	S_S (MPa)	S_e (MPa)	L_1 (mm)	θ (degree)	A_3 (mm^2)
Seawater pipe header	③Seawater nozzle pipe	Nozzle stub	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	90	[redacted]
	④ALPS Treated Water Injection Pipe	Nozzle stub	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	90	[redacted]
	⑤Vent pipe	Nozzle stub	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	90	[redacted]
	⑥Drain pipe	Nozzle stub	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	90	[redacted]
	⑦Inspection Manhole	Nozzle stub	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	90	[redacted]

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Table-8 Evaluation Results of Structural Strength of Hole Reinforcement

Evaluated component	Evaluation part	Evaluation point	S_S (MPa)	S_e (MPa)	D_{0e} (mm)	D_{0n} (mm)	t_e (mm)	L_2 (mm)	θ (degree)	A_4 (mm^2)
Seawater pipe header	③Seawater nozzle pipe	Nozzle stub	[redacted]	[redacted]	1300	914.4	[redacted]	[redacted]	90	[redacted]
	④ALPS Treated Water Injection Pipe	Nozzle stub	[redacted]	[redacted]	200	114.3	[redacted]	[redacted]	90	[redacted]
	⑤Vent pipe	Nozzle stub	[redacted]	[redacted]	200	114.3	[redacted]	[redacted]	90	[redacted]
	⑥Drain pipe	Nozzle stub	[redacted]	[redacted]	200	114.3	[redacted]	[redacted]	90	[redacted]
	⑦Inspection manhole	Nozzle stub	[redacted]	[redacted]	800	609.6	[redacted]	[redacted]	90	[redacted]

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Table-9 Evaluation Results of Structural Strength of Hole Reinforcement

Evaluated component	Evaluation part	Evaluation point	d (mm)	θ (degree)	t_r^3 (mm)	A_r (mm^2)	A_0 (mm^2)
Seawater pipe header	③Seawater nozzle pipe	Nozzle stub	[redacted]	90	[redacted]	6.35×10^3	1.33×10^4
	④ALPS Treated Water Injection Pipe	Nozzle stub	[redacted]	90	[redacted]	7.44×10^2	2.47×10^3
	⑤Vent pipe	Nozzle stub	[redacted]	90	[redacted]	7.44×10^2	2.47×10^3
	⑥Drain pipe	Nozzle stub	[redacted]	90	[redacted]	7.44×10^2	2.47×10^3
	⑦Inspection manhole	Nozzle stub	[redacted]	90	[redacted]	4.17×10^3	8.35×10^3

2.5 Mounting strength of reinforcement

2.5.1 Evaluation Method of Structural Strength

Evaluate the load to be incurred by the welds prescribed in the “Design and Construction Standards PPD-3424 (8)” and confirm that the welds strength is sufficient.

Loads to be incurred by welds: $W = d \cdot t_{sr} \cdot S_s - (\eta \cdot t_s - F \cdot t_{sr}) \cdot (2 \cdot L_A - d) \cdot S_s$

d : Diameter of the hole appearing in the cross section (mm)

t_s : Thickness of main pipe (mm)

t_{sr} : The thickness of main pipe required by calculation (mm)

S_s : Allowable tensile stress of the main pipe material at the maximum working temperature (MPa)

η : Efficiency of the joint

F : Value obtained based on the figure PPD-3424-1

L_A : Range effective for reinforcement separated by a straight line parallel to the hole centerline (mm)

2.5.2 Evaluation Results of Structural Strength

Table-10 shows evaluation results. Since the load that the weld should bear is 0 or less, the strength of the weld is evaluated to be sufficient.

Table-10 Evaluation Results of Structural Strength to Mounting Strength of Reinforcement

Evaluation component	Evaluation Part	Evaluation point	d (mm)	t_{sr} (mm)	S_S (MPa)	t_s (mm)	η	L_A (mm)	F	W(N)
Seawater pipe header	③Seawater nozzle pipe	Nozzle stub	[redacted]	[redacted]	100	14.2	1.0	[redacted]	1.0	-7.26×10^4
	④ALPS Treated Water Injection Pipe	Nozzle stub	[redacted]	[redacted]	100	14.2	1.0	[redacted]	1.0	-8.51×10^3
	⑤Vent pipe	Nozzle stub	[redacted]	[redacted]	100	14.2	1.0	[redacted]	1.0	-8.51×10^3
	⑥Drain pipe	Nozzle stub	[redacted]	[redacted]	100	14.2	1.0	[redacted]	1.0	-8.51×10^3
	⑦Inspection manhole	Nozzle stub	[redacted]	[redacted]	100	14.2	1.0	[redacted]	1.0	-4.76×10^4

The Japanese version shall prevail.

II Tolerance of nominal values for ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities

Table-1 Tolerance of seawater pipe header

Major dimensions (mm)			Tolerance	Basis
Main pipe	Outer diameter	2235.2	[redacted]	Production capacity, manufacturer's standards considering production result
	Thickness	16.0	[redacted]	Production capacity, manufacturer's standards considering production result
Outlet pipe	Outer diameter	1828.8	[redacted]	Production capacity, manufacturer's standards considering production result
	Thickness	16.0	[redacted]	Production capacity, manufacturer's standards considering production result
Seawater nozzle pipe	Outer diameter	914.4	[redacted]	Production capacity, manufacturer's standards considering production result
	Thickness	16.0	[redacted]	Production capacity, manufacturer's standards considering production result
ALPS Treated Water Injection Pipe	Outer diameter	114.3	[redacted]	Material tolerance according to JIS
	Thickness	6.0	[redacted]	Material tolerance according to JIS
Vent pipe	Outer diameter	114.3	[redacted]	Material tolerance according to JIS
	Thickness	6.0	[redacted]	Material tolerance according to JIS
Drain pipe	Outer diameter	114.3	[redacted]	Material tolerance according to JIS
	Thickness	6.0	[redacted]	Material tolerance according to JIS
Inspection manhole	Outer diameter	609.6	[redacted]	Production capacity, manufacturer's standards considering production result
	Thickness	16.0	[redacted]	Production capacity, manufacturer's standards considering production result
Reducer	Thickness	16.0	[redacted]	Production capacity, manufacturer's standards considering production result
End plate	Thickness	16.0	[redacted]	Production capacity, manufacturer's standards considering production result

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Table-2 Tolerance of seawater transfer pipe

Pipe ⑩※

Major dimensions (mm)		Tolerance	Basis
Outer diameter	1828.8	[redacted]	Production capacity, manufacturer's standards considering production result
Thickness	16.0	[redacted]	Production capacity, manufacturer's standards considering production result

Pipe c※

Major dimensions (mm)		Tolerance	Basis
Outer diameter	914.4	[redacted]	Production capacity, manufacturer's standards considering production result
Thickness	13.0	[redacted]	Production capacity, manufacturer's standards considering production result

※: It corresponds to number or symbol in Figure-5

Reference

Action in response to "Basic Policy on handling of ALPS treated water at the Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings' Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station"

On April 13, 2021, "The 5th the Ministerial Conference of Contaminated Water, Treated Water and Decommissioning," was held and established the " Basic Policy on handling of ALPS treated water at the Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings' Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (hereinafter "Basic Policy")".

Following the Basic Policy, TEPCO established "TEPCO Holdings' Action in Response to the Government's Policy on the Handling of ALPS Treated Water" on April 16, 2021, which shows measures shall be taken in response to the government policy, and, some part of the implementation plan explicitly mentioned for reference as items below, which are the items related to the discharge method of ALPS treated water into the sea, design and operations of the required facilities, and radiological impact of discharge into the sea.

(1) Required administrative works and facility development, etc. are pushed forward to enable the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea in around the spring of 2023, which is about 2 years after the release of the Basic Policy.
(2) Prior to the discharge, with a commitment from a third party with expertise in analysis of radioactive materials, tritium concentration of the ALPS treated water shall be confirmed while the purification of the water shall be confirmed to ensure that radioactive materials other than tritium is below the regulatory limit, and the confirmation result shall be disclosed.
(3) Tritium concentration of the discharge water after dilution with seawater shall be less than 1,500 Bq/L. To achieve this criteria, ALPS treated water shall be hugely diluted with seawater (100 times or more).
(4) Annual discharge volume of tritium shall be within 22 TBq per year.
(5) At the beginning of the discharge into the sea, it shall begin with smaller volume while impact on surrounding environment is confirmed through the sea area monitoring. Operation procedures are set to shut down the ocean discharge without fail in case the ALPS treated water dilution and discharge facility fails to discharge into the sea as designed, or any abnormal value is detected by the monitoring.
(6) Safety assessment regarding radiological impact to human and environment shall be done when ALPS treated water is discharged into the sea.

Attachment-1 Action in Response to the Basic Policy of the Government

Attachment-2 Radiological Impact Assessment Report Regarding the Discharge of ALPS Treated Water into the Sea (Design stage / Revised version)

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Attachment-1

Action in Response to the Basic Policy of the Government

Among the address in response to the Basic Policy, each action to 6 items, which are related to the discharge method of ALPS treated water into the sea, design and operations of the required facilities, and radiological impact from discharge into the sea, are described from the next page.

The Japanese version shall prevail.

The Basic Policy

3. Specific method of the ALPS treated water discharge into the sea

(1) Basic directions

> 5) The Government requires that TEPCO will proceed with concrete preparations such as the construction of facilities for discharge and other works, to start discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea approximately after two years.

○Action in response to the Basic Policy

Required administrative works and facility development, etc., including tests about equipment structure, strength, and leakage as well as tests to verify functions and performance of the whole facility, shall be pushed forward to enable discharge the ALPS treated water into the sea in around the spring of 2023, which is about 2 years after the release of the Basic Policy.

(See “II.2.50 ALPS Treated Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities and the Related Facility”)

3. Specific method of the ALPS treated water discharge into the sea

(2) A method of discharge that minimizes adverse impacts on reputation

1) Discharge of the ALPS treated water into the sea is conducted after sufficiently diluting the ALPS treated water. Prior to the discharge, i) the concentration of tritium of the ALPS treated water and ii) the water is purified until the level of radioactive materials other than tritium satisfies the regulatory standards for safety, will be confirmed and disclosed, engaging with third-party experts who have expertise in analysis of the radioactive materials.

○Action in response to the Basic Policy

Prior to the ALPS treated water discharge into the sea, while tritium concentration of the water is confirmed, to confirm that purification has made its sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of radioactive material other than tritium less than 1, radioactive materials other than tritium shall be confirmed to be purified to the level below the safety criteria without fail by conducting analysis by a third party analysis organization with expertise in the analysis in addition to the analysis by our company's analysis facility, and the results are compared. These results are disclosed at every timing of the ALPS treated water discharge.
(See "III 3.2.1 Supplementary Explanations in Relation to the Management of Radioactive Wastes, etc." and Appendix-1)

3. Specific method of the ALPS treated water discharge into the sea

(2) A method of discharge that minimizes adverse impacts on reputation

2) To allay the concerns of the consumers, the target concentration of tritium should be the same as the operational target (less than 1,500Bq/Liter-water7) for the currently implemented discharge of water pumped up via sub-drains, at Fukushima Daiichi NPS.
3) To achieve this target concentration of tritium, prior to the discharge into the sea, the ALPS treated water needs to be sufficiently diluted (more than 100 times8) by sea water. Radioactive materials other than tritium will also be significantly diluted with this dilution.

○Action in response to the Basic Policy

Operations target of less than 1,500 Bq/L of tritium concentration in the seawater after dilution of ALPS treated water shall be achieved by securing required flow rate of seawater for the seawater dilution by operating 2 units or more of seawater transfer pump constantly after installing 3 units of seawater transfer pump with capacity of 170 thousand m^3/day each while setting flow rate of ALPS treated water at the range of 500 m^3/day at maximum.
(See “III 3.1.9 Operation Management of the ALPS Treatment Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities”)

3. Specific method of the ALPS treated water discharge into the sea

(2) A method of discharge that minimizes adverse impacts on reputation

4) The total annual amount of tritium to be discharged will be at a level below the operational target value10 for tritium discharge of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS before the accident (22 trillion Bq/year). The amount will be reviewed periodically. This operational value for tritium discharge is within the range of the amount of discharge from each nuclear power station inside and outside the county.

○Action in response to the Basic Policy

In the near term, amount of tritium of the ALPS treated water discharge into the sea shall have the upper limit of 22 TBq per year, which was the discharge control value of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station before the accident, and shall be lower than that.

The discharge amount of the tritium shall be reviewed every fiscal year based on the trend of generation volume of the contaminated water and the trend of tritium concentration at the entrance of desalination device as well as utilization plan of the premise which influences the progress of the decommissioning.

Regarding the control of annual discharge, a discharge plan for the fiscal year is decided at the beginning of the fiscal year, and actual operation of the ocean discharge of ALPS treated water is carried out according to the plan. In addition, the control shall also be conducted from the facility side by embedding an interlock in the oversight/ control device to keep the annual discharge amount below 22 TBq.

However, when the generation volume of the contaminated water and the tritium concentration at the entrance of the desalination device, which are assumptions of the annual discharge planning, have changed to a large extent, adjustment shall be made flexibly within the range of 22 TBq of annual discharge.

(See “III 3.1.9 Operation Management of the ALPS Treatment Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities”)

3. Specific method of the ALPS treated water discharge into the sea

(2) A method of discharge that minimizes adverse impacts on reputation

6) The discharge into the sea will be conducted in small amount at the initial phase, while confirming the impacts on the surrounding environment. Discharge will be securely stopped until the safety of the discharge is confirmed, if there is any malfunction of dilution facilities and other equipment due to a power or other failure, or if a radiation monitor detects an irregular value.

○Action in response to the Basic Policy

At the beginning of the discharge into the sea, it shall start with smaller volume while impact on surrounding environment is confirmed through sea area monitoring. For the case the ALPS treated water dilution and discharge facility fails to discharge to the ocean as designed by any chance due to reasons such as a failure or power outage of the ALPS treated water dilution and discharge facility, or for the case any abnormal value is detected by the monitoring, operation procedures are set so as to shut down the ocean discharge without fail until the situation is confirmed to be ready for the safe discharge.

(See “III 3.1.9 Operation Management of the ALPS Treatment Water Dilution/Discharge Facilities” and Appendix-2 and 3)

3. Specific method of the ALPS treated water discharge into the sea

(2) A method of discharge that minimizes adverse impacts on reputation

7) Taking into account domestic and international concerns about the potential impact on the environment of discharge into the sea, the Government and TEPCO have been conducting analysis11 from various perspectives on the environmental impact of the discharge. In the actual discharge, TEPCO strictly complies with the national regulatory standards set based on recommendations of ICRP. Furthermore, considering relevant international law and international practice, measures shall be taken to assess the potential impact on the marine environment, and to ascertain the environmental situation through continuous monitoring stated above after discharge. The Government will seek to foster understanding both the general public and international community through ensuring a high degree of transparency by availing the information regarding the impact on the environment to the public in a timely manner.

○Action in response to the Basic Policy

Regarding the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, regulatory standards stipulated according to ICRP recommendations shall be strictly followed, and assessment for radiological impacts are carried out about the impact on the marine environment, and are reviewed by IAEA experts, etc., to check that they meet relevant international laws and practices. In addition, sea area monitoring shall be continued after the discharge to grasp the environmental situation.
Information on the environmental impact of the ALPS treated water into the sea shall be communicated accurately and promptly inside and outside Japan, and efforts shall be made to foster understanding inside and outside Japan.

Appendix-1

Supplementary explanation on the analyses of ALPS treated water prior to discharge into the sea

In order to confirm the tritium concentration of ALPS treated water as well as that the sum of ratios to regulatory concentration limit other than tritium of ALPS treated water is treated to less than 1 including the accuracy objectively, the ALPS treated water will be analyzed by not only TEPCO but also third-party analysis institute.

1.Operation method

Comparison of analytical results with a third-party analysis institute is conducted as a measure to show that the intended analysis is carried out from the pretreatment method to the acquisition of analytical results for our measurements, and that the obtained analytical values are appropriate. Comparison should include analytical precision, and if there is a steady discrepancy, we investigate the factors and improve the analytical environment or equipment as necessary.

2.View of selection for third-party analysis institute

TEPCO will select a third-party analysis institute, which has obtained certification for the analysis of radionuclides such as ISO/IEC-17025, which is a standard for ability to obtain analytical results of characteristics, properties, etc. for liquid with properties equivalent to those of ALPS treated water based on determined methods, and from domestic companies that do not have any interest with TEPCO.

End

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Appendix-2

Supplemental explanation on the small volume discharge at the early stage of discharge into the sea

In the ALPS treated water discharge into the sea, dilution and discharge is to be carried out each tank group for ALPS treated water (approx. 10 thousand m^3/tank group) measured/confirmed in the measurement/confirmation facility. In doing so, based on the Basic Policy, discharge shall be carried out cautiously with small volume in the early stage in following 2 steps, and required validation shall be made.

Step 1: To confirm the expected dilution in ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities, using the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage), tritium concentration is confirmed directly after the small volume of the ALPS treated water is diluted, and then it is discharged into the sea. (Refer to 1. operation method of the step 1)

Step 2: To confirm the secure operation under the operation procedure of ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities and the related facility, and no significant change of tritium concentration in the sea due to discharge into the sea, the ALPS treated water is discharged into the sea with adjustment of discharge volume and intervals. Discharge method of the step 2 will be determined in the discharge plan of the first fiscal year of the discharge.

After the step 2, ALPS treated water in a tank group of approximately 10 thousand m^3, measured in the measurement/confirmation facility, will be discharged continuously, followed by another tank group with no interval between tank groups.

1. Operation method of the step 1

   After the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) with the capacity of approx. 2,000 m^3 is emptied, one seawater transfer pump is started, small volume of ALPS treated water (20 m^3 or less) is transferred to the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage).

   Thus, sample water is collected from the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) to measure its tritium concentration. The measured tritium concentration of this sample is compared with the calculated tritium concentration, which determined from the volume of the transferred ALPS treated water and the volume of the seawater used for dilution, to check the two values are at similar level and the measured tritium concentration is less than 1,500Bq/L. After confirming that, the seawater for dilution is transferred again to discharge into the sea.

The Japanese version shall prevail.



(1) Empty the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage).



(2) Store the water in the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) after dilution of ALPS treated water, which is transferred by the transfer facility, ~~and diluted by~~in the dilution facility~~, in the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage)~~.



(3) Stop the pump before the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) is fully filled with water, and collect and measure sample water in the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) (suspend the discharge until the result is given).



(4) Verify that the actual concentration is close to the calculated tritium concentration and less than 1,500 Bq/L, before flowing seawater and discharging the water in the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) into the sea.

Figure-1 Image of operation in the step 1

End

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Supplemental explanation on the response when facility failure is detected or an abnormal value is monitored in the sea area monitoring

1. Suspension of discharge into the sea due to facility failure

When facility failure is identified, operation procedures to shut down the discharge to the ocean shall be as follows.

1.1 Suspension of discharge into the sea due to facility failure

ALPS treated water dilution/discharge facilities have emergency isolation valves which function is to stop the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea by closing without manual operation in the event of detecting an abnormality that deviates from normal operation.

Here, 9 types of deviation from normal operations which make the emergency isolation valves "closed" are assumed. In addition, emergency shutdown is available manually by design by the monitoring/control system (see Table-1).



Figure-2 Logic circuit of the emergency isolation valve

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Table-1 Details of operation signal for the emergency isolation valve

Element	Signal	Objectives
ALPS treated water flowmeter failure	Transfer line (A) (B) flowmeter overscale	The flow rate cannot be monitored due to instrument failure.
	Transfer line (A) (B) flowmeter downscale	The flow rate cannot be monitored due to instrument failure or cable disconnection.
Seawater flowmeter failure	Seawater transfer pump (A) (B) (C) flowmeter overscale	The flow rate cannot be monitored due to instrument failure.
	Seawater transfer pump (A) (B) (C) flowmeter downscale	The flow rate cannot be monitored due to instrument failure or cable disconnection.
ALPS treated water flow rate HIGH	Transfer line (A) (B) flow rate signal	To maintain tritium concentration after dilution below 1,500 Bq/L due to increased transfer line flow rate
Seawater flow rate LOW	Seawater transfer pump (A) (B) (C) Flow signal	To prevent an increase in tritium concentration after dilution due to insufficient supply of seawater for dilution. Due to possible abnormalities in the seawater transfer system.
ALPS treated water transfer pump trip	Circuit breaker trip signal	Due to possible abnormalities in the transfer process.
Seawater transfer pump trip	M/C trip signal	To prevent an increase in tritium concentration after dilution due to stopping of supply of seawater for dilution Due to possible abnormalities in the seawater transfer system.
Radiation monitor panel, major failure	Radiation monitor (A) (B) lower limit	Monitoring by radiation monitors is not available
	Radiation monitor (A) (B) circuit breaker trip	
Radiation monitor HIGH	Radiation monitor (A) (B) High	Abnormalities were detected by radiation monitor
Both series of emergency isolation valve panel communication abnormalities	Communication abnormal signal in both series	When communication abnormalities occur in the emergency isolation valve panel in both series, an abnormal signal cannot be received, and the automatic closure of the emergency isolation valve is disabled.
Emergency shutdown	Emergency shutdown signal	To stop immediately when an abnormality is detected by an operator

2. Suspension of discharge into the sea due to the sea area monitoring

Based on the results of sea area monitoring, assessment shall be carried out as follows.

2.1 Operation method

Confirmation shall be made that it stays within the assumed range through comparison with such as simulation results of diffusion in the sea, and concentration used for the radiological impact assessment. The abnormal value in the sea area monitoring will be set appropriately after ascertaining variation range of result of the sea area monitoring before and after discharge ALPS treated water into the sea. When the result exceeds the normal range of variation, results of other monitoring organizations shall also be confirmed and investigation shall be made about the causes. When an event is identified in which it hugely exceeds the normal range of variation, the discharge into the sea shall be suspended temporarily, and measurement shall be made again for the area, together with confirmation of no failure in the surrounding sea area while expanding the area and frequency temporarily.

Measurement results of the sea area monitoring have been stocked from April 2022, and normal values before the discharge shall be held such as changes in seawater concentration by tritium contained in treated water of subdrain/underground drain water and water of underground water bypass system, premise drainage.



Figure-3 Monitoring chart of the sea area within a 20 km radius from the power station

The Japanese version shall prevail.



Figure-4 Monitoring chart of the sea area outside a 20 km radius from the power station

End

The Japanese version shall prevail.

Provisional Translation

Radiological Impact Assessment Report Regarding the Discharge of ALPS Treated Water into the Sea (Design stage / Revised version)

April 2022

Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc.

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Executive summary

This report compiles the results of the assessment of the radiological impacts on humans and the environment resulting from the discharge of the water treated by the Advanced Liquid Processing System (Multi-Nuclide Removal Facility, hereinafter called “ALPS”) (hereinafter, the water called “ALPS treated water”) from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (hereinafter “FDNPS”) into the sea in accordance with the standards and guidelines established by internationally recognized organizations such as International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter called “IAEA”) and International Commission on Radiological Protection (hereinafter called “ICRP”).

This report first describes how contaminated water has been generated, managed, treated, and stored as a result of the accident of FDNPS following the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, and what on-going efforts are to ensure public and environmental safety (Chapter 1).

Next, the report describes how several proposals for handling of ALPS treated water have been discussed among experts for more than six years since the potential risk associated the storage of contaminated water became apparent in 2013 (Chapter 2), the purpose of this assessment (Chapter 3), the concept of this assessment (Chapter 4), and the mechanism to removal of the target nuclides by ALPS and the overview of the ALPS treated water discharge facility (Chapter 5), respectively.

Subsequent chapters 6 and 7 describe the assessment of the radiological impacts on humans and marine plants and animals. Each chapter details the concepts of source term, modeling of diffusion and transfer in seawater, exposure pathways, and establishment of representative persons and reference animals and plants, which are the main components of radiological impact assessment. The results of the sea diffusion simulation indicate that the concentration of radioactive materials exceeds the background level only within a few kilometers of sea area around the FDNPS because the discharged ALPS treated water is quickly advected and diffused by tidal currents, etc. (Details can be found in “the Summary of Evaluation” and chapter 6-1-3.(1) “Diffusion simulation result”).

The results of the assessment of the radiological impacts obtained by in-house and external experts based on the above-mentioned reasonable and conservative assumption indicate that (1) in the case of discharge of ALPS treated water from the seabed approximately 1km offshore from the FDNPS, the foreseeable radiological impact on the people who are most likely to be affected in the vicinity of the discharge point is sufficiently small, that is approximately 1/30,000 to 1/3,000 of Japanese safety standard set according to the international guidelines; (2) the impact on plants and animals inhabiting in 10km x 10km sea area around the FDNPS is only about 1/500,000 to 1/20,000 of the lower limit of the level proposed by ICRP as the threshold range beyond which there is concern that some impact may occur on the corresponding plants and animals (derived consideration reference level); and (3) the impact on areas far from the discharge point (transboundary impact) was evaluated undetectably low. This indicates that advanced water treatment by ALPS and the discharge plan to effectively use the period of time required for decommissioning will restrain the impacts on humans and marine plants and

animals, and the impacts will be well within Japan's regulatory standard in accordance with the internationally established safety guidelines.

Chapter 8 describes the considerations related to uncertainties in the assessments described above. It concludes that considering uncertainties does not impair the conservatism of the assessment.

Chapter 9 describes the monitoring plan to be implemented in conjunction with the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea. This includes an enhanced and expanded monitoring plan that includes increased sampling points, target of measurement and frequency. This monitoring plan is regarded as appropriate based on the results of the radiological impact assessment conducted up to Chapter 7.

In preparing this report, TEPCO has invited external experts from domestic institutes and universities to review and obtain comments in three field of human radiation protection, environmental protection, and ocean diffusion calculation.

The assessments in this report were conducted on the based on the information available at the design stage of the plan regarding to the discharge into the sea. After the original report was published last November, this report was reviewed and revised based on the progress of our study, opinions received through the public comment survey, reviews by the IAEA experts, and discussions with the Nuclear Regulation Authority. TEPCO plans to further review the assessment and revise this report as necessary to reflect the progress of studies on design and implementation including rigorous selection of target nuclides for measurement, opinions from various sectors, and the knowledge obtained through cross-checks by third-party assessments, etc. and to reflect in the plan and other necessary items respectively.

Before discharging ALPS treated water, TEPCO will analyze the radionuclides contained in the ALPS treated water which is pre-diluted and publish the results. In addition, during the initial period of the water discharge into the sea, TEPCO will also directly confirm the conditions of mixing and dilution prior to the discharge into the sea, and publish the results. Moreover, for discharge into the sea, the plan is to start the discharge with a small amount of discharge, while monitoring the impact on the surrounding environment, etc. In the unlikely event of a malfunction of the dilution facility due to trouble, power failure, or other reasons, or if abnormal value is detected by monitoring enhanced and expanded after the start of discharge, TEPCO will stop discharging until it is confirmed that the conditions have been established for safe discharge and will make every effort to ensure the safety of human and marine plants and animals.

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Attachment

References

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Overview of the assessment

We conducted the dose assessment for humans in respect of the planned discharge, as described in the IAEA safety standard document GSG-9 “Regulatory Control of Radioactive Discharges to the Environment” [1] (hereinafter called “GSG-9”) as well as conducted the dose assessment of potential exposure[1] and environmental protection, which is out of scope of the assessment under GSG-9, based on the current consideration of the discharge method of ALPS treated water into the sea. The specific procedure of the assessment follows the IAEA safety standard document GSG-10 “Prospective Radiological Environmental Impact Assessment for Facilities and Activities” [2] (hereinafter called “GSG-10”). The result of this assessment finds that advanced water treatment by ALPS and the discharge plan that effectively utilizes the decade-long decommissioning period will restrain the impact of discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea on humans and marine plants and animals, and will keep within the domestic safety standard determined in accordance with the internationally established safety guidelines.
In compiling this report, in-house experts with knowledge on the radiological impact assessments were selected and assigned, and external experts were invited as members to submit their opinions in three fields of human radiation protection, environmental protection, and marine diffusion calculation.
In this report, the contents conducted by the government on handling of ALPS treated water and enhancement and expansion of future monitoring are also taken into account.

Assessment of radioactive nuclides and diffusion

The nuclides to be assessed are a total of 64 nuclides including tritium (H-3), carbon 14 (C-14), and 62 nuclides subject to removal by ALPS (for the rationale behind the procedure to estimate radioactive materials contained in contaminated water and select 62 nuclides as nuclides subject to removal by ALPS, see Attachment I “Rationale behind the selection of nuclides subject to removal by ALPS”). The nuclide composition of ALPS treated water differs for each tank groups[2] depending on the composition and concentrations of radioactive materials in contaminated water before treatment, and lifetime of each adsorbent at the time of treatment in ALPS, etc. Therefore, the nuclide compositions of ALPS treated water used for the assessment were the nuclide compositions of the three tank groups in which measurement and assessment of 64 nuclides had actually been completed (for details, see 6-1-2.(1)).

[1] Potential exposure: Exposure caused by possible events in operation or events or possible events sequences including accidents of radiation sources or failures and operation mistakes of equipment. It was considered for the future.
[2] Multiple tank groups used in connection. Usually, 1 tank group consists of about 8 to 10 tanks.

According to the Japanese regulatory standard based on the internationally recognized guidelines specified by ICRP [3] , it is stipulated that that the sum of the ratios of concentrations to the regulatory concentration limits[3], which are the regulatory standards, (hereinafter called “the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits”[4]) should be less than 1 after dilution with a large amount of seawater at the discharging point. However, we have decided to minimize the amount of radioactive materials discharged into the environment as possible by appropriately treating nuclides other than tritium using water treatment facilities including ALPS, and reducing the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits less than 1 before dilution. In other words, we will not only confirm that the results of the individual assessments of radioactive nuclides such as cesium 137 (Cs-137) and iodine 129 (I-129) are below the regulatory standards, but also manage to ensure never to exceed the regulatory standards even when the overall effect of the overlapping effects of all those multiple radionuclides is taken into account.

Tritium is an isotope of hydrogen. In most cases, it exists as the molecule, which is one of the two hydrogen atoms in normal water molecule (H_2O) replaced by one tritium atom (HTO in chemical formula). The tritium concentration in the water stored in the tanks exceeds 60,000 Becquerel[5] (Bq)/L, which is the regulatory standard value (regulatory concentration limit), even after treatment by ALPS, etc., and tritium is almost impossible to remove, so the water shall be diluted until it meets the regulatory standard. In addition to strict compliance with regulatory standards to protect the public, the government required us to ensure that the tritium concentration of ALPS treated water at the point of discharge does not exceed 1,500Bq/L[6], which is much sufficiently lower compared to the level of regulatory concentration limit, in order to dispel any concerns of consumers and others and to control reputational effects to the maximum extent possible. In “TEPCO Holdings’ Action in Response to Government’s Policy on the Handling of the ALPS Treated Water from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station” (hereinafter called “TEPCO’s Action in response to Government’s Policy,”) we stipulated that we shall keep the tritium concentration in the discharged water less than 1,500Bq/L and set the upper limit of the annual discharge amount

[3] The regulatory concentration limit is the standard of discharge of radioactive waste into the sea set for each radioactive nuclide in “Pronouncement which set the dose limit based on the regulations such as the Regulations on Business of Smelting of Nuclear Source Materials or Nuclear Fuel Materials.” If a person drinks 2L of water equivalent to the regulatory concentration limit every day all their life (for 70 years in the case of an adult), the annual exposure dose will be 1 mSv/year.

[4] Sum of the ratios to the regulatory concentration limits [34], which are legal concentration limits specified for each nuclide in the case that multiple radioactive materials, are contained. If multiple radioactive materials are contained, the sum of the ratio to the concentrations to the regulatory concentration limit specified for each nuclide by laws must be less than 1.

[5] Unit indicating the amount of radiation. Becquerel is the number of nuclei whose radioactive nuclide changes into another one by radioactive disintegration in one second.

[6] It is set to the same value as the operation target value of the discharge concentration of the groundwater bypass and subdrain, through which water has been discharged. This value has been described in “Implementation plan III 3.2.1 Management of radioactive waste, etc.” and permitted by the Nuclear Regulation Authority.
The tritium concentration of 1,500Bq/L is 1/40 of the regulatory concentration limit of 60,000Bq/L and about 1/7 of 10,000Bq/L, which is the WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality.

22 TBq[7] (2.2E+13Bq)[8]. To keep the tritium concentration in the discharged water less than 1,500Bq/L, the ALPS treated water shall be diluted with seawater at least 100 times or more (at most 1,400 times or more considering the maximum measured tritium concentration of approximately 2.16 million Bq/L in the water stored in the tank measured so far) before discharge.

The concentration of nuclides other than tritium in the ALPS treated water is already below the regulatory standard even before the dilution. The concentration will be further reduced by dilution with seawater. Therefore, the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of 63 nuclides other than tritium in discharged water after seawater dilution is less than 0.01, and the impact of radiation will be further reduced (for details, see 5-2).

The diffusion calculation for the discharged water into the sea area was executed by the model of the sea area near the FDNPS using a high resolution, based on the model [4] whose reproducibility had been verified by the reproduction calculation of the cesium concentration in the seawater after the accident of the FDNPS (for details, see 6-1-2.(2)). For the assessment, only the radiation amount per unit time of tritium released (flow rate and concentration are not considered) is used in the diffusion calculations. Therefore, the effect of dilution is not considered in this assessment.

In this assessment, the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater does not take into account the decrease in dissolved concentration through absorbance of radionuclides to seabed and other materials. On the other hand, the concentration of radionuclides in fish, shellfish and seabed sediment assumed to be in equilibrium with the concentration in seawater after the adsorption, etc. (no further adsorption occurs). Also it is assessed using concentration coefficient and concentration ratio including the impact to the food chain. In reality, it takes a long period of time for radionuclides in seawater, fish and shellfish and seabed sediment to reach an equilibrium, however by using conservative assumptions mentioned above, this model verifies that there is no further increase in exposure to humans, fish and shellfish even if the discharge continues for a long time. This assessment actually verified the impact for a year of discharge of ALPS treated water, and it can also verify accumulation of radioactive materials in the environment for long term discharge (For details, see 4.(3)).

Human exposure pathways

In the setting of exposure pathways, they are roughly divided into external exposures and internal exposures. In line with previous practice, etc.[9], external exposures were assessed

[7] Target discharge control value of the FDNPS before the accident.

[8] E+XX means the XXth power of 10. 2.2E+13 indicates 2.2×10^{13}.

[9] Handbook for Determining Environmental Impacts of Decommissioning Work, etc. For details, see Chapter 6.

assuming the following five pathways: (1) external exposure from the sea surface, (2) external exposure from ship hulls, (3) external exposure under water during swimming, etc., (4) external exposure from beach sands, and (5) external exposure from fishing nets. Internal exposure was assessed assuming the following three pathways: (6) internal exposure from ingestion of seawater, (7) internal exposure from inhalation of seawater spray, and (8) internal exposure from ingestion of seafood (for details, see 6-1-2.(3)).

The exposure pathway to human is set with an assumption of a representative person in vicinity of the discharge point who are considered most affective. For the living habits and characteristics of the representative person for some exposure pathways should be used the highest group (e.g. 95 percentile value) from some lifestyle data distribution, etc. However, in considering current situation around FDNPS, we have instead assumed the representative persons are engaged in fishing for 120 days a year (2,880 hours), of which they work near fishing nets for 80 days (1,920 hours), stay on the seashore for 500 hours, and swim for 96 hours, according to “Dose Assessment to the General Public in the Safety Review of Commercial Light Water Reactor Facilities” [5]. Following the preconditions, the ingestion amount of seafood was investigated for two cases based on the ingestion amount data from “National Health and Nutrition Survey in Japan in 2019” [6] for each of (1) person who ingest an average amount of seafood and (2) person who ingest more seafood than average (one fifth of the amount of an adult for an infant, and half of the amount of an adult for child under school age) (for details, see 6-1-2.(4)).

The result of the assessments was compared with the dose limit[10] of 1mSv/year for the general public, and the dose constraint[11] of 0.05 mSv/year established by the Nuclear Regulation Authority, and the sum of internal and external exposure was below both the public dose limit and the dose constraint in all cases[12]. The dose limit of 1 mSv/year is the internationally recognized standard of public exposure (for details, see 6-1-3).

In addition, the potential exposure assessment based on the IAEA safety standard[13], which was also conducted, assumed that (1) in case of leakage from the piping, a piping rupture occurs near the ocean and all the ALPS Treated Water about 10,000 m^3 in one group of tanks at the facility for measurement and confirmation of water is discharged from north breakwater into the ocean for 20days without being diluted, as well as (2) the case of massive leakage from tanks, all three groups of tanks for measurement and confirmation are

[10] Dose limit: Effective dose or equivalent dose to a person which must not be exceeded in the planned exposure situation (GSR Part 3).

[11] Dose constraint: Predictive value of individual dose related to radiation sources used as a parameter for the optimization of protection and safety at the radiation source in planned exposure situation. It is useful as the boundary for setting of the range of options in optimization. For public exposure, this is a value related to the radiation source established or approved by the government or regulatory body considering the dose from planned handling of all radiation sources under control (GSR Part 3).

[12] The dose limit is the limit for the total of the exposure amount of an individual from all related acts subject to the regulations. The dose constraint is used as the limit value of the dose from a specific radiation source related to a planned act.

[13] GSG-10

damaged simultaneously due to great earthquake, etc. and of 30,000 m^3 of ALPS treated water is discharged into the sea in a single day. In this case, the migration pathways and exposure pathways of this case shall be the same as for normal exposure excluding for the discharge location near the north breakwater. The exposure time of leakage from piping is conservatively set to about one month (27 days), and about one week (8 days) in the case of huge earthquake. As a result, even in such cases, the effective dose of potential exposure was significantly smaller compared to the standard of the accident assessment shown in the IAEA safety standard[13] (for details, see 6-2).

Impact on marine plants and animals

As the assessment of environmental protection, we also assessed the protection of plants and animals during normal operation of the facility for discharging ALPS treated water according to the procedure shown in Annex I of the IAEA safety standard[13]. As the composition of nuclides in ALPS treated water used in the assessment, three cases based on the measured values were adopted in the same way as the human exposure assessment. As the plants and animals to be assessed, the standard flatfish (left-eyed and right-eyed flounders), the standard crabs (Ovalipes punctatus and Portunus trituberculatus) and the standard brown seaweeds (sargassum and Eisenia bicyclis) were selected from the list of standard animals and plants[14] indicated by the guideline of ICRP. The dose was assessed by the method shown by ICRP and the dose rate in the habitat of the standard animals and plants was compared with the derived consideration reference level (DCRL)[15]. As a result, all dose rates in the habitats of the standard animals and plants are much less than the lower limit value of the derived consideration reference level (for details, see Chapter 7).
Just for a precaution, the evaluation results of environmental impact from the factors other than radioactive materials from the ALPS treated water reveal that there is no severe pollution or no serious and hazardous changes to the environment (for details, see Reference D “Assessment result of environmental impacts including other elements than radiation related to discharge of ALPS treated water”).

Changes in response to new information and the result of monitoring

The assessment described in this report was conducted based on the information available at this point in time during the design stage of the plan for discharge into the sea. After the original report was issued last November, and revised based on the assessment reflecting

[14] Standard animals and plants: Specific types of animals and plants assumed in order to associate radiation exposure from the environment with the dose and impact.

[15] Derived consideration reference level (DCRL): Range of the dose rates within a range of one digit specified for each species advocated by ICRP. Dose rate level at which the impact has to be considered if is exceeded.

the comments received from the public, comments pointed out by the Nuclear Regulation Authority, the findings of review by the IAEA, etc. We are planning to revise this report further in order to reflect findings obtained through consideration of design and operation associated with the plan, opinions from various sectors, reviews by experts of the IAEA, cross-checks by third-party assessments, etc., and to modify the planned discharge program and its implementation as necessary.

Before discharging ALPS treated water, we will analyze the radionuclides contained in the ALPS treated water before dilution, and publish the results. In addition, during the initial period of the water discharge into the sea, we will also directly confirm the conditions of mixing and dilution before discharge into the sea and publish the results. Moreover, for discharge into the sea, TEPCO will carefully start the discharge with a small amount while monitoring the impact on the surrounding environment, etc. In case that the dilution facility fails due to malfunction, power failure, or other reasons, or if abnormal value is detected by monitoring after the start of discharge, TEPCO will stop discharge until it is confirmed that the conditions for safe discharge of the ALPS treated water have been securely re-established, and make every effort to ensure the safety of human and marine plants and animals.

This report concludes that the result of the assessment according to internationally recognized documents shows that exposure from radioactive materials contained in ALPS treated water discharged from the FDNPS is sufficiently lower than the dose limit, the dose constraint and the derived consideration reference level.

1. Background

At the FDNPS, which experienced an unprecedented accident in the event of the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, it has been continued to inject of cooling water into the reactor in order to cool the damaged reactor and nuclear fuel since the accident. The injected water contacts so-called fuel debris, which is fuel overheated, damaged, and molten in the event of the accident, and then solidified together with surrounding structures, passes through the reactor pressure vessel and reactor containment vessel damaged by the accident, and finally got stagnant on the lowest floor of the reactor building as building stagnant water (hereinafter called “stagnant water”). According to the previous investigation, it has turned out that stagnant water contains damaged fuel and structures of reactor core due to the damage in the event of the accident, or a high volume of water-derived radioactive materials, which are reactor coolants. From the viewpoint of prevention of diffusion of radioactive materials into the environment, it is especially necessary to prevent leakage of stagnant water outside the building.

On the other hand, seawater entered the basement floor of the building due to the tsunami, which was the direct cause of the accident, and then became stagnant water. In addition, rainwater has been entering the building through the ceiling damaged due to debris scattered by the hydrogen explosion of the reactor buildings that occurred in Units 1, 3, and 4 in the event of the accident. Moreover, the underground water level around the building is kept a little higher than the stagnant water level to prevent leakage of stagnant water mentioned above, which cause a little amount of groundwater to enter the building. It is considered that all of such water is mixed with the cooling water mentioned above and becomes new contaminated water.

Currently, by multilayered countermeasures[16], we manage to prevent leakage of contaminated water out of the building and also reduce the daily generated amount from about 540 m^3 (as of May 2014) to about 140 m^3 (as of 2020), and we are aiming to further reduce the daily generated amount to less than 100 m^3 by 2025. The contaminated water which will be generated in future must be treated in the same way and discharged appropriately.

[16] Examples of multilayered countermeasures:
- a To reduce the generated amount of contaminated water, contaminated water pumped and purified by the cesium adsorption device and desalinated by the reverse osmosis membrane device is reused as cooling water used to cool the nuclear fuel damaged by the accident.
- b In addition, the amount of groundwater entering the building is controlled. Specifically, the groundwater level near the building is kept low by pumping groundwater from uplands and the area adjacent to the building, installing land-side impermeable walls (frozen soil walls) around the building, etc.
- c To prevent leakage of contaminated water generated in the building to outside the system, the contaminated water level in the building is kept a little lower than the groundwater level outside the building by pumping contaminated water in the building.
- d Pumped contaminated water is stored in tanks installed on uplands after treatment by water treatment facilities which consist of the cesium adsorption device, ALPS, etc., in order to prevent contamination and reduce the dose.

Contaminated water is purified by the cesium adsorption equipments[17] and ALPS, which can remove 62 nuclides, and stored in tanks on the site. ALPS treatment makes the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of nuclides other than tritium less than 1 (water in which the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of nuclides other than tritium is less than 1 is called “ALPS treated water.” Water in which the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits is not less than 1 even after treatment is called “treated water to be purified.” “ALPS treated water” and “treated water to be purified” are collectively called “ALPS treated water, etc.”) (See Reference A “Site boundary dose assessment of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and the regulatory concentration limit in the Japanese laws”). As of January 2022, there are 1,047 tanks that store strontium treated water (water before ALPS treatment)[18] and ALPS treated water, etc., and the stored amount is about 1.29 million m^3, while the capacity is about 1.37 million m^3. Although it is necessary to carefully examine the effect of the measures to control the generation of contaminated water and prediction of the amount of contaminated water generated, the planned capacity is expected to reach after the summer of 2023.

As shown in “Mid- to Long-Term Roadmap towards Decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station” [7] revised by the government at the ministerial meeting on decommissioning and contaminated water measures (current “the ministerial meeting on decommissioning, contaminated water and treated water measures”) in December, 2019, decommissioning at the FDNPS is a continuous risk reduction activity to protect people and the environment from risks associated with radioactive materials manifested by the accident. In the long-term process toward decommissioning of the FDNPS for several decades, it is necessary to deal with the issues with greater radiation risks such as extraction of fuel debris and securing temporary storage locations of spent fuel, and it is essential to steadily reduce total risks from medium- to long-term viewpoints in order to appropriately deal with these issues.

The requirement to reduce the overall risks with the view of medium- to long-term views is the same in handling the contaminated water problem. So far, we have been steadily reducing the risks to the dose of less than 1 mSv/year, which is the dose limit for general public recommended by the ICRP in Publication 60 issued in 1990, for additional exposure dose associated with decommissioning on the site boundary by controlling the amount of contaminated water generated containing large amount of radioactive materials through so-called multi-layered countermeasures, and by removing radioactive materials contained in contaminated water through water treatment facilities including ALPS. In order to safely and steadily proceed with the decades-long decommissioning, it is necessary to continue to steadily reduce overall risk at the FDNPS by removing as much radioactive material as

[17] Equipments to purify contaminated water by adsorbing cesium and strontium.

[18] Water with most of the cesium and strontium removed before purification by ALPS.

possible using water treatment facilities including ALPS, implementing discharge in a safe manner that does not substantially affect humans and plants and animals, and appropriately storing spent fuels in temporary storage in dry cask to be installed in the future.

2. Consideration of handling of ALPS treated water

The details are as described in Reference B “Timeline of consideration of each disposal method of ALPS treated water,” the method of handling of contaminated water and ALPS treated water, etc., has been discussed for several years initially with the Ministerial Conference of Contaminated Water, Treated Water and Decommissioning issues, the government, the IAEA, municipal administrations, local residents and experts. In 2013, the government established the Tritiated Water Taskforce under the Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment, with participation of nine members of experts from the fields such as nuclear, environmental science, radiology, radiation biology, fish chemistry in addition to members from Nuclear Regulation Authority and related ministries. The Taskforce conducted technical studies on the five disposal methods (geosphere injection, discharge into the sea, vapor release, hydrogen release, and underground burial), which were proposed based on the scientific knowledge on tritium and the preceding cases [8][19]. In addition, since 2016, the Sub-committee on Handling of ALPS Treated Water has been established with 13 members of experts from the fields of such as nuclear, geological engineering, sociology, environmental science, agriculture, radiation biology, radiation science, fish chemistry as well as members from related ministries, to conduct a comprehensive deliberations, including social viewpoints such as reputation damage based on the results of the Tritiated Water Taskforce [9]. The Sub-committee on Handling ALPS Treated Water compiled the report in February 2020, in which it examined five disposal methods from various perspective, including monitoring feasibility. The Sub-committee then stated that the methods of geosphere injection, hydrogen release and underground burial have many issues as realistic option in terms of regulatory, technology and time schedule, while the methods of the discharge into the sea and the vapor release are considered as more realistic options. The conclusion was that in comparison to the vapor release, the method of the water discharge into the sea has already established regarding the amount of release. Furthermore, the ease of handling of discharge facilities and the way of monitoring should be conducted. In accordance with these reasons, the Sub-committee also pointed out the limited room for expansion of tanks for long-term storage and the increased risk of leakage due to natural disasters and deterioration, and concluded that discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea ensure the steady implementation.
In addition, the Government of Japan has Hosted the decommissioning review missions by the IAEA five times from 2013 to 2021 and has incorporated their opinions into considerations. The decommissioning review missions by the IAEA have pointed out the importance of the disposal plan for ALPS treated water. In the IAEA’s report in 2015, IAEA assessed that storage in tanks was “at best a temporary measure while a more sustainable

[19] Discussion on continuation of tank storage was included.

solution was needed[20].” Subsequently, in the IAEA’s report in 2019, it was stated that “a decision on the disposition path for the stored ALPS treated water containing tritium and other radionuclides, after further treatment as needed, must be taken urgently[21].”
In addition, in the report of the IAEA following-up review for the progress decommissioning of FDNPS in 2020, also assessed the technical aspects of the report of the Sub-committee, as being "based on a sufficiently comprehensive analysis and sound scientific and technical basis[22].”
Moreover, after the report was compiled in the Sub-committee on the Handling of ALPS Treated Water, the government held the Meeting to hear the Opinions of Related Parties on the Handling of ALPS Treated Water and widely solicited for opinions including those in writing. As a result, among the submitted opinions, some expressed concerns about the impact of discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea on the surrounding environment, etc.
Based on these considerations and opinions, the government announced the Basic Policy to handling ALPS treated water into the sea upon securing the safety as “Basic Policy on handling of ALPS treated water at the Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings’ Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station” (April 13, 2021, the Ministerial Conference of Contaminated Water, Treated Water and Decommissioning, hereinafter called “Basic Policy”) [10].
Considering the Basic Policy, on April 16th of the same year, we announced “TEPCO’s Action in response to Government’s Policy” [11] which include the following approach:

- Regarding the discharge of the ALPS treated water into the sea, we will ensure the safety of the public, surrounding environment as well as agricultural, forestry and fishery products through compliance with safety standards based on relevant laws and legislations. We will take further measures based on international standards and practices to confirm the safety of the water to be discharged.
  - To ensure the safety of the public and surrounding environment, we will surely comply with regulatory standards and relevant laws for concentration of tritium and other radioactive materials in the water to be discharged, which are set based on international recognized methods (e.g. International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) publication).
  - With regard to the radiological impact of the discharge on the humans and the environment under the condition indicated in the Basic Policy and international recognized method, we will assess its safety and publish the results prior to starting

[20] Mission Report, IAEA International Peer Review Mission on Mid-And-Long-Term Roadmap Towards the Decommissioning of TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Units 1-4, issued 13 May, 2015, p. 13, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/missionreport130515.pdf

[21] Mission Report, IAEA International Peer Review Mission on Mid-And-Long-Term Roadmap Towards the Decommissioning of TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Units 1-4, issued 31 January, 2019, p. 8, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/19/01/missionreport-310119.pdf

[22] Review Report IAEA Follow-up Review of Progress Made on Management of ALPS Treated Water and the Report of the Subcommittee on Handling of ALPS treated water at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, issued 2 April, 2020, p. 6, https://www.meti.go.jp/press/2020/04/20200402002/20200402002-2.pdf

the necessary procedure for approval by Nuclear Regulation Authority. Additionally, we will receive reviews by experts such as those of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and others. (The original report was issued in November 2021. We will publish the results including this revision and continue to receive reviews by experts of IAEA, etc.)

3. Objectives of the assessment

The objective of this Radiological Impact Assessment is as follows.

Objective 1: Evaluate the impact of radiation on humans and the environment in the case of our disposal of ALPS treated water by the internationally recognized method (IAEA safety standard and ICRP recommendation).

Objective 2: Announce the result of the assessment inside and outside Japan and consider the method to minimize the risks associated with disposal by making revisions, etc., as needed considering opinions from related parties.

4. Concept of assessment

This report was drafted assuming a dose assessment of the representative person by planned discharge shown in GSG-9, but the specific assessment method was based on GSG-10 and we also assessed potential exposure and environmental protection, which is not required in GSG-9.
The following shows the concepts of the assumptions in the assessment and the evaluation method.

(1) Dose constraints

The Japanese nuclear regulation system does not specifically set any dose constraints[23] and instead sets a target dose value of 0.05 mSv/year for the general public outside the surrounding monitoring area of light water reactor for power generation in normal operation.
On February 16, 2022, the Nuclear Regulation Authority issued the “Concept and Assessment Guidelines for Verifications in the Radiological Impact Assessment,” which says that “it must be verified that the estimated result of the representative person is small when compared to the fluctuation range of the annual radiation dose in humans in the region are exposed to through their living habits, etc., that is less than 50 μSv/year. The value of 50 μSv/year is the target dose for commercial light water reactors in normal operation, which corresponds to the dose constraint set in the IAEA Safety Standards. ” [12]. In this assessment, “Determine appropriate constraints” in GSG-9 Fig.3, “Steps in setting discharge limits, indicating those responsible.” corresponds to it and the target dose value of 50μSv/year = 0.05mSv/year as the dose constraint value.
However, the annual total amount of tritium contained in ALPS treated water actually discharged into the sea was specified in the Basic Policy of the Government of Japan before the assessment by this report, etc., in order to keep it below the discharge control value of 22 TBq/year (2.2E+13Bq/year) of the FDNPS before the accident from the viewpoints of various factors, such as the risk optimization of the whole of decommissioning, the effect of natural decay of radioactive materials expected during land storage of ALPS treated water, the leakage risk and occupational exposure during long-term storage, the plan to complete disposal of ALPS treated water before the completion of decommissioning, and the policy to dispel even little of the concerns of stakeholders. As shown in “TEPCO’s Action in response to Government’s Policy” (April 2021) above, we set the annual discharge amount of tritium to 22 TBq/year (2.2E+13Bq/year) as an evaluation condition of this report and assessed the impact of radiation.
The relationship between the dose constraint and the annual discharge amount of tritium of 22 TBq/year (2.2E+13Bq/year) is discussed in 6-1-3.

[23] See footnote No.12.

(2) About tritium

A part of tritiated water (HTO) is converted to organically bound tritium (OBT) by plants and animals, etc., in the environment.
The following shows the effective dose factor in the case of ingestion of tritium [13].

Tritiated water	1.8E-11 Sv/Bq
OBT	4.2E-11 Sv/Bq

The effective dose factor of tritiated water reflects conversion of a part of tritium to OBT in the body after a human ingests tritium. As shown in Table II-9-1 and II-9-2 in chapter II-6 “Water quality other than radioactive materials” of Attachment II “Properties of ALPS treated water, etc.,” the ALPS treated water to be discharged contains almost no organic matter and almost the whole of it is considered to be tritiated water when discharged, so the case of directly drinking seawater or inhaling seawater spray is assessed by the effective dose factor of tritiated water.
On the other hand, as with humans, a part of tritiated water is converted to OBT when ingested by plants and animals. If OBT is ingested directly through seafood, etc., the effective dose factor of OBT is applied, so for the ingestion of seafood, the effective dose factor is used after correction assuming that 10% of tritium ingested is OBT. Specifically, we used adult: 2.0E-11Sv/Bq, child under school age: 3.5E-11Sv/Bq, and infant: 7.0E-11Sv/Bq as the corrected effective dose coefficient of tritium for the exposure assessment of ingestion of seafood.
In monitoring of fish, we performed near the FDNPS, no OBT was detected and no event of concentration of tritium compared with the tritium concentration in the seawater in the surrounding area was observed. In addition, there is a general understanding that no evidence for biological concentration of OBT from HTO has been found in international studies [14][24].

[24] For example, “Tritium and the environment,” which was issued by Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety in France in 2012 [14] says “To date, no phenomenon of tritium bioaccumulation has been observed in marine organisms on the French Channel coast. This observation leads to the conclusion that discharge from nuclear industry, led by the spent fuel processing plant in La Hague, are overwhelmingly in the form of HTO.”

For OBT, see Attachment III “Impact of the organically bound tritium in the exposure assessment of tritium.”

(3) Assessment of migration and accumulation of nuclides other than tritium

The assessment of this report assumed that nuclides other than tritium was advected and diffused while dissolved in the seawater. A part of discharged nuclides is adsorbed to suspended particles in the seawater, seabed sediment, hulls, beach sand, and fishing nets, or advected or concentrated in marine organisms depending on the chemical forms of radioactive materials, etc., so the disposition in the environment is assumed not to be the same as that of tritium. As for this trend, the higher the distribution factor to seabed sediment, etc., or biological concentration factor the element has, the more significant the concentration decrease in the seawater side and the concentration increase in the soil and organism side may become because of more significant migration from the seawater to the soil and organisms.

However, ALPS treated water to be discharged is purified by coagulating sedimentation, adsorption, filtration, etc., and contains almost no impurities, so even if it is adsorbed to suspended particles, it will be unlikely that a lot of sediment is generated, and only a limited amount of seawater directly contacts the seabed sediment, etc., which means that initially the amount of radioactive materials adsorbed to seabed sediment is much smaller than the total amount of discharged radioactive materials. Therefore, while the decrease in the concentration in the seawater caused by adsorption to the seabed sediment in diffusion is not considered from the viewpoint of model simplification, considerations have been made so that such differences in the disposition in the environment need not be considered, by assuming that adsorption has proceeded until the concentration in the seawater reaches the equilibrium state as for adsorption to seabed sediment, etc., and biological concentration, which proceeds in the long term in reality, and setting both of them conservatively. This is shown in Figure 4-1.

For advection and diffusion in the sea, we also verified that annual variation was small, by simulated calculation of seven years

Thanks to these considerations, we can assess accumulation of radioactive materials in the environment due to long-term discharge, though this assessment is performed for just one year. Thus, the peak dose value is considered not higher than the value in this assessment.

Accumulation process in seabed sediment, etc. in actual phenomena		If discharge into the sea starts, advection and diffusion of radioactive materials discharged from the discharge outlet supplies radioactive materials, which increases the concentration in the seawater.
	Supply of radioactive materials by advection and diffusion => Adsorption to suspended particles and adsorption and deposition on seabed sediment 	Due to a rise in the concentration, some of the supplied radioactive materials are adsorbed to seabed sediment, suspended particles, etc. As a result, the radioactive material concentration in the seawater drops and the radioactive material concentrations in seabed sediment, suspended particles, etc., rises and reaches the equilibrium states depending on the distribution factors.
	Supply of radioactive materials by advection and diffusion => Rise in the concentration 	Then, more radioactive materials are discharged and the radioactive material concentration in the seawater rises.
	Supply of radioactive materials by advection and diffusion => Rise in the concentration => Adsorption and deposition on seabed sediment 	Some of the radioactive materials are adsorbed near seabed sediment, suspended particles, etc., the concentration in the seawater side drops, and the concentrations in seabed sediment and suspended particles rises and reaches equilibrium. Long-term repetition of this process raises the radioactive material concentrations in seabed sediment, suspended particles, etc., as well as the radioactive material concentration in the seawater, which reaches the equilibrium state.

Model of this report		In this assessment, if radioactive materials are supplied due to advection and diffusion, radioactive materials will be accumulated instantaneously up to the equilibrium state, and the concentrations in seabed sediment, etc. set along with the concentration in the seawater. On the other hand, the concentration in the seawater was assumed not to drop even in the event of adsorption in seabed sediment, etc. This simulates the state that the seawater, seabed sediment, etc., reaches the equilibrium states (balance of adsorption and desorption) due to long-term continuation of discharge and no more adsorption occurs.

Figure 4-1 Actual accumulation process in seabed sediment, etc., and model in this report (image)

5. Properties of ALPS treated water, etc. and discharge method

5-1. Properties of ALPS treated water, etc.

ALPS treated water, etc., of about 1.28 million m^3 currently stored in tanks is water purified by ALPS (excluding strontium treated water), which is designed to be able to remove 62 nuclides excluding tritium and C-14 among the radioactive nuclides contained in contaminated water. Contaminated water newly generated during the period of discharge into the sea has to be treated appropriately by ALPS, etc., in the same manner and discharged into the sea. The rationale behind the selection of 62 nuclides subject to removal by ALPS is shown in Attachment I “Rationale behind the selection of nuclides subject to removal by ALPS” and the mechanism to remove radioactive materials from contaminated water is shown in Attachment II “Properties of ALPS treated water, etc.”

ALPS can purify 62 radioactive materials other than tritium and C-14 up to less than 1 of sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits, but about 70% of ALPS treated water (based on the breakdown of the tank groups fully filled with water by December 31, 2019) is so-called “treated water to be purified,” which contains more radioactive materials other than tritium than the standard applicable to discharge into the environment (sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of less than 1) due to the treatment before performance improvement in the early stage of the treatment plan, priority on the treatment amount for reduction of additional exposure dose on the site boundary, etc. Such treated water to be purified, which is yet to be purified sufficiently, is surely purified until the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of radioactive materials other than tritium becomes less than 1 before discharge (secondary treatment) and then discharged as ALPS treated water. Table 5-1-1 shows the regulatory concentration limit of tritium, C-14, and 62 nuclides subject to removal by ALPS.

As for the secondary treatment by ALPS, we conducted a secondary treatment performance verification test for a total of 2,000 m^3 of two tank groups since September 2020 and verified that the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of nuclides excluding tritium in each tank group can be reduced to less than 1 [15]. The water quality of ALPS treated water, etc., including the result of the secondary treatment performance verification test, is shown in Attachment II “Properties of ALPS treated water, etc.”

The targets in this report include not only about 1.28 m^3 of ALPS treated water, etc., already stored in the FDNPS, but also contaminated water generated even after discharge into the sea is started, because such water is planned to be discharged into the sea as ALPS treated water after the purification by water treatment facilities including ALPS.

Table 5-1-1 Regulatory concentration limits of 62 nuclides subject to removal by ALPS, tritium, and C-14

	Target nuclides (physical half-life)	Regulatory concentration limit (Bq/L)		Target nuclides (physical half-life)	Regulatory concentration limit (Bq/L)
1	H-3 (about 12 years)	6.0E+04	33	Te-129m (about 34 days)	3.0E+02
2	C-14 (about 5700 years)	2.0E+03	34	I-129 (about 16 million years)	9.0E+00
3	Mn-54 (about 310 days)	1.0E+03	35	Cs-134 (about 2.1 years)	6.0E+01
4	Fe-59 (about 44 days)	4.0E+02	36	Cs-135 (about 2.3 million years)	6.0E+02
5	Co-58 (about 71 days)	1.0E+03	37	Cs-136 (about 13 days)	3.0E+02
6	Co-60 (about 5.3 years)	2.0E+02	38	Cs-137 (about 30 years)	9.0E+01
7	Ni-63 (about 100 years)	6.0E+03	39	Ba-137m (about 2.6 minutes)	8.0E+05
8	Zn-65 (about 240 days)	2.0E+02	40	Ba-140 (about 13 days)	3.0E+02
9	Rb-86 (about 19 days)	3.0E+02	41	Ce-141 (about 33 days)	1.0E+03
10	Sr-89 (about 51 days)	3.0E+02	42	Ce-144 (about 280 days)	2.0E+02
11	Sr-90 (about 29 years)	3.0E+01	43	Pr-144 (about 17 minutes)	2.0E+04
12	Y-90 (about 64 hours)	3.0E+02	44	Pr-144m (about 7.2 minutes)	4.0E+04
13	Y-91 (about 59 days)	3.0E+02	45	Pm-146 (about 5.5 years)	9.0E+02
14	Nb-95 (about 35 days)	1.0E+03	46	Pm-147 (about 2.6 years)	3.0E+03
15	Tc-99 (about 210,000 years)	1.0E+03	47	Pm-148 (about 5.4 days)	3.0E+02
16	Ru-103 (about 39 days)	1.0E+03	48	Pm-148m (about 41 days)	5.0E+02
17	Ru-106 (about 370 days)	1.0E+02	49	Sm-151 (about 90 years)	8.0E+03
18	Rh-103m (about 56 minutes)	2.0E+05	50	Eu-152 (about 14 years)	6.0E+02
19	Rh-106 (about 30 seconds)	3.0E+05	51	Eu-154 (about 8.6 years)	4.0E+02
20	Ag-110m (about 250 days)	3.0E+02	52	Eu-155 (about 4.8 years)	3.0E+03
21	Cd-113m (about 14 years)	4.0E+01	53	Gd-153 (about 240 days)	3.0E+03
22	Cd-115m (about 45 days)	3.0E+02	54	Tb-160 (about 72 days)	5.0E+02
23	Sn-119m (about 290 days)	2.0E+03	55	Pu-238 (about 88 years)	4.0E+00
24	Sn-123 (about 130 days)	4.0E+02	56	Pu-239 (about 24,000 years)	4.0E+00
25	Sn-126 (about 230,000 years)	2.0E+02	57	Pu-240 (about 6600 years)	4.0E+00
26	Sb-124 (about 60 days)	3.0E+02	58	Pu-241 (about 14 years)	2.0E+02
27	Sb-125 (about 2.8 years)	8.0E+02	59	Am-241 (about 430 years)	5.0E+00
28	Te-123m (about 120 days)	6.0E+02	60	Am-242m (about 140 years)	5.0E+00
29	Te-125m (about 57 days)	9.0E+02	61	Am-243 (about 7400 years)	5.0E+00
30	Te-127 (about 9.4 hours)	5.0E+03	62	Cm-242 (about 160 days)	6.0E+01
31	Te-127m (about 110 days)	3.0E+02	63	Cm-243 (about 29 years)	6.0E+00
32	Te-129 (about 70 minutes)	1.0E+04	64	Cm-244 (about 18 years)	7.0E+00

* The half-lives are indicated 2-digit accuracy using ICRP Publication 107 “Nuclear Decay Data for Dosimetric Calculations” [16]

5-2. Discharge method

The following shows the policy on the method of discharge into the sea following “TEPCO’s Action in response to Government’s Policy.”

- The design and operation of the facilities necessary for discharge into the sea shall comply with laws and get the necessary permissions from the Nuclear Regulation Authority.
- The amount of radioactive materials excluding tritium in treated water will be reduced by repeating secondary treatment prior to the discharge until the concentration before dilution surely falls below the regulatory standard value related to safety (until the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of nuclides other than tritium becomes less than 1). We shall not discharge treated water of which sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of radioactive materials excluding tritium before dilution is not less than 1.
- Before dilution and discharge, we shall measure and assess the concentration of the radioactive materials in ALPS treated water (tritium, 62 nuclides, and C-14) and announce the results of the measurement and assessment every time, as well as perform third-party measurement, assessment, announcement, etc., and announce the results.
- After that, tritium, which is difficult to exclude, is diluted with a massive amount of seawater (to be determined depending on the tritium concentration in the treated water to be discharged; about 100 to 1,400 times or more) before discharge, in order to meet the standard of the safety regulations of the government (regulatory concentration limit) set to reduce the impact on the environment immediately after discharge (at site boundary), dispel concerns of consumers, etc., as much as possible, and minimize reputation damage. Thanks to this, the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of radioactive materials other than tritium becomes less than 0.01. Besides, in actual operation, two sea water transfer pumps are enough to dilute the ALPS treated water to be discharged by setting the concentration limit of tritium before dilution below 1 million Bq/L.
- The tritium concentration of discharged water shall be sufficiently lower than 60,000Bq/L, which is the standard of the safety standards of the government (regulatory concentration limit), and 10,000Bq/L, which is the WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality: specifically, less than 1,500Bq/L as with the operation target of the currently applied discharge concentration of the groundwater bypass, subdrain, etc.
- Discharge into the sea shall be started carefully with a small amount. The soundness of facilities, the transfer procedure of ALPS treated water, measurement process of the concentration of radioactive materials, assessment of dilution of tritium in discharged water, the state of diffusion into the sea, etc., shall be verified.
- If the transfer facility or dilution facility does not function as planned due to malfunction, power failure, etc., we will stop the discharge immediately. If any abnormal value is

detected in sea area monitoring, we will stop discharge and investigate the state. When resuming discharge, confirm the safety of discharge.

- The upper limit of the annual discharge amount of tritium, which cannot be removed by ALPS, shall be 22 TBq (2.2E+13Bq) per year, which is the discharge control value of the FDNPS before the accident, for the time being. Moreover, we shall minimize the discharge amount as well as secure the site for facilities necessary for decommissioning by preferentially discharging water with a low tritium concentration and waiting for natural decay based on the half-life for water with a high concentration. Attachment IV “Analysis on the period of discharge of ALPS treated water” shows the simulation result related to discharge of ALPS treated water assuming that discharge will be started in FY 2023 and completed in FY 2051.

Table 5-2-1 shows the specific items to be implemented as shown in “TEPCO’s Action in response to Government’s Policy.”

Table 5-2-1 Specific items to be implemented

Secondary treatment of treated water to be purified	• The amount of radioactive materials excluding tritium in treated water to be purified to be discharged into the environment is reduced by secondary treatment by ALPS, etc., to ensure that radioactive materials other than tritium surely falls below the regulatory standard value related to safety (until the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of nuclides other than tritium becomes less than 1).
Analysis of ALPS treated water	• Before dilution and discharge, we shall announce the measurement and assessment results of the concentration of radioactive materials of 62 nuclides (nuclides subject to removal by ALPS) and C-14 every time, as well as perform third-party measurement, assessment, announcement, etc.
Dilution and discharge (including emergency actions)	• Tritium, which is difficult to remove, is diluted with a sufficient amount of seawater (100 or more times) before discharge so that the concentration will be sufficiently lower than the regulatory concentration limit. Thanks to this, the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of nuclides other than tritium in discharged water becomes less than 0.01. - The tritium concentration shall be the same as the operation target of the discharge concentration of the groundwater bypass, subdrain, etc. (less than 1,500Bq/L). • The upper limit of the annual discharge amount of tritium shall be 22 TBq (2.2E+13Bq) per year, which is the discharge control value at FDNPS before the accident, for the time being. The annual discharge amount of tritium is reviewed as needed based on the progress of decommissioning. • If the transfer facility or dilution facility does not function as planned due to a failure, outage, etc., stop the discharge immediately. • If any abnormal value is detected in sea area monitoring, stop discharge and investigate the state. When resuming discharge, confirm the safety of discharge.
Sea area monitoring	• Sea area monitoring is started according to the plan enhanced since about one year before the scheduled date to start discharge. • Monitoring of seawater, fish, and seaweeds are enhanced. - Tritium is intensively measured and assessed in addition to the past measurement and assessment focusing on Cs-137.

	- The measurement sample continued to be seawater but the sampled amount of fish and seaweeds are increased. • The radioactivity measurement result at the time of discharge is announced. - Third-party analysis, announcement, etc., are considered.

In addition, management values before dilution are set voluntarily for further reduction of the impact of radiation on the environment for eight nuclides with relative impacts of human exposure due to concentration in fish, etc., with the same ratio to regulatory concentration limit as management before discharge of ALPS treated water. The consideration of management values is shown in Reference C “Setting of Management Values and Exposure Assessment of Hypothetical ALPS Treated Water.” Table 5-2-2 shows the nuclides subject to management and the management values. If the concentration of any of these eight nuclides exceeds the management value as a result of analysis in the measurement/confirmation facility before discharge, the water shall not be discharged but subject to secondary treatment. These eight nuclides will be reviewed as needed, together with the review result of nuclides subject to measurement, which will be conducted prior to discharge.

Table 5-2-2 Management values (before dilution)

Target nuclide	Regulatory concentration limit (Bq/L)	Operation management value (Bq/L)	Ratio to regulatory concentration limit
C-14	2.0E+03	5.0E+02	2.5E-01
Fe-59	4.0E+02	2.0E-01	5.0E-04
Ag-110m	3.0E+02	6.0E-02	2.0E-04
Cd-113m	4.0E+01	2.0E-01	5.0E-03
Cd-115m	3.0E+02	4.0E+00	1.3E-02
Sn-119m	2.0E+03	6.0E+01	3.0E-02
Sn-123	4.0E+02	8.0E+00	2.0E-02
Sn-126	2.0E+02	4.0E-01	2.0E-03

5-3. Facilities for discharge

“TEPCO’s Action in response to Government’s Policy” shows a conceptual diagram of the facilities for discharging into the sea (Figure 5-3-1), but the assessment was performed reflecting the state of consideration of the facilities for discharge shown below by the following design clarification.

5-3-1. Overview of the facilities for discharge

The facilities for discharge into the sea mainly consist of “the measurement/confirmation facility” to verify the radioactive material concentration of ALPS treated water before dilution, “the dilution facility” which consists of seawater transfer piping and discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) including the seawater transfer pump and seawater pipe header to pump and discharge seawater for dilution, “the transfer facility” which consists of the treated water transfer pump and treated water transfer piping and valves to transfer ALPS treated water from the measurement/confirmation facility to the seawater piping, and “the discharge facility (related facility)” which consists of the discharge tunnel and discharge outlet.
After confirming the water, of which radioactive materials have been removed by ALPS up to a sufficiently law concentration, is so-called “ALPS treated water” (water whose sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of nuclides other than tritium is verified to be less than 1), and then diluted with a large amount of seawater 100 or more times.
The water to be discharged is received by the measurement/confirmation facility, the radioactive material concentration is homogenized by circulation and stirring, and then it is verified by sampling and analysis that the water is ALPS treated water. The verified water is transferred to the dilution facility by the transfer facility, mixed with a large amount of seawater pumped with the seawater transfer pump through the Unit 5 intake channel by the dilution facility, and drained to the discharge facility after dilution of the tritium concentration up to less than 1,500Bq/L.
The details of each facility are shown in the following pages. Figure 5-3-1 shows the conceptual diagram of the discharge facility. Figure 5-3-2 shows the big picture of the facility for discharge into the sea and related facilities.



Figure 5-3-1 Conceptual diagram of facilities for discharging ALPS treated water into the sea



Figure 5-3-2 Overview of facilities for discharging into the sea and related facilities

5-3-2. Measurement/confirmation facility

For the measurement/confirmation facility, we will use 30 out of 35 tanks installed in the K4 tank areas in the center of the site 33.5 m above sea level near ALPS. To sample and analyze homogenized water, use 10 tanks, whose total capacity is about 10,000 m^3, as 1 group, and install a stirring device in each tank and a circulation device in each tank group. Since we have to deal with three purposes, namely receiving, measurement/confirmation, and discharge, set up three tanks groups and operate them on a rotation basis.
Figure 5-3-3 shows the schematic diagram of the measurement/confirmation facility. This figure also outlines the operation of the measurement/confirmation facility.



	Group A	Group B	Group C
1st cycle	Receiving	-	-
2nd cycle	Measurement/ confirmation	Receiving	-
3rd cycle	Discharge	Measurement /confirmation	Receiving
4th cycle	Receiving	Discharge	Measurement /confirmation
•••	Measurement/ confirmation	Receiving	Discharge

Figure 5-3-3 Schematic diagram of measurement/confirmation facilities

5-3-3. Transfer facility

The transfer facility is mainly composed of ALPS treated water transfer pump and transfer piping, etc.

In the transfer facility, the ALPS treated water transfer pump consists of two units, namely operating unit and spare unit, and is installed in the ALPS transfer facility building near the measurement/confirmation facility to transfer ALPS treated water from the tanks of the measurement/confirmation facility 33.5 m above sea level to the dilution facility. Install a radiation detector to detect gamma rays for emergency isolation in the building in order to prevent water from being discharged without sufficient purification.

In the transfer facility, the transfer piping is installed to connect the measurement/confirmation facility 33.5 m above sea level to the seawater piping 2.5 m above sea level. Install an emergency isolation valve in two points in the transfer piping to enable to stop transfer of ALPS treated water in the event of an abnormality. One point is set before the injection part of the seawater piping in order to minimize the discharge amount of ALPS treated water in the event of an abnormality. The other point is set in the ALPS electrical equipment room set up inside the seawall to be newly constructed 11.5m above sea level in preparation for cases that the former emergency isolation valve does not work due to water immersion, etc., caused by the expected Japan Trench tsunami. In the same room, a flowmeter to measure the flow rate of ALPS treated water to be transferred to the seawater pipe header and the flow rate adjustment valve to adjust the flow rate as specified are installed.

Figure 5-3-4 shows the schematic diagram of the transfer facility



Figure 5-3-4 Schematic diagram of the transfer facility

5-3-4. Dilution facility

The dilution facility consists of a seawater transfer pump, seawater piping (including header), and a discharge shaft (upstream water tank) with the purpose of diluting the ALPS treated water with seawater, transferring it to the discharge shaft (upstream water tank), and discharging it to the discharge facility (related facility). Dilution is done by injecting ALPS treated water into the seawater pipe header and mixing it.

The dilution facility is installed in a location 2.5 m above sea level in the sea side of Units 5/6. A flowmeter is installed in the seawater transfer piping to ensure that the tritium concentration is less than 1,500Bq/L by dilution with a high volume of water (100 or more times). For the seawater transfer pump, the intake channel for the existing Unit 5 circulation water pump is reused. Conservatively, three pumps are installed. The capacity of the seawater transfer pump shall be about 170, 000 m^3/day/unit, at which the flowrate of the seawater transfer pump can be measured, in order to enable sufficient dilution with seawater. Figure 5-3-5 shows the schematic diagram of the dilution facility.



Figure 5-3-5 Schematic diagram of the dilution facility

As mentioned above, because dilution is performed by injecting ALPS treated water into the seawater pipe header and mixing it; the mixing behavior in the seawater piping of ALPS treated water was calculated, the expected dilution effect was assessed, the maximum mass concentration on the cross section of the concentration assessment at the seawater piping outlet of injected water was assessed to be 0.28%, and it was concluded that the water was diluted about 357 times.

5-3-5. Discharge facility (related facility)

In this discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, as a result of optimization of the design process, the water diluted and mixed with a large amount of seawater is discharged not through the existing discharge outlet installed on the coast to the north of the northern breakwater, but through the discharge outlet installed on the seabed about 1 km off the coast of the FDNPS (See Figures 5-3-6 to 5-3-7).

The discharge facility consists of the discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage), discharge tunnel, and discharge outlet, and is designed to transfer water flowing out over the partition wall (weir which separates the upper-stream storage from the down-stream storage) in the discharge vertical shaft to the outlet, which is approximately 1 km away, by making use of the head between water in the discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage) and the sea surface. The discharge tunnel passes through bedrock to minimize the leakage risk and improve seismic resistance.

This proposal has the following advantages compared with the proposal to use the existing discharge outlet.

- Compared with water intake inside and outside the port using the existing intake and discharge facilities, water inside the port, of which radioactive material concentration is higher than that of water outside the port, is not discharged. To take water outside the port, isolation from the inside of the port is secured with a partition weir in the south side of the Unit 5 intake gate, and a part of the permeation prevention work of the north breakwater of the port is removed. Attachment V “Impacts of intake and discharge of diluted water on outside” shows discussion about the impact of the radioactive material concentration in the port. As a result of the exposure assessment, the assessment results of both water intake inside and outside the port was much smaller than the dose limit and target dose value, but it turned out that the external impact of water intake outside the port is smaller.
- Since discharged water is diffused offshore, seawater is hard to recirculate (hard to be taken again as seawater for dilution).
- The impact on fishing is reduced by setting the position of the discharge outlet within “area where common fishery rights are not set” where fishing is not done on a daily basis.
- As a result of a geological investigation, a stable bedrock is exposed on the seabed, so construction can be performed safely and steadily (See Figure 5-3-8).

Figures 5-3-9 shows the overview of the structure of the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage/down-stream storage) in the water discharge tunnel side. Figure 5-3-10 shows the image of the discharge outlet, which is the discharge tunnel outlet. Figure 5-3-11 shows its sectional view.



Source: the Geographical Survey Institute map (national land electronic website) revised by Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings Corporation
https://maps.gsi.go.jp/#13/37.422730/141.044970/&base=std&ls=std&disp=1&vs=c1j0h0k0l0u0t0z0r0s0m0f1

Figure 5-3-6 Discharge location map



Figure 5-3-7 General view of the intake and discharge facilities



Figure 5-3-8 Plane view of assumed geology



Figure 5-3-9 Schematic diagram of the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage/down-stream storage)



Figure 5-3-10 Image drawing of discharge outlet



Figure 5-3-11 Section view of the discharge outlet

6. Assessment of protection of humans (general public)

6-1. Exposure assessment under normal conditions

6-1-1. Assessment procedure

We assess the dose of the representative person in order to verify the risk from the viewpoint of radiation protection for human based on the current consideration situation. The specific procedure of the assessment is as shown in the procedure of Figure 6-1-1 shown in GSG-10.



Figure 6-1-1 Exposure assessment procedure (prepared from GSG-10)

[25] In this assessment, the source term means the annual discharge amount (total amount) of each nuclide contained in the ALPS treated water discharged into the sea in a certain period (e.g. one year).

6-1-2. Assessment method

(1) Source term (annual discharge amount of each nuclide)

The target nuclides of the radioactive impact assessment related to discharge into the sea of ALPS treated water are a total of 64 nuclides: tritium, C-14, and 62 nuclides subject to removal by ALPS (Table 5-1-1). In “TEPCO’s Action in response to Government’s Policy,” the upper limit of the annual discharge amount of tritium is set to 22 TBq (2.2E+13Bq), which is the discharge control value of the FDNPS before the accident, for the time being.

The discharge amount of 63 nuclides other than tritium is calculated by the product of the composition of nuclides in ALPS treated water (concentration of each nuclide) and the annual discharge volume of water. Though the composition of nuclides in ALPS treated water varies among tank groups, it is to be set using the compositions of nuclides of three tank groups, namely K4, J1-C, and J1-G, of which the analysis results of all of the 64 nuclides are available.

i. K4 tank group (Sum of the ratios to regulatory concentration limits of 63 nuclides other than tritium: 0.29)
ii. J1-C tank group (Sum of the ratios to regulatory concentration limits of 63 nuclides other than tritium: 0.35)
iii. J1-G tank group (Sum of the ratios to regulatory concentration limits of 63 nuclides other than tritium: 0.22)

The water in the K4 tank group has been treated by one treatment process using the performance of ALPS to make the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits less than 1, as described in b.2016 of II-7. “Reason for generation of treated water to be purified” of Attachment II “Properties of ALPS treated water, etc.”

On the other hand, the water in the J1-C and J1-G tank groups has been treated while the operating rate of ALPS was high and stored as treated water to be purified because the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits did not fall below 1 after the first treatment by ALPS. The tank groups were selected as groups with a higher concentration (J1-C tank group; the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits before secondary treatment is about 2,400) and with a lower concentration (J1-G tank group; the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits before secondary treatment is about 390). Secondary treatment was performed for each of them and the sums of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of both of them were much less than 1 after secondary treatment.

We compared the concentration of the 7 major nuclides[26] and Tc-99 of these three tank groups with the measurement results of the tank groups in which the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits other than tritium is estimated to be less than 1 from the analysis result of the tank groups currently used for storage of water. Figure 6-1-2 shows the result. Though I-129 varies in the three tank groups as well as the other tank groups, the concentrations of the other nuclides are normal in the analysis results of the other tank groups as well. The reason why the three tank groups have lower Cs-134 result, the detection limits of the three tank groups were 0.1 Bq/L, while the detection limits of many other tank groups were from 0.1 to 0.2 Bq/L. Cs-134, a short half-life nuclide, of most tank groups were nevertheless undetected.

In addition, tritium and C-14, which are not subject to removal by ALPS, were compared with the measurement results of all tank groups. The comparison result is shown in Figure 6-1-3. The concentration of C-14 is also normal in the analysis results of the other tank groups.

Based on these comparisons, the compositions of the nuclides of the three tank groups are considered typical as the composition of concentrations in ALPS treated water. These source terms include uncertainties, which is described in chapter 8.

The 62 nuclides to removal by ALPS had been selected from fission products derived from fuel in the reactors of Unit 1 to 3 and the corrosion products derived from water retained in operating nuclear reactors. However, a gap found later between sum of the measured radioactive concentration of the 7 major nuclides of ALPS treated water and measured gross beta. Examinations has identified Tc-99 and C-14 as the cause of the gap and C-14 has been added into the required nuclides to be measured.

On the other hands, abundance of some nuclides may be sufficiently small at present due to enough decay, because of using inventory data of one year after the earthquake to select 62 nuclides for removal targets by ALPS.

In light of the above circumstances, for discharging ALPS treated water into the sea, the selection of targert nuclides for measurement will be carried out after thorough verification once again, in which case this assessment will be revised. New target nuclides may be added, but the revision of the target nuclides for measurement is expected to have almost no impact on the exposure assessment, because it was verified that the sum of the measured radioactive concentration of 7 major nuclides, Tc-99 and C-14 of ALPS treated water is not differ from the measured gross beta as to suspect the existence of nuclides other than the current 64 nuclides, and because the nuclides to be added as targets for measurement are expected to have only a small impact on the human body due to low-energy radiation.

[26] Seven nuclides which are significantly detected in the process of ALPS treatment at the facility inlet and outlet (Cs-134, Cs-147, Co-60, Sb-125, Ru-106, Sr-90, I-129)



Figure 6-1-2 Concentration distribution of the seven major nuclides and Tc-99 in the analysis result of ALPS treated water (as of the end of March 2021), and comparison among the three tank groups

* The analysis results in which the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of the 7 major nuclides is less than 0.59 (for 80 tanks) (excluding secondary treatment test water)

* The vertical axis indicates the number of tanks (counted as the detection limit if not detected)

* Values are measured values at the times and no half-life correction is considered.



Figure 6-1-3 Concentration distribution of tritium and C-14 in the analysis result of ALPS treated water, etc. (as of the end of March 2021) and comparison among the three tank groups

* The analysis results of the tank group (189 tanks for tritium and 81 tanks for C-14) are plotted (excluding secondary treatment test water)
* The vertical axis indicates the number of tanks (counted as the detection limit if not detected)
* Values are measured values at the times and no half-life correction is considered.

On the other hand, the tritium concentration of stored ALPS treated water, etc., varies as shown in Figure 6-1-3, so the assumed annual discharge volume of treated water depends on the concentration of tritium contained in ALPS treated water to be discharged. The annual discharge volume of water is in inverse proportion to the tritium concentration; the lower the tritium concentration is, the greater the annual discharge amount of 63 nuclides other than tritium becomes. The relationships are as shown in the following equation.

$$S_i = V \times C_i = \frac{S_{H-3}}{C_{H-3}} \times C_i$$

where

S_i: Annual radioactivity amount of discharged nuclide i (Bq)

V: Annual discharge volume of ALPS treated water (L)

C_i: Concentration of nuclide i contained in the ALPS treated water discharged (Bq/L)

S_{H-3}: Annual radioactivity amount of tritium discharged
(= 22 TBq (2.2E+13Bq))

C_{H-3}: Concentration of tritium contained in the ALPS treated water discharged (Bq/L)

Among them the values of C_i and C_{H-3} are given by the definition of each nuclide's compositions in this assessment, which means that the annual discharge amount of each nuclide is uniquely determined from the concentration of tritium of the nuclide's compositions.

The source term using the analysis result of each tank group is set by the following procedure. In actual discharge, the source term varies among tank groups, but this assessment assumes that it does not vary throughout the year for simplification of the model.
Tables 6-1-1 to 6-1-3 show the concentration, annual discharge volume of water, and annual discharge amount of each nuclide based on these settings.

(1) The annual discharge amount of tritium shall be the upper limit: 22 TBq (2.2E+13Bq).
(2) The annual discharge volume of water is calculated from (1) and the tritium concentration.
(3) The annual discharge amount of each nuclide is calculated from the concentration of 63 nuclides and the product of the annual discharge amount calculated in (2). Some of the nuclides below the detection limit value have short half-lives or have already decayed because more than 11 years have elapsed since the accident, but conservatively they are assumed to exist at the detection limit.

Actually, when ALPS treated water is discharged, the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of nuclides other than tritium becomes less than 0.01 because as shown in 5-2, the water is diluted with seawater 100 or more times before discharge into the sea so that the tritium concentration falls below 1,500Bq/L, which is the target value of the groundwater bypass and subdrain.

Table 6-1-1 Source term based on the nuclide composition of measured values (K4 tank group) (annual discharge amount)

Target nuclide	Nuclide concentration (Bq/L)	Annual discharge volume of water (L)	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Remarks
H-3	1.9E+05	1.2E+08	2.2E+13	• For the annual discharge amount of tritium, the upper limit value of the annual discharge amount is used • Dilute with seawater 100 or more times before discharge so that the tritium concentration becomes less than 1,500Bq/L
C-14	1.5E+01		1.7E+09	
Mn-54	6.7E-03		7.8E+05	
Fe-59	1.7E-02		2.0E+06	
Co-58	8.0E-03		9.3E+05	
Co-60	4.4E-01		5.1E+07	
Ni-63	2.2E+00		2.5E+08	
Zn-65	1.5E-02		1.7E+06	
Rb-86	1.9E-01		2.2E+07	
Sr-89	1.0E-01		1.2E+07	
Sr-90	2.2E-01		2.5E+07	
Y-90	2.2E-01		2.5E+07	
Y-91	2.2E+00		2.5E+08	

Target nuclide	Nuclide concentration (Bq/L)	Annual discharge volume of water (L)	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Remarks
Nb-95	1.0E-02		1.2E+06	
Tc-99	7.0E-01		8.1E+07	
Ru-103	1.0E-02		1.2E+06	
Ru-106	1.6E+00		1.9E+08	
Rh-103m	1.0E-02		1.2E+06	
Rh-106	1.6E+00		1.9E+08	
Ag-110m	5.6E-03		6.5E+05	
Cd-113m	1.8E-02		2.1E+06	
Cd-115m	6.4E-01		7.4E+07	
Sn-119m	1.7E-01		2.0E+07	
Sn-123	1.2E+00		1.4E+08	
Sn-126	2.7E-02		3.1E+06	
Sb-124	9.5E-03		1.1E+06	
Sb-125	3.3E-01		3.8E+07	
Te-123m	9.2E-03		1.1E+06	
Te-125m	3.3E-01		3.8E+07	
Te-127	3.2E-01		3.7E+07	
Te-127m	3.2E-01		3.7E+07	
Te-129	8.1E-02		9.4E+06	
Te-129m	3.2E-01		3.7E+07	
I-129	2.1E+00		2.4E+08	
Cs-134	4.5E-02		5.2E+06	
Cs-135	2.5E-06		2.9E+02	
Cs-136	3.0E-02		3.5E+06	
Cs-137	4.2E-01		4.9E+07	
Ba-137m	4.2E-01		4.9E+07	
Ba-140	9.5E-02		1.1E+07	
Ce-141	2.5E-02		2.9E+06	
Ce-144	6.3E-02		7.3E+06	
Pr-144	6.3E-02		7.3E+06	
Pr-144m	6.3E-02		7.3E+06	
Pm-146	9.8E-02		1.1E+07	
Pm-147	1.9E-01		2.2E+07	
Pm-148	5.0E-01		5.8E+07	
Pm-148m	8.4E-03		9.7E+05	
Sm-151	9.0E-04		1.0E+05	
Eu-152	2.8E-02		3.2E+06	
Eu-154	1.2E-02		1.4E+06	
Eu-155	3.3E-02		3.8E+06	

Target nuclide	Nuclide concentration (Bq/L)	Annual discharge volume of water (L)	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Remarks
Gd-153	3.2E-02		3.7E+06	
Tb-160	2.8E-02		3.2E+06	
Pu-238	6.3E-04		7.3E+04	
Pu-239	6.3E-04		7.3E+04	
Pu-240	6.3E-04		7.3E+04	
Pu-241	2.8E-02		3.2E+06	
Am-241	6.3E-04		7.3E+04	
Am-242m	3.9E-05		4.5E+03	
Am-243	6.3E-04		7.3E+04	
Cm-242	6.3E-04		7.3E+04	
Cm-243	6.3E-04		7.3E+04	
Cm-244	6.3E-04		7.3E+04	

Table 6-1-2 Source term based on the nuclide composition of measured values (J1-C tank group) (annual discharge amount)

Target nuclide	Nuclide concentration (Bq/L)	Annual discharge volume of water (L)	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Remarks
H-3	8.2E+05	2.7E+07	2.2E+13	• For the annual discharge amount of tritium, the upper limit value of the annual discharge amount is used • Dilute with seawater 100 or more times before discharge so that the tritium concentration becomes less than 1,500Bq/L
C-14	1.8E+01		4.8E+08	
Mn-54	3.8E-02		1.0E+06	
Fe-59	8.7E-02		2.3E+06	
Co-58	4.1E-02		1.1E+06	
Co-60	3.3E-01		8.9E+06	
Ni-63	8.5E+00		2.3E+08	
Zn-65	9.4E-02		2.5E+06	
Rb-86	5.0E-01		1.3E+07	
Sr-89	5.4E-02		1.4E+06	
Sr-90	3.6E-02		9.7E+05	
Y-90	3.6E-02		9.7E+05	
Y-91	1.7E+01		4.6E+08	
Nb-95	5.0E-02		1.3E+06	
Tc-99	1.2E+00		3.2E+07	
Ru-103	5.3E-02		1.4E+06	
Ru-106	1.4E+00		3.8E+07	
Rh-103m	5.3E-02		1.4E+06	
Rh-106	1.4E+00		3.8E+07	
Ag-110m	4.3E-02		1.2E+06	
Cd-113m	8.5E-02		2.3E+06	

Target nuclide	Nuclide concentration (Bq/L)	Annual discharge volume of water (L)	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Remarks
Cd-115m	2.7E+00		7.2E+07	
Sn-119m	4.2E+01		1.1E+09	
Sn-123	6.6E+00		1.8E+08	
Sn-126	2.9E-01		7.8E+06	
Sb-124	9.7E-02		2.6E+06	
Sb-125	2.3E-01		6.2E+06	
Te-123m	9.2E-02		2.5E+06	
Te-125m	2.3E-01		6.2E+06	
Te-127	4.7E+00		1.3E+08	
Te-127m	4.9E+00		1.3E+08	
Te-129	6.2E-01		1.7E+07	
Te-129m	1.4E+00		3.8E+07	
I-129	1.2E+00		3.2E+07	
Cs-134	7.6E-02		2.0E+06	
Cs-135	1.2E-06		3.2E+01	
Cs-136	4.7E-02		1.3E+06	
Cs-137	1.9E-01		5.1E+06	
Ba-137m	1.9E-01		5.1E+06	
Ba-140	2.0E-01		5.4E+06	
Ce-141	2.6E-01		7.0E+06	
Ce-144	5.7E-01		1.5E+07	
Pr-144	5.7E-01		1.5E+07	
Pr-144m	5.7E-01		1.5E+07	
Pm-146	6.7E-02		1.8E+06	
Pm-147	8.0E-01		2.1E+07	
Pm-148	2.3E-01		6.2E+06	
Pm-148m	4.8E-02		1.3E+06	
Sm-151	1.1E-02		3.0E+05	
Eu-152	2.8E-01		7.5E+06	
Eu-154	1.1E-01		3.0E+06	
Eu-155	3.4E-01		9.1E+06	
Gd-153	2.6E-01		7.0E+06	
Tb-160	1.4E-01		3.8E+06	
Pu-238	3.3E-02		8.9E+05	
Pu-239	3.3E-02		8.9E+05	
Pu-240	3.3E-02		8.9E+05	
Pu-241	1.2E+00		3.2E+07	
Am-241	3.3E-02		8.9E+05	
Am-242m	5.9E-04		1.6E+04	

Target nuclide	Nuclide concentration (Bq/L)	Annual discharge volume of water (L)	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Remarks
Am-243	3.3E-02		8.9E+05	
Cm-242	3.3E-02		8.9E+05	
Cm-243	3.3E-02		8.9E+05	
Cm-244	3.3E-02		8.9E+05	

Table 6-1-3 Source term based on the nuclide composition of measured values (J1-G tank group) (annual discharge amount)

Target nuclide	Nuclide concentration (Bq/L)	Annual discharge volume of water (L)	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Remarks
H-3	2.7E+05	8.1E+07	2.2E+13	• For the annual discharge amount of tritium, the upper limit value of the annual discharge amount is used • Dilute with seawater 100 or more times before discharge so that the tritium concentration becomes less than 1,500Bq/L
C-14	1.6E+01		1.3E+09	
Mn-54	3.8E-02		3.1E+06	
Fe-59	7.2E-02		5.9E+06	
Co-58	3.7E-02		3.0E+06	
Co-60	2.3E-01		1.9E+07	
Ni-63	8.8E+00		7.2E+08	
Zn-65	8.0E-02		6.5E+06	
Rb-86	4.7E-01		3.8E+07	
Sr-89	4.5E-02		3.7E+06	
Sr-90	3.2E-02		2.6E+06	
Y-90	3.2E-02		2.6E+06	
Y-91	1.2E+01		9.8E+08	
Nb-95	4.7E-02		3.8E+06	
Tc-99	1.3E+00		1.1E+08	
Ru-103	5.1E-02		4.2E+06	
Ru-106	4.8E-01		3.9E+07	
Rh-103m	5.1E-02		4.2E+06	
Rh-106	4.8E-01		3.9E+07	
Ag-110m	4.0E-02		3.3E+06	
Cd-113m	8.6E-02		7.0E+06	
Cd-115m	2.3E+00		1.9E+08	
Sn-119m	4.0E+01		3.3E+09	
Sn-123	6.3E+00		5.1E+08	
Sn-126	1.5E-01		1.2E+07	
Sb-124	8.4E-02		6.8E+06	
Sb-125	1.4E-01		1.1E+07	
Te-123m	6.7E-02		5.5E+06	
Te-125m	1.4E-01		1.1E+07	

Target nuclide	Nuclide concentration (Bq/L)	Annual discharge volume of water (L)	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Remarks
Te-127	4.3E+00		3.5E+08	
Te-127m	4.5E+00		3.7E+08	
Te-129	5.9E-01		4.8E+07	
Te-129m	1.2E+00		9.8E+07	
I-129	3.3E-01		2.7E+07	
Cs-134	6.7E-02		5.5E+06	
Cs-135	2.1E-06		1.7E+02	
Cs-136	3.6E-02		2.9E+06	
Cs-137	3.3E-01		2.7E+07	
Ba-137m	3.3E-01		2.7E+07	
Ba-140	1.7E-01		1.4E+07	
Ce-141	1.2E-01		9.8E+06	
Ce-144	5.5E-01		4.5E+07	
Pr-144	5.5E-01		4.5E+07	
Pr-144m	5.5E-01		4.5E+07	
Pm-146	6.3E-02		5.1E+06	
Pm-147	7.2E-01		5.9E+07	
Pm-148	4.5E-01		3.7E+07	
Pm-148m	4.1E-02		3.3E+06	
Sm-151	1.0E-02		8.1E+05	
Eu-152	1.9E-01		1.5E+07	
Eu-154	1.0E-01		8.1E+06	
Eu-155	1.8E-01		1.5E+07	
Gd-153	1.9E-01		1.5E+07	
Tb-160	1.4E-01		1.1E+07	
Pu-238	2.8E-02		2.3E+06	
Pu-239	2.8E-02		2.3E+06	
Pu-240	2.8E-02		2.3E+06	
Pu-241	1.0E+00		8.1E+07	
Am-241	2.8E-02		2.3E+06	
Am-242m	5.1E-04		4.2E+04	
Am-243	2.8E-02		2.3E+06	
Cm-242	2.8E-02		2.3E+06	
Cm-243	2.8E-02		2.3E+06	
Cm-244	2.8E-02		2.3E+06	

(2) Modeling of diffusion and transfer after discharge

(1) Selection of the migration model

As the migration model of radioactive materials discharged into the sea, the following was selected referring to GSG-10, domestic cases, etc. For the timeline of selection, etc., see Attachment VI “Transfer pathways and exposure pathways other than the assessment targets.”

i. Advection and diffusion by tidal currents, etc.
Advection and diffusion in the sea were selected because the water will be discharged into the sea.

ii. Advection and diffusion by tidal currents, etc. -> Adhesion to hulls
Adhesion to hulls is selected because ships sail for fishing, etc., in the sea.

iii. Advection and diffusion by tidal currents, etc. -> Adhesion to seabed sediment and beach sand
Selected because radioactive materials will be advected and diffused by tidal currents, etc., and migrate to seabed sediment, beach sand, etc.

iv. Advection and diffusion by tidal currents, etc. -> Adhesion to fishing nets
Migration to fishing nets is selected because radioactive materials will be advected and diffused by tidal currents, etc., and adhered to fishing nets used in the surrounding area.

v. Advection and diffusion by tidal currents -> Resuspension to air by seawater spray
Selected because radioactive materials will be advected and diffused by tidal currents, etc., and seawater spray will occur due to waves, etc., at beaches.

vi. Advection and diffusion by tidal currents, etc. -> Intake and concentration by marine organisms such as fish
Selected because radioactive materials will be advected and diffused by tidal currents, etc., and migrate to and concentrate in fish.

(2) Assessment of advection and diffusion in the sea area

For the calculation of diffusion of radioactive materials in the sea area, the area sea model “ROMS: Regional Ocean Modeling System” applied to off-shore of Fukushima by Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI) is used. This model was verified to have high reproducibility by reproduction calculation of the cesium concentration in the seawater from actual past meteorological and oceanographic data and comparison with actual data for diffusion of cesium leaked into the sea due to the Accident at the FDNPS (Tsumune et al., 2020) [4], and also used in “TEPCO Draft Study Responding to the Subcommittee Report on Handling ALPS Treated Water,” [17] which was issued on March 24, 2020. The concentration was calculated from the model of the sea area near the FDNPS at high resolution in order to set the discharge point and the

FDNPS port facilities more correctly. It was verified that higher resolution improved the reproducibility of the concentration in the seawater of cesium leaked due to the accident at the FDNPS. Attachment VII “Validity of the diffusion simulation” shows discussion about the validity of diffusion simulation.
In this report, the concentration in the seawater was calculated from this model in the case of discharge of a total of 22 TBq (2.2E+13Bq) of tritium per year at an even pace throughout the year, and those of the other nuclides were calculated by proportionate calculation of the annual discharge amount with tritium.
In this model, tritium equivalent to the discharge rate is added to the mesh including the discharge point so that it instantaneously spreads evenly in the mesh. Due to the characteristics of the model, dilution of ALPS treated water with the seawater and the promotion effect of the discharge flow velocity on mixing dilution are not considered, so it may be different from the contribution distribution in the actual discharge near the discharge outlet, but there is considered to be no significant difference in the case of diffusion away from the discharge outlet.
This can also be verified by comparing the diffusion simulation results with different discharge points, shown in Attachment VIII “Difference in the diffusion area by discharge location.” The annual mean concentration in the 10 km × 10 km area when ALPS treated water is discharged from the unit 5/6 discharge outlet on the sea surface is higher only by 20% than the concentration when ALPS treated water is discharged from an outlet on the seabed 1 km off the coast.

The following shows the major calculation conditions.

Flow data of the sea area

- For the advection term of the flow and tracer as a setting of ROMS (term representing migration with the flow velocity), third-order upwind difference and MPDATA, respectively, were used; for the harmonic viscosity and diffusion terms, forth-order central difference. The horizontal viscosity and diffusion coefficients are set to 5.0 m^2/s. For the vertical viscosity and diffusion, the K-profile parameterization mixing (KPP) model (Large et al., 1994) is used and the minimum limit value of the vertical viscosity and diffusion coefficients are set 10^{-5} m^2/s and 10^{-6} m^2/s, respectively.
- For the drive force of the sea surface, we used the result of reanalysis (wind velocity, short wave, long wave, atmospheric pressure, ambient temperature, humidity, and precipitation) with a short-term weather prediction system (Numerical Weather Forecasting and Analysis System (NuWFAS), Hashimoto et al., 2010) [18], which interpolate the short-term weather prediction of the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA-GSM) using the mesoscale weather model (Weather Research and Forecasting model (WRF), Skamarock, et al, 2008 [19]). The time resolution of the output of NuWFAS is about 1 hour and the horizontal

resolution is 5 km, so in the simulation, the result with the time and horizontal direction interpolated was given.

- As the original data of the boundary conditions and data assimilation (nudging)[27], we used the results (water temperature, salt content, and sea surface height) of the reanalysis data of tidal currents updated in real-time (Japan Coastal Ocean Prediction Experiment 2 (JCOPE2, Miyazawa et al., 2009)[28] [20].
- Since the off-shore of Fukushima, which is a mixed area of Oyashio and Kuroshio (a cold current form north and a warm current from south, respectively) is affected by the mesoscale vortex, data assimilation (nudging) was applied which mitigates the simulation result into the reanalysis result of the water temperature and salt content by JCOPE2 (The mitigation factor is a daily reciprocal) for the purpose of reproducing complex behavior such as the mesoscale vortex.
- The drive force by tide was set by interpolating the result (8-divided tide: M2, S2, N2, K2, K1, O1, P1, Q1) of the global tide model (TPXO; Egbert and Erofeeva, 2002) as the tidal level, the tidal ellipse, and their phases near the open boundary. Since the resolution of the result of TPXO is 0.25° × 0.25°, it is likely that the tidal level amplitude and phase associated with synthesis of reflected wave near the coast cannot be set correctly near the boundary. To correct the tidal components of the boundary, harmonic analysis to resolve each tidal level component for the simulation result at the tidal observation points of JMA (Ofunato, Ayukawa, Onahama, and Choshi) was performed to compare tidal level observation data to adjust the scales and phases of the tidal level and tide of the boundary conditions. Actually, the difference between the simulation and observation results was averaged, and adjustments were made with the averaged difference.

Range of the model (See Figure 6-1-4)

Resolution (overall): North-south about 925 m x East-west about 735 m (about 1 km), 30 vertical layers

Resolution (adjacent area): North-south about 185 m x East-west about 147 m (about 200 m), 30 vertical layers

Model range: The resolution of the sea area surrounded by the blue and red lines is improved in stages from a mesh of about 1 km mesh so that the sea area where the red and blue batches of the northern latitude of 35.30 to 39.71 degrees, the eastern longitude of 140.30 to 143.50 degrees (490 km × 270 km), and north-south about 22.5 km x east-west about 8.4 km around the FDNPS get crossed becomes a 200-m mesh

[27] Data assimilation: Method to incorporate actual data in numerical simulation.

[28] JCOPE2: Tidal current prediction model developed by JAMSTEC to ascertain the variations of the Kuroshio/Kuroshio Extension, the Oyashio current, the mesoscale vortex, etc., in the northwestern Pacific Ocean.



Figure 6-1-4 Range of the model and water depth distribution
(In the right figure, the resolution of the sea area where the red and blue hatches get crossed is improved into a 200-m mesh)



Figure 6-1-5 Section view of the seabed up to 10 km offshore and vertical division on the model

(3) Setting of exposure pathways

A total of eight exposure pathways are selected based on the existing assessments, GSG-10, etc.[29]: five external exposure pathways and three internal exposure pathways. The following shows the concept of selection. In revising the report, we clarified the beach assessment point described below and added ingestion of seawater and inhalation of seawater spray as express pathways related to beaches.

(1) External exposure from sea surface

Selected as an exposure pathway because external exposure may occur from radiation from radioactive materials in the seawater during offshore navigation by ship or offshore work.

(2) External exposure from hulls

Selected as an exposure pathway because external exposure may occur from radiation from radioactive materials that have migrated from the seawater to hulls (deck) during offshore navigation by ship or offshore work.

(3) Underwater external exposure during swimming, etc.

Selected as an exposure pathway because external exposure may occur from radiation from radioactive materials in the surrounding seawater during swimming, etc.

(4) External exposure from beach sand

Selected as an exposure pathway because external exposure may occur from radiation from radioactive materials that have moved from seawater to beach sand.

(5) External exposure from fishing nets

Selected as an exposure pathway because external exposure may occur from radiation from radioactive materials that have migrated from the seawater to fishing nets because fishing nets are used in the seawater for fishing.

[29] IAEA-TECDOC-1759, "Determining the Suitability of Materials for Disposal at Sea under the London Convention 1972 and London Protocol 1996: A Radiological Assessment Procedure" (2015)

(6) Internal exposure from ingestion of seawater

Selected as an exposure pathway because internal exposure may occur from radiation from radioactive materials in the seawater due to accidental ingestion of seawater.

(7) Internal exposure from inhalation of seawater spray

Selected as an exposure pathway because internal exposure may occur from radiation from radioactive materials in the seawater due to inhalation of seawater spray caused by waves on beaches.

(8) Internal exposure from ingestion of seafood

Selected as an exposure pathway because internal exposure may occur from ingestion of seafood that radioactive materials in the seawater have moved to and concentrated.

The following shows the assessment model and used parameters of each exposure pathway.

a. External exposure

(1) External exposure from sea surface

Assess the external exposure from radioactive materials in the seawater during swimming and offshore work by the model shown in Figure 6-1-6.

Equation (6-1-1) shows the calculation equation of the effective dose D_1(mSv/year) from radiation from the sea surface.

$$\mathrm{D}_1 = \sum_i (K_1)_i \cdot (x_1)_i \cdot t_1 \qquad (6\text{-}1\text{-}1)$$

where

$(K_1)_i$ is the effective dose conversion factor from gamma radiation from nuclide i from sea surface ((mSv/h)/(Bq/L))

$(x_1)_i$ is the concentration of nuclide i in seawater (Bq/L)

t_1 is the annual exposure time (h/year)

For the effective dose conversion factor[30] from the gamma rays from the sea surface, the value in the Handbook for Determining Environmental Impacts of Decommissioning Work [21] (hereinafter called “Decommissioning Handbook”) was used. For the calculation of the dose conversion factor for the effective dose, the simple shielding calculation code QAD-CGGP2 is used using the point attenuation nuclear integration method. For β and γ nuclides and α nuclides not shown in the Decommissioning Handbook, conservatively, the highest values, Co-60 and Am-243, respectively were used (Table 6-1-5).

The concentration in the seawater used for the assessment and the annual exposure time are set by the characteristics of representative persons.



Figure 6-1-6 Assessment model of exposure from the sea surface in the decommissioning handbook

(2) External exposure from hulls

Assess the external exposure from radioactive materials that have migrated from the seawater to hulls during offshore work such as movement by ship by the model shown in Figure 6-1-7.

Equations (6-1-2) and (6-1-3) show the calculation equation of the effective dose D_2(mSv/year) from hulls.

$$\mathrm{D}_2 = \sum_i (K_2)_i \cdot (S_2)_i \cdot t_2 \qquad (6\text{-}1\text{-}2)$$

$$(S_2)_i = (F_2)_i \cdot (x_2)_i \qquad (6\text{-}1\text{-}3)$$

where

- $(K_2)_i$ is the effective dose conversion factor from gamma radiation from nuclide i from hulls ((mSv/h)/(Bq/m^2))
- $(S_2)_i$ is the contamination density of nuclide i in hulls (Bq/m^2)
- t_2 is the annual exposure time (h/year)
- $(F_2)_i$ is the migration factor of nuclide i from seawater to hulls ((Bq/m^2)/(Bq/L))
- $(x_2)_i$ is the concentration of nuclide i in seawater (Bq/L)

[30] Radiation dose per hour (mSv/h) from radiation from radioactive materials contained in the seawater ingested by those working above the sea surface when any radioactive materials are contained in the seawater at a concentration of 1Bq/L, as shown in the model of Figure 6-1-6.

For the effective dose conversion factor[31] from the gamma rays from radioactive materials adhered to hulls, the value of the Decommissioning Handbook was used. For the calculation of the dose conversion factor for the effective dose, the simple shielding calculation code QAD-CGGP2 is used using the point attenuation nuclear integration method. For β and γ nuclides and α nuclides not shown in the Decommissioning Handbook, conservatively, the highest values, Co-60 and Am-243, respectively were used (Table 6-1-6). The factor of migration to hulls[32] was assumed to be constantly in the equilibrium state with the concentration in the seawater at 100((Bq/m^2)/(Bq/L)) according to “Application for the Designation of Reprocessing Business of Rokkasho Plant” (Japan Nuclear Fuel Service, 1989). [22]

The concentration in the seawater used for the assessment and the annual exposure time are set by the characteristics of representative persons.



Figure 6-1-7 Assessment model of exposure from hulls in the decommissioning handbook

(3) Underwater external exposure during swimming, etc.

Assess the external exposure from gamma rays from radioactive materials in the surrounding seawater during swimming and underwater work by the submersion model[33].

Equation (6-1-4) shows the calculation equation of the effective dose D_3(mSv/year) from radiation during swimming and underwater work.

$$\mathrm{D}_3 = \sum_i (K_3)_i \cdot (x_3)_i \cdot t_3 \qquad (6\text{-}1\text{-}4)$$

where

$(K_3)_i$ is the effective dose conversion factor from gamma radiation from nuclide i from seawater ((mSv/h)/(Bq/L))

$(x_3)_i$ is the concentration of nuclide i in seawater (Bq/L)

t_3 is the annual swimming time (h/year)

[31] Radiation dose ingested by people on ships from radiation emitted from radioactive materials that have migrated from the seawater to hulls; evaluated by the model of Figure 6-1-7; and shown as a coefficient for the deposit density of radioactive materials adhered to hulls.

[32] Degree of adhesion of radioactive materials to what contacts the seawater if the concentration of radioactive materials contained in the seawater is 1Bq/L, shown as radiation per unit area.

[33] Model to calculate exposure from radiation from the surrounding radioactive materials.

For the effective dose conversion factor from the gamma rays in the seawater, the value of the Decommissioning Handbook was used. For β and γ nuclides and α nuclides not shown in the Decommissioning Handbook, conservatively, the highest values, Co-60 and Am-243, respectively were used (Table 6-1-7).
The concentration in the seawater used for the assessment and the annual exposure time are set by the characteristics of representative persons.

(4) External exposure from beach sand

Assess the external exposure from radioactive materials migrated from seawater to beach sand while staying on a beach by the model shown in Figure 6-1-8.
Equation (6-1-5) shows the calculation equation of the effective dose D_4(mSv/year) from the gamma radiation from beach sand.

$$\mathrm{D}_4 = \sum_i (K_4)_i \cdot (x_4)_i \cdot (F_4)_i \cdot t_4 \qquad (6\text{-}1\text{-}5)$$

where

$(K_4)_i$ is the effective dose conversion factor from gamma radiation from nuclide *i* from beach sand ((mSv/h)/(Bq/kg))
$(x_4)_i$ is the concentration of nuclide i in seawater (Bq/L)
$(F_4)_i$ is the migration factor of nuclide i from seawater to beaches ((Bq/kg)/(Bq/L))
t_4 is the annual exposure time (h/year)

For the effective dose conversion factor from the gamma rays from beach sand, the value of the Decommissioning Handbook was used. For the calculation of the dose conversion factor for the effective dose, the simple shielding calculation code QAD-CGGP2 is used using the point attenuation nuclear integration method. For β and γ nuclides and α nuclides not shown in the Decommissioning Handbook, conservatively, the highest values, Co-60 and Am-243, respectively were used (Table 6-1-8). The migration factor of nuclides to beaches is assumed to constantly in the equilibrium state with the concentration in the seawater at 1,000((Bq/kg)/(Bq/L)) for all nuclides based on "Dose Assessment to the General Public in the Safety Review of Commercial Light Water Reactor Facilities."
The concentration in the seawater used for the assessment and the annual exposure time are set by the characteristics of representative persons.



Figure 6-1-8 Assessment model of exposure from beach sand in the decommissioning handbook

(5) External exposure from fishing nets

Assess external exposure from radioactive materials that have migrated from the seawater to fishing nets and adhered to fishing nets when they are placed on a ship or ground during fishing work, by the model shown in Figure 6-1-9.

Equations (6-1-6) and (6-1-7) show the calculation equation of the effective dose D_5(mSv/year) from radioactive materials adhered to fishing nets.

$$D_5 = \sum_i (K_5)_i \cdot (S_5)_i \cdot t_5 \qquad (6\text{-}1\text{-}6)$$

$$(S_5)_i = (F_5)_i \cdot (x_5)_i \qquad (6\text{-}1\text{-}7)$$

where

$(K_5)_i$ is the effective dose conversion factor from gamma radiation from nuclide i from fishing nets ((mSv/h)/(Bq/kg))

$(S_5)_i$ is the concentration of nuclide i on fishing nets (Bq/kg)

t_5 is the annual exposure time (h/year)

$(F_5)_i$ is the migration factor of nuclide i from seawater to fishing nets ((Bq/kg)/(Bq/L))

$(x_5)_i$ is the concentration of nuclide i in seawater (Bq/L)

For the effective dose conversion factor, the value of the Decommissioning Handbook was used. For the calculation of the dose conversion factor for the effective dose, the simple shielding calculation code QAD-CGGP2 is used using the point attenuation nuclear integration method. For β and γ nuclides and α nuclides not shown in the Decommissioning Handbook, conservatively, the highest values, Co-60 and Am-243, respectively were used (Table 6-1-9). The factor of migration to fishing nets was assumed to be constantly in the equilibrium state with the concentration in the seawater at 4,000((Bq/kg)/(Bq/L)) for all nuclides other than tritium according to “Application for the Designation of Reprocessing Business of Rokkasho Plant.”

The concentration in the seawater used for the assessment and the annual exposure time are set by the characteristics of representative persons.



Figure 6-1-9 Assessment model of exposure from fishing nets in the decommissioning handbook

b. Internal exposure

(6) Internal exposure from ingestion of water

Accidental ingestion of seawater while swimming in the sea may happen; therefore, assess internal exposure from ingestion of water while swimming.

Equation (6-1-8) shows the calculation equation of the effective dose D_6(mSv/year) from radioactive materials from ingestion of water.

$$D_6 = \sum_i t_6 \bullet Hs \bullet (x_6)_i \bullet \left(K_F^{50}\right)_i \qquad (6\text{-}1\text{-}8)$$

where

t_6 is the annual swimming time (h/year)

Hs is the seawater intake rate during swimming and conservatively set to 0.2L/h for adult and child under school age

$(x_6)_i$ is the concentration of nuclide i in seawater (Bq/L)

$(K_F^{50})_i$ is the committed effective dose factor from ingestion of nuclide i ((mSv)/(Bq))

For the committed effective dose factor from ingestion, the factor specified in Table III.2D. “Members of the Public: Committed Effective Dose per Unit Intake e(g) via ingestion (Sv/Bq)” of the IAEA No. GSR Part 3 “Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards” (hereinafter called “GSR Part 3”) was used (Table 6-1-10).

Infant was excluded from the assessment targets because it rarely swims.

The concentration in the seawater used for the assessment and the annual exposure time are set by the characteristics of representative persons.

(7) Internal exposure from inhalation of seawater spray

Internal exposure from inhalation of seawater spray is assessed because seawater spray caused by waves is considered to be inhaled at beaches. The assessment procedure is based on the IAEA-TECDOC-1759 “Determining the Suitability of Materials for Disposal at Sea under the London Convention 1972 and London Protocol 1996: A Radiological Assessment Procedure” [23] (hereinafter called “TECDOC-1759”).

Equation (6-1-9) shows the calculation equation of the effective dose D_7(mSv/year) from radioactive materials from inhalation of seawater spray.

$$D_7 = 10^3 \bullet \sum_i t_7 \bullet Rs \bullet \frac{C_s}{\rho_w} (x_7)_i \bullet \left(K_h^{50}\right)_i \qquad (6\text{-}1\text{-}9)$$

where

t_7 is the annual beach stay time (h/year)

Rs is the respiration rate, and 0.925 m^3/h, 0.363 m^3/h, and 0.119 m^3/h are used for adult, child under school age, and infant, respectively, according to “Guidelines for the Assessment of Dose Target Values Around Light Water Reactor Facilities” [24].

C_s is the air concentration of seawater spray (kg/m^3) and the recommended value of TECDOC-1759, 1.0E-02kg/m^3, is used

ρ_w is the density of seawater and 1.0E+03 kg/m^3 is used.

$(x_7)_i$ is the concentration of nuclide i in seawater (Bq/L)

$(K_h^{50})_i$ is the committed effective dose factor from inhalation of nuclide i (mSv/Bq)

10^3 is the factor converted to the unit (10^3L/m^3)

For the committed effective dose factor from inhalation, the factor specified in Table III.2E. “Members of the Public: Committed Effective Dose per Unit Intake e(g) via inhalation (Sv/Bq)” of GSR Part 3 was used, but only for tritium, the one specified in Table III.2G. “Inhalation: Committed Effective Dose per Unit Intake e(g) (Sv/Bq) for soluble or reactive gases and vapours” was used. (Table 6-1-11).

The concentration in the seawater used for the assessment and the annual exposure time are set by the characteristics of representative persons.

(8) Internal exposure from ingestion of seafood

Internal exposure from ingestion of radioactive materials that have migrated from the seawater to marine organisms through ingestion of seafood is assessed.

Equations (6-1-10) and (6-1-11) show the calculation equation of the effective dose D_8(mSv/year) from ingestion of seafood

$$D_8 = \sum_k \sum_i (K_F^{50})_i \cdot H_{ki} \quad (6\text{-}1\text{-}10)$$

$$H_{ki} = 365 \cdot 10^{-3} \cdot (x_8)_i \cdot (CF)_{ki} \cdot F_k \cdot W_k \cdot f_{ki} \quad (6\text{-}1\text{-}11)$$

where

$(K_F^{50})_i$ is the committed effective dose factor from ingestion of nuclide i (mSv/Bq)

H_{ki} is the ingestion rate (Bq/year) of nuclide i through ingestion of seafood k

(x_8) Concentration of nuclide i in seawater (Bq/L)

$(\mathrm{CF})_{ki}$ is the concentration factor of nuclide i to seafood k ((Bq/kg)/(Bq/L))[34]

F_k is the market dilution factor[35]

W_k is the ingestion amount of seafood k (g/day)

f_{ki} is the decay ratio of nuclide i from catching to ingestion of seafood k

$365 \cdot 10^{-3}$ is the factor converted to the unit (365 days/year, 10^{-3}kg/g)

The committed effective dose coefficient from ingestion is the same as that from ingestion of water during swimming (Table 6-1-10).

For the concentration factor of seafood[36], the factor specified in IAEA Technical Reports Series No.422 ”Sediment Distribution Coefficients and Concentration Factors for Biota in the Marine Environment” [25] (hereinafter called “TRS-422”) and UCRL-50564 Rev.1 ”CONCENTRATION FACTORS OF CHEMICAL ELEMENTS IN EDIBLE AQUATIC ORGANISMS” [26] (hereinafter called “UCRL-50564 Rev.1”) was used (Table 6-1-12).

Actually, market dilution which must occur during market distribution of seafood from other production areas and decay of nuclides from catching to ingestion of seafood were ignored to secure conservativeness.

The concentration in the seawater used for the assessment and the annual exposure time are set by the characteristics of representative persons.

[34] Expedient factor indicating the relationship between the radioactive nuclide concentration in marine organisms (per wet weight) in marine organisms (in principle, edible parts) and the radioactive nuclide concentration in the seawater in the environment where such organisms live, which is used for the assessment model for migration to organisms (IAEA, 2004).

[35] Generally, it is extremely rare that all foods are local products, and products caught in other places not affected by discharge of radioactive materials considered are distributed together. This reduces the impact of discharge of radioactive materials to the environment to be performed, so it is instructed to set and assess the percentage of intake (market dilution factor) for each food, but conservatively all products are assumed to be caught in the sea area in question without considering market dilution in this assessment.

[36] Radioactive materials are ingested in organisms which live for a long time in the seawater containing radioactive materials depending on the types of elements, and it reaches equilibrium at a certain concentration. This refers to the ratio of the concentration of the radioactive materials in the seawater in the surrounding environment to the equilibrium concentration of radioactive materials in organisms.

Table 6-1-5 Dose conversion factor for the effective dose of radiation from the sea surface
(Decommissioning handbook [21] and others are shown in remarks)

Nuclide	Dose conversion factor for the effective dose ((mSv/h)/(Bq/L))	Remarks
H-3	0.0E+00	Defined 0 due to pure β nuclide
C-14	0.0E+00	Defined 0 due to pure β nuclide
Mn-54	1.7E-07	
Fe-59	3.2E-11	
Co-58	2.0E-07	
Co-60	5.0E-07	
Ni-63	0.0E+00	Defined 0 due to pure β nuclide
Zn-65	1.2E-07	
Rb-86	5.0E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sr-89	5.0E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sr-90	1.6E-09	
Y-90	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Sr-90
Y-91	5.0E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Nb-95	5.0E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Tc-99	1.5E-11	
Ru-103	5.0E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Ru-106	4.5E-08	
Rh-103m	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Ru-103
Rh-106	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Ru-106
Ag-110m	5.0E-07	Conservatively set to the same value as that of Co-60
Cd-113m	7.4E-11	
Cd-115m	5.0E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sn-119m	5.0E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sn-123	5.0E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sn-126	1.1E-08	
Sb-124	5.0E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sb-125	8.7E-08	

Nuclide	Dose conversion factor for the effective dose ((mSv/h)/(Bq/L))	Remarks
Te-123m	5.0E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Te-125m	6.6E-09	
Te-127	5.0E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Te-127m	5.0E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Te-129	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Te-129m
Te-129m	5.0E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
I-129	4.6E-09	
Cs-134	3.1E-07	
Cs-135	5.0E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Cs-136	5.0E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Cs-137	1.2E-07	
Ba-137m	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Cs-137
Ba-140	5.0E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Ce-141	5.0E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Ce-144	1.3E-08	
Pr-144	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Ce-144
Pr-144m	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Ce-144
Pm-146	5.0E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Pm-147	8.2E-12	
Pm-148	5.0E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Pm-148m	5.0E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sm-151	1.7E-12	
Eu-152	2.3E-07	
Eu-154	2.5E-07	
Eu-155	5.0E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source

Nuclide	Dose conversion factor for the effective dose ((mSv/h)/(Bq/L))	Remarks
Gd-153	5.0E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Tb-160	5.0E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Pu-238	4.7E-11	
Pu-239	2.6E-11	
Pu-240	4.6E-11	
Pu-241	2.9E-08	
Am-241	4.6E-09	
Am-242m	3.1E-09	
Am-243	4.4E-08	
Cm-242	4.8E-11	
Cm-243	4.4E-08	Conservatively, the same value as that of Am-243 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Cm-244	4.5E-11	

Table 6-1-6 Dose conversion factor for the effective dose of radiation from hulls (Decommissioning handbook [21] and others are shown in remarks)

Nuclide	Dose conversion factor for the effective dose ((mSv/h)/(Bq/m^2))	Remarks
H-3	0.0E+00	Defined 0 due to pure β nuclide
C-14	0.0E+00	Defined 0 due to pure β nuclide
Mn-54	1.4E-09	
Fe-59	4.2E-12	
Co-58	1.6E-09	
Co-60	3.5E-09	
Ni-63	0.0E+00	Defined 0 due to pure β nuclide
Zn-65	1.0E-09	
Rb-86	3.5E-09	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sr-89	3.5E-09	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sr-90	5.8E-11	
Y-90	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Sr-90
Y-91	3.5E-09	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Nb-95	3.5E-09	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Tc-99	2.8E-12	

Nuclide	Dose conversion factor for the effective dose ((mSv/h)/(Bq/m^2))	Remarks
Ru-103	3.5E-09	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Ru-106	4.0E-10	
Rh-103m	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Ru-103
Rh-106	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Ru-106
Ag-110m	3.5E-09	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Cd-113m	7.2E-12	
Cd-115m	3.5E-09	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sn-119m	3.5E-09	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sn-123	3.5E-09	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sn-126	2.3E-10	
Sb-124	3.5E-09	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sb-125	8.3E-10	
Te-123m	3.5E-09	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Te-125m	4.4E-10	
Te-127	3.5E-09	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Te-127m	3.5E-09	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Te-129	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Te-129m
Te-129m	3.5E-09	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
I-129	3.0E-10	
Cs-134	2.4E-09	
Cs-135	3.5E-09	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Cs-136	3.5E-09	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Cs-137	9.5E-10	
Ba-137m	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Cs-137
Ba-140	3.5E-09	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source

Nuclide	Dose conversion factor for the effective dose ((mSv/h)/(Bq/m^2))	Remarks
Ce-141	3.5E-09	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Ce-144	1.6E-10	
Pr-144	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Ce-144
Pr-144m	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Ce-144
Pm-146	3.5E-09	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Pm-147	1.9E-12	
Pm-148	3.5E-09	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Pm-148m	3.5E-09	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sm-151	8.7E-13	
Eu-152	1.8E-09	
Eu-154	1.8E-09	
Eu-155	3.5E-09	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Gd-153	3.5E-09	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Tb-160	3.5E-09	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Pu-238	1.1E-10	
Pu-239	3.9E-11	
Pu-240	1.0E-10	
Pu-241	7.7E-10	
Am-241	2.0E-10	
Am-242m	8.3E-10	
Am-243	1.1E-09	
Cm-242	1.1E-10	
Cm-243	1.1E-09	Conservatively, the same value as that of Am-243 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Cm-244	1.0E-10	

Table 6-1-7 Dose conversion factor for the effective dose of radiation from seawater during swimming and underwater work (Decommissioning handbook [21] and others are shown in remarks)

Nuclide	Dose conversion factor for the effective dose ((mSv/h)/(Bq/L))	Remarks
H-3	0.0E+00	
C-14	0.0E+00	
Mn-54	4.8E-07	
Fe-59	6.8E-07	
Co-58	4.7E-07	
Co-60	1.4E-06	
Ni-63	0.0E+00	
Zn-65	3.3E-07	
Rb-86	1.4E-06	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sr-89	1.4E-06	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sr-90	7.2E-13	
Y-90	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Sr-90
Y-91	1.4E-06	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Nb-95	1.4E-06	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Tc-99	4.0E-13	
Ru-103	1.4E-06	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Ru-106	1.2E-07	
Rh-103m	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Ru-103
Rh-106	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Ru-106
Ag-110m	1.4E-06	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Cd-113m	4.2E-11	
Cd-115m	1.4E-06	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sn-119m	1.4E-06	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sn-123	1.4E-06	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sn-126	3.2E-08	
Sb-124	1.4E-06	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source

Nuclide	Dose conversion factor for the effective dose ((mSv/h)/(Bq/L))	Remarks
Sb-125	2.5E-07	
Te-123m	1.4E-06	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Te-125m	2.0E-08	
Te-127	1.4E-06	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Te-127m	1.4E-06	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Te-129	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Te-129m
Te-129m	1.4E-06	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
I-129	1.4E-08	
Cs-134	9.0E-07	
Cs-135	1.4E-06	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Cs-136	1.4E-06	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Cs-137	3.4E-07	
Ba-137m	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Cs-137
Ba-140	1.4E-06	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Ce-141	1.4E-06	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Ce-144	2.8E-08	
Pr-144	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Ce-144
Pr-144m	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Ce-144
Pm-146	1.4E-06	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Pm-147	2.5E-12	
Pm-148	1.4E-06	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Pm-148m	1.4E-06	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sm-151	8.3E-12	
Eu-152	6.6E-07	
Eu-154	6.4E-07	
Eu-155	1.4E-06	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source

Nuclide	Dose conversion factor for the effective dose ((mSv/h)/(Bq/L))	Remarks
Gd-153	1.4E-06	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Tb-160	1.4E-06	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Pu-238	1.1E-09	
Pu-239	5.2E-10	
Pu-240	9.9E-10	
Pu-241	8.1E-08	
Am-241	1.9E-08	
Am-242m	1.4E-08	
Am-243	1.4E-07	
Cm-242	1.1E-09	
Cm-243	1.4E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Am-243 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Cm-244	9.0E-10	

Table 6-1-8 Dose conversion factor for the effective dose of radiation from beach sand
(Decommissioning handbook [21] and others are shown in remarks)

Nuclide	Dose conversion factor for the effective dose ((mSv/h)/(Bq/kg))	Remarks
H-3	0.0E+00	Defined 0 due to pure β nuclide
C-14	0.0E+00	Defined 0 due to pure β nuclide
Mn-54	1.6E-07	
Fe-59	1.6E-11	
Co-58	1.9E-07	
Co-60	4.7E-07	
Ni-63	0.0E+00	Defined 0 due to pure β nuclide
Zn-65	1.1E-07	
Rb-86	4.7E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sr-89	4.7E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sr-90	1.2E-09	
Y-90	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Sr-90
Y-91	4.7E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Nb-95	4.7E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source

Nuclide	Dose conversion factor for the effective dose ((mSv/h)/(Bq/kg))	Remarks
Tc-99	6.3E-12	
Ru-103	4.7E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Ru-106	4.3E-08	
Rh-103m	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Ru-103
Rh-106	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Ru-106
Ag-110m	4.7E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Cd-113m	4.1E-11	
Cd-115m	4.7E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sn-119m	4.7E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sn-123	4.7E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sn-126	5.2E-09	
Sb-124	4.7E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sb-125	8.3E-08	
Te-123m	4.7E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Te-125m	1.9E-09	
Te-127	4.7E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Te-127m	4.7E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Te-129	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Te-129m
Te-129m	4.7E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
I-129	1.3E-09	
Cs-134	3.1E-07	
Cs-135	4.7E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Cs-136	4.7E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Cs-137	1.2E-07	
Ba-137m	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Cs-137
Ba-140	4.7E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source

Nuclide	Dose conversion factor for the effective dose ((mSv/h)/(Bq/kg))	Remarks
Ce-141	4.7E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Ce-144	1.0E-08	
Pr-144	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Ce-144
Pr-144m	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Ce-144
Pm-146	4.7E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Pm-147	3.5E-12	
Pm-148	4.7E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Pm-148m	4.7E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sm-151	6.3E-13	
Eu-152	2.1E-07	
Eu-154	2.3E-07	
Eu-155	4.7E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Gd-153	4.7E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Tb-160	4.7E-07	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Pu-238	3.6E-11	
Pu-239	2.1E-11	
Pu-240	3.5E-11	
Pu-241	2.0E-08	
Am-241	1.7E-09	
Am-242m	2.0E-09	
Am-243	3.1E-08	
Cm-242	3.7E-11	
Cm-243	3.1E-08	Conservatively, the same value as that of Am-243 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Cm-244	3.6E-11	

Table 6-1-9 Dose conversion factor for the effective dose of radiation from fishing nets
(Decommissioning handbook [21] and others are shown in remarks)

Nuclide	Dose conversion factor for the effective dose ((mSv/h)/(Bq/kg))	Remarks
H-3	0.0E+00	Defined 0 due to pure β nuclide
C-14	0.0E+00	Defined 0 due to pure β nuclide
Mn-54	3.2E-08	
Fe-59	2.2E-12	
Co-58	3.7E-08	
Co-60	9.9E-08	
Ni-63	0.0E+00	Defined 0 due to pure β nuclide
Zn-65	2.3E-08	
Rb-86	9.9E-08	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sr-89	9.9E-08	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sr-90	2.1E-10	
Y-90	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Sr-90
Y-91	9.9E-08	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Nb-95	9.9E-08	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Tc-99	7.9E-13	
Ru-103	9.9E-08	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Ru-106	8.2E-09	
Rh-103m	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Ru-103
Rh-106	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Ru-106
Ag-110m	9.9E-08	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Cd-113m	5.9E-12	
Cd-115m	9.9E-08	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sn-119m	9.9E-08	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sn-123	9.9E-08	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sn-126	7.0E-10	
Sb-124	9.9E-08	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source

Nuclide	Dose conversion factor for the effective dose ((mSv/h)/(Bq/kg))	Remarks
Sb-125	1.5E-08	
Te-123m	9.9E-08	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Te-125m	2.3E-10	
Te-127	9.9E-08	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Te-127m	9.9E-08	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Te-129	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Te-129m
Te-129m	9.9E-08	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
I-129	1.6E-10	
Cs-134	5.9E-08	
Cs-135	9.9E-08	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Cs-136	9.9E-08	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Cs-137	2.2E-08	
Ba-137m	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Cs-137
Ba-140	9.9E-08	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Ce-141	9.9E-08	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Ce-144	2.0E-09	
Pr-144	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Ce-144
Pr-144m	-	Contained in the parent nuclide Ce-144
Pm-146	9.9E-08	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Pm-147	4.2E-13	
Pm-148	9.9E-08	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Pm-148m	9.9E-08	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Sm-151	5.8E-14	
Eu-152	4.3E-08	
Eu-154	4.7E-08	
Eu-155	9.9E-08	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source

Nuclide	Dose conversion factor for the effective dose ((mSv/h)/(Bq/kg))	Remarks
Gd-153	9.9E-08	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Tb-160	9.9E-08	Conservatively, the same value as that of Co-60 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Pu-238	1.7E-12	
Pu-239	1.9E-12	
Pu-240	1.8E-12	
Pu-241	3.1E-09	
Am-241	2.1E-10	
Am-242m	2.7E-10	
Am-243	4.8E-09	
Cm-242	1.8E-12	
Cm-243	4.8E-09	Conservatively, the same value as that of Am-243 is set because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
Cm-244	2.1E-12	

Table 6-1-10 Effective dose factor of ingestion (GSR Part 3 [13])

Target nuclide	Effective dose factor (mSv/Bq)			Remarks
	Adult	Child under school age	Infant	
H-3 (THO)	1.8E-08	3.1E-08	6.4E-08	Used for the assessment of ingestion of water
H-3 (considering OBT)	2.0E-08	3.5E-08	7.0E-08	Used for the assessment of ingestion of seafood assuming that 10% of tritium to be ingested is OBT
C-14	5.8E-07	9.9E-07	1.4E-06	
Mn-54	7.1E-07	1.9E-06	5.4E-06	
Fe-59	1.8E-06	7.5E-06	3.9E-05	
Co-58	7.4E-07	2.6E-06	7.3E-06	
Co-60	3.4E-06	1.7E-05	5.4E-05	
Ni-63	1.5E-07	4.6E-07	1.6E-06	
Zn-65	3.9E-06	9.7E-06	3.6E-05	
Rb-86	2.8E-06	9.9E-06	3.1E-05	
Sr-89	2.6E-06	8.9E-06	3.6E-05	
Sr-90	2.8E-05	4.7E-05	2.3E-04	Including the impact of the progeny nuclide
Y-90	2.7E-06	1.0E-05	3.1E-05	
Y-91	2.4E-06	8.8E-06	2.8E-05	
Nb-95	5.8E-07	1.8E-06	4.6E-06	

Target nuclide	Effective dose factor (mSv/Bq)			Remarks
	Adult	Child under school age	Infant	
Tc-99	6.4E-07	2.3E-06	1.0E-05	
Ru-103	7.3E-07	2.4E-06	7.1E-06	Including the impact of the progeny nuclide
Ru-106	7.0E-06	2.5E-05	8.4E-05	Including the impact of the progeny nuclide
Rh-103m	3.8E-09	1.3E-08	4.7E-08	
Rh-106	-	-	-	Independent intake is not considered because the half-life is short enough (about 30 seconds).
Ag-110m	2.8E-06	7.8E-06	2.4E-05	
Cd-113m	2.3E-05	3.9E-05	1.2E-04	
Cd-115m	3.3E-06	9.7E-06	4.1E-05	
Sn-119m	3.4E-07	1.3E-06	4.1E-06	
Sn-123	2.1E-06	7.8E-06	2.5E-05	
Sn-126	4.7E-06	1.6E-05	5.0E-05	
Sb-124	2.5E-06	8.4E-06	2.5E-05	
Sb-125	1.1E-06	3.4E-06	1.1E-05	
Te-123m	1.4E-06	4.9E-06	1.9E-05	
Te-125m	8.7E-07	3.3E-06	1.3E-05	
Te-127	1.7E-07	6.2E-07	1.5E-06	
Te-127m	2.3E-06	9.5E-06	4.1E-05	
Te-129	6.3E-08	2.1E-07	7.5E-07	
Te-129m	3.0E-06	1.2E-05	4.4E-05	Including the impact of the progeny nuclide
I-129	1.1E-04	1.7E-04	1.8E-04	
Cs-134	1.9E-05	1.3E-05	2.6E-05	
Cs-135	2.0E-06	1.7E-06	4.1E-06	
Cs-136	3.0E-06	6.1E-06	1.5E-05	
Cs-137	1.3E-05	9.6E-06	2.1E-05	Including the impact of the progeny nuclide
Ba-137m	-	-	-	Independent intake is not considered because the half-life is short enough (about 2.6 minutes).
Ba-140	2.6E-06	9.2E-06	3.2E-05	
Ce-141	7.1E-07	2.6E-06	8.1E-06	
Ce-144	5.2E-06	1.9E-05	6.6E-05	Including the impact of the progeny nuclide
Pr-144	5.0E-08	1.7E-07	6.4E-07	
Pr-144m	-	-	-	Independent intake is not considered because the half-life is short enough (about 7.2 minutes).
Pm-146	9.0E-07	2.8E-06	1.0E-05	

Target nuclide	Effective dose factor (mSv/Bq)			Remarks
	Adult	Child under school age	Infant	
Pm-147	2.6E-07	9.6E-07	3.6E-06	
Pm-148	2.7E-06	9.7E-06	3.0E-05	
Pm-148m	1.7E-06	5.5E-06	1.5E-05	
Sm-151	9.8E-08	3.3E-07	1.5E-06	
Eu-152	1.4E-06	4.1E-06	1.6E-05	
Eu-154	2.0E-06	6.5E-06	2.5E-05	
Eu-155	3.2E-07	1.1E-06	4.3E-06	
Gd-153	2.7E-07	9.4E-07	2.9E-06	
Tb-160	1.6E-06	5.4E-06	1.6E-05	
Pu-238	2.3E-04	3.1E-04	4.0E-03	
Pu-239	2.5E-04	3.3E-04	4.2E-03	
Pu-240	2.5E-04	3.3E-04	4.2E-03	
Pu-241	4.8E-06	5.5E-06	5.6E-05	
Am-241	2.0E-04	2.7E-04	3.7E-03	
Am-242m	1.9E-04	2.3E-04	3.1E-03	
Am-243	2.0E-04	2.7E-04	3.6E-03	
Cm-242	1.2E-05	3.9E-05	5.9E-04	
Cm-243	1.5E-04	2.2E-04	3.2E-03	
Cm-244	1.2E-04	1.9E-04	2.9E-03	

Table 6-1-11 Effective dose factor of inhalation (GSR Part 3 [13])

Target nuclide	Effective dose factor (mSv/Bq)			Remarks
	Adult	Child under school age	Infant	
H-3	1.8E-08	3.1E-08	6.4E-08	The conversion factor of tritium vapor is used
C-14	5.8E-06	1.1E-05	1.9E-05	
Mn-54	1.5E-06	3.8E-06	7.5E-06	
Fe-59	4.0E-06	8.1E-06	2.1E-05	
Co-58	2.1E-06	4.5E-06	9.0E-06	
Co-60	3.1E-05	5.9E-05	9.2E-05	
Ni-63	1.3E-06	2.7E-06	4.8E-06	
Zn-65	2.2E-06	5.7E-06	1.5E-05	
Rb-86	9.3E-07	3.4E-06	1.2E-05	
Sr-89	7.9E-06	1.7E-05	3.9E-05	

Target nuclide	Effective dose factor (mSv/Bq)			Remarks
	Adult	Child under school age	Infant	
Sr-90	1.6E-04	2.7E-04	4.2E-04	Including the impact of the progeny nuclide
Y-90	1.5E-06	4.2E-06	1.3E-05	
Y-91	8.9E-06	1.9E-05	4.3E-05	
Nb-95	1.8E-06	3.6E-06	7.7E-06	
Tc-99	1.3E-05	2.4E-05	4.1E-05	
Ru-103	3.0E-06	6.0E-06	1.3E-05	Including the impact of the progeny nuclide
Ru-106	6.6E-05	1.4E-04	2.6E-04	Including the impact of the progeny nuclide
Rh-103m	2.7E-09	6.7E-09	2.0E-08	
Rh-106	-	-	-	Independent intake is not considered because the half-life is short enough (about 30 seconds).
Ag-110m	1.2E-05	2.6E-05	4.6E-05	
Cd-113m	1.1E-04	1.8E-04	3.0E-04	
Cd-115m	7.7E-06	1.7E-05	4.6E-05	
Sn-119m	2.2E-06	4.7E-06	1.0E-05	
Sn-123	8.1E-06	1.8E-05	4.0E-05	
Sn-126	2.8E-05	6.2E-04	1.2E-04	
Sb-124	8.6E-06	1.8E-05	3.9E-05	
Sb-125	1.2E-05	2.4E-05	4.2E-05	
Te-123m	5.1E-06	9.8E-06	2.0E-05	
Te-125m	4.2E-06	7.8E-06	1.7E-05	
Te-127	1.4E-07	3.9E-07	1.2E-06	
Te-127m	9.8E-06	2.0E-05	4.1E-05	
Te-129	3.9E-08	1.0E-07	3.5E-07	
Te-129m	7.9E-06	1.7E-05	3.8E-05	Including the impact of the progeny nuclide
I-129	3.6E-05	6.1E-05	7.2E-05	
Cs-134	2.0E-05	4.1E-05	7.0E-05	
Cs-135	8.6E-06	1.6E-05	2.7E-05	
Cs-136	2.8E-06	6.0E-06	1.5E-05	
Cs-137	3.9E-05	7.0E-05	1.1E-04	Including the impact of the progeny nuclide
Ba-137m	-	-	-	Independent intake is not considered because the half-life is short enough (about 2.6 minutes).
Ba-140	5.8E-06	1.2E-05	2.9E-05	
Ce-141	3.8E-06	7.1E-06	1.6E-05	
Ce-144	5.3E-05	1.4E-04	3.6E-04	Including the impact of the progeny nuclide

Target nuclide	Effective dose factor (mSv/Bq)			Remarks
	Adult	Child under school age	Infant	
Pr-144	1.8E-08	5.2E-08	1.9E-07	
Pr-144m	-	-	-	Independent intake is not considered because the half-life is short enough (about 7.2 minutes).
Pm-146	2.1E-05	3.9E-05	6.4E-05	
Pm-147	5.0E-06	1.1E-05	2.1E-05	
Pm-148	2.2E-06	5.5E-06	1.5E-05	
Pm-148m	5.7E-06	1.2E-05	2.5E-05	
Sm-151	4.0E-06	6.7E-06	1.1E-05	
Eu-152	4.2E-05	7.0E-05	1.1E-04	
Eu-154	5.3E-05	9.7E-05	1.6E-04	
Eu-155	6.9E-06	1.4E-05	2.6E-05	
Gd-153	2.1E-06	6.5E-06	1.5E-05	
Tb-160	7.0E-06	1.5E-05	3.2E-05	
Pu-238	1.1E-01	1.4E-01	2.0E-01	
Pu-239	1.2E-01	1.5E-01	2.1E-01	
Pu-240	1.2E-01	1.5E-01	2.1E-01	
Pu-241	2.3E-03	2.6E-03	2.8E-03	
Am-241	9.6E-02	1.2E-01	1.8E-01	
Am-242m	9.2E-02	1.1E-01	1.6E-01	
Am-243	9.6E-02	1.2E-01	1.8E-01	
Cm-242	5.9E-03	1.2E-02	2.7E-02	
Cm-243	6.9E-02	9.5E-02	1.6E-01	
Cm-244	5.7E-02	8.3E-02	1.5E-01	

Table 6-1-12 Concentration factor for seafood

(TRS-422 [25] and others are shown in remarks)

Target Nuclide	Concentration factor ((Bq/kg)/(Bq/L))			Remarks
	Fish	Invertebrate	Seaweeds	
H-3	1.0E+00	1.0E+00	1.0E+00	
C-14	2.0E+04	2.0E+04	1.0E+04	
Mn-54	1.0E+03	5.0E+04	6.0E+03	
Fe-59	3.0E+04	5.0E+05	2.0E+04	
Co-58	7.0E+02	2.0E+04	6.0E+03	
Co-60	7.0E+02	2.0E+04	6.0E+03	
Ni-63	1.0E+03	2.0E+03	2.0E+03	
Zn-65	1.0E+03	8.0E+04	2.0E+03	

Target Nuclide	Concentration factor ((Bq/kg)/(Bq/L))			Remarks
	Fish	Invertebrate	Seaweeds	
Rb-86	9.0E+00	1.7E+01	1.7E+01	Excerpted from UCRL-50564 Rev.1
Sr-89	3.0E+00	1.0E+01	1.0E+01	
Sr-90	3.0E+00	1.0E+01	1.0E+01	
Y-90	-	-	-	Equilibrium state with the parent nuclide Sr-90
Y-91	2.0E+01	1.0E+03	1.0E+03	
Nb-95	3.0E+01	1.0E+03	3.0E+03	
Tc-99	8.0E+01	5.0E+02	3.0E+04	
Ru-103	2.0E+00	5.0E+02	2.0E+03	
Ru-106	2.0E+00	5.0E+02	2.0E+03	
Rh-103m	-	-	-	Equilibrium state with the parent nuclide Ru-103
Rh-106	-	-	-	Equilibrium state with the parent nuclide Ru-106
Ag-110m	1.0E+04	6.0E+04	5.0E+03	
Cd-113m	5.0E+03	8.0E+04	2.0E+04	
Cd-115m	5.0E+03	8.0E+04	2.0E+04	
Sn-119m	5.0E+05	5.0E+05	2.0E+05	
Sn-123	5.0E+05	5.0E+05	2.0E+05	
Sn-126	5.0E+05	5.0E+05	2.0E+05	
Sb-124	6.0E+02	3.0E+02	2.0E+01	
Sb-125	6.0E+02	3.0E+02	2.0E+01	
Te-123m	1.0E+03	1.0E+03	1.0E+04	
Te-125m	1.0E+03	1.0E+03	1.0E+04	
Te-127	1.0E+03	1.0E+03	1.0E+04	
Te-127m	1.0E+03	1.0E+03	1.0E+04	
Te-129	-	-	-	Equilibrium state with the parent nuclide Te-129m
Te-129m	1.0E+03	1.0E+03	1.0E+04	
I-129	9.0E+00	1.0E+01	1.0E+04	
Cs-134	1.0E+02	6.0E+01	5.0E+01	
Cs-135	1.0E+02	6.0E+01	5.0E+01	
Cs-136	1.0E+02	6.0E+01	5.0E+01	
Cs-137	1.0E+02	6.0E+01	5.0E+01	
Ba-137m	-	-	-	Equilibrium state with the parent nuclide Cs-137
Ba-140	1.0E+01	1.0E+01	7.0E+01	
Ce-141	5.0E+01	2.0E+03	5.0E+03	
Ce-144	5.0E+01	2.0E+03	5.0E+03	
Pr-144	-	-	-	Equilibrium state with the parent nuclide Ce-144

Target Nuclide	Concentration factor ((Bq/kg)/(Bq/L))			Remarks
	Fish	Invertebrate	Seaweeds	
Pr-144m	-	-	-	Equilibrium state with the parent nuclide Ce-144
Pm-146	3.0E+02	7.0E+03	3.0E+03	
Pm-147	3.0E+02	7.0E+03	3.0E+03	
Pm-148	3.0E+02	7.0E+03	3.0E+03	
Pm-148m	3.0E+02	7.0E+03	3.0E+03	
Sm-151	3.0E+02	7.0E+03	3.0E+03	
Eu-152	3.0E+02	7.0E+03	3.0E+03	
Eu-154	3.0E+02	7.0E+03	3.0E+03	
Eu-155	3.0E+02	7.0E+03	3.0E+03	
Gd-153	3.0E+02	7.0E+03	3.0E+03	
Tb-160	6.0E+01	3.0E+03	2.0E+03	
Pu-238	1.0E+02	3.0E+03	4.0E+03	
Pu-239	1.0E+02	3.0E+03	4.0E+03	
Pu-240	1.0E+02	3.0E+03	4.0E+03	
Pu-241	1.0E+02	3.0E+03	4.0E+03	
Am-241	1.0E+02	1.0E+03	8.0E+03	
Am-242m	1.0E+02	1.0E+03	8.0E+03	
Am-243	1.0E+02	1.0E+03	8.0E+03	
Cm-242	1.0E+02	1.0E+03	5.0E+03	
Cm-243	1.0E+02	1.0E+03	5.0E+03	
Cm-244	1.0E+02	1.0E+03	5.0E+03	

* For invertebrates, the value of molluscs (excluding cephalopods) was used.

(4) Setting of the representative person subject to the exposure assessment

(1) Situation around the FDNPS

According to GSG-9, the living habits and characteristics of the representative person for some of the exposure pathways should be based on the highest group from the distribution of the living habit data (e.g. 95 percentile value), etc.

However, as shown in Figure 6-1-10, in the area around the FDNPS, measures to prevent the general public from living in the area are taken by setting Difficult-to-Return Zones set in response to the accident, installing intermediate storage facilities surrounding the land side of the FDNPS, etc. In addition, fishing industry in Fukushima is yet in the middle of reconstruction.

This situation is expected to improve gradually thanks to the lifting of the setting of Difficult-to-Return Zones, mitigation of residence restriction, etc., but it is not desirable as a future prediction to make judgment based on the current data, so no assessment shall be performed based on the actual data of the current situation and instead an assessment shall be performed using the data used for the safety review of the existing reactor facilities, etc.

We will consider the adoption of the actual data about living habits and characteristics of the representative person which will be accumulated in the future as the reconstruction of this area will proceed.



Source: Support for victims of the nuclear accident of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Regarding evacuation orders)] Prepared by Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc. based on the map of the area surrounding Difficult-to-Return Zones (from R2.12.10) https://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/kinkyu.html

Figure 6-1-10 Condition of Difficult-to-Return Zones, etc. around the FDNPS

(2) Characteristics of the representative person

The characteristics of the representative person subject to exposure assessment was set as follows according to “Dose Assessment to the General Public in the Safety Review of Commercial Light Water Reactor Facilities,” etc.

- Engage in fishing 120 days (2,880 hours) a year, of which 80 days (1,920 hours) are spent near fishing nets.
- Stay at the beach 500 hours a year and swim for 96 hours.

The ingestion of seafood was set based on classification into fish (total of the fishery product (excluding shellfish, squid, octopus, shrimp, and crab) and processed fishery products), invertebrates (total of shellfish, squid, octopus, shrimp, and crab), and seaweeds (algae) extracting the data of ingestion of fishery products, processed fishery products, and algae from “National Health and Nutrition Survey (2019)”[37] of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, which is the latest large-scale survey result regarding ingestion of foods of the entire Japanese people. It was decided to assess the ingestion of seafood considering three age groups (adult, child under school age, and infant) in the following two cases.

i. Individual who ingests the average amount of seafood

The average ingestion amount of those who are aged 20 or older is used as the value of adult. 1/2 and 1/5 of the value of adult are used as the values of child under school age (assumed to be aged 5 or older) and infant (assumed to be aged 1), respectively, based on “Guidelines for the Assessment of Dose Target Values Around Light Water Reactor Facilities” [24].

ii. Persons who ingests the large amount of seafood

The value of adult is set to the average ingestion of those who are aged 20 or older plus twice the value of the standard deviation. Those of child under school age and infant are set to 1/2 and 1/5, respectively, of the value of adult.

Tables 6-1-13 and 6-1-14 show the set ingestion of seafood.

For external exposure, no age group is set because ICRP Publication 101a “Assessing Dose of the Representative Person for the Purpose of the Radiation Protection of the Public” [27] stipulates “It is generally recognized that for external exposure in the environment, there is little variability in dose per unit of exposure with age.”

[37] In 2020 and 2021, the survey itself was not performed due to the novel coronavirus.

The assessment points related to exposure and the seawater concentration used for the assessment are as follows.

i. External exposure from sea surface and external exposure from hulls

The nearest ports to the south and north of the FDNPS is 5 km or more away from the FDNPS. Fishing is widely performed by ships from fishing ports in the sea area, including the area around the FDNPS centering on the fishing ports. In the assessment, conservatively, fishing is assumed to be performed within 5 km to the north and south and 10 km off the coast of the FDNPS (range of 10 km × 10 km around the FDNPS (Figure 6-1-11)). The concentration in the seawater used for the assessment is the annual average concentration on the sea surface (top layer) within 10 km × 10 km around the FDNPS, including areas where no fishing is conducted on a daily basis.

ii. External exposure from seawater during swimming, etc., external exposure from beach sand, internal exposure from ingestion of water, and internal exposure from inhalation of seawater spray

All of these were assumed as exposure while staying on a beach. The coastline around the FDNPS is a Difficult-to-Return Zone and intermediate storage facilities are installed there, but there is a beach in the habitable area in the north side. Therefore, the assessment point is set to the nearby beach to the north of the FDNPS and the concentration in the seawater is set to the annual average concentration in the seawater (all layers) in front of the beach. Since the water depth is less than 5m near the coast, mixing of the upper and lower layers is remarkable, so that there is little difference between the concentration on the sea surface and the average concentration of all layers.

iii. External exposure from fishing nets and internal exposure from ingestion of seafood

It is considered that radioactive materials will migrate from seawater to fishing nets at the time of fishing. In addition, fish are caught by fishing and delivered to the dinner table as seafood. Therefore, fishing is performed only within the range of 10 km × 10 km around the FDNPS for point of assessment as with i. conservatively, but fish are found from the surface layer to the bottom layer and fishing nets are used at depths appropriate for the fish to be caught, so the concentration in the seawater is the annual average concentration in the seawater (all layers) in front of the beach.

The specific calculation method of the concentration in the seawater is shown in 6-1-3.(1) to (3).

Table 6-1-13 Ingestion of persons who ingest the average amount of seafood (g/day) (Set based on the National Health and Nutrition Survey in Japan in 2019 (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare) [6])

	Fish	Invertebrate	Seaweeds
Adult	58	10	11
Child under school age	29	5.1	5.3
Infant	12	2.0	2.1

Table 6-1-14 Ingestion of persons who consume a large amount of seafood (g/day) (Set based on the National Health and Nutrition Survey in Japan in 2019 (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare) [6])

	Fish	Invertebrate	Seaweeds
Adult	190	62	52
Child under school age	97	31	26
Infant	39	12	10



Figure 6-1-11 Point to determine concentrations in seawater used for the assessment of exposures in normal conditions

Source: Geographical Survey Institute (Electronic Map Web) and support for victims of the nuclear accident of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (Regarding evacuation orders) Prepared by Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc. based on the map of the area surrounding Difficult-to-Return Zones (from R2.12.10)
https://maps.gsi.go.jp/#13/37.422730/141.044970/&base=std&ls=std&disp=1&vs=c1j0h0k0l0u0t0z0r0s0m0f1

(5) Dose assessment method

Exposure is calculated by the assessment method set in 6-1-2.(3).

The calculation result is compared with the dose limit of 1 mSv/year for the general public, and the dose target of 0.05 mSv/year for domestic nuclear power plants, which is deemed to be equivalent to the dose constraint by the Nuclear Regulation Authority, as shown in 4.(1).

6-1-3. Assessment result

(1) Diffusion simulation result

The tritium concentration in the seawater after advection and diffusion was calculated using the model shown in 6-1-2.(2) assuming discharge of a total of 22 TBq (2.2E+13Bq) of tritium per year at an even pace throughout the year from the seabed about 1 km off the coast of the FDNPS. The calculation based on the meteorological and oceanographic conditions was performed for two years: 2014 and 2019. Though there is no large difference between the results of the two years, we decided to use the calculation result based on the meteorological and oceanographic conditions of 2019, in which the average concentration around the FDNPS is higher, for the assessment. Figures 6-1-12 to 6-1-16 show the calculation result.
Figures 6-1-12 and 6-1-13 show the annual average concentrations of the sea surfaces of a wide area and the area around the FDNPS, respectively. The range of concentrations over 1Bq/L on the sea surface is about 3 km around the FDNPS.
Figures 6-1-14 and 6-1-15 diagrammatically show the annual average concentrations in the seawater with east-west and north-south sectional views, respectively. The stored water amount of the assessed cell near the discharge point of the seabed is large, so the concentration is assessed to be about 30Bq/L and immediately drop in the area around the power station.
Figure 6-1-16 shows the average concentration distribution diagram of the sea surface in each season. The range of concentrations over 1Bq/L on the sea surface has more seasonal variation than in Figure 6-1-12, but it is limited to the area around the FDNPS.
Figures 6-1-17 and 6-1-18 diagrammatically show the daily average concentrations on the sea surface throughout the year, which are expanded the most to the north, south, and east, respectively.
Attachment VIII “Difference in the diffusion range in the discharge position” shows the comparison between the discharge from the coast compared in the consideration of the discharge method and the calculation result.
To verify the impact of the variation of meteorological and oceanographic data between years, simulation calculation was performed using the meteorological and oceanographic data of 2015 to 2018 and 2020. Table 6-1-15 and Figure 6-1-19 show the calculation results of 7 years from 2014 and 2020. The calculation of the seven years is not a continuous calculation of the seven years but a collection of calculations of individual years, but the flow in the sea area changes on a daily basis and no accumulation trend is observed. On the other hand, the annual variation of the average concentration and diffusion range within 10 km × 10 km from the FDNPS is so small that there is no problem with using the calculation result of 2019 for a long-term assessment.
We also verified the concentration on the boundary of the calculation area from the calculation result of seven years mentioned above. As a result, it turned out that the maximum value of daily average concentrations on the boundary of the calculation area was 1.4E-02Bq/L. The maximum annual mean concentration was up to 2.6 E-04 Bq/L (2015, top layer), measured at the eastern boundary of the region. This concentration is 3 to 4 orders of

magnitude lower than the tritium concentration in the sea water in the sea area around Japan (about 0.1 to 1Bq/L) and 2 to 3 orders of magnitude lower than the assessment result of 10 km × 10 km around the FDNPS, and no large variation in the concentration between years is observed, so the scale of the calculation area is sufficient and the impact of radiation outside the calculation area of this assessment is sufficiently small. Table 6-1-16 shows the maximum concentration on the model boundary of each assessment year.



Detailed concentration classification in the left figure

Figure 6-1-12 Distribution of annual mean concentration on the sea surface

(Discharge tritium 2.2E+13Bq constantly throughout the year)



Detailed concentration classification in the left figure

Figure 6-1-13 Distribution of annual mean concentration on the sea surface (expanded diagram of neighborhood)

(Discharge tritium 2.2E+13Bq constantly throughout the year)



Figure 6-1-14 Distribution of annual mean concentration on the sea surface (east-west section view of the discharge position)

(Discharge tritium 2.2E+13Bq constantly throughout the year)



Figure 6-1-15 Distribution of annual mean concentration on the sea surface (north-south section view of the discharge position)

(Discharge tritium 2.2E+13Bq constantly throughout the year)



Expanded area surrounding the power plant in the left figure

Figure 6-1-16(1) Average concentration distribution diagram of the sea surface in each season

(Average of January to March)



Expanded area surrounding the power plant in the left figure

Figure 6-1-16(2) Average concentration distribution diagram of the sea surface in each season

(Average of April to June)



Expanded area surrounding the power plant in the left figure

Figure 6-1-16(3) Average concentration distribution diagram of the sea surface in each season

(Average of July to September)



Expanded area surrounding the power plant in the left figure

Figure 6-1-16(4) Average concentration distribution diagram of the sea surface in each season

(Average of October to December)



Figure 6-1-17(1) Distribution of daily mean concentration on the sea surface

(When the range of 0.1 Bq/L extends to the northernmost point)



Figure 6-1-17(2) Distribution of daily mean concentration on the sea surface

(When the range of 0.1 Bq/L extends to the southernmost point)



Detailed concentration classification in the left figure

Figure 6-1-17(3) Distribution of daily mean concentration on the sea surface

(When the range of 0.1 Bq/L extends to the easternmost point)



Detailed concentration classification in the left figure

Figure 6-1-18(1) Distribution of daily mean concentration on the sea surface

(When the range of 1 Bq/L extends to the easternmost point)



Figure 6-1-18(2) Distribution of daily mean concentration on the sea surface
(When the range of 1 Bq/L extends to the southernmost point)



Figure 6-1-18(3) Distribution of daily mean concentration on the sea surface
(When the range of 1 Bq/L extends to the easternmost point)



Figure 6-1-19 Range of the annual average concentration of 0.1Bq/L between 2014 and 2020

Table 6-1-15 Calculation result of the annual average concentration within the range of 10 km × 10 km between 2014 and 2020

Year	Annual average concentration within 10 km × 10 km around the FDNPS (Bq/L)		
	All layers	Top layer	Bottom layer
2014	4.8E-02	1.0E-01	5.0E-02
2015	4.9E-02	9.6E-02	5.3E-02
2016	4.9E-02	9.6E-02	5.3E-02
2017	5.8E-02	1.2E-01	6.3E-02
2018	5.0E-02	1.1E-01	5.4E-02
2019	5.6E-02	1.2E-01	6.0E-02
2020	5.4E-02	1.1E-01	6.0E-02
Mean	5.2E-02	1.1E-01	5.6E-02
Standard deviation	3.8E-03	9.3E-03	4.4E-03

Table 6-1-16 Maximum concentration on the boundary of the calculation area (all of the north, east, and south sides)

Year	Concentration (Bq/L)	Coordinate		
		East - West (0: West boundary, 460: East boundary)	North - South (0: South boundary, 658: North boundary)	Depth (0: Bottom layer, 29: Top layer)
2014	1.1E-04	460 (East boundary)	80	23
2015	2.6E-04	460 (East boundary)	145	29
2016	1.4E-04	460 (East boundary)	318	25
2017	2.4E-04	460 (East boundary)	224	23
2018	1.9E-04	460 (East boundary)	150	29
2019	1.6E-04	460 (East boundary)	181	28
2020	1.9E-04	460 (East boundary)	232	28

(2) Concentration of each nuclide used for the assessment in the seawater

The concentration of the other nuclides was calculated from the ratio of tritium to the annual discharge amount of the other nuclides in the source term based on the assessment result of advection and diffusion to tritium.

Table 6-1-17 shows the concentration of tritium in the seawater within 10 km × 10 km around the FDNPS and at the beach assessment point to the north of the FDNPS (annual discharge amount) in the case of the annual discharge amount of 22 TBq (2.2E+13Bq) of tritium. The change rate of the concentration of 2019 from the concentration of 2014 is about 20%. Though the impact of annual variation is small, we decided to use the concentration of 2019, which is higher, for the exposure assessment.

Tables 6-1-18 to 20 show this result and the radioactive material concentration in the seawater for the assessment calculated from the annual discharge amount of each nuclide shown in Tables 6-1-1 to 6-1-3.

Table 6-1-17 Tritium concentration in the seawater in the case of the annual tritium discharge amount of 2.2E+13Bq

	Depth	Calculation result (Bq/L)			Concentration for assessment (Bq/L)
		Meteorological and oceanographic data of 2014	Meteorological and oceanographic data of 2019	Difference (%)	
Annual average concentration within 10 km × 10 km around the FDNPS	All layers	4.8E-02	5.6E-02	17	5.6E-02
	Top layer	1.0E-01	1.2E-01	20	1.2E-01
Annual average concentration of the beach assessment point	All layers	7.2E-01	8.8E-01	22	8.8E-01

Table 6-1-18 Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment
(Source term based on the composition of nuclides in the K4 tank group)

Target nuclide	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Bq/L)		
		Within 10 km × 10 km Average of all layers	Within 10 km × 10 km Average of the top layer	Beach assessment point Average of all layers
H-3	2.2E+13	5.6E-02	1.2E-01	8.8E-01
C-14	1.7E+09	4.4E-06	9.5E-06	6.9E-05
Mn-54	7.8E+05	2.0E-09	4.2E-09	3.1E-08
Fe-59	2.0E+06	5.0E-09	1.1E-08	7.9E-08
Co-58	9.3E+05	2.4E-09	5.1E-09	3.7E-08
Co-60	5.1E+07	1.3E-07	2.8E-07	2.0E-06
Ni-63	2.5E+08	6.5E-07	1.4E-06	1.0E-05
Zn-65	1.7E+06	4.4E-09	9.5E-09	6.9E-08
Rb-86	2.2E+07	5.6E-08	1.2E-07	8.8E-07
Sr-89	1.2E+07	2.9E-08	6.3E-08	4.6E-07
Sr-90	2.5E+07	6.5E-08	1.4E-07	1.0E-06
Y-90	2.5E+07	6.5E-08	1.4E-07	1.0E-06
Y-91	2.5E+08	6.5E-07	1.4E-06	1.0E-05
Nb-95	1.2E+06	2.9E-09	6.3E-09	4.6E-08
Tc-99	8.1E+07	2.1E-07	4.4E-07	3.2E-06
Ru-103	1.2E+06	2.9E-09	6.3E-09	4.6E-08
Ru-106	1.9E+08	4.7E-07	1.0E-06	7.4E-06
Rh-103m	1.2E+06	2.9E-09	6.3E-09	4.6E-08
Rh-106	1.9E+08	4.7E-07	1.0E-06	7.4E-06
Ag-110m	6.5E+05	1.7E-09	3.5E-09	2.6E-08
Cd-113m	2.1E+06	5.3E-09	1.1E-08	8.3E-08
Cd-115m	7.4E+07	1.9E-07	4.0E-07	3.0E-06
Sn-119m	2.0E+07	5.0E-08	1.1E-07	7.9E-07
Sn-123	1.4E+08	3.5E-07	7.6E-07	5.6E-06
Sn-126	3.1E+06	8.0E-09	1.7E-08	1.3E-07
Sb-124	1.1E+06	2.8E-09	6.0E-09	4.4E-08
Sb-125	3.8E+07	9.7E-08	2.1E-07	1.5E-06
Te-123m	1.1E+06	2.7E-09	5.8E-09	4.3E-08
Te-125m	3.8E+07	9.7E-08	2.1E-07	1.5E-06
Te-127	3.7E+07	9.4E-08	2.0E-07	1.5E-06
Te-127m	3.7E+07	9.4E-08	2.0E-07	1.5E-06

Target nuclide	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Bq/L)		
		Within 10 km × 10 km Average of all layers	Within 10 km × 10 km Average of the top layer	Beach assessment point Average of all layers
Te-129	3.7E+07	9.4E-08	2.0E-07	1.5E-06
Te-129m	3.7E+07	9.4E-08	2.0E-07	1.5E-06
I-129	2.4E+08	6.2E-07	1.3E-06	9.7E-06
Cs-134	5.2E+06	1.3E-08	2.8E-08	2.1E-07
Cs-135	2.9E+02	7.4E-13	1.6E-12	1.2E-11
Cs-136	3.5E+06	8.8E-09	1.9E-08	1.4E-07
Cs-137	4.9E+07	1.2E-07	2.7E-07	1.9E-06
Ba-137m	4.9E+07	1.2E-07	2.7E-07	1.9E-06
Ba-140	1.1E+07	2.8E-08	6.0E-08	4.4E-07
Ce-141	2.9E+06	7.4E-09	1.6E-08	1.2E-07
Ce-144	7.3E+06	1.9E-08	4.0E-08	2.9E-07
Pr-144	7.3E+06	1.9E-08	4.0E-08	2.9E-07
Pr-144m	7.3E+06	1.9E-08	4.0E-08	2.9E-07
Pm-146	1.1E+07	2.9E-08	6.2E-08	4.5E-07
Pm-147	2.2E+07	5.6E-08	1.2E-07	8.8E-07
Pm-148	5.8E+07	1.5E-07	3.2E-07	2.3E-06
Pm-148m	9.7E+05	2.5E-09	5.3E-09	3.9E-08
Sm-151	1.0E+05	2.7E-10	5.7E-10	4.2E-09
Eu-152	3.2E+06	8.3E-09	1.8E-08	1.3E-07
Eu-154	1.4E+06	3.5E-09	7.6E-09	5.6E-08
Eu-155	3.8E+06	9.7E-09	2.1E-08	1.5E-07
Gd-153	3.7E+06	9.4E-09	2.0E-08	1.5E-07
Tb-160	3.2E+06	8.3E-09	1.8E-08	1.3E-07
Pu-238	7.3E+04	1.9E-10	4.0E-10	2.9E-09
Pu-239	7.3E+04	1.9E-10	4.0E-10	2.9E-09
Pu-240	7.3E+04	1.9E-10	4.0E-10	2.9E-09
Pu-241	3.2E+06	8.3E-09	1.8E-08	1.3E-07
Am-241	7.3E+04	1.9E-10	4.0E-10	2.9E-09
Am-242m	4.5E+03	1.1E-11	2.5E-11	1.8E-10
Am-243	7.3E+04	1.9E-10	4.0E-10	2.9E-09
Cm-242	7.3E+04	1.9E-10	4.0E-10	2.9E-09
Cm-243	7.3E+04	1.9E-10	4.0E-10	2.9E-09

Target nuclide	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Bq/L)		
		Within 10 km × 10 km Average of all layers	Within 10 km × 10 km Average of the top layer	Beach assessment point Average of all layers
Cm-244	7.3E+04	1.9E-10	4.0E-10	2.9E-09
Target exposure assessment		From fishing nets Ingestion of seafood	From sea surface From hulls	During swimming From beach sand Ingestion of seawater Inhalation of seawater spray

Table 6-1-19 Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Source term based on the composition of nuclides in the J1-C tank group)

Target nuclide	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Bq/L)		
		Within 10 km × 10 km Average of all layers	Within 10 km × 10 km Average of the top layers	Beach assessment point Average of all layers
H-3	2.2E+13	5.6E-02	1.2E-01	8.8E-01
C-14	4.8E+08	1.2E-06	2.6E-06	1.9E-05
Mn-54	1.0E+06	2.6E-09	5.6E-09	4.1E-08
Fe-59	2.3E+06	5.9E-09	1.3E-08	9.3E-08
Co-58	1.1E+06	2.8E-09	6.0E-09	4.4E-08
Co-60	8.9E+06	2.3E-08	4.8E-08	3.5E-07
Ni-63	2.3E+08	5.8E-07	1.2E-06	9.1E-06
Zn-65	2.5E+06	6.4E-09	1.4E-08	1.0E-07
Rb-86	1.3E+07	3.4E-08	7.3E-08	5.4E-07
Sr-89	1.4E+06	3.7E-09	7.9E-09	5.8E-08
Sr-90	9.7E+05	2.5E-09	5.3E-09	3.9E-08
Y-90	9.7E+05	2.5E-09	5.3E-09	3.9E-08
Y-91	4.6E+08	1.2E-06	2.5E-06	1.8E-05
Nb-95	1.3E+06	3.4E-09	7.3E-09	5.4E-08
Tc-99	3.2E+07	8.2E-08	1.8E-07	1.3E-06
Ru-103	1.4E+06	3.6E-09	7.8E-09	5.7E-08
Ru-106	3.8E+07	9.6E-08	2.0E-07	1.5E-06
Rh-103m	1.4E+06	3.6E-09	7.8E-09	5.7E-08
Rh-106	3.8E+07	9.6E-08	2.0E-07	1.5E-06
Ag-110m	1.2E+06	2.9E-09	6.3E-09	4.6E-08
Cd-113m	2.3E+06	5.8E-09	1.2E-08	9.1E-08
Cd-115m	7.2E+07	1.8E-07	4.0E-07	2.9E-06

Target nuclide	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Bq/L)		
		Within 10 km × 10 km Average of all layers	Within 10 km × 10 km Average of the top layers	Beach assessment point Average of all layers
Sn-119m	1.1E+09	2.9E-06	6.1E-06	4.5E-05
Sn-123	1.8E+08	4.5E-07	9.7E-07	7.1E-06
Sn-126	7.8E+06	2.0E-08	4.2E-08	3.1E-07
Sb-124	2.6E+06	6.6E-09	1.4E-08	1.0E-07
Sb-125	6.2E+06	1.6E-08	3.4E-08	2.5E-07
Te-123m	2.5E+06	6.3E-09	1.3E-08	9.9E-08
Te-125m	6.2E+06	1.6E-08	3.4E-08	2.5E-07
Te-127	1.3E+08	3.2E-07	6.9E-07	5.0E-06
Te-127m	1.3E+08	3.3E-07	7.2E-07	5.3E-06
Te-129	3.8E+07	9.6E-08	2.0E-07	1.5E-06
Te-129m	3.8E+07	9.6E-08	2.0E-07	1.5E-06
I-129	3.2E+07	8.2E-08	1.8E-07	1.3E-06
Cs-134	2.0E+06	5.2E-09	1.1E-08	8.2E-08
Cs-135	3.2E+01	8.2E-14	1.8E-13	1.3E-12
Cs-136	1.3E+06	3.2E-09	6.9E-09	5.0E-08
Cs-137	5.1E+06	1.3E-08	2.8E-08	2.0E-07
Ba-137m	5.1E+06	1.3E-08	2.8E-08	2.0E-07
Ba-140	5.4E+06	1.4E-08	2.9E-08	2.1E-07
Ce-141	7.0E+06	1.8E-08	3.8E-08	2.8E-07
Ce-144	1.5E+07	3.9E-08	8.3E-08	6.1E-07
Pr-144	1.5E+07	3.9E-08	8.3E-08	6.1E-07
Pr-144m	1.5E+07	3.9E-08	8.3E-08	6.1E-07
Pm-146	1.8E+06	4.6E-09	9.8E-09	7.2E-08
Pm-147	2.1E+07	5.5E-08	1.2E-07	8.6E-07
Pm-148	6.2E+06	1.6E-08	3.4E-08	2.5E-07
Pm-148m	1.3E+06	3.3E-09	7.0E-09	5.2E-08
Sm-151	3.0E+05	7.5E-10	1.6E-09	1.2E-08
Eu-152	7.5E+06	1.9E-08	4.1E-08	3.0E-07
Eu-154	3.0E+06	7.5E-09	1.6E-08	1.2E-07
Eu-155	9.1E+06	2.3E-08	5.0E-08	3.6E-07
Gd-153	7.0E+06	1.8E-08	3.8E-08	2.8E-07
Tb-160	3.8E+06	9.6E-09	2.0E-08	1.5E-07
Pu-238	8.9E+05	2.3E-09	4.8E-09	3.5E-08

Target nuclide	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Bq/L)		
		Within 10 km × 10 km Average of all layers	Within 10 km × 10 km Average of the top layers	Beach assessment point Average of all layers
Pu-239	8.9E+05	2.3E-09	4.8E-09	3.5E-08
Pu-240	8.9E+05	2.3E-09	4.8E-09	3.5E-08
Pu-241	3.2E+07	8.2E-08	1.8E-07	1.3E-06
Am-241	8.9E+05	2.3E-09	4.8E-09	3.5E-08
Am-242m	1.6E+04	4.0E-11	8.6E-11	6.3E-10
Am-243	8.9E+05	2.3E-09	4.8E-09	3.5E-08
Cm-242	8.9E+05	2.3E-09	4.8E-09	3.5E-08
Cm-243	8.9E+05	2.3E-09	4.8E-09	3.5E-08
Cm-244	8.9E+05	2.3E-09	4.8E-09	3.5E-08
Target exposure assessment		From fishing nets Ingestion of seafood	From sea surface From hulls	During swimming From beach sand Ingestion of seawater Inhalation of seawater spray

Table 6-1-20 Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Source term based on the composition of nuclides in the J1-G tank group)

Target nuclide	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Bq/L)		
		Within 10 km × 10 km Average of all layers	Within 10 km × 10 km Average of the top layers	Beach assessment point Average of all layers
H-3	2.2E+13	5.6E-02	1.2E-01	8.8E-01
C-14	1.3E+09	3.3E-06	7.1E-06	5.2E-05
Mn-54	3.1E+06	7.9E-09	1.7E-08	1.2E-07
Fe-59	5.9E+06	1.5E-08	3.2E-08	2.3E-07
Co-58	3.0E+06	7.7E-09	1.6E-08	1.2E-07
Co-60	1.9E+07	4.8E-08	1.0E-07	7.5E-07
Ni-63	7.2E+08	1.8E-06	3.9E-06	2.9E-05
Zn-65	6.5E+06	1.7E-08	3.6E-08	2.6E-07
Rb-86	3.8E+07	9.7E-08	2.1E-07	1.5E-06
Sr-89	3.7E+06	9.3E-09	2.0E-08	1.5E-07
Sr-90	2.6E+06	6.6E-09	1.4E-08	1.0E-07
Y-90	2.6E+06	6.6E-09	1.4E-08	1.0E-07
Y-91	9.8E+08	2.5E-06	5.3E-06	3.9E-05
Nb-95	3.8E+06	9.7E-09	2.1E-08	1.5E-07

Target nuclide	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Bq/L)		
		Within 10 km × 10 km Average of all layers	Within 10 km × 10 km Average of the top layers	Beach assessment point Average of all layers
Tc-99	1.1E+08	2.7E-07	5.8E-07	4.2E-06
Ru-103	4.2E+06	1.1E-08	2.3E-08	1.7E-07
Ru-106	3.9E+07	1.0E-07	2.1E-07	1.6E-06
Rh-103m	4.2E+06	1.1E-08	2.3E-08	1.7E-07
Rh-106	3.9E+07	1.0E-07	2.1E-07	1.6E-06
Ag-110m	3.3E+06	8.3E-09	1.8E-08	1.3E-07
Cd-113m	7.0E+06	1.8E-08	3.8E-08	2.8E-07
Cd-115m	1.9E+08	4.8E-07	1.0E-06	7.5E-06
Sn-119m	3.3E+09	8.3E-06	1.8E-05	1.3E-04
Sn-123	5.1E+08	1.3E-06	2.8E-06	2.1E-05
Sn-126	1.2E+07	3.1E-08	6.7E-08	4.9E-07
Sb-124	6.8E+06	1.7E-08	3.7E-08	2.7E-07
Sb-125	1.1E+07	2.9E-08	6.2E-08	4.6E-07
Te-123m	5.5E+06	1.4E-08	3.0E-08	2.2E-07
Te-125m	1.1E+07	2.9E-08	6.2E-08	4.6E-07
Te-127	3.5E+08	8.9E-07	1.9E-06	1.4E-05
Te-127m	3.7E+08	9.3E-07	2.0E-06	1.5E-05
Te-129	9.8E+07	2.5E-07	5.3E-07	3.9E-06
Te-129m	9.8E+07	2.5E-07	5.3E-07	3.9E-06
I-129	2.7E+07	6.8E-08	1.5E-07	1.1E-06
Cs-134	5.5E+06	1.4E-08	3.0E-08	2.2E-07
Cs-135	1.7E+02	4.4E-13	9.3E-13	6.8E-12
Cs-136	2.9E+06	7.5E-09	1.6E-08	1.2E-07
Cs-137	2.7E+07	6.8E-08	1.5E-07	1.1E-06
Ba-137m	2.7E+07	6.8E-08	1.5E-07	1.1E-06
Ba-140	1.4E+07	3.5E-08	7.6E-08	5.5E-07
Ce-141	9.8E+06	2.5E-08	5.3E-08	3.9E-07
Ce-144	4.5E+07	1.1E-07	2.4E-07	1.8E-06
Pr-144	4.5E+07	1.1E-07	2.4E-07	1.8E-06
Pr-144m	4.5E+07	1.1E-07	2.4E-07	1.8E-06
Pm-146	5.1E+06	1.3E-08	2.8E-08	2.1E-07
Pm-147	5.9E+07	1.5E-07	3.2E-07	2.3E-06
Pm-148	3.7E+07	9.3E-08	2.0E-07	1.5E-06

Target nuclide	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Bq/L)		
		Within 10 km × 10 km Average of all layers	Within 10 km × 10 km Average of the top layers	Beach assessment point Average of all layers
Pm-148m	3.3E+06	8.5E-09	1.8E-08	1.3E-07
Sm-151	8.1E+05	2.1E-09	4.4E-09	3.3E-08
Eu-152	1.5E+07	3.9E-08	8.4E-08	6.2E-07
Eu-154	8.1E+06	2.1E-08	4.4E-08	3.3E-07
Eu-155	1.5E+07	3.7E-08	8.0E-08	5.9E-07
Gd-153	1.5E+07	3.9E-08	8.4E-08	6.2E-07
Tb-160	1.1E+07	2.9E-08	6.2E-08	4.6E-07
Pu-238	2.3E+06	5.8E-09	1.2E-08	9.1E-08
Pu-239	2.3E+06	5.8E-09	1.2E-08	9.1E-08
Pu-240	2.3E+06	5.8E-09	1.2E-08	9.1E-08
Pu-241	8.1E+07	2.1E-07	4.4E-07	3.3E-06
Am-241	2.3E+06	5.8E-09	1.2E-08	9.1E-08
Am-242m	4.2E+04	1.1E-10	2.3E-10	1.7E-09
Am-243	2.3E+06	5.8E-09	1.2E-08	9.1E-08
Cm-242	2.3E+06	5.8E-09	1.2E-08	9.1E-08
Cm-243	2.3E+06	5.8E-09	1.2E-08	9.1E-08
Cm-244	2.3E+06	5.8E-09	1.2E-08	9.1E-08
Target exposure assessment		From fishing nets Ingestion of seafood	From sea surface From hulls	During swimming From beach sand Ingestion of seawater Inhalation of seawater spray

(3) Exposure assessment result

Tables 6-1-21 to 22 show the result of the exposure assessments of the following three cases using the concentrations in the seawater shown in Tables 6-1-18 to 6-1-20.
Source term based on the measured composition of nuclides

i. K4 tank group (Sum of the ratios to regulatory concentration limits of 63 nuclides other than tritium: 0.29)
ii. J1-C tank group (Sum of the ratios to regulatory concentration limits of 63 nuclides other than tritium: 0.35)
iii. J1-G tank group (Sum of the ratios to regulatory concentration limits of 63 nuclides other than tritium: 0.22)

The result of human exposure assessment is 0.00003 (3E-05) to 0.0004 (4E-04) mSv/year. In all cases, the results were much smaller than the dose limit of 1 mSv/year for the general public and the dose target of 0.05 mSv/year for domestic nuclear power plants, which is equivalent to the dose constraint value.
The assessment in the source term based on the measured value was assessed assuming that nuclides below the detection limits (undetected nuclides) were contained at the detection limits, so the assessment result is considered to be conservative. Attachment IX "Contribution to the undetected nuclides in the source term based on the measured value" shows the contribution of undetected nuclides in the assessment result.
Even in the exposure assessment of infant, of which the assessed value of internal exposure is high because the effective dose factor is large, the assessment result of internal exposure is 0.000029 (2.9E-05) mSv/year to 0.00071 (7.1E-04) mSv/year. This result is much lower than the dose limit of 1mSv/year as well as the target dose value of 0.05mSv/year, which is equivalent to the dose constraint.
Attachment X "Breakdown of the exposure assessment result by nuclide" shows the nuclide-specific breakdown of these assessment results.

In terms of the basic concept of radiation protection[38], which is to make every effort to reduce exposure as low as reasonably achievable while also considering social and economical balance, optimization of radiation protection does not necessarily equal to the minimization of exposure. Radiation protection is optimized to the extent that it does not exceed the dose constraint, so the upper limit of annual discharge amount calculated from "the annual discharge amount of treated water", "Dose constraints", and "Exposure assessment result by the source term" is shown below.
For example, if the calculation is performed the annual discharge amount of tritium from the assessment result of the J1-G tank group of which value of the exposure assessment result is the largest among the source terms based on the measured values, the result is as follows considering the dose constraint is 0.05mSv/year and the exposure assessment result based on the source term of the J1-G tank group (if the ingestion of seafood is large amount) is 4E-04mSv/year:

2.2E+13(Bq/year)×0.05 (mSv/year)÷0.0004(mSv/year)=2.7E+15(Bq/year)=<u>2,700 TBq/year</u>

[38] The principle of "ALARA" (As Low As Reasonably Achievable), which means radiation can be utilized with optimizing exposure as low as reasonably achievable when benefits from a practice with the radiation outweigh risks by the exposure

As the same calculation, if the calculation is performed using the assessment result of the K4 tank group of which value of the exposure assessment result is the smallest, the result is as follows:

2.2E+13(Bq/year)×0.05 (mSv/year)÷0.00003(mSv/year)=3.6E+16(Bq/year)=36 PBq/year (36,000 TBq/year)

The actual discharge amount will be determined setting the minimum value of 2,700 TBq (source term: J1-C tank group, seafood ingestion: large amount) as the limit value, which is the lowest value depends on source term and seafood ingestion at a result of optimization of radiation protection.
On the other hand, the Basic Policy of the government in April 2021 stipulates “The total annual amount of tritium to be discharged will be at a level below the operational target value10 for tritium discharge of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS before the accident (22 TBq/year).” This is a policy-making decision with consideration of the viewpoint of risk optimization of the whole decommissioning process as well as ALPS treated water, the effect of natural decay of radioactive materials expected to occur during land storage of ALPS treated water, leakage risk and occupational exposure during long-term storage, and social acceptance such as understanding from stakeholders. Based on this circumstance, we set the annual discharge amount of tritium 22 TBq/year (2.2E+13Bq/year) in accordance with above mentioned “TEPCO’s Action in response to Government’s Policy,” and assessed radiological impact.
In accordance with the Basic Policy of the government, the annual discharge amount of tritium is to be reviewed periodically below the dose constraint, by closely examining the circumstances of contaminated water generation and tritium concentration of newly generated ALPS treated water, and paying sufficient attention to the optimization including viewpoint of stakeholders.

Table 6-1-21 Results of human exposures assessment

Assessed case	Source term	Source term based on measured values					
		i. K4 tank group		ii. J1-C tank group		iii. J1-G tank group	
	Ingestion of seafood	Average	Large	Average	Large	Average	Large
External exposure (mSv/year)	Sea surface	6.5E-09		1.7E-08		4.7E-08	
	Hull	4.8E-09		1.2E-08		3.3E-08	
	During swimming	4.5E-09		1.2E-08		3.2E-08	
	Beach sand	7.8E-06		2.1E-05		5.6E-05	
	Fishing net	1.6E-06		4.3E-06		1.2E-05	
Internal exposure (mSv/year)	Ingestion of water	3.3E-07		3.1E-07		3.2E-07	
	Inhalation of spray	9.3E-08		2.0E-07		4.0E-07	
	Ingestion of seafood	1.5E-05	6.1E-05	2.8E-05	1.1E-04	7.9E-05	3.0E-04
Total (mSv/year)		3E-05	7E-05	5E-05	1E-04	1E-04	4E-04

Table 6-1-22 Results of internal exposures assessment by age

Assessed case	Source term	Source term based on measured values					
		i. K4 tank group		ii. J1-C tank group		iii. J1-G tank group	
	Ingestion of seafood	Average	Large	Average	Large	Average	Large
Internal exposure from ingestion of water (mSv/year)	Adult	3.3E-07		3.1E-07		3.2E-07	
	Child under school age	5.7E-07		5.4E-07		5.5E-07	
	Infant	-		-		-	
Internal exposure from inhalation of spray (mSv/year)	Adult	9.3E-08		2.0E-07		4.0E-07	
	Child under school age	6.2E-08		1.1E-07		2.2E-07	
	Infant	4.0E-08		6.5E-08		1.2E-07	
Internal exposure from ingestion of seafood (mSv/year)	Adult	1.5E-05	6.1E-05	2.8E-05	1.1E-04	7.9E-05	3.0E-04
	Child under school age	2.4E-05	9.4E-05	5.1E-05	2.0E-04	1.5E-04	5.6E-04
	Infant	2.9E-05	1.1E-04	6.7E-05	2.5E-04	1.9E-04	7.1E-04

6-2. Potential exposure assessment

Potential exposure was assessed according to the assessment procedure of potential exposure shown in GSG-10 (Figure 6-2-1).



Figure 6-2-1. Assessment procedure of potential exposures

6-2-1. Assessment method

(1) Identification and selection of potential exposure scenarios

The facilities for discharging ALPS treated water into the sea are measurement/confirmation facility, transfer facility, dilution facility, and discharge facility. The target facilities contain two types of radioactive water: diluted and undiluted ALPS treated water. Therefore, unintentional discharge of ALPS treated water into the ocean is defined as the top event, and the following three types of specific abnormal events are defined:

(1) Discharge radioactive materials with defective measurement/ confirmation
(2) Discharge with insufficient seawater dilution
(3) Leakage from facilities

In the design, to prevent these:

For (1)
- Set up interlock for discharge
- Duplication of tank valves
- Comparison with the analysis by a third-party institution
- Homogenization of samples by stirring and circulation equipment

For (2)
- Surveillance of the dilution rate based on the flow rate
- Set up interlock to stop discharge when the seawater flow rate is abnormal
- Installation of double emergency isolation valves

For (3)
- Stop in the event of earthquake
- Implementation of periodic patrol inspection
- Connection between the polyethylene pipes shall be a fusion structure.
- Installation of a leakage detector and weir in the flange
- Installation of a water level gauge in the receiving tank

Thanks to these and other measures, the unintentional discharge amount of ALPS treated water in the event of a single failure is limited to about 1.2 m^3 at the most.
As for (1) and (2), discharge is prevented or mitigated by design and operation, but as for (3) leakage from facilities, there remains a possibility of occurrence caused by external events beyond design assumptions, etc., so we selected scenarios.
As mentioned at the beginning, the facilities for discharging ALPS treated water into the sea are measurement/confirmation facility, transfer facility, dilution facility, and discharge facility. Among these facilities, dilution facility and discharge facility are facilities containing ALPS treated water after dilution and the risk of exposure from leakage is negligible.

On the other hand, the measurement/confirmation facility mainly consists of tanks for measurement and confirmation, pumps, piping, and valves, and the transfer facility mainly consists of pumps, piping, and valves. As scenarios of leakage from these facilities, we selected case 1: leakage from piping, and case 2: leakage from tanks as the severest event, as follows.

- Case 1 Leakage from piping

In the case of leakage from piping, the flow rate of ALPS treated water is considered to be the same as in normal conditions, but the water flows into the sea without dilution. As the severest scenario of leakage from piping, selected is the event of leakage of the whole amount of the maximum flow rare in the normal operation (500 m^3/day) from near the north breakwater due to piping rupture near the sea. In addition, in reality, leakage is considered to stop on the following day because the flow rate is monitored constantly and a patrol inspection is performed every day, but here it is assumed that leakage was overlooked and continued for 20 days until one tank series for measurement/confirmation of 10,000 m^3 became empty.

- Case 2 Leakage from tanks

As the severest scenario, selected is the event of leakage of ALPS treated water of 30,000 m^3 per day into the sea due to damage of all of the 3 tank groups for measurement/confirmation caused by an enormous earthquake, etc. In reality, it is conceivable that some of ALPS treated water may remain in the tanks and weirs or penetrate into the ground within the site, but it was decided that the whole volume would flow into the sea in this case.

(2) Source term (daily discharge amount of each nuclide)

Case 1 (Piping rupture)

Leaked ALPS treated water is the one which is usually discharged after dilution, and the source term was calculated from the product of the composition of nuclides based on the measured value and the maximum daily discharge volume of water (500 m^3/day). Tables 6-2-1 to 6-2-3 show the source term used for the assessment.

Table 6-2-1 Source term based on the nuclide composition of measured values (K4 tank group) (Case 1)

Target nuclide	Nuclide concentration (Bq/L)	Daily discharge volume of water (L/day)	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Remarks
H-3	1.9E+05	5.0E+05	9.5E+10	

Target nuclide	Nuclide concentration (Bq/L)	Daily discharge volume of water (L/day)	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Remarks
C-14	1.5E+01		7.5E+06	• The daily discharge amount was calculated from the product of the maximum value of the daily discharge volume of water in normal operation, 500 m^3, and the concentrations of each nuclide
Mn-54	6.7E-03		3.4E+03	
Fe-59	1.7E-02		8.5E+03	
Co-58	8.0E-03		4.0E+03	
Co-60	4.4E-01		2.2E+05	
Ni-63	2.2E+00		1.1E+06	
Zn-65	1.5E-02		7.5E+03	
Rb-86	1.9E-01		9.5E+04	
Sr-89	1.0E-01		5.0E+04	
Sr-90	2.2E-01		1.1E+05	
Y-90	2.2E-01		1.1E+05	
Y-91	2.2E+00		1.1E+06	
Nb-95	1.0E-02		5.0E+03	
Tc-99	7.0E-01		3.5E+05	
Ru-103	1.0E-02		5.0E+03	
Ru-106	1.6E+00		8.0E+05	
Rh-103m	1.0E-02		5.0E+03	
Rh-106	1.6E+00		8.0E+05	
Ag-110m	5.6E-03		2.8E+03	
Cd-113m	1.8E-02		9.0E+03	
Cd-115m	6.4E-01		3.2E+05	
Sn-119m	1.7E-01		8.5E+04	
Sn-123	1.2E+00		6.0E+05	
Sn-126	2.7E-02		1.4E+04	
Sb-124	9.5E-03		4.8E+03	
Sb-125	3.3E-01		1.7E+05	
Te-123m	9.2E-03		4.6E+03	
Te-125m	3.3E-01		1.7E+05	
Te-127	3.2E-01		1.6E+05	
Te-127m	3.2E-01		1.6E+05	
Te-129	8.1E-02		4.1E+04	
Te-129m	3.2E-01		1.6E+05	
I-129	2.1E+00		1.1E+06	
Cs-134	4.5E-02		2.3E+04	
Cs-135	2.5E-06		1.3E+00	
Cs-136	3.0E-02		1.5E+04	
Cs-137	4.2E-01		2.1E+05	
Ba-137m	4.2E-01		2.1E+05	
Ba-140	9.5E-02		4.8E+04	

Target nuclide	Nuclide concentration (Bq/L)	Daily discharge volume of water (L/day)	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Remarks
Ce-141	2.5E-02		1.3E+04	
Ce-144	6.3E-02		3.2E+04	
Pr-144	6.3E-02		3.2E+04	
Pr-144m	6.3E-02		3.2E+04	
Pm-146	9.8E-02		4.9E+04	
Pm-147	1.9E-01		9.5E+04	
Pm-148	5.0E-01		2.5E+05	
Pm-148m	8.4E-03		4.2E+03	
Sm-151	9.0E-04		4.5E+02	
Eu-152	2.8E-02		1.4E+04	
Eu-154	1.2E-02		6.0E+03	
Eu-155	3.3E-02		1.7E+04	
Gd-153	3.2E-02		1.6E+04	
Tb-160	2.8E-02		1.4E+04	
Pu-238	6.3E-04		3.2E+02	
Pu-239	6.3E-04		3.2E+02	
Pu-240	6.3E-04		3.2E+02	
Pu-241	2.8E-02		1.4E+04	
Am-241	6.3E-04		3.2E+02	
Am-242m	3.9E-05		2.0E+01	
Am-243	6.3E-04		3.2E+02	
Cm-242	6.3E-04		3.2E+02	
Cm-243	6.3E-04		3.2E+02	
Cm-244	6.3E-04		3.2E+02	

Table 6-2-2 Source term based on the nuclide composition of measured values (J1-C tank group) (Case 1)

Target nuclide	Nuclide concentration (Bq/L)	Daily discharge volume of water (L/day)	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Remarks
H-3	8.2E+05	5.0E+05	4.1E+11	• The daily discharge amount was calculated from the product of the maximum value of the daily discharge volume of water in normal operation, 500 m^3, and the concentrations of each nuclide
C-14	1.8E+01		9.0E+06	
Mn-54	3.8E-02		1.9E+04	
Fe-59	8.7E-02		4.4E+04	
Co-58	4.1E-02		2.1E+04	
Co-60	3.3E-01		1.7E+05	
Ni-63	8.5E+00		4.3E+06	

Target nuclide	Nuclide concentration (Bq/L)	Daily discharge volume of water (L/day)	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Remarks
Zn-65	9.4E-02		4.7E+04	
Rb-86	5.0E-01		2.5E+05	
Sr-89	5.4E-02		2.7E+04	
Sr-90	3.6E-02		1.8E+04	
Y-90	3.6E-02		1.8E+04	
Y-91	1.7E+01		8.5E+06	
Nb-95	5.0E-02		2.5E+04	
Tc-99	1.2E+00		6.0E+05	
Ru-103	5.3E-02		2.7E+04	
Ru-106	1.4E+00		7.0E+05	
Rh-103m	5.3E-02		2.7E+04	
Rh-106	1.4E+00		7.0E+05	
Ag-110m	4.3E-02		2.2E+04	
Cd-113m	8.5E-02		4.3E+04	
Cd-115m	2.7E+00		1.4E+06	
Sn-119m	4.2E+01		2.1E+07	
Sn-123	6.6E+00		3.3E+06	
Sn-126	2.9E-01		1.5E+05	
Sb-124	9.7E-02		4.9E+04	
Sb-125	2.3E-01		1.2E+05	
Te-123m	9.2E-02		4.6E+04	
Te-125m	2.3E-01		1.2E+05	
Te-127	4.7E+00		2.4E+06	
Te-127m	4.9E+00		2.5E+06	
Te-129	6.2E-01		3.1E+05	
Te-129m	1.4E+00		7.0E+05	
I-129	1.2E+00		6.0E+05	
Cs-134	7.6E-02		3.8E+04	
Cs-135	1.2E-06		6.0E-01	
Cs-136	4.7E-02		2.4E+04	
Cs-137	1.9E-01		9.5E+04	
Ba-137m	1.9E-01		9.5E+04	
Ba-140	2.0E-01		1.0E+05	
Ce-141	2.6E-01		1.3E+05	
Ce-144	5.7E-01		2.9E+05	
Pr-144	5.7E-01		2.9E+05	
Pr-144m	5.7E-01		2.9E+05	
Pm-146	6.7E-02		3.4E+04	
Pm-147	8.0E-01		4.0E+05	

Target nuclide	Nuclide concentration (Bq/L)	Daily discharge volume of water (L/day)	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Remarks
Pm-148	2.3E-01		1.2E+05	
Pm-148m	4.8E-02		2.4E+04	
Sm-151	1.1E-02		5.5E+03	
Eu-152	2.8E-01		1.4E+05	
Eu-154	1.1E-01		5.5E+04	
Eu-155	3.4E-01		1.7E+05	
Gd-153	2.6E-01		1.3E+05	
Tb-160	1.4E-01		7.0E+04	
Pu-238	3.3E-02		1.7E+04	
Pu-239	3.3E-02		1.7E+04	
Pu-240	3.3E-02		1.7E+04	
Pu-241	1.2E+00		6.0E+05	
Am-241	3.3E-02		1.7E+04	
Am-242m	5.9E-04		3.0E+02	
Am-243	3.3E-02		1.7E+04	
Cm-242	3.3E-02		1.7E+04	
Cm-243	3.3E-02		1.7E+04	
Cm-244	3.3E-02		1.7E+04	

Table 6-2-3 Source term based on the nuclide composition of measured values (J1-G tank group) (Case 1)

Target nuclide	Nuclide concentration (Bq/L)	Daily discharge volume of water (L/day)	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Remarks
H-3	2.7E+05	5.0E+05	1.4E+11	• The daily discharge amount was calculated from the product of the maximum value of the daily discharge volume of water in normal operation, 500 m^3, and the concentrations of each nuclide
C-14	1.6E+01		8.0E+06	
Mn-54	3.8E-02		1.9E+04	
Fe-59	7.2E-02		3.6E+04	
Co-58	3.7E-02		1.9E+04	
Co-60	2.3E-01		1.2E+05	
Ni-63	8.8E+00		4.4E+06	
Zn-65	8.0E-02		4.0E+04	
Rb-86	4.7E-01		2.4E+05	
Sr-89	4.5E-02		2.3E+04	
Sr-90	3.2E-02		1.6E+04	
Y-90	3.2E-02		1.6E+04	
Y-91	1.2E+01		6.0E+06	

Target nuclide	Nuclide concentration (Bq/L)	Daily discharge volume of water (L/day)	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Remarks
Nb-95	4.7E-02		2.4E+04	
Tc-99	1.3E+00		6.5E+05	
Ru-103	5.1E-02		2.6E+04	
Ru-106	4.8E-01		2.4E+05	
Rh-103m	5.1E-02		2.6E+04	
Rh-106	4.8E-01		2.4E+05	
Ag-110m	4.0E-02		2.0E+04	
Cd-113m	8.6E-02		4.3E+04	
Cd-115m	2.3E+00		1.2E+06	
Sn-119m	4.0E+01		2.0E+07	
Sn-123	6.3E+00		3.2E+06	
Sn-126	1.5E-01		7.5E+04	
Sb-124	8.4E-02		4.2E+04	
Sb-125	1.4E-01		7.0E+04	
Te-123m	6.7E-02		3.4E+04	
Te-125m	1.4E-01		7.0E+04	
Te-127	4.3E+00		2.2E+06	
Te-127m	4.5E+00		2.3E+06	
Te-129	5.9E-01		3.0E+05	
Te-129m	1.2E+00		6.0E+05	
I-129	3.3E-01		1.7E+05	
Cs-134	6.7E-02		3.4E+04	
Cs-135	2.1E-06		1.1E+00	
Cs-136	3.6E-02		1.8E+04	
Cs-137	3.3E-01		1.7E+05	
Ba-137m	3.3E-01		1.7E+05	
Ba-140	1.7E-01		8.5E+04	
Ce-141	1.2E-01		6.0E+04	
Ce-144	5.5E-01		2.8E+05	
Pr-144	5.5E-01		2.8E+05	
Pr-144m	5.5E-01		2.8E+05	
Pm-146	6.3E-02		3.2E+04	
Pm-147	7.2E-01		3.6E+05	
Pm-148	4.5E-01		2.3E+05	
Pm-148m	4.1E-02		2.1E+04	
Sm-151	1.0E-02		5.0E+03	
Eu-152	1.9E-01		9.5E+04	
Eu-154	1.0E-01		5.0E+04	
Eu-155	1.8E-01		9.0E+04	

Target nuclide	Nuclide concentration (Bq/L)	Daily discharge volume of water (L/day)	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Remarks
Gd-153	1.9E-01		9.5E+04	
Tb-160	1.4E-01		7.0E+04	
Pu-238	2.8E-02		1.4E+04	
Pu-239	2.8E-02		1.4E+04	
Pu-240	2.8E-02		1.4E+04	
Pu-241	1.0E+00		5.0E+05	
Am-241	2.8E-02		1.4E+04	
Am-242m	5.1E-04		2.6E+02	
Am-243	2.8E-02		1.4E+04	
Cm-242	2.8E-02		1.4E+04	
Cm-243	2.8E-02		1.4E+04	
Cm-244	2.8E-02		1.4E+04	

Case 2 (Tank damage)

Leaked ALPS treated water is the one which is usually discharged after dilution, and the source term was calculated from the product of the composition of nuclides based on the measured value and the daily discharge volume of water (30,000 m^3/day). Tables 6-2-4 to 6-2-6 show the source term used for the assessment.

Table 6-2-4 Source term based on the nuclide composition of measured values (K4 tank group) (Case 2)

Target nuclide	Nuclide concentration (Bq/L)	Daily discharge volume of water (L/day)	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Remarks
H-3	1.9E+05	3.0E+07	5.7E+12	• It was assumed that all of 3 tank groups for measurement/confirmation were damaged and whole capacity (30,000 m^3) leaked in 1 day • The daily discharge amount was calculated from the product of the daily discharge volume of water, 30,000 m^3, and the nuclide concentration
C-14	1.5E+01		4.5E+08	
Mn-54	6.7E-03		2.0E+05	
Fe-59	1.7E-02		5.1E+05	
Co-58	8.0E-03		2.4E+05	
Co-60	4.4E-01		1.3E+07	
Ni-63	2.2E+00		6.6E+07	
Zn-65	1.5E-02		4.5E+05	
Rb-86	1.9E-01		5.7E+06	
Sr-89	1.0E-01		3.0E+06	
Sr-90	2.2E-01		6.6E+06	
Y-90	2.2E-01		6.6E+06	
Y-91	2.2E+00		6.6E+07	
Nb-95	1.0E-02		3.0E+05	
Tc-99	7.0E-01		2.1E+07	
Ru-103	1.0E-02		3.0E+05	
Ru-106	1.6E+00		4.8E+07	
Rh-103m	1.0E-02		3.0E+05	
Rh-106	1.6E+00		4.8E+07	
Ag-110m	5.6E-03		1.7E+05	
Cd-113m	1.8E-02		5.4E+05	
Cd-115m	6.4E-01		1.9E+07	
Sn-119m	1.7E-01		5.1E+06	
Sn-123	1.2E+00		3.6E+07	
Sn-126	2.7E-02		8.1E+05	
Sb-124	9.5E-03		2.9E+05	
Sb-125	3.3E-01		9.9E+06	
Te-123m	9.2E-03		2.8E+05	

Target nuclide	Nuclide concentration (Bq/L)	Daily discharge volume of water (L/day)	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Remarks
Te-125m	3.3E-01		9.9E+06	
Te-127	3.2E-01		9.6E+06	
Te-127m	3.2E-01		9.6E+06	
Te-129	8.1E-02		2.4E+06	
Te-129m	3.2E-01		9.6E+06	
I-129	2.1E+00		6.3E+07	
Cs-134	4.5E-02		1.4E+06	
Cs-135	2.5E-06		7.5E+01	
Cs-136	3.0E-02		9.0E+05	
Cs-137	4.2E-01		1.3E+07	
Ba-137m	4.2E-01		1.3E+07	
Ba-140	9.5E-02		2.9E+06	
Ce-141	2.5E-02		7.5E+05	
Ce-144	6.3E-02		1.9E+06	
Pr-144	6.3E-02		1.9E+06	
Pr-144m	6.3E-02		1.9E+06	
Pm-146	9.8E-02		2.9E+06	
Pm-147	1.9E-01		5.7E+06	
Pm-148	5.0E-01		1.5E+07	
Pm-148m	8.4E-03		2.5E+05	
Sm-151	9.0E-04		2.7E+04	
Eu-152	2.8E-02		8.4E+05	
Eu-154	1.2E-02		3.6E+05	
Eu-155	3.3E-02		9.9E+05	
Gd-153	3.2E-02		9.6E+05	
Tb-160	2.8E-02		8.4E+05	
Pu-238	6.3E-04		1.9E+04	
Pu-239	6.3E-04		1.9E+04	
Pu-240	6.3E-04		1.9E+04	
Pu-241	2.8E-02		8.4E+05	
Am-241	6.3E-04		1.9E+04	
Am-242m	3.9E-05		1.2E+03	
Am-243	6.3E-04		1.9E+04	
Cm-242	6.3E-04		1.9E+04	
Cm-243	6.3E-04		1.9E+04	
Cm-244	6.3E-04		1.9E+04	

Table 6-2-5 Source term based on the nuclide composition of measured values (J1-C tank group) (Case 2)

Target nuclide	Nuclide concentration (Bq/L)	Daily discharge volume of water (L/day)	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Remarks
H-3	8.2E+05	3.0E+07	2.5E+13	• It was assumed that all of 3 tank groups for measurement/confirmation were damaged and whole capacity (30,000 m^3) leaked in 1 day • The daily discharge amount was calculated from the product of the daily discharge volume of water, 30,000 m^3, and the nuclide concentration
C-14	1.8E+01		5.4E+08	
Mn-54	3.8E-02		1.1E+06	
Fe-59	8.7E-02		2.6E+06	
Co-58	4.1E-02		1.2E+06	
Co-60	3.3E-01		9.9E+06	
Ni-63	8.5E+00		2.6E+08	
Zn-65	9.4E-02		2.8E+06	
Rb-86	5.0E-01		1.5E+07	
Sr-89	5.4E-02		1.6E+06	
Sr-90	3.6E-02		1.1E+06	
Y-90	3.6E-02		1.1E+06	
Y-91	1.7E+01		5.1E+08	
Nb-95	5.0E-02		1.5E+06	
Tc-99	1.2E+00		3.6E+07	
Ru-103	5.3E-02		1.6E+06	
Ru-106	1.4E+00		4.2E+07	
Rh-103m	5.3E-02		1.6E+06	
Rh-106	1.4E+00		4.2E+07	
Ag-110m	4.3E-02		1.3E+06	
Cd-113m	8.5E-02		2.6E+06	
Cd-115m	2.7E+00		8.1E+07	
Sn-119m	4.2E+01		1.3E+09	
Sn-123	6.6E+00		2.0E+08	
Sn-126	2.9E-01		8.7E+06	
Sb-124	9.7E-02		2.9E+06	
Sb-125	2.3E-01		6.9E+06	
Te-123m	9.2E-02		2.8E+06	
Te-125m	2.3E-01		6.9E+06	
Te-127	4.7E+00		1.4E+08	
Te-127m	4.9E+00		1.5E+08	
Te-129	6.2E-01		1.9E+07	
Te-129m	1.4E+00		4.2E+07	
I-129	1.2E+00		3.6E+07	
Cs-134	7.6E-02		2.3E+06	
Cs-135	1.2E-06		3.6E+01	

Target nuclide	Nuclide concentration (Bq/L)	Daily discharge volume of water (L/day)	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Remarks
Cs-136	4.7E-02		1.4E+06	
Cs-137	1.9E-01		5.7E+06	
Ba-137m	1.9E-01		5.7E+06	
Ba-140	2.0E-01		6.0E+06	
Ce-141	2.6E-01		7.8E+06	
Ce-144	5.7E-01		1.7E+07	
Pr-144	5.7E-01		1.7E+07	
Pr-144m	5.7E-01		1.7E+07	
Pm-146	6.7E-02		2.0E+06	
Pm-147	8.0E-01		2.4E+07	
Pm-148	2.3E-01		6.9E+06	
Pm-148m	4.8E-02		1.4E+06	
Sm-151	1.1E-02		3.3E+05	
Eu-152	2.8E-01		8.4E+06	
Eu-154	1.1E-01		3.3E+06	
Eu-155	3.4E-01		1.0E+07	
Gd-153	2.6E-01		7.8E+06	
Tb-160	1.4E-01		4.2E+06	
Pu-238	3.3E-02		9.9E+05	
Pu-239	3.3E-02		9.9E+05	
Pu-240	3.3E-02		9.9E+05	
Pu-241	1.2E+00		3.6E+07	
Am-241	3.3E-02		9.9E+05	
Am-242m	5.9E-04		1.8E+04	
Am-243	3.3E-02		9.9E+05	
Cm-242	3.3E-02		9.9E+05	
Cm-243	3.3E-02		9.9E+05	
Cm-244	3.3E-02		9.9E+05	

Table 6-2-6 Source term based on the nuclide composition of measured values (J1-G tank group) (Case 2)

Target nuclide	Nuclide concentration (Bq/L)	Daily discharge volume of water (L/day)	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Remarks
H-3	2.7E+05	3.0E+07	8.1E+12	• It was assumed that all of 3 tank groups for measurement/confirmation were
C-14	1.6E+01		4.8E+08	
Mn-54	3.8E-02		1.1E+06	

Target nuclide	Nuclide concentration (Bq/L)	Daily discharge volume of water (L/day)	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Remarks
Fe-59	7.2E-02		2.2E+06	damaged and whole capacity (30,000 m^3) leaked in 1 day • The daily discharge amount was calculated from the product of the daily discharge volume of water, 30,000 m^3, and the nuclide concentration
Co-58	3.7E-02		1.1E+06	
Co-60	2.3E-01		6.9E+06	
Ni-63	8.8E+00		2.6E+08	
Zn-65	8.0E-02		2.4E+06	
Rb-86	4.7E-01		1.4E+07	
Sr-89	4.5E-02		1.4E+06	
Sr-90	3.2E-02		9.6E+05	
Y-90	3.2E-02		9.6E+05	
Y-91	1.2E+01		3.6E+08	
Nb-95	4.7E-02		1.4E+06	
Tc-99	1.3E+00		3.9E+07	
Ru-103	5.1E-02		1.5E+06	
Ru-106	4.8E-01		1.4E+07	
Rh-103m	5.1E-02		1.5E+06	
Rh-106	4.8E-01		1.4E+07	
Ag-110m	4.0E-02		1.2E+06	
Cd-113m	8.6E-02		2.6E+06	
Cd-115m	2.3E+00		6.9E+07	
Sn-119m	4.0E+01		1.2E+09	
Sn-123	6.3E+00		1.9E+08	
Sn-126	1.5E-01		4.5E+06	
Sb-124	8.4E-02		2.5E+06	
Sb-125	1.4E-01		4.2E+06	
Te-123m	6.7E-02		2.0E+06	
Te-125m	1.4E-01		4.2E+06	
Te-127	4.3E+00		1.3E+08	
Te-127m	4.5E+00		1.4E+08	
Te-129	5.9E-01		3.6E+07	
Te-129m	1.2E+00		3.6E+07	
I-129	3.3E-01		9.9E+06	
Cs-134	6.7E-02		2.0E+06	
Cs-135	2.1E-06		6.3E+01	
Cs-136	3.6E-02		1.1E+06	
Cs-137	3.3E-01		9.9E+06	
Ba-137m	3.3E-01		9.9E+06	
Ba-140	1.7E-01		5.1E+06	
Ce-141	1.2E-01		3.6E+06	

Target nuclide	Nuclide concentration (Bq/L)	Daily discharge volume of water (L/day)	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Remarks
Ce-144	5.5E-01		1.7E+07	
Pr-144	5.5E-01		1.7E+07	
Pr-144m	5.5E-01		1.7E+07	
Pm-146	6.3E-02		1.9E+06	
Pm-147	7.2E-01		2.2E+07	
Pm-148	4.5E-01		1.4E+07	
Pm-148m	4.1E-02		1.2E+06	
Sm-151	1.0E-02		3.0E+05	
Eu-152	1.9E-01		5.7E+06	
Eu-154	1.0E-01		3.0E+06	
Eu-155	1.8E-01		5.4E+06	
Gd-153	1.9E-01		5.7E+06	
Tb-160	1.4E-01		4.2E+06	
Pu-238	2.8E-02		8.4E+05	
Pu-239	2.8E-02		8.4E+05	
Pu-240	2.8E-02		8.4E+05	
Pu-241	1.0E+00		3.0E+07	
Am-241	2.8E-02		8.4E+05	
Am-242m	5.1E-04		1.5E+04	
Am-243	2.8E-02		8.4E+05	
Cm-242	2.8E-02		8.4E+05	
Cm-243	2.8E-02		8.4E+05	
Cm-244	2.8E-02		8.4E+05	

(3) Modeling of diffusion and transfer, and exposure pathway

In the assessment of potential exposure, the location of discharge into the sea changes from 1 km offshore to the coast, but these discharge destinations are the same sea area and diffusion and advection are assumed as same as those of the normal exposure, so the migration pathways are the same as those of the normal exposure set in 6-1-2.(2). Though the same model is also used for simulation, the calculation result based on discharge from near the Unit 5/6 discharge outlets was used because it is the leakage from the coast.
The target regions, sea areas, and migration pathways are the same, so exposure pathways are the same as those of the normal exposure.

(4) Setting of the representative person

For the representative person subject to the potential exposure assessment, the region, sea area, migration pathways, and exposure pathways are the same, so the same characteristics as 6-1-2.(4) are applied. After leakage of ALPS treated water, diffusion dilution proceeds due to tidal currents and the concentration immediately drops, but exposure was assumed to continue for one week even after the end of leakage considering the case that the flow velocity continues to be small for 3 to 4 days. Conservatively, the concentration in the seawater is assumed to continue to be the same during such a period. For each case, the exposure time, etc., was set by a time proportion calculation of the exposure continuation period from the annual operation hours, etc. The set exposure time, etc., are as shown in Table 6-2-7.

Table 6-2-7 Exposure time of the representative person used for the potential exposure assessment, etc.

Item	Case 1 (27 days)	Case 2 (8 days)
Operation hours on a ship	210 hours	63 hours
Swimming time	7.1 hours	2.1 hours
Coastline stay time	37 hours	11 hours
Operation hours near fishing nets	140 hours	42 hours
Ingestion of seafood	Ingestion of persons who consume a large amount of seafood in 27 days	Ingestion of persons who consume a large amount of seafood in 8 days

The exposure assessment point is near the beach assessment point to the north of the FDNPS used for the normal exposure, and conservatively the concentration in the seawater near the beach assessment point was used for all pathways.

(5) Dose assessment method

The exposure amount of the representative person is compared with 5mSv, which is the typical decision criteria for simple assessment based on conservatively defined potential exposure scenarios for facilities and activities as described in 5.69 of GSG-10.

6-2-2. Assessment result

(1) Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment

The concentration in the seawater is the concentration near the beach assessment point to the north of the FDNPS calculated based on the result of simulation of the case of discharge from the Unit 5/6 discharge outlets of a total of 22 TBq (2.2E+13Bq) of tritium per year at an even pace throughout the year (equivalent to 6.0E+10Bq/day) as follows.

- Case 1 (Piping rupture)

We calculated the 20 days moving average of the daily average tritium concentration at the assessment point from the simulation results of tritium of 2014 and 2019, and then calculated the maximum value of each year. Table 6-2-8 shows the result. We selected the result of 2014, of which concentration is higher, 5.6Bq/L from the results of the two years.
Since this concentration assumed the daily discharge amount of tritium 6.0E+10Bq/day, we calculated the concentration of each nuclide by comparing the daily discharge amount of each nuclide in Tables 6-2-1 to 3. Tables 6-2-9 to 6-2-11 show the concentration of each nuclide used for the assessment.

- Case 2 (Tank damage)

From the simulation results of tritium of 2014 and 2019, we calculated the maximum daily average tritium concentration of each year at the assessment point. Table 6-2-8 shows the result. We selected the higher result, namely 15Bq/L in 2014, from the results of two years.
Since this concentration assumed the daily discharge amount of tritium 6.0E+10Bq/day, we calculated the concentration of each nuclide by comparing the daily discharge amount of each nuclide in Tables 6-2-4 to 6. Tables 6-2-9 to 6-2-11 show the concentration of each nuclide used for the assessment.

Table 6-2-8 Concentration of tritium in the seawater near the beach assessment point on which the potential exposure assessment is based
(Calculated daily average concentration from a simulation of the case of discharge from the Unit 5 and 6 discharge outlets at an even pace throughout the year of a total of 22 TBq (2.2E+13Bq) per year)

Assessment year	Case 1 (Piping rupture)	Case 2 (Tank damage)
	Maximum value of the 20-day moving average concentration (Bq/L)	Maximum value of the daily average concentration (Bq/L)
2014	5.6	15
2019	5.5	12

Table 6-2-9 Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Source term based on the composition of nuclides in the K4 tank group)

Target nuclide	Case 1 (Piping rupture)		Case 2 (Tank damage)	
	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Concentration in the seawater near the beach assessment point (Bq/L)	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Concentration in the seawater near the beach assessment point (Bq/L)
H-3	9.5E+10	8.8E+00	5.7E+12	1.4E+03
C-14	7.5E+06	7.0E-04	4.5E+08	1.1E-01
Mn-54	3.4E+03	3.1E-07	2.0E+05	5.0E-05
Fe-59	8.5E+03	7.9E-07	5.1E+05	1.3E-04
Co-58	4.0E+03	3.7E-07	2.4E+05	6.0E-05
Co-60	2.2E+05	2.0E-05	1.3E+07	3.3E-03
Ni-63	1.1E+06	1.0E-04	6.6E+07	1.6E-02
Zn-65	7.5E+03	7.0E-07	4.5E+05	1.1E-04
Rb-86	9.5E+04	8.8E-06	5.7E+06	1.4E-03
Sr-89	5.0E+04	4.6E-06	3.0E+06	7.5E-04
Sr-90	1.1E+05	1.0E-05	6.6E+06	1.6E-03
Y-90	1.1E+05	1.0E-05	6.6E+06	1.6E-03
Y-91	1.1E+06	1.0E-04	6.6E+07	1.6E-02
Nb-95	5.0E+03	4.6E-07	3.0E+05	7.5E-05
Tc-99	3.5E+05	3.3E-05	2.1E+07	5.2E-03
Ru-103	5.0E+03	4.6E-07	3.0E+05	7.5E-05
Ru-106	8.0E+05	7.4E-05	4.8E+07	1.2E-02
Rh-103m	5.0E+03	4.6E-07	3.0E+05	7.5E-05
Rh-106	8.0E+05	7.4E-05	4.8E+07	1.2E-02
Ag-110m	2.8E+03	2.6E-07	1.7E+05	4.2E-05
Cd-113m	9.0E+03	8.4E-07	5.4E+05	1.3E-04
Cd-115m	3.2E+05	3.0E-05	1.9E+07	4.8E-03
Sn-119m	8.5E+04	7.9E-06	5.1E+06	1.3E-03
Sn-123	6.0E+05	5.6E-05	3.6E+07	9.0E-03
Sn-126	1.4E+04	1.3E-06	8.1E+05	2.0E-04
Sb-124	4.8E+03	4.4E-07	2.9E+05	7.1E-05
Sb-125	1.7E+05	1.5E-05	9.9E+06	2.5E-03
Te-123m	4.6E+03	4.3E-07	2.8E+05	6.9E-05
Te-125m	1.7E+05	1.5E-05	9.9E+06	2.5E-03
Te-127	1.6E+05	1.5E-05	9.6E+06	2.4E-03

Target nuclide	Case 1 (Piping rupture)		Case 2 (Tank damage)	
	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Concentration in the seawater near the beach assessment point (Bq/L)	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Concentration in the seawater near the beach assessment point (Bq/L)
Te-127m	1.6E+05	1.5E-05	9.6E+06	2.4E-03
Te-129	4.1E+04	3.8E-06	2.4E+06	6.0E-04
Te-129m	1.6E+05	1.5E-05	9.6E+06	2.4E-03
I-129	1.1E+06	9.8E-05	6.3E+07	1.6E-02
Cs-134	2.3E+04	2.1E-06	1.4E+06	3.4E-04
Cs-135	1.3E+00	1.2E-10	7.5E+01	1.9E-08
Cs-136	1.5E+04	1.4E-06	9.0E+05	2.2E-04
Cs-137	2.1E+05	2.0E-05	1.3E+07	3.1E-03
Ba-137m	2.1E+05	2.0E-05	1.3E+07	3.1E-03
Ba-140	4.8E+04	4.4E-06	2.9E+06	7.1E-04
Ce-141	1.3E+04	1.2E-06	7.5E+05	1.9E-04
Ce-144	3.2E+04	2.9E-06	1.9E+06	4.7E-04
Pr-144	3.2E+04	2.9E-06	1.9E+06	4.7E-04
Pr-144m	3.2E+04	2.9E-06	1.9E+06	4.7E-04
Pm-146	4.9E+04	4.6E-06	2.9E+06	7.3E-04
Pm-147	9.5E+04	8.8E-06	5.7E+06	1.4E-03
Pm-148	2.5E+05	2.3E-05	1.5E+07	3.7E-03
Pm-148m	4.2E+03	3.9E-07	2.5E+05	6.3E-05
Sm-151	4.5E+02	4.2E-08	2.7E+04	6.7E-06
Eu-152	1.4E+04	1.3E-06	8.4E+05	2.1E-04
Eu-154	6.0E+03	5.6E-07	3.6E+05	9.0E-05
Eu-155	1.7E+04	1.5E-06	9.9E+05	2.5E-04
Gd-153	1.6E+04	1.5E-06	9.6E+05	2.4E-04
Tb-160	1.4E+04	1.3E-06	8.4E+05	2.1E-04
Pu-238	3.2E+02	2.9E-08	1.9E+04	4.7E-06
Pu-239	3.2E+02	2.9E-08	1.9E+04	4.7E-06
Pu-240	3.2E+02	2.9E-08	1.9E+04	4.7E-06
Pu-241	1.4E+04	1.3E-06	8.4E+05	2.1E-04
Am-241	3.2E+02	2.9E-08	1.9E+04	4.7E-06
Am-242m	2.0E+01	1.8E-09	1.2E+03	2.9E-07
Am-243	3.2E+02	2.9E-08	1.9E+04	4.7E-06
Cm-242	3.2E+02	2.9E-08	1.9E+04	4.7E-06
Cm-243	3.2E+02	2.9E-08	1.9E+04	4.7E-06

Target nuclide	Case 1 (Piping rupture)		Case 2 (Tank damage)	
	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Concentration in the seawater near the beach assessment point (Bq/L)	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Concentration in the seawater near the beach assessment point (Bq/L)
Cm-244	3.2E+02	2.9E-08	1.9E+04	4.7E-06

Table 6-2-10 Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Source term based on the composition of nuclides in the J1-C tank group)

Target nuclide	Case 1 (Piping rupture)		Case 2 (Tank damage)	
	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Concentration in the seawater near the beach assessment point (Bq/L)	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Concentration in the seawater near the beach assessment point (Bq/L)
H-3	4.1E+11	3.8E+01	2.5E+13	6.1E+03
C-14	9.0E+06	8.4E-04	5.4E+08	1.3E-01
Mn-54	1.9E+04	1.8E-06	1.1E+06	2.8E-04
Fe-59	4.4E+04	4.0E-06	2.6E+06	6.5E-04
Co-58	2.1E+04	1.9E-06	1.2E+06	3.1E-04
Co-60	1.7E+05	1.5E-05	9.9E+06	2.5E-03
Ni-63	4.3E+06	3.9E-04	2.6E+08	6.3E-02
Zn-65	4.7E+04	4.4E-06	2.8E+06	7.0E-04
Rb-86	2.5E+05	2.3E-05	1.5E+07	3.7E-03
Sr-89	2.7E+04	2.5E-06	1.6E+06	4.0E-04
Sr-90	1.8E+04	1.7E-06	1.1E+06	2.7E-04
Y-90	1.8E+04	1.7E-06	1.1E+06	2.7E-04
Y-91	8.5E+06	7.9E-04	5.1E+08	1.3E-01
Nb-95	2.5E+04	2.3E-06	1.5E+06	3.7E-04
Tc-99	6.0E+05	5.6E-05	3.6E+07	9.0E-03
Ru-103	2.7E+04	2.5E-06	1.6E+06	4.0E-04
Ru-106	7.0E+05	6.5E-05	4.2E+07	1.0E-02
Rh-103m	2.7E+04	2.5E-06	1.6E+06	4.0E-04
Rh-106	7.0E+05	6.5E-05	4.2E+07	1.0E-02
Ag-110m	2.2E+04	2.0E-06	1.3E+06	3.2E-04
Cd-113m	4.3E+04	3.9E-06	2.6E+06	6.3E-04
Cd-115m	1.4E+06	1.3E-04	8.1E+07	2.0E-02
Sn-119m	2.1E+07	2.0E-03	1.3E+09	3.1E-01

Target nuclide	Case 1 (Piping rupture)		Case 2 (Tank damage)	
	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Concentration in the seawater near the beach assessment point (Bq/L)	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Concentration in the seawater near the beach assessment point (Bq/L)
Sn-123	3.3E+06	3.1E-04	2.0E+08	4.9E-02
Sn-126	1.5E+05	1.3E-05	8.7E+06	2.2E-03
Sb-124	4.9E+04	4.5E-06	2.9E+06	7.2E-04
Sb-125	1.2E+05	1.1E-05	6.9E+06	1.7E-03
Te-123m	4.6E+04	4.3E-06	2.8E+06	6.9E-04
Te-125m	1.2E+05	1.1E-05	6.9E+06	1.7E-03
Te-127	2.4E+06	2.2E-04	1.4E+08	3.5E-02
Te-127m	2.5E+06	2.3E-04	1.5E+08	3.7E-02
Te-129	3.1E+05	2.9E-05	1.9E+07	4.6E-03
Te-129m	7.0E+05	6.5E-05	4.2E+07	1.0E-02
I-129	6.0E+05	5.6E-05	3.6E+07	9.0E-03
Cs-134	3.8E+04	3.5E-06	2.3E+06	5.7E-04
Cs-135	6.0E-01	5.6E-11	3.6E+01	9.0E-09
Cs-136	2.4E+04	2.2E-06	1.4E+06	3.5E-04
Cs-137	9.5E+04	8.8E-06	5.7E+06	1.4E-03
Ba-137m	9.5E+04	8.8E-06	5.7E+06	1.4E-03
Ba-140	1.0E+05	9.3E-06	6.0E+06	1.5E-03
Ce-141	1.3E+05	1.2E-05	7.8E+06	1.9E-03
Ce-144	2.9E+05	2.6E-05	1.7E+07	4.3E-03
Pr-144	2.9E+05	2.6E-05	1.7E+07	4.3E-03
Pr-144m	2.9E+05	2.6E-05	1.7E+07	4.3E-03
Pm-146	3.4E+04	3.1E-06	2.0E+06	5.0E-04
Pm-147	4.0E+05	3.7E-05	2.4E+07	6.0E-03
Pm-148	1.2E+05	1.1E-05	6.9E+06	1.7E-03
Pm-148m	2.4E+04	2.2E-06	1.4E+06	3.6E-04
Sm-151	5.5E+03	5.1E-07	3.3E+05	8.2E-05
Eu-152	1.4E+05	1.3E-05	8.4E+06	2.1E-03
Eu-154	5.5E+04	5.1E-06	3.3E+06	8.2E-04
Eu-155	1.7E+05	1.6E-05	1.0E+07	2.5E-03
Gd-153	1.3E+05	1.2E-05	7.8E+06	1.9E-03
Tb-160	7.0E+04	6.5E-06	4.2E+06	1.0E-03
Pu-238	1.7E+04	1.5E-06	9.9E+05	2.5E-04

Target nuclide	Case 1 (Piping rupture)		Case 2 (Tank damage)	
	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Concentration in the seawater near the beach assessment point (Bq/L)	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Concentration in the seawater near the beach assessment point (Bq/L)
Pu-239	1.7E+04	1.5E-06	9.9E+05	2.5E-04
Pu-240	1.7E+04	1.5E-06	9.9E+05	2.5E-04
Pu-241	6.0E+05	5.6E-05	3.6E+07	9.0E-03
Am-241	1.7E+04	1.5E-06	9.9E+05	2.5E-04
Am-242m	3.0E+02	2.7E-08	1.8E+04	4.4E-06
Am-243	1.7E+04	1.5E-06	9.9E+05	2.5E-04
Cm-242	1.7E+04	1.5E-06	9.9E+05	2.5E-04
Cm-243	1.7E+04	1.5E-06	9.9E+05	2.5E-04
Cm-244	1.7E+04	1.5E-06	9.9E+05	2.5E-04

Table 6-2-11 Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Source term based on the composition of nuclides in the J1-G tank group)

Target nuclide	Case 1 (Piping rupture)		Case 2 (Tank damage)	
	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Concentration in the seawater near the beach assessment point (Bq/L)	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Concentration in the seawater near the beach assessment point (Bq/L)
H-3	1.4E+11	1.3E+01	8.1E+12	2.0E+03
C-14	8.0E+06	7.4E-04	4.8E+08	1.2E-01
Mn-54	1.9E+04	1.8E-06	1.1E+06	2.8E-04
Fe-59	3.6E+04	3.3E-06	2.2E+06	5.4E-04
Co-58	1.9E+04	1.7E-06	1.1E+06	2.8E-04
Co-60	1.2E+05	1.1E-05	6.9E+06	1.7E-03
Ni-63	4.4E+06	4.1E-04	2.6E+08	6.6E-02
Zn-65	4.0E+04	3.7E-06	2.4E+06	6.0E-04
Rb-86	2.4E+05	2.2E-05	1.4E+07	3.5E-03
Sr-89	2.3E+04	2.1E-06	1.4E+06	3.4E-04
Sr-90	1.6E+04	1.5E-06	9.6E+05	2.4E-04
Y-90	1.6E+04	1.5E-06	9.6E+05	2.4E-04
Y-91	6.0E+06	5.6E-04	3.6E+08	9.0E-02
Nb-95	2.4E+04	2.2E-06	1.4E+06	3.5E-04

Target nuclide	Case 1 (Piping rupture)		Case 2 (Tank damage)	
	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Concentration in the seawater near the beach assessment point (Bq/L)	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Concentration in the seawater near the beach assessment point (Bq/L)
Tc-99	6.5E+05	6.0E-05	3.9E+07	9.7E-03
Ru-103	2.6E+04	2.4E-06	1.5E+06	3.8E-04
Ru-106	2.4E+05	2.2E-05	1.4E+07	3.6E-03
Rh-103m	2.6E+04	2.4E-06	1.5E+06	3.8E-04
Rh-106	2.4E+05	2.2E-05	1.4E+07	3.6E-03
Ag-110m	2.0E+04	1.9E-06	1.2E+06	3.0E-04
Cd-113m	4.3E+04	4.0E-06	2.6E+06	6.4E-04
Cd-115m	1.2E+06	1.1E-04	6.9E+07	1.7E-02
Sn-119m	2.0E+07	1.9E-03	1.2E+09	3.0E-01
Sn-123	3.2E+06	2.9E-04	1.9E+08	4.7E-02
Sn-126	7.5E+04	7.0E-06	4.5E+06	1.1E-03
Sb-124	4.2E+04	3.9E-06	2.5E+06	6.3E-04
Sb-125	7.0E+04	6.5E-06	4.2E+06	1.0E-03
Te-123m	3.4E+04	3.1E-06	2.0E+06	5.0E-04
Te-125m	7.0E+04	6.5E-06	4.2E+06	1.0E-03
Te-127	2.2E+06	2.0E-04	1.3E+08	3.2E-02
Te-127m	2.3E+06	2.1E-04	1.4E+08	3.4E-02
Te-129	3.0E+05	2.7E-05	1.8E+07	4.4E-03
Te-129m	6.0E+05	5.6E-05	3.6E+07	9.0E-03
I-129	1.7E+05	1.5E-05	9.9E+06	2.5E-03
Cs-134	3.4E+04	3.1E-06	2.0E+06	5.0E-04
Cs-135	1.1E+00	9.8E-11	6.3E+01	1.6E-08
Cs-136	1.8E+04	1.7E-06	1.1E+06	2.7E-04
Cs-137	1.7E+05	1.5E-05	9.9E+06	2.5E-03
Ba-137m	1.7E+05	1.5E-05	9.9E+06	2.5E-03
Ba-140	8.5E+04	7.9E-06	5.1E+06	1.3E-03
Ce-141	6.0E+04	5.6E-06	3.6E+06	9.0E-04
Ce-144	2.8E+05	2.6E-05	1.7E+07	4.1E-03
Pr-144	2.8E+05	2.6E-05	1.7E+07	4.1E-03
Pr-144m	2.8E+05	2.6E-05	1.7E+07	4.1E-03
Pm-146	3.2E+04	2.9E-06	1.9E+06	4.7E-04
Pm-147	3.6E+05	3.3E-05	2.2E+07	5.4E-03

Target nuclide	Case 1 (Piping rupture)		Case 2 (Tank damage)	
	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Concentration in the seawater near the beach assessment point (Bq/L)	Daily discharge amount (Bq/day)	Concentration in the seawater near the beach assessment point (Bq/L)
Pm-148	2.3E+05	2.1E-05	1.4E+07	3.4E-03
Pm-148m	2.1E+04	1.9E-06	1.2E+06	3.1E-04
Sm-151	5.0E+03	4.6E-07	3.0E+05	7.5E-05
Eu-152	9.5E+04	8.8E-06	5.7E+06	1.4E-03
Eu-154	5.0E+04	4.6E-06	3.0E+06	7.5E-04
Eu-155	9.0E+04	8.4E-06	5.4E+06	1.3E-03
Gd-153	9.5E+04	8.8E-06	5.7E+06	1.4E-03
Tb-160	7.0E+04	6.5E-06	4.2E+06	1.0E-03
Pu-238	1.4E+04	1.3E-06	8.4E+05	2.1E-04
Pu-239	1.4E+04	1.3E-06	8.4E+05	2.1E-04
Pu-240	1.4E+04	1.3E-06	8.4E+05	2.1E-04
Pu-241	5.0E+05	4.6E-05	3.0E+07	7.5E-03
Am-241	1.4E+04	1.3E-06	8.4E+05	2.1E-04
Am-242m	2.6E+02	2.4E-08	1.5E+04	3.8E-06
Am-243	1.4E+04	1.3E-06	8.4E+05	2.1E-04
Cm-242	1.4E+04	1.3E-06	8.4E+05	2.1E-04
Cm-243	1.4E+04	1.3E-06	8.4E+05	2.1E-04
Cm-244	1.4E+04	1.3E-06	8.4E+05	2.1E-04

(2) Exposure assessment result

Table 6-2-12 shows the potential exposure result calculated using the concentration in the seawater calculated in (1). The result is 0.0007 (7E-04) mSv to 0.3(3E-01) mSv, which falls below 5mSv, which is the standard at the time of accident.

Table 6-2-12 Results of the potential exposure assessment

Assessed case	Source term	Case 1 (Piping rupture)			Case 2 (Tank damage)		
		K4 tank group	J1-C tank group	J1-G tank group	K4 tank group	J1-C tank group	J1-G tank group
	Ingestion of seafood	Large	Large	Large	Large	Large	Large
External exposure (mSv)	Sea surface	3.5E-08	4.0E-07	3.6E-07	1.7E-06	1.9E-05	1.7E-05
	Hull	2.5E-08	2.8E-07	2.5E-07	1.2E-06	1.4E-05	1.2E-05
	During swimming	3.3E-09	3.8E-08	3.4E-08	1.6E-07	1.8E-06	1.6E-06
	Beach sand	5.8E-06	6.7E-05	5.9E-05	2.8E-04	3.2E-03	2.8E-03
	Fishing net	1.8E-05	2.1E-04	1.9E-04	8.9E-04	1.0E-02	9.1E-03
Internal exposure (mSv)	Ingestion of water	2.4E-07	9.9E-07	3.3E-07	1.2E-05	4.7E-05	1.6E-05
	Inhalation of spray	6.9E-08	6.4E-07	4.2E-07	3.3E-06	3.1E-05	2.0E-05
	Ingestion of seafood	7.1E-04	5.4E-03	4.9E-03	3.4E-02	2.6E-01	2.4E-01
Total (mSv)		7E-04	6E-03	5E-03	4E-02	3E-01	2E-01

7. Assessment regarding environmental protection

The assessment method of environmental protection is as shown in GSG -10 Annex I. In this report, environmental protection was assessed according to the procedure of GSG -10 Annex I.

7-1. Concept of assessment

The assessment for protection of plants and animals in the normal operation is performed according to GSG -10 Annex I.

7-1-1. Assessment procedure

The assessment is performed according to the procedure shown in Figure 7-1.



Figure 7-1 Environmental protection assessment procedure (prepared from GSG-10)

[39] Reference animals and plants: Specific types of animals and plants assumed in order to associate radiation exposure from the environment with the dose and impact.

[40] Derived consideration reference level (DCRL): Range of the dose rates within a range of one digit specified for each species advocated by ICRP. Dose rate level at which the impact has to be considered if is exceeded.

7-2. Assessment method

7-2-1. Source term

Use the same source term as the one shown in 6-1-2.(1) Source term.

7-2-2. Modeling of diffusion and transfer after discharge

(1) Selection of the migration model

As the migration model of radioactive materials discharged into the sea, the following was selected from the migration model of human exposure assessment, considering habitat environment of marine plants and animals, referring to GSG-10.

i. Advection and diffusion by tidal currents, etc.
Selected because advection and diffusion will occur after discharge into the sea.

ii. Advection and diffusion by tidal currents, etc. -> Migration to seabed sediment
Selected because ALPS treated water will migrate to seabed sediment, etc., due to advection and diffusion caused by tidal currents, etc., after discharge into the sea.

iii. Advection and diffusion by tidal currents, etc. -> Intake and concentration by marine plants and animals such as fish
Selected because migration to and concentration in fish, etc. will occur after discharge into the sea.

(2) Assessment of advection and diffusion in the sea area

The same model as that for the human protection assessment is used.

7-2-3. Setting of exposure pathways

The following pathways were selected according to GSG -10 Annex I-21.

i. Internal exposure from radioactive materials ingested or inhaled by plants and animals
ii. External exposure from the surrounding seawater
iii. External exposure from the surrounding seabed sediment

The following shows the specific assessment method.

(1) Internal exposure from radioactive materials ingested or inhaled by plants and animals
Equation (7-1) shows the calculation equation of the absorbed dose rate D_{int} (mGy/day) of radiation from radioactive materials ingested from the seawater by standard animals and plants.

$$D_{int} = \sum_i (DCF_{int})_{ki} \cdot (x_9)_i \cdot (CR)_{ki} \quad (7\text{-}1)$$

where

$(DCF_{int})_{ki}$ is the internal exposure dose conversion factor to marine plants and animals k of nuclide i ((mGy/day)/(Bq/kg))

$(x_9)_i$ is the concentration of nuclide i in seawater (Bq/L)

$(CR)_{ki}$ is the ration of the concentration in the seawater to marine plants and animals k in nuclide i ((Bq/kg)/(Bq/L))

(2) External exposure from the seawater and seabed sediment

The absorbed dose rate $D_{ext,sw}$ (mGy/day) of plants and animals surrounded by the seawater is calculated by equation (7-2).

$$D_{ext,sw} = \sum_i (DCF_{ext})_{ki} \cdot \frac{(x_9)_i}{\rho_w} \quad (7\text{-}2)$$

where

$(DCF_{ext})_{ki}$ is the external exposure dose conversion factor to marine plants and animals k of nuclide i ((mGy/day)/(Bq/kg))

$(x_9)_i$ is the concentration of nuclide i in seawater (Bq/L)

ρ_w is the density of seawater (kg/L)

Similarly, the absorbed dose rate $D_{ext,sed}$ (mGy/day) of plants and animals surrounded by seabed sediment is calculated by equation (7-3).

$$D_{ext,sed} = \sum_i (DCF_{ext})_{ki} \cdot (x_9)_i \cdot (K_d)_i \quad (7\text{-}3)$$

where

$(DCF_{ext})_{ki}$ is the external exposure dose conversion factor to marine plants and animals k of nuclide i ((mGy/day)/(Bq/kg))

$(x_9)_i$ is the concentration of nuclide i in seawater (Bq/L)

$(K_d)_i$ is the concentration distribution coefficient from seawater to sediment of nuclide i ((Bq/kg)/(Bq/L))

External exposure in the case of exposure from the seawater and seabed sediment D_{ext} is the total of both, but plants and animals that live on the seabed are exposed to half each of the seawater of upper half and the seabed sediment of the lower half, respectively, so it is calculated by Equation (7-4).

$$D_{ext}=0.5\bullet D_{ext,sw}+0.5\bullet D_{ext,sed} \quad (7\text{-}4)$$

The internal and external exposure dose conversion factors to plants and animals[41] is excerpted from ICRP Publication 136 “Dose Coefficients for Non-human Biota Environmentally Exposed to Radiation”(ICRP,2017) [29] (hereinafter called “ICRP pub.136”) and the BiotaDC program of ICRP [30] (See Tables 7-2-1 and 7-2-2). Only the dose conversion factor of Sn-126 could not be calculated by BiotaDC, so conservatively the values of Ru-106 and Ag-110m are used for the internal and external exposure dose conversion factors, respectively.

The concentration ratios of plants and animals and the seawater[42] are excerpted from ICRP Publication 114 “Environmental Protection : Transfer Parameters for Reference Animals and Plants”(ICRP,2009) [31] (hereinafter called “ICRP pub.114”) and IAEA Technical report series No.479 “Handbook of Parameter Values for the Prediction of Radionuclide Transfer to Wildlife” (hereinafter called “TRS-479”). For the elements not shown here, the concentration factors of TRS-422 [25] are excerpted (See Table 7-2-3). For the concentration distribution coefficients of the seawater and seabed sediment, those specified in 2.3.OCEAN MARGIN *Kd*s of TRS-422 are used (See Table 7-2-4).

[41] Dose conversion factor to plants and animals: Value set for simplified calculations of internal and external exposure doses to organism by radioactive nuclides in the environment.

[42] Concentration ratio (CR): The ratio of the radioactive nuclides in aquatic organisms living in hydrosphere to the underwater concentration in the environment for the assessment of radiation exposure to plants and animals from the environment (ICPR, 2009). Unlike the concentration factor, it is not limited to the edible part.

7-2-4. Selection of reference plants and animals (organisms to be assessed)

Small seaweed beds mainly consisting of Eisenia bicyclis, which is a perennial marine alga, are distributed on the coast of Fukushima, in which the FDNPS is located [32]. There is no special sea area like a habitat of a marine plant or animal designated as a protected species around the FDNPS [33] so the following plants and animals are selected as those clarified in ICRP Pub.136.

- Reference flat fish (Left-eyed and right-eyed flounders widely inhabit in the sea area around the FDNPS)
- Reference crabs ((Ovalipes punctatus and Portunus trituberculatus widely inhabit in the sea area around the FDNPS)
- Reference brown seaweeds (Sargassum and Eisenia bicyclis widely inhabit in the sea area around the FDNPS)

These plants and animals are widely distributed in the sea area around the FDNPS, so the radioactive material concentration in the seawater used for the assessment is the annual average concentration of 10 km × 10 km around the FDNPS, which matches 100-400 km^2 as recommended in I-23. of GSG -10 Annex I. In addition, in the assessment of plants and animals, the concentration near the seabed (bottom layer) is used because the impact of external exposure from radioactive materials migrated to the seabed sediment is greater than in the seawater and the selected standard flatfish live on the seabed.

7-2-5. Dose assessment

The dose is assessed by comparison with the derived consideration reference level (DCRL) shown in ICRP Publication 124 “Protection of the Environment under Different Exposure Situations” for each type of the reference plants and animals.

Table 7-2-1 Internal exposure conversion factor to marine plants and animals

(ICRP Pub.136 and others are shown in remarks)

	Target nuclide	Internal exposure dose conversion factor ((mGy/day)/(Bq/kg)			Remarks
		Flatfish	Crab	Brown seaweed	
1	H-3	7.9E-08	7.9E-08	7.9E-08	
2	C-14	7.0E-07	7.0E-07	7.0E-07	
3	Mn-54	1.1E-06	1.4E-06	9.4E-07	
4	Fe-59	2.9E-06	3.4E-06	2.0E-06	Calculated from BiotaDC
5	Co-58	1.6E-06	2.1E-06	1.5E-06	
6	Co-60	3.8E-06	5.0E-06	3.6E-06	
7	Ni-63	2.4E-07	2.4E-07	2.4E-07	
8	Zn-65	7.7E-07	1.0E-06	7.0E-07	
9	Rb-86	8.8E-06	9.1E-06	6.9E-06	Calculated from BiotaDC
10	Sr-89	7.7E-06	7.9E-06	7.7E-06	
11	Sr-90	1.4E-05	1.5E-05	1.4E-05	
12	Y-90	—	—	—	Contained in the parent nuclide Sr-90
13	Y-91	8.0E-06	8.1E-06	6.4E-06	Calculated from BiotaDC
14	Nb-95	1.5E-06	1.9E-06	1.4E-06	
15	Tc-99	1.4E-06	1.4E-06	1.4E-06	
16	Ru-103	2.1E-06	2.3E-06	2.0E-06	
17	Ru-106	1.7E-05	1.9E-05	1.7E-05	
18	Rh-103m	—	—	—	Contained in the parent nuclide Ru-103
19	Rh-106	—	—	—	Contained in the parent nuclide Ru-106
20	Ag-110m	4.3E-06	5.5E-06	4.1E-06	Calculated from BiotaDC
21	Cd-113m	2.5E-06	2.5E-06	2.4E-06	Calculated from BiotaDC
22	Cd-115m	8.0E-06	8.2E-06	6.4E-06	Calculated from BiotaDC
23	Sn-119m	1.2E-06	1.2E-06	1.1E-06	Calculated from BiotaDC
24	Sn-123	7.0E-06	7.1E-06	5.8E-06	Calculated from BiotaDC
25	Sn-126	1.7E-05	1.9E-05	1.7E-05	The value of Ru-106 is used because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
26	Sb-124	7.0E-06	7.9E-06	6.7E-06	
27	Sb-125	2.0E-06	2.2E-06	1.9E-06	
28	Te-123m	1.6E-06	1.7E-06	1.4E-06	Calculated from BiotaDC
29	Te-125m	1.7E-06	1.8E-06	1.6E-06	Calculated from BiotaDC
30	Te-127	3.1E-06	3.1E-06	2.9E-06	Calculated from BiotaDC
31	Te-127m	4.2E-06	4.2E-06	4.0E-06	Calculated from BiotaDC

	Target nuclide	Internal exposure dose conversion factor ((mGy/day)/(Bq/kg)			Remarks
		Flatfish	Crab	Brown seaweed	
32	Te-129	—	—	—	Contained in the parent nuclide Te-129m
33	Te-129m	8.4E-06	8.6E-06	8.2E-06	
34	I-129	1.0E-06	1.1E-06	1.0E-06	
35	Cs-134	4.1E-06	4.8E-06	3.8E-06	
36	Cs-135	1.2E-06	1.2E-06	1.2E-06	
37	Cs-136	4.3E-06	5.3E-06	4.1E-06	
38	Cs-137	4.1E-06	4.3E-06	4.1E-06	
39	Ba-137m	—	—	—	Contained in the parent nuclide Cs-137
40	Ba-140	1.4E-05	1.5E-05	1.4E-05	
41	Ce-141	2.4E-06	2.6E-06	2.4E-06	
42	Ce-144	1.6E-05	1.7E-05	1.6E-05	
43	Pr-144	—	—	—	Contained in the parent nuclide Ce-144
44	Pr-144m	—	—	—	Contained in the parent nuclide Ce-144
45	Pm-146	2.3E-06	2.6E-06	1.5E-06	Calculated from BiotaDC
46	Pm-147	8.6E-07	8.6E-07	8.5E-07	Calculated from BiotaDC
47	Pm-148	9.9E-06	1.1E-05	7.3E-06	Calculated from BiotaDC
48	Pm-148m	5.2E-06	6.1E-06	3.3E-06	Calculated from BiotaDC
49	Sm-151	2.8E-07	2.8E-07	2.8E-07	Calculated from BiotaDC
50	Eu-152	3.1E-06	3.6E-06	2.9E-06	
51	Eu-154	5.0E-06	5.8E-06	5.0E-06	
52	Eu-155	1.0E-06	1.0E-06	9.8E-07	
53	Gd-153	8.5E-07	9.2E-07	7.0E-07	Calculated from BiotaDC
54	Tb-160	4.8E-06	5.4E-06	3.7E-06	Calculated from BiotaDC
55	Pu-238	7.7E-05	7.7E-05	7.7E-05	
56	Pu-239	7.2E-05	7.2E-05	7.2E-05	
57	Pu-240	7.2E-05	7.2E-05	7.2E-05	
58	Pu-241	7.4E-08	7.4E-08	7.4E-08	
59	Am-241	7.7E-05	7.7E-05	7.7E-05	
60	Am-242m	3.6E-06	3.6E-06	3.4E-06	Calculated from BiotaDC
61	Am-243	7.9E-05	7.9E-05	7.8E-05	Calculated from BiotaDC
62	Cm-242	8.6E-05	8.6E-05	8.6E-05	
63	Cm-243	8.4E-05	8.4E-05	8.4E-05	

	Target nuclide	Internal exposure dose conversion factor ((mGy/day)/(Bq/kg)			Remarks
		Flatfish	Crab	Brown seaweed	
64	Cm-244	8.2E-05	8.2E-05	8.2E-05	

Table 7-2-2 External exposure conversion factor to marine plants and animals

(ICRP Pub.136 and others are shown in remarks)

	Target nuclide	External exposure dose conversion factor ((mGy/day)/(Bq/kg))			Remarks
		Flatfish	Crab	Brown seaweed	
1	H-3	1.9E-14	2.4E-16	2.4E-16	
2	C-14	4.3E-10	5.3E-10	5.3E-10	
3	Mn-54	1.1E-05	1.0E-05	1.1E-05	
4	Fe-59	1.5E-05	1.5E-05	1.6E-05	Calculated from BiotaDC
5	Co-58	1.2E-05	1.2E-05	1.2E-05	
6	Co-60	3.1E-05	3.1E-05	3.4E-05	
7	Ni-63	2.6E-11	4.1E-11	4.1E-11	
8	Zn-65	7.4E-06	7.2E-06	7.4E-06	
9	Rb-86	1.7E-06	1.4E-06	3.7E-06	Calculated from BiotaDC
10	Sr-89	3.6E-07	2.0E-07	4.1E-07	
11	Sr-90	1.2E-06	5.5E-07	1.2E-06	
12	Y-90	—	—	—	Contained in the parent nuclide Sr-90
13	Y-91	4.4E-07	2.5E-07	2.0E-06	Calculated from BiotaDC
14	Nb-95	9.6E-06	9.4E-06	9.8E-06	
15	Tc-99	3.1E-09	3.4E-09	3.6E-09	
16	Ru-103	6.2E-06	6.0E-06	6.2E-06	
17	Ru-106	5.3E-06	3.8E-06	5.3E-06	
18	Rh-103m	—	—	—	Contained in the parent nuclide Ru-103
19	Rh-106m	—	—	—	Contained in the parent nuclide Ru-106
20	Ag-110m	3.6E-05	3.4E-05	3.6E-05	
21	Cd-113m	1.7E-08	1.6E-08	1.4E-07	Calculated from BiotaDC
22	Cd-115m	8.2E-07	6.2E-07	2.4E-06	Calculated from BiotaDC
23	Sn-119m	1.0E-07	8.0E-08	1.7E-07	Calculated from BiotaDC
24	Sn-123	3.7E-07	2.5E-07	1.6E-06	Calculated from BiotaDC

	Target nuclide	External exposure dose conversion factor ((mGy/day)/(Bq/kg))			Remarks
		Flatfish	Crab	Brown seaweed	
25	Sn-126	3.6E-05	3.4E-05	3.6E-05	The value of Ag-110m is used because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
26	Sb-124	2.4E-05	2.3E-05	2.4E-05	
27	Sb-125	5.5E-06	5.3E-06	5.5E-06	
28	Te-123m	1.8E-06	1.7E-06	2.0E-06	Calculated from BiotaDC
29	Te-125m	2.9E-07	2.4E-07	4.3E-07	Calculated from BiotaDC
30	Te-127	8.9E-08	8.3E-08	2.9E-07	Calculated from BiotaDC
31	Te-127m	1.8E-07	1.6E-07	4.2E-07	Calculated from BiotaDC
32	Te-129	—	—	—	Contained in the parent nuclide Te-129m
33	Te-129m	1.2E-06	1.1E-06	1.3E-06	
34	I-129	2.2E-07	1.9E-07	2.4E-07	
35	Cs-134	2.0E-05	1.9E-05	2.0E-05	
36	Cs-135	2.2E-09	2.6E-09	2.6E-09	
37	Cs-136	2.6E-05	2.6E-05	2.6E-05	
38	Cs-137	7.2E-06	7.0E-06	7.2E-06	
39	Ba-137m	—	—	—	Contained in the parent nuclide Cs-137
40	Ba-140	3.1E-05	3.1E-05	3.4E-05	
41	Ce-141	9.6E-07	9.1E-07	9.8E-07	
42	Ce-144	2.6E-06	1.5E-06	2.6E-06	
43	Pr-144	—	—	—	Contained in the parent nuclide Ce-144
44	Pr-144m	—	—	—	Contained in the parent nuclide Ce-144
45	Pm-146	9.5E-06	9.1E-06	1.0E-05	Calculated from BiotaDC
46	Pm-147	9.9E-10	1.1E-09	1.0E-08	Calculated from BiotaDC
47	Pm-148	8.1E-06	7.5E-06	1.1E-05	Calculated from BiotaDC
48	Pm-148m	2.5E-05	2.4E-05	2.7E-05	Calculated from BiotaDC
49	Sm-151	7.7E-11	8.4E-11	7.6E-10	Calculated from BiotaDC
50	Eu-152	1.5E-05	1.4E-05	1.5E-05	
51	Eu-154	1.6E-05	1.5E-05	1.6E-05	
52	Eu-155	7.4E-07	7.0E-07	7.4E-07	
53	Gd-153	1.2E-06	1.1E-06	1.4E-06	Calculated from BiotaDC
54	Tb-160	1.4E-05	1.4E-05	1.5E-05	Calculated from BiotaDC

	Target nuclide	External exposure dose conversion factor ((mGy/day)/(Bq/kg))			Remarks
		Flatfish	Crab	Brown seaweed	
55	Pu-238	4.6E-09	3.8E-09	5.5E-09	
56	Pu-239	2.6E-09	2.3E-09	3.1E-09	
57	Pu-240	4.3E-09	3.6E-09	5.3E-09	
58	Pu-241	1.9E-11	1.9E-11	2.0E-11	
59	Am-241	2.9E-07	2.6E-07	2.9E-07	
60	Am-242m	2.4E-07	2.3E-07	4.2E-07	Calculated from BiotaDC
61	Am-243	2.9E-06	2.8E-06	3.2E-06	Calculated from BiotaDC
62	Cm-242	5.3E-09	4.3E-09	6.2E-09	
63	Cm-243	1.6E-06	1.5E-06	1.6E-06	
64	Cm-244	4.8E-09	3.8E-09	5.5E-09	

Table 7-2-3 Concentration ratio to marine plants and animals (ICRP Pub.114 and others, shown in remarks)

	Target nuclide	Concentration ratio ((Bq/kg-f.w)/(Bq/L))			Remarks
		Flatfish	Crab	Brown seaweed	
1	H-3	1.0E+00	1.0E+00	3.7E-01	Excerpted from ICRP Pub.114
2	C-14	1.2E+04	1.0E+04	8.0E+03	Excerpted from ICRP Pub.114
3	Mn-54	2.6E+03	4.5E+04	1.1E+04	Excerpted from TRS-479 (fish and crab) Excerpted from ICRP Pub.114 (brown seaweed)
4	Fe-59	3.0E+04	5.0E+05	2.0E+04	The concentration factor of TRS-422 is excerpted because it is not shown in ICRP Pub.114 or TRS-479
5	Co-58	1.1E+04	5.5E+03	1.7E+03	Excerpted from TRS-479
6	Co-60	1.1E+04	5.5E+03	1.7E+03	Excerpted from TRS-479
7	Ni-63	2.7E+02	6.4E+03	2.0E+03	Excerpted from TRS-479
8	Zn-65	2.5E+04	3.0E+05	1.3E+04	Excerpted from TRS-479 (fish) Excerpted from ICRP Pub.114 (crab and brown seaweed)
9	Rb-86	1.2E+02	6.3E+01	9.6E+01	The value of congener Cs is used
10	Sr-89	4.4E+01	1.5E+02	4.3E+01	Excerpted from TRS-479
11	Sr-90	4.4E+01	1.5E+02	4.3E+01	Excerpted from TRS-479
12	Y-90	-	-	-	Assessed with the parent nuclide Sr-90.
13	Y-91	2.0E+01	1.0E+03	1.0E+03	The concentration factor of TRS-422 is excerpted because it is not shown in ICRP Pub.114 or TRS-479

	Target nuclide	Concentration ratio ((Bq/kg-f.w)/(Bq/L))			Remarks
		Flatfish	Crab	Brown seaweed	
14	Nb-95	3.0E+01	8.8E+02	4.9E+02	Excerpted from ICRP Pub.114 (fish) Excerpted from TRS-479 (crab and brown seaweed)
15	Tc-99	8.0E+01	1.8E+04	5.3E+04	Excerpted from ICRP Pub.114 (fish) Excerpted from TRS-479 (crab and brown seaweed)
16	Ru-103	2.9E+01	1.6E+03	1.2E+03	Excerpted from TRS-479
17	Ru-106	2.9E+01	1.6E+03	1.2E+03	Excerpted from TRS-479
18	Rh-103m	-	-	-	Assessed with the parent nuclide Ru-103
19	Rh-106	-	-	-	Assessed with the parent nuclide Ru-106
20	Ag-110m	1.1E+04	2.0E+05	3.9E+03	Excerpted from TRS-479 (fish and brown seaweed) Excerpted from ICRP Pub.114 (crab)
21	Cd-113m	2.9E+04	1.3E+05	1.6E+03	Excerpted from TRS-479 (fish and crab) Excerpted from ICRP Pub.114 (brown seaweed)
22	Cd-115m	2.9E+04	1.3E+05	1.6E+03	Excerpted from TRS-479 (fish and crab) Excerpted from ICRP Pub.114 (brown seaweed)
23	Sn-119m	5.0E+05	5.0E+05	2.0E+05	The concentration factor of TRS-422 is excerpted because it is not shown in ICRP Pub.114 or TRS-479
24	Sn-123	5.0E+05	5.0E+05	2.0E+05	The concentration factor of TRS-422 is excerpted because it is not shown in ICRP Pub.114 or TRS-479
25	Sn-126	5.0E+05	5.0E+05	2.0E+05	The concentration factor of TRS-422 is excerpted because it is not shown in ICRP Pub.114 or TRS-479
26	Sb-124	6.0E+02	4.7E+02	1.5E+03	Excerpted from ICRP Pub.114 (fish and brown seaweed) Excerpted from TRS-479 (crab)
27	Sb-125	6.0E+02	4.7E+02	1.5E+03	Excerpted from ICRP Pub.114 (fish and brown seaweed) Excerpted from TRS-479 (crab)
28	Te-123m	1.0E+03	1.0E+03	1.0E+04	Excerpted from ICRP Pub.114
29	Te-125m	1.0E+03	1.0E+03	1.0E+04	Excerpted from ICRP Pub.114
30	Te-127	1.0E+03	1.0E+03	1.0E+04	Excerpted from ICRP Pub.114
31	Te-127m	1.0E+03	1.0E+03	1.0E+04	Excerpted from ICRP Pub.114
32	Te-129	-	-	-	Assessed with the parent nuclide Te-129m
33	Te-129m	1.0E+03	1.0E+03	1.0E+04	Excerpted from ICRP Pub.114
34	I-129	9.0E+00	8.8E+03	4.2E+03	Excerpted from ICRP Pub.114 (fish) Excerpted from TRS-479 (crab and brown seaweed)
35	Cs-134	1.2E+02	6.3E+01	9.6E+01	Excerpted from TRS-479
36	Cs-135	1.2E+02	6.3E+01	9.6E+01	Excerpted from TRS-479
37	Cs-136	1.2E+02	6.3E+01	9.6E+01	Excerpted from TRS-479
38	Cs-137	1.2E+02	6.3E+01	9.6E+01	Excerpted from TRS-479
39	Ba-137m	-	-	-	Assessed with the parent nuclide Cs-137
40	Ba-140	9.6E+00	8.0E+02	1.6E+03	Excerpted from ICRP Pub.114
41	Ce-141	3.9E+02	2.2E+03	2.1E+03	Excerpted from TRS-479
42	Ce-144	3.9E+02	2.2E+03	2.1E+03	Excerpted from TRS-479

	Target nuclide	Concentration ratio ((Bq/kg-f.w)/(Bq/L))			Remarks
		Flatfish	Crab	Brown seaweed	
43	Pr-144	-	-	-	Assessed with the parent nuclide Ce-144
44	Pr-144m	-	-	-	Assessed with the parent nuclide Ce-144
45	Pm-146	7.3E+02	2.4E+04	5.9E+03	The value of congener Eu is used (fish and crab) The value of congener La is used (brown seaweed)
46	Pm-147	7.3E+02	2.4E+04	5.9E+03	The value of congener Eu is used (fish and crab) The value of congener La is used (brown seaweed)
47	Pm-148	7.3E+02	2.4E+04	5.9E+03	The value of congener Eu is used (fish and crab) The value of congener La is used (brown seaweed)
48	Pm-148m	7.3E+02	2.4E+04	5.9E+03	The value of congener Eu is used (fish and crab) The value of congener La is used (brown seaweed)
49	Sm-151	7.3E+02	2.4E+04	5.9E+03	The value of congener Eu is used (fish and crab) The value of congener La is used (brown seaweed)
50	Eu-152	7.3E+02	2.4E+04	1.4E+03	Excerpted from ICRP Pub.114 (fish and crab) Excerpted from TRS-479 (brown seaweed)
51	Eu-154	7.3E+02	2.4E+04	1.4E+03	Excerpted from ICRP Pub.114 (fish and crab) Excerpted from TRS-479 (brown seaweed)
52	Eu-155	7.3E+02	2.4E+04	1.4E+03	Excerpted from ICRP Pub.114 (fish and crab) Excerpted from TRS-479 (brown seaweed)
53	Gd-153	7.3E+02	2.4E+04	5.9E+03	The value of congener Eu is used (fish and crab) The value of congener La is used (brown seaweed)
54	Tb-160	6.0E+01	4.0E+03	2.0E+03	The concentration factor of TRS-422 is excerpted because it is not shown in ICRP Pub.114 or TRS-479
55	Pu-238	2.5E+03	1.7E+03	4.1E+03	Excerpted from TRS-479
56	Pu-239	2.5E+03	1.7E+03	4.1E+03	Excerpted from TRS-479
57	Pu-240	2.5E+03	1.7E+03	4.1E+03	Excerpted from TRS-479
58	Pu-241	2.5E+03	1.7E+03	4.1E+03	Excerpted from TRS-479
59	Am-241	3.2E+02	9.9E+03	4.3E+02	Excerpted from TRS-479
60	Am-242m	3.2E+02	9.9E+03	4.3E+02	Excerpted from TRS-479
61	Am-243	3.2E+02	9.9E+03	4.3E+02	Excerpted from TRS-479
62	Cm-242	1.9E+02	3.2E+04	1.2E+04	Excerpted from ICRP Pub.114 (fish) Excerpted from TRS-479 (crab and brown seaweed)
63	Cm-243	1.9E+02	3.2E+04	1.2E+04	Excerpted from ICRP Pub.114 (fish) Excerpted from TRS-479 (crab and brown seaweed)
64	Cm-244	1.9E+02	3.2E+04	1.2E+04	Excerpted from ICRP Pub.114 (fish) Excerpted from TRS-479 (crab and brown seaweed)

Table 7-2-4 Concentration distribution coefficient of the seawater and seabed sediment (TRS-422 and others are shown in remarks)

	Target nuclide	Concentration distribution coefficient ((Bq/kg)/(Bq/L))	Remarks
1	H-3	1.0E+00	
2	C-14	1.0E+03	
3	Mn-54	2.0E+06	
4	Fe-59	3.0E+08	
5	Co-58	3.0E+05	
6	Co-60	3.0E+05	
7	Ni-63	2.0E+04	
8	Zn-65	7.0E+04	
9	Rb-86	4.0E+03	The value of congener Cs is used because no value is given to this nuclide in the source
10	Sr-89	8.0E+00	
11	Sr-90	8.0E+00	
12	Y-90	-	Assessed with the parent nuclide Sr-90
13	Y-91	9.0E+05	
14	Nb-95	8.0E+05	
15	Tc-99	1.0E+02	
16	Ru-103	4.0E+04	
17	Ru-106	4.0E+04	
18	Rh-103m	-	Assessed with the parent nuclide Ru-103
19	Rh-106	-	Assessed with the parent nuclide Ru-106
20	Ag-110m	1.0E+04	
21	Cd-113m	3.0E+04	
22	Cd-115m	3.0E+04	
23	Sn-119m	4.0E+06	
24	Sn-123	4.0E+06	
25	Sn-126	4.0E+06	
26	Sb-124	2.0E+03	
27	Sb-125	2.0E+03	
28	Te-123m	1.0E+03	
29	Te-125m	1.0E+03	
30	Te-127	1.0E+03	
31	Te-127m	1.0E+03	
32	Te-129	-	Assessed with the parent nuclide Te-129m
33	Te-129m	1.0E+03	
34	I-129	7.0E+01	
35	Cs-134	4.0E+03	
36	Cs-135	4.0E+03	
37	Cs-136	4.0E+03	

	Target nuclide	Concentration distribution coefficient ((Bq/kg)/(Bq/L))	Remarks
38	Cs-137	4.0E+03	
39	Ba-137m	-	Assessed with the parent nuclide Cs-137
40	Ba-140	2.0E+03	
41	Ce-141	3.0E+06	
42	Ce-144	3.0E+06	
43	Pr-144	-	Assessed with the parent nuclide Ce-144
44	Pr-144m	-	Assessed with the parent nuclide Ce-144
45	Pm-146	2.0E+06	
46	Pm-147	2.0E+06	
47	Pm-148	2.0E+06	
48	Pm-148m	2.0E+06	
49	Sm-151	3.0E+06	
50	Eu-152	2.0E+06	
51	Eu-154	2.0E+06	
52	Eu-155	2.0E+06	
53	Gd-153	2.0E+06	
54	Tb-160	2.0E+06	
55	Pu-238	1.0E+05	
56	Pu-239	1.0E+05	
57	Pu-240	1.0E+05	
58	Pu-241	1.0E+05	
59	Am-241	2.0E+06	
60	Am-242m	2.0E+06	
61	Am-243	2.0E+06	
62	Cm-242	2.0E+06	
63	Cm-243	2.0E+06	
64	Cm-244	2.0E+06	

7-3. Assessment result

7-3-1. Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment

As with the human protection assessment, the concentration in the seawater used for the exposure assessment of each nuclide was calculated by proportion calculation with the calculation result of advection and diffusion of tritium and the annual discharge amount of each nuclide. Here the concentration of the bottom layer is used because the impact of seabed sediment is considered in the exposure assessment.
Table 7-3-1 shows the concentration of tritium in the seawater in the bottom layer within 10 km × 10 km around the FDNPS (annual discharge amount) in the case of the annual discharge amount of 22 TBq (2.2E+13Bq) of tritium. The concentration for the assessment is the concentration based on the 2019 meteorological and oceanographic data as with the human exposure assessment.
Tables 7-3-2 to 4 show this result, and the concentration in the seawater used for the exposure assessment of each nuclide calculated from the source terms shown in Tables 6-1-1 to 3.

Table 7-3-1 Tritium concentration in the seawater in the case of the annual tritium discharge amount of 2.2E+13Bq

Assessment point	Depth	Calculation result (Bq/L)			Concentration for assessment (Bq/L)
		2014 Meteorological and oceanographic data	2019 Meteorological and oceanographic data	Difference (%)	
Average concentration within 10 km × 10 km around the FDNPS	Bottom layer	5.0E-02	6.0E-02	19	6.0E-02

Table 7-3-2 Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Source term based on the composition of nuclides in the K4 tank group)

Target nuclide	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (within 10 km × 10 km)
		Average concentration of the bottom layer (Bq/L)
H-3	2.2E+13	6.0E-02
C-14	1.7E+09	4.7E-06
Mn-54	7.8E+05	2.1E-09
Fe-59	2.0E+06	5.4E-09
Co-58	9.3E+05	2.5E-09
Co-60	5.1E+07	1.4E-07
Ni-63	2.5E+08	6.9E-07
Zn-65	1.7E+06	4.7E-09

Target nuclide	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (within 10 km × 10 km)
		Average concentration of the bottom layer (Bq/L)
Rb-86	2.2E+07	6.0E-08
Sr-89	1.2E+07	3.2E-08
Sr-90	2.5E+07	6.9E-08
Y-90	2.5E+07	6.9E-08
Y-91	2.5E+08	6.9E-07
Nb-95	1.2E+06	3.2E-09
Tc-99	8.1E+07	2.2E-07
Ru-103	1.2E+06	3.2E-09
Ru-106	1.9E+08	5.1E-07
Rh-103m	1.2E+06	3.2E-09
Rh-106	1.9E+08	5.1E-07
Ag-110m	6.5E+05	1.8E-09
Cd-113m	2.1E+06	5.7E-09
Cd-115m	7.4E+07	2.0E-07
Sn-119m	2.0E+07	5.4E-08
Sn-123	1.4E+08	3.8E-07
Sn-126	3.1E+06	8.5E-09
Sb-124	1.1E+06	3.0E-09
Sb-125	3.8E+07	1.0E-07
Te-123m	1.1E+06	2.9E-09
Te-125m	3.8E+07	1.0E-07
Te-127	3.7E+07	1.0E-07
Te-127m	3.7E+07	1.0E-07
Te-129	9.4E+06	2.6E-08
Te-129m	3.7E+07	1.0E-07
I-129	2.4E+08	6.6E-07
Cs-134	5.2E+06	1.4E-08
Cs-135	2.9E+02	7.9E-13
Cs-136	3.5E+06	9.5E-09
Cs-137	4.9E+07	1.3E-07
Ba-137m	4.9E+07	1.3E-07
Ba-140	1.1E+07	3.0E-08

Target nuclide	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (within 10 km × 10 km)
		Average concentration of the bottom layer (Bq/L)
Ce-141	2.9E+06	7.9E-09
Ce-144	7.3E+06	2.0E-08
Pr-144	7.3E+06	2.0E-08
Pr-144m	7.3E+06	2.0E-08
Pm-146	1.1E+07	3.1E-08
Pm-147	2.2E+07	6.0E-08
Pm-148	5.8E+07	1.6E-07
Pm-148m	9.7E+05	2.7E-09
Sm-151	1.0E+05	2.8E-10
Eu-152	3.2E+06	8.8E-09
Eu-154	1.4E+06	3.8E-09
Eu-155	3.8E+06	1.0E-08
Gd-153	3.7E+06	1.0E-08
Tb-160	3.2E+06	8.8E-09
Pu-238	7.3E+04	2.0E-10
Pu-239	7.3E+04	2.0E-10
Pu-240	7.3E+04	2.0E-10
Pu-241	3.2E+06	8.8E-09
Am-241	7.3E+04	2.0E-10
Am-242m	4.5E+03	1.2E-11
Am-243	7.3E+04	2.0E-10
Cm-242	7.3E+04	2.0E-10
Cm-243	7.3E+04	2.0E-10
Cm-244	7.3E+04	2.0E-10
Target exposure assessment		Environmental protection

Table 7-3-3 Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Source term based on the composition of nuclides in the J1-C tank group)

Target nuclide	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (within 10 km × 10 km)
		Average concentration of the bottom layer (Bq/L)
H-3	2.2E+13	6.0E-02
C-14	4.8E+08	1.3E-06
Mn-54	1.0E+06	2.8E-09
Fe-59	2.3E+06	6.4E-09
Co-58	1.1E+06	3.0E-09
Co-60	8.9E+06	2.4E-08
Ni-63	2.3E+08	6.2E-07
Zn-65	2.5E+06	6.9E-09
Rb-86	1.3E+07	3.7E-08
Sr-89	1.4E+06	4.0E-09
Sr-90	9.7E+05	2.6E-09
Y-90	9.7E+05	2.6E-09
Y-91	4.6E+08	1.2E-06
Nb-95	1.3E+06	3.7E-09
Tc-99	3.2E+07	8.8E-08
Ru-103	1.4E+06	3.9E-09
Ru-106	3.8E+07	1.0E-07
Rh-103m	1.4E+06	3.9E-09
Rh-106	3.8E+07	1.0E-07
Ag-110m	1.2E+06	3.1E-09
Cd-113m	2.3E+06	6.2E-09
Cd-115m	7.2E+07	2.0E-07
Sn-119m	1.1E+09	3.1E-06
Sn-123	1.8E+08	4.8E-07
Sn-126	7.8E+06	2.1E-08
Sb-124	2.6E+06	7.1E-09
Sb-125	6.2E+06	1.7E-08
Te-123m	2.5E+06	6.7E-09
Te-125m	6.2E+06	1.7E-08
Te-127	1.3E+08	3.4E-07

Target nuclide	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (within 10 km × 10 km)
		Average concentration of the bottom layer (Bq/L)
Te-127m	1.3E+08	3.6E-07
Te-129	1.7E+07	4.5E-08
Te-129m	3.8E+07	1.0E-07
I-129	3.2E+07	8.8E-08
Cs-134	2.0E+06	5.6E-09
Cs-135	3.2E+01	8.8E-14
Cs-136	1.3E+06	3.4E-09
Cs-137	5.1E+06	1.4E-08
Ba-137m	5.1E+06	1.4E-08
Ba-140	5.4E+06	1.5E-08
Ce-141	7.0E+06	1.9E-08
Ce-144	1.5E+07	4.2E-08
Pr-144	1.5E+07	4.2E-08
Pr-144m	1.5E+07	4.2E-08
Pm-146	1.8E+06	4.9E-09
Pm-147	2.1E+07	5.9E-08
Pm-148	6.2E+06	1.7E-08
Pm-148m	1.3E+06	3.5E-09
Sm-151	3.0E+05	8.0E-10
Eu-152	7.5E+06	2.0E-08
Eu-154	3.0E+06	8.0E-09
Eu-155	9.1E+06	2.5E-08
Gd-153	7.0E+06	1.9E-08
Tb-160	3.8E+06	1.0E-08
Pu-238	8.9E+05	2.4E-09
Pu-239	8.9E+05	2.4E-09
Pu-240	8.9E+05	2.4E-09
Pu-241	3.2E+07	8.8E-08
Am-241	8.9E+05	2.4E-09
Am-242m	1.6E+04	4.3E-11
Am-243	8.9E+05	2.4E-09

Target nuclide	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (within 10 km × 10 km)
		Average concentration of the bottom layer (Bq/L)
Cm-242	8.9E+05	2.4E-09
Cm-243	8.9E+05	2.4E-09
Cm-244	8.9E+05	2.4E-09
Target exposure assessment		Environmental protection

Table 7-3-4 Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Source term based on the composition of nuclides in the J1-G tank group)

Target nuclide	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (within 10 km × 10 km)
		Average concentration of the bottom layer (Bq/L)
H-3	2.2E+13	6.0E-02
C-14	1.3E+09	3.6E-06
Mn-54	3.1E+06	8.4E-09
Fe-59	5.9E+06	1.6E-08
Co-58	3.0E+06	8.2E-09
Co-60	1.9E+07	5.1E-08
Ni-63	7.2E+08	2.0E-06
Zn-65	6.5E+06	1.8E-08
Rb-86	3.8E+07	1.0E-07
Sr-89	3.7E+06	1.0E-08
Sr-90	2.6E+06	7.1E-09
Y-90	2.6E+06	7.1E-09
Y-91	9.8E+08	2.7E-06
Nb-95	3.8E+06	1.0E-08
Tc-99	1.1E+08	2.9E-07
Ru-103	4.2E+06	1.1E-08
Ru-106	3.9E+07	1.1E-07
Rh-103m	4.2E+06	1.1E-08
Rh-106	3.9E+07	1.1E-07
Ag-110m	3.3E+06	8.9E-09
Cd-113m	7.0E+06	1.9E-08

Target nuclide	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (within 10 km × 10 km)
		Average concentration of the bottom layer (Bq/L)
Cd-115m	1.9E+08	5.1E-07
Sn-119m	3.3E+09	8.9E-06
Sn-123	5.1E+08	1.4E-06
Sn-126	1.2E+07	3.3E-08
Sb-124	6.8E+06	1.9E-08
Sb-125	1.1E+07	3.1E-08
Te-123m	5.5E+06	1.5E-08
Te-125m	1.1E+07	3.1E-08
Te-127	3.5E+08	9.6E-07
Te-127m	3.7E+08	1.0E-06
Te-129	4.8E+07	1.3E-07
Te-129m	9.8E+07	2.7E-07
I-129	2.7E+07	7.3E-08
Cs-134	5.5E+06	1.5E-08
Cs-135	1.7E+02	4.7E-13
Cs-136	2.9E+06	8.0E-09
Cs-137	2.7E+07	7.3E-08
Ba-137m	2.7E+07	7.3E-08
Ba-140	1.4E+07	3.8E-08
Ce-141	9.8E+06	2.7E-08
Ce-144	4.5E+07	1.2E-07
Pr-144	4.5E+07	1.2E-07
Pr-144m	4.5E+07	1.2E-07
Pm-146	5.1E+06	1.4E-08
Pm-147	5.9E+07	1.6E-07
Pm-148	3.7E+07	1.0E-07
Pm-148m	3.3E+06	9.1E-09
Sm-151	8.1E+05	2.2E-09
Eu-152	1.5E+07	4.2E-08
Eu-154	8.1E+06	2.2E-08
Eu-155	1.5E+07	4.0E-08

Target nuclide	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (within 10 km × 10 km) Average concentration of the bottom layer (Bq/L)
Gd-153	1.5E+07	4.2E-08
Tb-160	1.1E+07	3.1E-08
Pu-238	2.3E+06	6.2E-09
Pu-239	2.3E+06	6.2E-09
Pu-240	2.3E+06	6.2E-09
Pu-241	8.1E+07	2.2E-07
Am-241	2.3E+06	6.2E-09
Am-242m	4.2E+04	1.1E-10
Am-243	2.3E+06	6.2E-09
Cm-242	2.3E+06	6.2E-09
Cm-243	2.3E+06	6.2E-09
Cm-244	2.3E+06	6.2E-09
Target exposure assessment		Environmental protection

7-3-2. Exposure assessment result

Table 7-3-5 shows the result of the exposure assessment of reference plants and animals. All results are low dose rates that are lower than 1/10,000 of the minimum limit value of the derived consideration reference level.

Table 7-3-5 Assessment result regarding environmental protection

Assessed case		Source term based on measured values		
		i. K4 tank group	ii. J1-C tank group	iii. J1-G tank group
Exposure (mGy/day)	Flatfish	2E-05	2E-05	6E-05
	Crab	2E-05	2E-05	6E-05
	Brown seaweed	2E-05	2E-05	6E-05
Derived consideration reference level (DCRL) [29] Flatfish: 1-10 mGy/day Crab: 10-100 mGy/day Brown seaweed: 1-10 mGy/day				

8. Discussion about the uncertainty of the assessment

This assessment was performed adding various data related to the disposal plan of ALPS treated water, assumptions of the exposure assessment, etc., to the assessment model including parameters created from obtained findings, etc. The assessment model including these parameters, the data, the set assumptions, etc., include uncertainty. So does the assessment result.

Generally, the uncertainty is roughly divided into (1) aleatory uncertainty (or variability) and (2) epistemic uncertainty. “Aleatory uncertainty (or variability)” is uncertainty caused by statistical distribution such as initial variation in data, and cannot be reduced even if data and knowledge to be obtained in the future are considered. “Epistemic uncertainty” is uncertainty due to lack of knowledge, though there is considered to be the one and only state.

The following shows the result of consideration of the degree of uncertainty referring to the result of simulation performed in each assessment process for each type, etc.

8-1. Uncertainty included in the selection of the source term

The following items are examples of uncertainty of the source term.

8-1-1. Uncertainty of the composition of nuclide (epistemic uncertainty)

The treated water to be purified in storage is planned to be subject to secondary treatment by ALPS, etc., and the composition of nuclides is unknown until measurement is performed after secondary treatment. Though it is guaranteed that the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits is less than 1, the composition of nuclides depends on various factors such as the composition and concentration of radioactive materials at the ALPS inlet at the time of treatment, the stage of the adsorbent in the ALPS adsorption vessel in the performance life period at the time of treatment, etc. The same applies to the contaminated water generated in the future.

Among the exposure assessment value by three source terms, there is about a five-fold difference between the source terms based on the K4 and J1-G tank groups. Since the difference in the tritium concentration is not large, this difference is mainly caused by the difference in the composition of nuclides, but the assessment is designed conservatively assuming that undetected nuclides including short-half-life radionuclides are included at their minimum limit values of detection and 70% or more of the uncertainty of the source term is due to the undetected nuclides as shown in Attachment IX “Contribution to the undetected nuclides in the source term based on the measured value,” so the main cause of the uncertainty of the source term is considered to be the difference in the ditection limit.

On the other hand, the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of the composition of nuclides in the three tanks is about 0.3 and the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of the composition of the nuclides of the J1-G tank group with the highest exposure assessment value is 0.22. The limit value in discharge control is the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of less than 1, so if ALPS treated water in which the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits is close to 1, exposure may become 4 to 5 times larger.
If the tritium concentration in ALPS treated water is low, the discharge volume of water instead increases, so there is uncertainty due to the tritium concentration that exposure increases due to an increase in the discharge amount of nuclides other than tritium, but the discharge volume of water is limited to up to 500 m^3/day and the annual discharge volume of water is 1.5E+08L (capacity factor: 80%), which is just 1.25 times larger than that of the K4 tank group (annual discharge volume of water: 1.2E+08L) and about 2 times larger than the J1-G tank group (annual discharge volume of water: 8.1E+07L).

8-1-2. Uncertainty of analysis (aleatory uncertainty)

The compositions of nuclides of the three tank groups used for the setting of the source term includes uncertainty of analysis. To verify the impact of the uncertainty of analysis on the exposure assessment value, we applied the expanded uncertainty calculated from the analysis result of the J1-C tank group to the measurement result of the J1-G tank group with a high exposure assessment value for the normal exposure assessment. Table 8-1 shows the composition of nuclides considering expanded uncertainty in the composition of nuclides of the J1-G tank group. Table 8-2 shows the concentration in the seawater used for the set source term and assessment. Table 8-3 shows the exposure assessment result.
The exposure assessment result of the source term considering the uncertainty of analysis is about 1.5 times larger than that not considering the uncertainty, so the uncertainty of the exposure assessment due to the uncertainty of the analysis is considered to be less than 2 times greater.

8-1-3. Summary of the uncertainty of the source term

As for the uncertainty of the source term, the difference due to the composition of nuclides of the tank group is about ±5-fold centering on the source term based on the J1-G group and the uncertainty of analysis is considered to be about ±1.5-fold.

Table 8-1 Composition of nuclides considering the uncertainty of detection for the composition of nuclides of the J1-G tank group

Target nuclide	Regulatory concentration limit (Bq/L)	Composition of nuclides of the J1-G tank group (Bq/L)	Composition of nuclides of the J1-G tank group considering expanded uncertainty (Bq/L)	Ratio to regulatory concentration limit
H-3	6.0E+04	2.7E+05	2.7E+05	-
C-14	2.0E+03	1.6E+01	2.0E+01	1.0E-02
Mn-54	1.0E+03	3.8E-02	6.4E-02	6.4E-05
Fe-59	4.0E+02	7.2E-02	1.2E-01	3.0E-04
Co-58	1.0E+03	3.7E-02	6.2E-02	6.2E-05
Co-60	2.0E+02	2.3E-01	2.7E-01	1.4E-03
Ni-63	6.0E+03	8.8E+00	9.2E+00	1.5E-03
Zn-65	2.0E+02	8.0E-02	1.3E-01	6.7E-04
Rb-86	3.0E+02	4.7E-01	7.9E-01	2.6E-03
Sr-89	3.0E+02	4.5E-02	5.3E-02	1.8E-04
Sr-90	3.0E+01	3.2E-02	4.2E-02	1.4E-03
Y-90	3.0E+02	3.2E-02	4.2E-02	1.4E-04
Y-91	3.0E+02	1.2E+01	2.0E+01	6.6E-02
Nb-95	1.0E+03	4.7E-02	7.9E-02	7.9E-05
Tc-99	1.0E+03	1.3E+00	1.3E+00	1.3E-03
Ru-103	1.0E+03	5.1E-02	8.6E-02	8.6E-05
Ru-106	1.0E+02	4.8E-01	6.1E-01	6.1E-03
Rh-103m	2.0E+05	5.1E-02	8.6E-02	4.3E-07
Rh-106	3.0E+05	4.8E-01	6.1E-01	2.0E-06
Ag-110m	3.0E+02	4.0E-02	6.7E-02	2.2E-04
Cd-113m	4.0E+01	8.6E-02	9.0E-02	2.2E-03
Cd-115m	3.0E+02	2.3E+00	4.5E+00	1.5E-02
Sn-119m	2.0E+03	4.0E+01	6.7E+01	3.4E-02
Sn-123	4.0E+02	6.3E+00	1.1E+01	2.6E-02
Sn-126	2.0E+02	1.5E-01	2.5E-01	1.3E-03
Sb-124	3.0E+02	8.4E-02	1.4E-01	4.7E-04
Sb-125	8.0E+02	1.4E-01	2.0E-01	2.5E-04
Te-123m	6.0E+02	6.7E-02	1.1E-01	1.9E-04
Te-125m	9.0E+02	1.4E-01	2.0E-01	2.2E-04
Te-127	5.0E+03	4.3E+00	7.5E+00	1.5E-03

Target nuclide	Regulatory concentration limit (Bq/L)	Composition of nuclides of the J1-G tank group (Bq/L)	Composition of nuclides of the J1-G tank group considering expanded uncertainty (Bq/L)	Ratio to regulatory concentration limit
Te-127m	3.0E+02	4.5E+00	7.9E+00	2.6E-02
Te-129	1.0E+04	5.9E-01	1.0E+00	1.0E-04
Te-129m	3.0E+02	1.2E+00	2.1E+00	7.1E-03
I-129	9.0E+00	3.3E-01	3.8E-01	4.2E-02
Cs-134	6.0E+01	6.7E-02	1.1E-01	1.9E-03
Cs-135	6.0E+02	2.1E-06	2.6E-06	4.3E-09
Cs-136	3.0E+02	3.6E-02	6.1E-02	2.0E-04
Cs-137	9.0E+01	3.3E-01	4.0E-01	4.5E-03
Ba-137m	8.0E+05	3.3E-01	4.0E-01	5.0E-07
Ba-140	3.0E+02	1.7E-01	2.9E-01	9.6E-04
Ce-141	1.0E+03	1.2E-01	2.0E-01	2.0E-04
Ce-144	2.0E+02	5.5E-01	9.4E-01	4.7E-03
Pr-144	2.0E+04	5.5E-01	9.4E-01	4.7E-05
Pr-144m	4.0E+04	5.5E-01	9.4E-01	2.3E-05
Pm-146	9.0E+02	6.3E-02	1.1E-01	1.2E-04
Pm-147	3.0E+03	7.2E-01	1.2E+00	4.1E-04
Pm-148	3.0E+02	4.5E-01	7.6E-01	2.5E-03
Pm-148m	5.0E+02	4.1E-02	6.9E-02	1.4E-04
Sm-151	8.0E+03	1.0E-02	1.7E-02	2.1E-06
Eu-152	6.0E+02	1.9E-01	3.2E-01	5.3E-04
Eu-154	4.0E+02	1.0E-01	1.7E-01	4.3E-04
Eu-155	3.0E+03	1.8E-01	3.0E-01	1.0E-04
Gd-153	3.0E+03	1.9E-01	3.2E-01	1.1E-04
Tb-160	5.0E+02	1.4E-01	2.4E-01	4.7E-04
Pu-238	4.0E+00	2.8E-02	3.3E-02	8.4E-03
Pu-239	4.0E+00	2.8E-02	3.3E-02	8.4E-03
Pu-240	4.0E+00	2.8E-02	3.3E-02	8.4E-03
Pu-241	2.0E+02	1.0E+00	1.2E+00	6.0E-03
Am-241	5.0E+00	2.8E-02	3.3E-02	6.7E-03
Am-242m	5.0E+00	5.1E-04	6.1E-04	1.2E-04
Am-243	5.0E+00	2.8E-02	3.3E-02	6.7E-03

Target nuclide	Regulatory concentration limit (Bq/L)	Composition of nuclides of the J1-G tank group (Bq/L)	Composition of nuclides of the J1-G tank group considering expanded uncertainty (Bq/L)	Ratio to regulatory concentration limit
Cm-242	6.0E+01	2.8E-02	3.3E-02	5.6E-04
Cm-243	6.0E+00	2.8E-02	3.3E-02	5.6E-03
Cm-244	7.0E+00	2.8E-02	3.3E-02	4.8E-03
Sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits				3.2E-01

Table 8-2 Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Source term based on the composition of nuclides in the J1-G tank group reflecting the uncertainty of detection)

Target nuclide	Source term (annual discharge amount) (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Bq/L)		
		Within 10 × 10 km Average of all layers	Within 10 × 10 km Average of the top layers	Beach assessment point Average of all layers
H-3	2.2E+13	5.6E-02	1.2E-01	9.0E-01
C-14	6.1E+08	1.5E-06	3.3E-06	2.5E-05
Mn-54	1.7E+06	4.4E-09	9.4E-09	7.0E-08
Fe-59	3.9E+06	1.0E-08	2.1E-08	1.6E-07
Co-58	1.9E+06	4.7E-09	1.0E-08	7.6E-08
Co-60	1.0E+07	2.7E-08	5.7E-08	4.3E-07
Ni-63	2.4E+08	6.1E-07	1.3E-06	9.7E-06
Zn-65	4.2E+06	1.1E-08	2.3E-08	1.7E-07
Rb-86	2.3E+07	5.7E-08	1.2E-07	9.2E-07
Sr-89	1.7E+06	4.4E-09	9.3E-09	7.0E-08
Sr-90	1.3E+06	3.2E-09	6.9E-09	5.2E-08
Y-90	1.3E+06	3.2E-09	6.9E-09	5.2E-08
Y-91	7.5E+08	1.9E-06	4.1E-06	3.1E-05
Nb-95	2.3E+06	5.7E-09	1.2E-08	9.2E-08
Tc-99	3.3E+07	8.3E-08	1.8E-07	1.3E-06
Ru-103	2.4E+06	6.1E-09	1.3E-08	9.8E-08
Ru-106	4.7E+07	1.2E-07	2.6E-07	1.9E-06
Rh-103m	2.4E+06	6.1E-09	1.3E-08	9.8E-08
Rh-106	4.7E+07	1.2E-07	2.6E-07	1.9E-06
Ag-110m	1.9E+06	4.9E-09	1.1E-08	7.9E-08

Target nuclide	Source term (annual discharge amount) (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Bq/L)		
		Within 10 × 10 km Average of all layers	Within 10 × 10 km Average of the top layers	Beach assessment point Average of all layers
Cd-113m	2.4E+06	6.1E-09	1.3E-08	9.7E-08
Cd-115m	1.4E+08	3.6E-07	7.8E-07	5.8E-06
Sn-119m	1.9E+09	4.8E-06	1.0E-05	7.8E-05
Sn-123	3.0E+08	7.6E-07	1.6E-06	1.2E-05
Sn-126	1.3E+07	3.3E-08	7.2E-08	5.4E-07
Sb-124	4.4E+06	1.1E-08	2.4E-08	1.8E-07
Sb-125	8.9E+06	2.3E-08	4.8E-08	3.6E-07
Te-123m	4.2E+06	1.1E-08	2.3E-08	1.7E-07
Te-125m	8.9E+06	2.3E-08	4.8E-08	3.6E-07
Te-127	2.2E+08	5.6E-07	1.2E-06	9.0E-06
Te-127m	2.3E+08	5.8E-07	1.3E-06	9.4E-06
Te-129	6.7E+07	1.7E-07	3.7E-07	2.7E-06
Te-129m	6.7E+07	1.7E-07	3.7E-07	2.7E-06
I-129	3.7E+07	9.4E-08	2.0E-07	1.5E-06
Cs-134	3.4E+06	8.7E-09	1.9E-08	1.4E-07
Cs-135	3.9E+01	1.0E-13	2.1E-13	1.6E-12
Cs-136	2.1E+06	5.4E-09	1.2E-08	8.7E-08
Cs-137	6.2E+06	1.6E-08	3.4E-08	2.5E-07
Ba-137m	6.2E+06	1.6E-08	3.4E-08	2.5E-07
Ba-140	9.1E+06	2.3E-08	5.0E-08	3.7E-07
Ce-141	1.2E+07	3.0E-08	6.4E-08	4.8E-07
Ce-144	2.6E+07	6.6E-08	1.4E-07	1.1E-06
Pr-144	2.6E+07	6.6E-08	1.4E-07	1.1E-06
Pr-144m	2.6E+07	6.6E-08	1.4E-07	1.1E-06
Pm-146	3.0E+06	7.6E-09	1.6E-08	1.2E-07
Pm-147	3.6E+07	9.3E-08	2.0E-07	1.5E-06
Pm-148	1.0E+07	2.7E-08	5.7E-08	4.3E-07
Pm-148m	2.2E+06	5.5E-09	1.2E-08	8.9E-08
Sm-151	5.0E+05	1.3E-09	2.7E-09	2.1E-08
Eu-152	1.3E+07	3.2E-08	6.9E-08	5.2E-07
Eu-154	5.0E+06	1.3E-08	2.7E-08	2.1E-07

Target nuclide	Source term (annual discharge amount) (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Bq/L)		
		Within 10 × 10 km Average of all layers	Within 10 × 10 km Average of the top layers	Beach assessment point Average of all layers
Eu-155	1.5E+07	3.9E-08	8.3E-08	6.3E-07
Gd-153	1.2E+07	3.0E-08	6.4E-08	4.8E-07
Tb-160	6.4E+06	1.6E-08	3.5E-08	2.6E-07
Pu-238	1.1E+06	2.7E-09	5.8E-09	4.3E-08
Pu-239	1.1E+06	2.7E-09	5.8E-09	4.3E-08
Pu-240	1.1E+06	2.7E-09	5.8E-09	4.3E-08
Pu-241	3.8E+07	9.8E-08	2.1E-07	1.6E-06
Am-241	1.1E+06	2.7E-09	5.8E-09	4.3E-08
Am-242m	1.9E+04	4.8E-11	1.0E-10	7.7E-10
Am-243	1.1E+06	2.7E-09	5.8E-09	4.3E-08
Cm-242	1.1E+06	2.7E-09	5.8E-09	4.3E-08
Cm-243	1.1E+06	2.7E-09	5.8E-09	4.3E-08
Cm-244	1.1E+06	2.7E-09	5.8E-09	4.3E-08
Target exposure assessment		From fishing nets Ingestion of seafood	From sea surface From hulls	During swimming From beach sand Ingestion of seawater Inhalation of seawater spray

Table 8-3 Exposure assessment result based on the composition of nuclides in the J1-G tank group reflecting the uncertainty of detection (Assessment area: 10 km × 10 km)

Assessed case	Source term	(1) Source term based on measured values						(2) Source term considering the uncertainty of analysis (J1-G)	
		i. K4 tank group		ii. J1-C tank group		iii. J1-G tank group			
	Ingestion of seafood	Average	Large	Average	Large	Average	Large	Average	Large
External exposure (mSv/year)	Sea surface	6.5E-09		1.7E-08		4.7E-08		8.0E-08	
	Hull	4.8E-09		1.2E-08		3.3E-08		5.6E-08	
	During swimming	4.5E-09		1.2E-08		3.2E-08		5.6E-08	
	Beach sand	7.8E-06		2.1E-05		5.6E-05		9.7E-05	
	Fishing net	1.6E-06		4.3E-06		1.2E-05		2.0E-05	
Internal exposure (mSv/year)	Ingestion of water	3.3E-07		3.1E-07		3.2E-07		3.3E-07	
	Inhalation of spray	9.3E-08		2.0E-07		4.0E-07		4.8E-07	
	Ingestion of seafood	1.5E-05	6.1E-05	2.8E-05	1.1E-04	7.9E-05	3.0E-04	1.3E-04	5.0E-04
Total (mSv/year)		3E-05	7E-05	5E-05	1E-04	1E-04	4E-04	2E-04	6E-04

Table 8-4 Results of internal exposures assessment by age based on the composition of nuclides in the J1-G tank group reflecting the uncertainty of detection (Assessment area: 10 km × 10 km)

Assessed case	Source term	(1) Source term based on measured values						(2) Source term considering the uncertainty of analysis (J1-G)	
		i. K4 tank group		ii. J1-C tank group		iii. J1-G tank group			
	Ingestion of seafood	Average	Large	Average	Large	Average	Large	Average	Large
Internal exposure from ingestion of water (mSv/year)	Adult	3.3E-07		3.1E-07		3.2E-07		3.2E-07	
	Child under school age	5.7E-07		5.4E-07		5.5E-07		5.7E-07	
	Infant	-		-		-		-	
Internal exposure from inhalation of spray (mSv/year)	Adult	9.3E-08		2.0E-07		4.0E-07		4.7E-07	
	Child under school age	6.2E-08		1.1E-07		2.2E-07		2.5E-07	
	Infant	4.0E-08		6.5E-08		1.2E-07		1.3E-07	
Internal exposure from ingestion of seafood (mSv/year)	Adult	1.5E-05	6.1E-05	2.8E-05	1.1E-04	7.9E-05	3.0E-04	1.3E-04	5.0E-04
	Child under school age	2.4E-05	9.4E-05	5.1E-05	2.0E-04	1.5E-04	5.6E-04	2.4E-04	9.4E-04
	Infant	2.9E-05	1.1E-04	6.7E-05	2.5E-04	1.9E-04	7.1E-04	3.2E-04	1.2E-03

8-2. Uncertainty of modeling of diffusion and transfer in the environment

8-2-1. Uncertainty of meteorological and oceanographic data, etc. (aleatory uncertainty)

The diffusion simulation is considered to include uncertainty caused by variations such as the annual variations of meteorological and oceanographic data.
For this assessment, the meteorological and oceanographic data of 2014 to 2020 are used, but the biggest observed difference in the annual average concentration of 10 km × 10 km used for the assessment is up to about 20%. A document that simulated the diffusion of cesium using the same model to reproduce the monitoring results shows no difference in the shape of diffusion of each year and that the scale of uncertainty is not twice as great.

8-2-2. Uncertainty of the simulation model itself (epistemic uncertainty)

The diffusion simulation model does not reproduce all of the natural phenomena and scientific findings that the model is constructed based on is not complete. However, the model used this time has been verified by a reproduction calculation of the cesium concentration in the same sea area and the simulation result matches the measured value well. There could be a charge to verify this with another modeling to confirm the magnitude of uncertainty more accurately, but the uncertainty of the model itself is estimated to be not so great.

8-2-3. Uncertainty in the selection of migration pathways (epistemic uncertainty)

In the external exposure assessment, the external exposure from radioactive materials migrated to hulls, beach sand, and fishing nets are assessed. The factor of migration to hulls, beaches, and fishing nets are excerpted from domestic cases such as past guidelines, but not all data regarding the nuclides required for this assessment was obtained. The assessment was based on the data of limited nuclides.
Though there are few findings about these migration factors, the migration to sandy beaches can be assessed by the method of TECDOC-1759 (using the external exposure dose conversion factor of FGR15 issued by U.S. Environmental Protection Agency), so the exposure from sandy beaches was calculated and the result of this report was 20 to 200 or more times larger. However, it turned out that as the contribution to the overall exposure, the contribution of external exposure is smaller than internal exposure and the total exposure value does not differ so much from that of this report. Attachment XI “Conservativeness of the external exposure dose conversion factor” shows the details of the assessment result

using the external exposure dose conversion factor of FGR15 issued by U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

8-2-4. Uncertainty in the concentration factor of seafood and the distribution coefficient of seabed sediment (epistemic uncertainty)

The concentration coefficient of fish, etc. used for internal exposure from ingestion of seafood shown in TRS-422 is calculated assuming that the concentration in the seawater and marine organisms are in the equilibrium state from the investigation results of the concentration in the seawater and fish, etc.
However, while the process of migration to organisms and seabed sediment takes much time, whereas movement of the seawater is fast, and it is uncertain whether they were in the equilibrium state at the time of the investigation. In addition, there are also great deal of variations depending on the type of fishes and seabed sediment, and survey locations, and TRS-422 indicates that insufficient reliable data are available to allow accurate assessments of ranges around a recommended value for most element–organism combinations. On the other hand, where a reliable database does exist for a given element and type of organism, in nearly every case the range of minimum and maximum CFs is one order of magnitude (or less) from the recommended value. Therefore, TRS-422 indicate that maximum and minimum CFs are one order of magnitude above and below the recommended value. This is same for the distribution coefficient of seabed sediment, where a range of values is required, maximum and minimum values could be assumed to be a factor of 10 higher and lower than the recommended value.

8-3. Uncertainty in the setting of exposure pathways

8-3-1. Uncertainty in the selection of exposure pathways (epistemic uncertainty)

The setting of exposure pathways may be insufficient. In TECDOC-1759, most of the pathways set as external exposure ones such as exposure from the sea surface and hulls in this assessment are not subject to the assessment, but pathways not set in this report such as ingestion of beach sediment, ingestion of seawater, and inhalation of seawater spray are picked up. As a result of a verification calculation of unselected pathways by the method of TECDOC-1759, pathways of which exposure assessment results exceeded the pathways selected in this report were found such as ingestion of seawater and inhalation of seawater spray, so they were added as pathways. However, the total value did not change because the impact of internal exposure from ingestion of seafood is great in the exposure assessment. For the result of the verification calculation., see Attachment VI “Transfer pathways and exposure pathways other than the assessment targets.” Please note that the difference from TECDOC-1759 is due to the inclusion of modeling of dispersion and transfer.

8-4. Uncertainty in the selection of the representative person

8-4-1. Uncertainty in the actual life of the representative person (aleatory uncertainty)

In this assessment, the life habit data of the critical group in the case of exposure simulation from domestic nuclear power plants is used. The latest data of the national health and nutrition survey is used for the ingestion of seafood, which has a slight annual variation of about 10 to 20%. However, considering this uncertainty, ingested fish assessed in this report is assumed to be consumed immediately after being caught in the area around the FDNPS without considering market dilution, decay of radioactive nuclides after catching, etc., so there is considered to be not uncertainty which may lead to underestimation.

8-4-2. Uncertainty in the selection of the representative pathway (epistemic uncertainty)

The area around the FDNPS is still in the middle of reconstruction: e.g. even now Difficult-to-Return Zones are set. It is still prohibited to live in Difficult-to-Return Zones. Even for the other zones, return of residents is very limited. Under such circumstances, it is very difficult to ascertain detailed life habits available for the setting of the representative person including the prediction of the future situation.

Therefore, in this assessment, the life habit data of the critical group used in the case of simulation of exposure from domestic nuclear power plants is used, but it includes uncertainty due to the difference from the actual life habits of residents in the surrounding area after reconstruction.

On the other hand, in this assessment, the reprocessing plant located in Aomori, which is also in Tohoku, applies the setting based on the social environment survey and the time of exposure from fishing nets is longer than that of this assessment, but it is less than two times longer. Moreover, the impact of external exposure is smaller than that of internal exposure from the ingestion of seafood, so there is no impact on the exposure assessment.

For the ingestion of seafood which affects the internal exposure result, nation-wide statistical data aggregated by age is used and about 10% different from the data of Tohoku. Fish and invertebrates (total of shellfish, cephalopods, and crustacea at reprocessing plant) of the reprocessing plant are 20 to 30% more and seaweeds of this report are 30% more, but the uncertainty of the food ingestion is unlikely to be two times greater and ingested fish assessed in this report is assumed to be consumed immediately after being caught in the area around the FDNPS without considering market dilution, decay of radioactive nuclides after catching, etc., so there is considered to be no uncertainty which may lead to underestimation.

8-4-3. Uncertainty depending on the range of the sea area to be assessed (epistemic uncertainty)

The further it is from the discharge outlet, the lower the concentration in the seawater becomes in the case of discharge of ALPS treated water, so there is uncertainty of variation of the concentration in the seawater used for the assessment depending on the scale of the range to be assessed.

To verify the impact due to the scale of the range to be assessed, we calculated the annual average concentration within 5 km × 5 km and 20 km × 10 km in addition to 10 km × 10 km and assessed exposure of human under normal conditions. The exposure assessment result of 20 km×10 km is about 20% lower than that of 10 km×10 km, but the difference was small. That of 5 km × 5 km was about 3 times higher than that of 10 km × 10 km. In reality, it is unlikely that fishing is performed only within 5 km×5 km around the FDNPS; and in this report, exposure is assessed assuming that only seafood caught in the assessed sea area but in reality, it is unlikely that only fish caught in the area around the FDNPS is ingested, so it is considered to be unnecessary to consider uncertainty about the range of the sea area. Attachment XII “Impact of the assessment range of concentrations in seawater used for the assessment of exposures” shows the result of the exposure assessment of 5 km × 5 km and 20 km × 10 km from the power station.

8-5. Summary about uncertainty

Table 8-5 summarizes these contents.

There is great uncertainty in the composition of nuclides in the source term and migration pathways such as the concentration factor of fish, but the exposure assessment result is sufficiently lower than the dose constraint and it is considered that the conservativeness of the assessment is not lost.

Table 8-5 Summary of uncertainty in this assessment

Item	Details of uncertainty	Assessment of uncertainty
Selection of the source terms	The composition of nuclides of ALPS treated water is unknown until secondary treatment and measurement is completed, so it has epistemic uncertainty.	The exposure assessment result of the K4 tank group with a low detection limit in the source term based on the measured value is about 1/5 of the J1-G tank group with the highest one. On the other hand, the sum of ratios to regulatory concentration limit of the J1-G tank group is 0.22. If the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentration limit is 1 with the same nuclide ratio, exposure will be about 5 times greater.
	The measured value incudes aleatory uncertainty based on uncertainty of analysis.	The impact of uncertainty of analysis seems to be less than double.
Modeling of diffusion and transfer in the environment	The meteorological and oceanographic data has annual variations and includes aleatory uncertainty.	We calculated the average concentration of 10 km × 10 km of 7 years and found a difference of about 20%. In the comparison with the measured value, the parts with high concentrations match well, so uncertainty is assumed to be less than two times greater in the calculation of the average calculation of 10 km × 10 km.
	The diffusion simulation model has epistemic uncertainty in the model itself.	
For the migration pathways	and the migration factor of external exposure, differences in elements are not considered, so the dose conversion factor of external exposure has epistemic uncertainty which does not cover all nuclides.	We calculated exposure from beaches from the method of TECDOC-1759 (using the external exposure dose conversion factor of FGR15) and it turned out that the result of the radiological impact assessment report was 20 to 200 or more times higher. Even so, the effect of external exposure on exposure is smaller than that of internal exposures, and the total exposure value does not differ so much from that of this report.
	The concentration factor of fish used for the internal exposure assessment from ingestion of seafood includes epistemic uncertainty due to insufficiency of data.	For the concentration factor, TRS-422 indicate that maximum and minimum CFs are one order of magnitude above and below the recommended value in the case of existence of reliable data for element–organism combination, and for the distribution coefficient, maximum and minimum values could be assumed to be a factor of 10 higher and lower than the recommended value.
Exposure pathways	There are epistemic uncertainties because the selected migration and exposure pathways do not cover all the pathways.	We calculated the unselected exposure pathways by the method of TECDOC-1759 and added pathways with higher exposure assessments than those of the selected pathways. However, the total value did not change because the impact of internal exposure from ingestion of seafood is great.
Selection of a representative person	The area around the FDNPS is undergoing reconstruction, so we used life habit data from domestic precedent cases. As a result, it includes epistemic uncertainty due to the difference in the actual life habits. The food ingestion is set from nationwide data and also includes epistemic uncertainty.	The external exposure time is shorter than that of the Rokkasho reprocessing plant, but it is smaller than internal exposure from ingestion of seafood and does not affect the exposure assessment result. For the ingestion of seafood which affects the internal exposure result, nation-wide statistical data aggregated by age is used and about 10% different from the data of Tohoku, but in the report, all ingested fish are assumed to have been caught in the area around the FDNPS in the assessment, so there is considered to be not uncertainty which may lead to underestimation.
	It includes epistemic uncertainty about the range of the appropriate area as the sea area to be assessed.	We assessed 5 km × 5 km, which is smaller, and 20 km × 10 km, which is larger, than 10 km × 10 km and it turned out that the exposure is about three times greater in the range of 5 km × 5 km and not much different in the range of 20 km × 20 km. Actually, it is unrealistic to perform fishing only within the range of 5 km × 5 km and the assessment in this report assumes that all ingested fish are caught in the area around the FDNPS, so it is considered to be unnecessary to consider uncertainty due to the setting of the assessed sea area.

9. Monitoring to be performed in response to discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea

This section describes our analytical capabilities at the FDNPS as well as the plan of monitoring to be performed inside and outside the site in relation to the discharge of ALPS treated water of the FDNPS (as of the issuance of this revised report; to be revised as needed).
All of these enhance and expand the monitoring program which has been performed continuously since the accident at the FDNPS.
Through the monitoring activity in the site, we will ensure that ALPS treated water discharged into the environment is safe. Through the monitoring activity outside the site, we shall correctly ascertain the impact of discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea on the environment.

9-1. Analytical capability in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station

In the site of the FDNPS, the environment control building for environmental sample analysis and the Unit 5/6 analysis rooms (hot lab.) for analysis of samples with high activity concentration, which have been operated before the earthquake, are still in operation. In addition to these, we started the operation of the chemical analysis building for samples with low activity concentration for which measures to prevent contamination in the site and eliminate the impact of the environmental dose were performed in 2013. The analysis and measurement functions of the environment control building were terminated due to the contamination state of the facility and facility aging, and only the pretreatment function remains.
After the earthquake, initially we especially focused on handling of samples with high activity concentration in order to deal with the problem of contaminated water. However, in July 2013, when the chemical analysis building was completed and environmental samples were able to be analyzed, we started to develop human resources to analyze samples of which radioactive concentrations had been confirmed to be low such as the seawater. After that, as drainage of groundwater bypass water (hereinafter called “groundwater bypass”) and treated water of the purification facilities such as the subdrain (hereinafter called “subdrain”) to reduce the contaminated water generation, we have been expanding the training of workers for the Unit 5/6 analysis rooms and the chemical analysis building in parallel. For discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, we will enhance and expand the analysis framework in terms of facilities and competence.

9-1-1. Analytical capability in terms of facilities

Since all analyses related to discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea are classified into analyses of samples with low activity concentration, it is planned to perform analyses and assessments using the facilities of the chemical analysis building. The layout arrangement, addition of analysis devices, etc., for the chemical analysis building shall be performed flexibly as needed. Table 9-1 shows the overview and functions of the analysis facilities in

the site of the FDNPS. Table 9-2 shows the overview of the analysis devices installed in the chemical analysis buildings.

Table 9-1 Overview and functions of the analysis facility

Facility name	Function	Overview of the facility	Remarks
Environmental management building	Pretreatment (pretreatment of fish)	Analysis room + Measurement room: 480m^2 Experimental table: 4	● Before the earthquake, we analyzed environmental samples but transferred the functions to the chemical analysis building and the Unit 5/6 analysis rooms after the earthquake ● The functions are limited to pretreatment
Units 5/6 analysis room	Analysis of samples with high activity concentration	Analysis room + Measurement room: 850m^2 Experimental table: 23 Fume hood: 26	● Expanded the facility which had been operated since before the earthquake in 2016
Chemical analysis building	Analysis of samples with low activity concentration	Analysis room + Measurement room: 1,000m^2 Experimental table: 15 Fume hood: 35	● This facility was put into use in 2013. ● The analysis of ALPS treated water is planned to be performed here
Chemical analysis building (for expansion, planned)	Pretreatment operation and analysis of a sample of a low radioactive concentration	Analysis room + Measurement room: About 600 m^2 [Facility proposal] Experimental table: 8 Fume hood: 21 Rotary evaporator: 5 Electrolytic condenser: 10 Lyophilizer: 6 H-3 -> He converter: 2	● The construction work is scheduled to be completed by the end of FY 2023. ● The number of analyzers, etc. may be changed in the future

Table 9-2 Analyzers in the chemical analysis building (including those planned to be expanded in the future)

Sample handled	Analyzer	Target nuclides to be measured	Number of units deployed
Monitoring samples: seawater, etc. Drainage sample: Groundwater bypass and sub-drain ALPS outlet water: last stage etc.	Ge semiconductor detector	γ-ray emitting nuclides (e.g. Cs -134.137)	12
	Automatic α-measuring device	Total α	2
	Low back gas flow counter	Total β, Sr -90	5
	β-nuclide analysis equipment	Sr-90	2
	Low background liquid scintillation counter	Tritium, C -14 Cd-113 m, Ni-63	9 (Three more to be expanded)
	Inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometer (ICP-MS)	I-129, Tc-99	2
	Noble gas mass spectrometer (He-MS)	Tritium	2 (To be expanded)
	High purity Ge semiconductor detector for low energy photons (LEPS)	Low-energy γ-ray emitting nuclide (including Sn-126)	2 (To be expanded)

For the measuring instruments used for measurement, we verify the detection efficiency with the standard source and the standard solution as daily inspections at the start of work to maintain the device performance and measure samples. Table 9-3 shows the overview of

daily inspections of the measuring instruments installed in the FDNPS (verification of the detection efficiency).

Table 9-3 Verification of the detection efficiency in the daily inspection of measuring instruments

Measuring instrument	Standard source	Confirmation method
Ge semiconductor detector	Co-57, Ba-133, Cs-137, Mn-54, Co-60	Frequency: At the beginning of daily work Method: Obtain the detection efficiency for each nominal energy of the standard source and confirm that it is within the judgment value (±10%) Actions to be taken in case of deviation: The measured sample after the value judged last time is evaluated again, and the sample during the deviation period is measured if necessary
Automatic α-measuring device	Am-241	
β-nuclide analysis equipment	Sr-90 Cs-137	
Low background liquid scintillation counter	Tritium	
Inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometer (ICP-MS)	Li, Co, Y, Tl	Frequency: Each use Method: Measure the strength of each element. After checking the judged value or above, prepare a calibration curve before measurement. Strength of standard solution: Li: >1000 Co, Y: >200 Tl: >800

9-1-2. Analytical capability in terms of competence

The analysis work led by us shall be consigned to Tokyo Power Technology[43] (hereinafter called “TPT”). We shall formulate the plan for analysis and prepare resources suitable for the plan, supervise the work by TPT, judge the possibility of discharge based on the analysis result, manage and announce analysis data, etc.

Our employees who supervise analysis work shall have been certified to have skill levels sufficient for their roles through the on-site technique and skills certification system, and competence is secured in a planned manner by periodic competence assessments and effectiveness reviews.

On the other hand, TPT, which is the consignee of the analysis work, increases and secure competent analysts in order to maintain the capabilities to surely analyze the nuclides for which high skills are required (hereinafter called “difficult-to-measure nuclides”) such as C-14. Moreover, to have objective confirmation of skills from the viewpoint of a third party, we shall participate in IAEA Proficiency Test Exercise[44] and continuously conduct crosschecking, etc., with analytical institutes inside Japan.

In the chemical analysis building, ISO/IEC-17025 certification[45] for Cs-134, Cs-137, and tritium has been acquired and maintained and it is planned to acquire certification for the Sr-

[43] We are a wholly owned subsidiary of Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc. and have advantages in terms of design, construction, operation, and maintenance of electricity-related facilities including our company; environment investigation measurements and their assessments; investigations/analyses and measurements of substances, etc.; control of radioactive materials and radiation; decontamination in general; processing treatment/disposal of radioactive waste, etc.

[44] The IAEA prepares a sample with a known result for the test and provide it to each participating analysis institute. Then, each institute analyzes it and the IAEA compares the result with the components of the sample for the test to assess the accuracy of the analysis by each institute.

[45] Examining authority examine the ability of test places and correction organizations to authorize their capability.

90 analysis as well. In addition, the appropriateness of the data to be used for decision of discharge was confirmed by comparison with the analysis value of the third-party institute specified as the consignee by us. Table 9-4 shows the certification acquisition status by the certification institute for us (TPT) and each consignee analysis institute.

Table 9-4 Certification acquisition statuses of us (TPT) and consignee analysis institutes

Organization	Certification	Acquisition status (17025)
TPT (Fukushima Daichi)	ISO/IEC17025 ISO9001	(Chemical analysis building) Cs-134,Cs-137,H-3
KAKEN Co.,Ltd.	ISO/IEC17025	Cs-134,Cs-137 I-131 Sr-90 H-3
Japan Chemical Analysis Center	ISO/IEC17025 ISO9001	Gamma-emitting nuclide H-3 Radioactive strontium Plutonium
Tohoku Greening Environmental Conservation Co., Ltd.	ISO/IEC17025 ISO9001	Cs-134,Cs-137 I-131 H-3

To ascertain the competence of each analyst, we increase those who can deal with analyses of difficult-measure nuclides by OJT and verify the competence with the Z score (within two times wider range as detected concentration ± standard deviation), which is an ISO review method, by measurements using samples with known concentrations once a year for the nuclides subject to ISO/IEC-17025 authentication [46] for all the personnel in charge of tritium and cesium (See Figure 9-1).

[46] "Analytical test of radionuclide (including Cs134/Cs137 and H-3) in public waters, wastewater, soil, ash and sludge" (Certification institute: Perry Johnson Laboratory Accreditation Inc., Certificate: L20-355-R1)



Persons targeted for H -3 Skill Test: 13 analysts (A to M)
Sample concentration: 10.2Bq/L
Intermediate value of 10 times repeated measured of 3 samples by the sample creator
Implementation period: October 9-29, 2020
Implementation location: Chemical Analysis Building
Judgment method: Z score (ISO inspection method)
Judgment value: | Z | ≤ 2

Persons targeted for Cs-137 Skill Test: 25 analysts (A to Y)
Sample concentration: 4.5Bq/L
Intermediate value of 10 times repeated measured by the sample creator
Implementation period: July 29 to August 6, 2020
Implementation location: Chemical Analysis Building
Judgment method: Z score (ISO inspection method)
Judgment value: | Z | ≤ 2

Figure 9-1 Example of competence check of analysts (result of FY 2020)

9-1-3. Our management and supervision

We request consignees to comply with the determined analysis procedures and secure the competence of analysts based on contracts, and receive and verify analysis procedures and competence control records.
Figure 9-2 shows the overview of the system that maintains the flow and quality of analysis, which means that the quality of the analysis process is kept constant and a mechanism to detect abnormalities of data is constructed.



Figure 9-2 Flow of analysis and overview of the system to maintain quality

In addition, the following activities are performed.

- Usage status of procedures and the implementation status of specifications are regularly checked in all analysis rooms (it is applied to all analytical work performed within the premises of the FDNPS)
- In order to ensure the quality of operation and work safety, it is stipulated as a requirement that work can be performed with the same procedure even when an analyst is replaced.
- Methods for checking procedures are standardized.
- The third-party organizations are required to submit work procedures in their specifications as well, and our company's involvement in the quality control of work processes will be enhanced.
- Guidance is given to contractors for identifying risks in the prior safety assessment before starting operation. TEPCO explains previous nonconformity cases and gives guidance to raise their awareness and ensure the thorough compliance with the rules

- Every month, TEPCO discusses with contractors on issues in analytical operation and the implementation status of the preventive measures for the recurrence of previous nonconformities to maintain performance
- Every month, TEPCO conducts on-site observations for analysis work with contractors to identify unsafe conditions to ensure safety at the site and maintain work quality
- Implementation status of analysis procedures established by contractors, is checked, and guidance is given for the identification and correction of the area to be improved in the work.

9-2. Monitoring within the premises of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station

The following three activities are to be performed at the site: (1) measurement and assessment of 64 nuclides by the measurement/confirmation facility of which results are used to judge the possibility of discharge and determine the dilution ratio (source monitoring), (2) monitoring with samples collected at the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) to confirm the dilution and mixing states of treated water with the seawater used for judgment of discharge immediately after the start of discharge, and (3) monitoring with samples collected from the seawater piping performed to confirm the dilution state every day during continuous discharge, all of which are led by us. This section describes the procedures, etc., used for maintaining the accuracy of monitoring as well.

Figure 9-3 shows monitoring to be performed within the premises of the FDNPS.



Figure 9-3 Monitoring within the premises of the FDNPS

9-2-1. Source monitoring

Source monitoring is monitoring of the source term (annual discharge amount (total amount) of each nuclide contained in the ALPS treated water, which is diluted and discharged into the sea). In this analysis, we collect samples after homogenization of ALPS treated water every time the measurement/confirmation facility is fully filled with ALPS treated water, and all nuclides to be measured in ALPS treated water (tritium, C-14, and 62 nuclides subject to removal by ALPS) are analyzed and assessed[47]. From the analysis results, we verified that:

- The sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits[48] of the concentrations of 63 nuclides excluding tritium falls below 1, which is the regulatory standard
- This is the basis for the determination of the flow rate of the ALPS treated amount to be diluted and discharged based on the measured tritium concentration to surely make the concentration after dilution less than 1,500Bq/L, which is the concentration specified in the fundamental policy of the government.

Therefore, the homogeneity of ALPS treated water stored in the measurement/confirmation facility is extremely important for securing the representativeness of collected samples. The measurement/confirmation facility where samples are collected consists of three tank groups each of which consists of 10 tanks with capacity of about 1,000 m^3 connected by connecting piping so that they can be managed uniformly. For each tank group, the circulation/stirring facility is installed to stir and circulate the ALPS treated water stored in the tanks for homogenization. By operating the facility properly, we secure the representativeness of samples.

Samples are analyzed by TPT analysts in the chemical analysis building installed in the site of the FDNPS and planned to be expanded in the future (See Table 9-2). In addition, the mechanism for multiple parties to verify the analysis result has been established involving the analysis institute we designated as a third party; an analysis laboratory designated as a third party by the government; and the IAEA laboratories and the analysis laboratories of the member countries specified by the IAEA as a part of review of discharge of ALPS treated water. The framework of analysis led by the government and the IAEA is now being discussed by the government and the IAEA. The results are also planned to be announced.

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[47] Some of the nuclides to be measured take time and actually took about two months for the measurement and assessment in the secondary treatment performance verification test (We are considering how to shorten the required time). Therefore, we plan to secure the storage capacity of about 10,000 m^3 (amount generated in 2 months (150 m^3/day)) as the capacity of the measurement/confirmation facility.

[48] See Reference A “Site boundary dose assessment of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and the regulatory concentration limit in the Japanese laws”

Table 9-5 shows the measurement and assessment method of each nuclides in the measurement/confirmation facility. Table 9-6 shows the minimum limit value and compliance method of each nuclide.

Table 9-5 Measurement and assessment methods of each nuclide

No.	Nuclide	Radiation type	Measurement or assessment method
1	Mn-54	γ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
2	Fe-59	γ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
3	Co-58	γ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
4	Co-60	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
5	Ni-63	β	Isolated by resin, mixed with a scintillator, and counted by a low back liquid scintillation counter.
6	Zn-65	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
7	Rb-86	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
8	Sr-89	β	Isolated with resin, precipitated and recovered, mounted, and counted with the β nuclide analyzer in stainless steel dish
9	Sr-90	β	Isolated with resin, precipitated and recovered, mounted, and counted with the β nuclide analyzer in stainless steel dish
10	Y-90	β	[Evaluation value] Concentration assessment as radioactive equilibrium with Sr-90
11	Y-91	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
12	Nb-95	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
13	Tc-99	β	Samples are diluted with dilute nitric acid and counted with the inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS).
14	Ru-103	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
15	Ru-106	β	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
16	Rh-103m	βγ	[Evaluation value] Concentration assessment as radioactive equilibrium with Ru-103
17	Rh-106	γ	[Evaluation value] Concentration assessment as radioactive equilibrium with Ru-106
18	Ag-110m	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
19	Cd-113m	γ	Isolated by ion exchange, mixed with a scintillator, and counted by a low back liquid scintillation counter.
20	Cd-115m	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
21	Sn-119m	γ	[Evaluation value] Assessed from the measured value of the radioactive concentration of Sn-123 and the calculated nuclide abundance ratio
22	Sn-123	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
23	Sn-126	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.

No.	Nuclide	Radiation type	Measurement or assessment method
24	Sb-124	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
25	Sb-125	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
26	Te-123m	γ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
27	Te-125m	γ	[Evaluation value] Concentration assessment as radioactive equilibrium with Sb-125
28	Te-127	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container, counted with a Ge semiconductor detector, and assessed using the half-life of the parent nuclide (Te-127m).
29	Te-127m	βγ	[Evaluation value] Assessed from the measured value of the radioactive concentration of Te-127 and the calculated nuclide abundance ratio
30	Te-129	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container, counted with a Ge semiconductor detector, and assessed using the half-life of the parent nuclide (Te-129m).
31	Te-129m	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
32	I-129	βγ	Samples were counted with the inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) after adjusting to iodate ion by the addition of reagents.
33	Cs-134	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
34	Cs-135	β	[Evaluation value] Assessed from the measured value of the radioactive concentration of Cs-137 and the calculated nuclide abundance ratio
35	Cs-136	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
36	Cs-137	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
37	Ba-137m	γ	[Evaluation value] Concentration assessment as radioactive equilibrium with Cs-137
38	Ba-140	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
39	Ce-141	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
40	Ce-144	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
41	Pr-144	βγ	[Evaluation value] Concentration assessment as radiation equilibrium with Ce-144, using half-life of parent nuclide (Pr-144m)
42	Pr-144m	γ	[Evaluation value] Concentration assessment as radioactive equilibrium with Ce-144
43	Pm-146	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
44	Pm-147	βγ	[Assessed value] Assessed from the measured value of the radioactive concentration of congener Eu-154 and the calculated nuclide abundance ratio
45	Pm-148	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
46	Pm-148m	γ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
47	Sm-151	βγ	[Assessed value] Assessed from the measured value of the radioactive concentration of congener Eu-154 and the calculated nuclide abundance ratio

No.	Nuclide	Radiation type	Measurement or assessment method
48	Eu-152	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
49	Eu-154	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
50	Eu-155	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
51	Gd-153	γ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
52	Tb-160	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
53	Pu-238	α	After iron is removed by iron coprecipitation, the sample is evaporated to dryness in a stainless steel dish and the total α measured value counted with the ZnSα automatic measuring device is used as it is without proportionate division with other nuclides
54	Pu-239	α	After iron is removed by iron coprecipitation, the sample is evaporated to dryness in a stainless steel dish and the total α measured value counted with the ZnSα automatic measuring device is used as it is without proportionate division with other nuclides
55	Pu-240	α	After iron is removed by iron coprecipitation, the sample is evaporated to dryness in a stainless steel dish and the total α measured value counted with the ZnSα automatic measuring device is used as it is without proportionate division with other nuclides
56	Pu-241	β	[Evaluation value] Assessed from the total α discrete value and the isotopic ratio of Pu-238
57	Am-241	α	After iron is removed by iron coprecipitation, the sample is evaporated to dryness in a stainless steel dish and the total α measured value counted with the ZnSα automatic measuring device is used as it is without proportionate division with other nuclides
58	Am-242m	α	[Evaluation value] Assessed from the isotopic ratio of Am-241
59	Am-243	α	After iron is removed by iron coprecipitation, the sample is evaporated to dryness in a stainless steel dish and the total α measured value counted with the ZnSα automatic measuring device is used as it is without proportionate division with other nuclides
60	Cm-242	α	After iron is removed by iron coprecipitation, the sample is evaporated to dryness in a stainless steel dish and the total α measured value counted with the ZnSα automatic measuring device is used as it is without proportionate division with other nuclides
61	Cm-243	α	After iron is removed by iron coprecipitation, the sample is evaporated to dryness in a stainless steel dish and the total α measured value counted with the ZnSα automatic measuring device is used as it is without proportionate division with other nuclides
62	Cm-244	α	After iron is removed by iron coprecipitation, the sample is evaporated to dryness in a stainless steel dish and the total α measured value counted with the ZnSα automatic measuring device is used as it is without proportionate division with other nuclides
-	Tritium (FWT)	β	Isolated by distillation, mixed with a scintillator, and counted by a low back liquid scintillation counter.
-	C-14	β	Converted to CO_2, collected and isolated on absorbent, mixed with a scintillator, and counted by a low back liquid scintillation counter.

Table 9-6 Target detection limit and compliance method of each analyzed nuclide

Nuclide	Analysis method	Target minimum limit of detection value[49]	Applicable technique
γ-ray emitting nuclides	Samples are dispensed in a Marinelli container and measured with a Ge semiconductor detector.	0.07Bq/L Set in Cs-137[50]	Series of Radioactivity Measuring Methods. No. 7 (Gamma ray spectrometry with germanium semiconductor detector)
Sr-89/90	Sr was refined by Sr resin, precipitated and recovered as carbonate, and measured with a β-nuclide analysis equipment.	0.04Bq/L Set in Sr-90[51]	JAEA-Technology2009-051 (Simple and rapid analytical method for nuclides, contained in waste from research facilities, etc. (analytical guidelines))
I-129	Hypochlorous acid was added to the sample to adjust it to iodic acid ion, and then measured with an inductively coupled plasma mass analysis equipment.	0.2Bq/L	Series of Radioactivity Measuring Methods. No. 32 (Method for rapid analysis of iodine 129 in environmental samples)
Tritium	After mixing the sample from which impurities have been removed by distillation with the scintillator, measurement is performed with a low back liquid scintillation counter.	30Bq/L	Series of Radioactivity Measuring Methods. No. 9 (Tritium analysis method)
C-14	The sample is heated by adding concentrated nitric acid and potassium persulfate, and the generated CO2 is collected in an absorbent, mixed with a scintillator, and measured by a low back liquid scintillation counter.	10Bq/L	Series of Radioactivity Measuring Methods. No. 25 (Radiocarbon Analysis Method) JGC: Radiochemical Analysis of Radioactive Waste
Tc-99	The sample is diluted with nitric acid and measured with an inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometer.	2Bq/L	Radioactive waste management funding and research center: Research on upgrading and streamlining of radiochemical analytical technique
Total-α radioactivity	After α-nuclide is coprecipitated with iron hydroxide and iron is removed by extraction, it is evaporated to dryness and then baked to the stainless plate, and measured with an α automatic measuring device	0.04Bq/L	Manual of standard procedures for analysis of radioactive effluents and gases from Tokai Works of Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation
Cd-113m	Cd is refined and recovered by ion exchange, mixed with a scintillator, and measured by a low back liquid scintillation counter.	0.2Bq/L	Analytical Chemistry, vol.63, No. 4. (Review of Analysis method with β-rays measurement method using low back liquid scintillation counter for ^{113m}Cd in stagnant water in FDNPS)

[49]Value for each nuclide set to confirm that the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits is less than 1

[50]Other nuclides vary with baseline, interfering nuclides, background and gamma ray emission rate

[51]Sr-89 varies with Sr-90 concentration

Nuclide	Analysis method	Target minimum limit of detection value[49]	Applicable technique
Ni-63	Ni is refined and recovered by Ni resin, mixed with a scintillator, and measured by a low back liquid scintillation counter.	20Bq/L	JAEA-Technology2009-051 (Simple and rapid analytical method for nuclides, contained in waste from research facilities, etc. (analytical guidelines))

9-2-2. Monitoring at the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage)

ALPS treated water to be discharged into the sea is treated by ALPS until the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of 63 nuclides excluding tritium fall below 1, in order to ensure the safety of ALPS treated water to be discharged into the environment.
On the other hand, to the extent of the available knowledge, ALPS treated water, etc., contains 0.15 to 2.16 million Bq/L of tritium, which exceeds the regulatory concentration limit (60,000 Bq/L), which is the upper limit on the discharge into the environment specified by laws. In addition, the Basic Policy of the government in April 2021 stipulates that the tritium concentration be less than 1,500 Bq/L as with the groundwater bypass and subdrain. In response to it, we decided to dilute ALPS treated water, etc., with a lot of seawater before discharge in order to meet the regulatory concentration limit and dispel concerns of consumers, etc., as much as possible for minimization of reputation damage.
Tritium is a nuclide that emits week beta rays, which cannot be monitored continuously, unlike gamma rays from Cs-137. Therefore, the appropriateness of dilution is verified by collecting samples and measurement with the liquid scintillation counting device.
To start discharge into the sea, for the time being, we shall verify that appropriate dilution is performed by the dilution facility by the procedure shown in Figure 9-4 below and the tritium concentration is less than 1,500 Bq/L at the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) immediately before discharge into the environment, for each type of ALPS treated water (about 10,000 m^3/tank group) of which sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of 63 nuclides other than tritium is less than 1 by the analysis and assessment by the measurement/confirmation facility (See 9-2-1).



(1) Empty the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage).

(2) Store ALPS treated water transferred by the transfer facility and diluted by the dilution facility, in the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage).



(3) Stop the pump before the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) is fully filled with water, and collect and measure sample water in the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) (suspend the discharge until the result is given).

(4) Verify that the actual concentration is close to the calculated tritium concentration and less than 1,500 Bq/L, before flowing seawater and discharging the water in the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage) into the sea.

Figure 9-4 Analysis and discharge procedure at the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage)

9-2-3. Monitoring in seawater piping

After verification of the appropriateness of dilution described in 9-2-2. above, dilute the remaining ALPS treated water (about 10,000 m^3/tank group), transfer it to the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage), and discharge it continuously or intermittently. The capacity of the ALPS treated water transfer pump is 500 m^3/day. Considering the capacity of each tank group of the measurement/confirmation facility (about 10,000 m^3/tank group), it

takes about 20 days to discharge the whole of the remaining ALPS treated water measured even by continuous discharge.
Collect samples every day by the sampling facility installed in the seawater piping, analyze the tritium concentration, and, in principle, announce the result on the following day, in order to verify the appropriateness of dilution of tritium during this discharge period.
To verify whether appropriate dilution mixing is performed in the seawater piping, mass concentration of injected ALPS treated water in each section of piping was calculated by fluid analysis (seawater flow rate of 340,000 m^3/day and ALPS treated water flow rate of 500 m^3/day, the theoretical mass concentration of 0.14%). As a result of the assessment, it was verified that 100 or more times higher dilution effect than the target of this facility was obtained at 04: Down elbow outlet in Figure 9-5 in the downstream side from the ALPS treated water injection position.



Name	Maximum concentration value at the section (%)
00: Treated water injection location	100
01: Header throttle inlet	14.26
02: Header throttle outlet	4.16
03: Down elbow inlet	1.79
04: Down elbow outlet	0.90
05: Horizontal elbow inlet	0.84
06: Horizontal elbow outlet	0.71
07: Middle of the lower horizontal part of seawater pipe	0.46
08:Riser elbow inlet	0.37
09: Riser elbow outlet	0.33
10: Middle of the rise part of seawater pipe	0.30
11: End of the rise of seawater pipe	0.28



Figure 9-5　Fluid analysis result regarding dilution mixing in the seawater piping

9-3. Monitoring outside of the premises of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station

After the accident at the FDNPS, the “Monitoring Coordination Meeting” was set up under the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters of the government and the “Comprehensive Radiation Monitoring Plan” was formulated in August 2011 for secure and planned implementation of find monitoring about the environment[52]. Based on this plan, we have been monitoring mainly Cs-134, Cs-137, and Sr-90 in the sea area for the purpose of ascertaining the states of diffusion and advection of radioactive materials discharged into the environment, etc., in cooperation with each monitoring executing body such as the related ministries, local governments, and us (hereinafter called “implementation entity”). The Comprehensive Radiation Monitoring Plan defines the division of roles of each implementation entity and each implementation entity has been fulfilling their roles according to the definition.

After the announcement of the Basic Policy on handling of the ALPS treated water in April 2021, each implementation entity has been considering enhancement and expansion of sea area monitoring (See 9-3-1 and 9-3-2). We recognize that in discharging ALPS treated water into the sea, it is important to enhance and expand sea area monitoring from the viewpoints of compliance with legal regulatory standards, etc., and actions based on international laws and practices, as well as prevention of reputation damage, dispelling of concerns of people inside and outside Japan, and deepening of understanding. Our consideration result was reflected in the Comprehensive Radiation Monitoring Plan at the Monitoring Coordination Meeting held on March 30, 2022. Figure 9-6 shows the position of monitoring by each implementation entity.



Figure 9-6 Position of sea area monitoring by each implementation entity

[52] Monitoring Coordination Meeting of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters (revised on March 30, 2022) https://radioactivity.nsr.go.jp/en/list/274/list-1.html

The following shows the monitoring plan conducted and to be performed in the future by each implementation entity as of the end of March 2022.

9-3-1. Sea area monitoring around the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station by TEPCO

In the past, we performed the following monitoring as a part of the total monitoring plan.

Table 9-7 Overview of our sea area monitoring based on the past total monitoring plan

Target	Target nuclide	Measurement frequency (depending on the location and nuclide)
Seawater	Cs-134/137, strontium, tritium, and plutonium	Every day or every six months
Seabed sediment	Cs-134/137, strontium, and plutonium	Every month or every six months
Fish, etc.	Cs-134/137	Once a month

Based on the Basic Policy of the government in April 2021, in the same month, we announced “TEPCO’s Action in response to Government’s Policy” including further enhancement and expansion of sea area monitoring in order to minimize reputation damage associated with discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea[53].
After that, we announced sea area monitoring (plan) in August 2021, as the executing body of discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea[54], and then assessed the state of diffusion of ALPS treated water by simulation in the radiological impact assessment in November 2021. We considered sea area monitoring for verification of the diffusion state and the migration state of radiological materials to fish and seaweeds in the sea area off the coast of Fukushima centering on the area adjacent to the FDNPS, in which the tritium concentration was assessed to change[55].[56]
To continuously get data for comparison with the diffusion state and migration state after discharge, it is planned to formulate the sea area monitoring plan setting the detection limit in addition to the consideration result announced in August 2021 and started the implementation of the plan in April 2022 before starting discharge. For this monitoring (sampling, radiation measurement, etc.), it is planned to ask agriculture, forestry and fisheries workers, related parties in local governments, etc. participate in and observe monitoring, and request an analysis by a third party organization specified by us and

[53] TEPCO Holdings’ Action in Response to the Government’s Policy on the Handling of ALPS Treated Water from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station
https://www.tepco.co.jp/en/hd/newsroom/press/archives/2021/20210416_01.html

[54] Status of Review Regarding the Handling of ALPS Treated Water
https://www.tepco.co.jp/en/hd/newsroom/press/archives/2021/pdf/210825e0101.pdf

[55] However, the change in the concentration is assessed to be 1 to 2Bq/L, which is as little as 1/10,000 to 1/5,000 of 10,000Bq/L, which is the WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality.

[56] The sampling points are added from the diffusion simulation result in March 2020, and consequently the results showed this assessment requires no change. The frequency to ascertain usual values increased as well as enhance the verification of the state of migration to marine organisms

involvement of the IAEA as with source monitoring in order to secure objectivity and reliability of the monitoring result.
We plan to monitor not only the seawater but also fish and seaweeds to verify the state of migration of radioactive materials to marine plants and animals due to discharge.

We decided to enhance and expand sea area monitoring as follows. Figure 9-7 shows the details of enhancement and expansion of our sea area monitoring

- Increase in measurement points and targets
  - Considering that we are the executing body of discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, we decided to perform monitoring focusing on the area around the discharge outlet and added a total of 13 tritium measurement points of the seawater and marine organisms (fish) in the area near the FDNPS and the coast of Fukushima (See red and orange boxes in Figure 9-7).
  - For seawater monitoring, we added three new monitoring points on the boundary of the “area where no fishing is conducted on a daily basis” considered in this assessment of radiation impact on human and environment (See the red texts in Figure 9-7).
  - For fish, we currently analyze cesium, which is representative[57] in the measurement of radiation impact, based on samples collected in 11 locations within 20 km off the coast of Fukushima (in one of which tritium analysis is still performed), and will analyze tritium in fish caught in a total of 11 locations including 10 new locations where currently tritium is not analyzed, in order to verify the impact of concentration of tritium (See orange boxes in the right figure in Figure 9-7). Tritium analysis is also performed for the seawater on the point.
  - We will collect and analyze seaweeds in two new locations outside the port as well as the location in the port where currently gamma nuclides are analyzed (See green boxes in Figure 9-7). We shall add tritium to the measured nuclides, verify whether it concentrates, etc., and add iodine, which is easy to concentrate in seaweeds, to the measured nuclides.
  - We will continue the current measurements of nuclides other than tritium and I-129, of which measurements are to be enhanced and expanded (Cs-134, Cs-137, Sr-90, Pu-238, and Pu-239+240)[58].

[57] This is because there are some nuclides which emit strong gamma rays.
[58] We shall perform monitoring of mainly tritium considering the migration and advection processes in the environment, but if any abnormality is found in the enhanced monitoring, we shall consider the necessity for additional monitoring of such nuclides and C-14.

- Increase in the frequency
  - As measurement points increase, the frequency is increased at points where tritium in the seawater has been measured (For measurement points, see blue boxes in Figure 9-7. For the frequency, see Table 9-9).
- The detection limit is set to match the target value set by the government
  - To verify the diffusion state of radioactive materials in the seawater and the state of marine organisms, the minimum limit values of detection of tritium and iodine 129 are reduced to be consistent with the target detection limit set by the government (For measurement points, see black boxes in Figure 9-7. For the detection limit, see Table 9-9)



<Legend>

[Current total monitoring plan]
Nuclear Regulation Authority M-○
Ministry of the Environment E-○
Fisheries Agency (marine products)
Fukushima Prefecture F-○
TEPCO T-○

[Enhancement plan of TEPCO]
Points where the detection limit are to be revised (seawater)
New sampling points (seawater)
Points where frequencies are increased (seawater)
Points where tritium is analyzed in addition to cesium (seawater and fish)
Same points as before (seaweeds)
New sampling points (seaweeds)

An area where no fishing is conducted on a daily basis 1.5 km east to west, 3.5 km north to south
*: Areas where common fishery rights are not established

Figure 9-7 Sampling point of sea area monitoring enhanced and expanded by us (Near the FDNPS/Coast within a 20 km radius)

Moreover, we decided to perform monitoring in 9 new points even in “Outside the area of 20 km off the coast of the FDNPS,” in which tritium has not been analyzed and the concentration is estimated not to exceed the background of seawater in our marine diffusion simulation.



<Legend>
[Current total monitoring plan]
Nuclear Regulation Authority M-○
Ministry of the Environment E-○
Fisheries Agency (marine products)
Fukushima Prefecture F-○
TEPCO T-○

[Enhancement plan of TEPCO]
: Point where tritium is analyzed in addition to cesium, which was analyzed before (seawater)

Figure 9-8 Sampling point of sea area monitoring enhanced and expanded by us (Coast outside a 20 km radius)

Based on the above, the frequency and the number of sampling points of tritium analysis in sea area monitoring by us increases as shown in Table 9-8 below compared to the previous sea area monitoring.

Table 9-8 Frequency and the number of sampling points of tritium analysis in sea area monitoring near the FDNPS and in the coastal sea area by us

Implementation entity	Tritium analysis			
	Measurement frequency	Number of samples		
		Seawater	Fish	Seaweeds
Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings	Once a week	17 -> **20**	-	-
	Twice/month -> **Once a week**	6	-	-
	Once a month	1 -> **20**	1 -> **11**	-
	Three times/year	-	-	0 -> **2**

The detection limit is set as shown in the following table including the past analysis targets associated with enhancement and expansion of this sea area monitoring.

Table 9-9 Samples and nuclides to be measured, and detection limit (The parts in thick frames indicate the points to be enhanced and expanded)

Target	Sampling site	Number of samples	Nuclides to be measured	Measurement frequency	Target detection limit
Seawater (Surface layer)	Within the port	10	Cs-134/137	Every day	0.4 Bq/L
			Tritium	Once a week	3 Bq/L
	Outside the port Within a 2 km radius	2	Cs-134/137	Once a week	0.003 Bq/L
				Every day	1 -> **0.4** Bq/L
		5 -> **8**	Cs-134/137	Once a week	1 -> **0.4** Bq/L
		7 -> **10**	H-3	Once a week	1 -> **0.4** Bq/L[*1]
	Coast Within a 20 km radius	6	Cs-134/137	Once a week	0.003 Bq/L
			Tritium	Twice/month -> **Once a week**[*2]	0.4 -> **0.1** Bq/L[*3]
	Coast within a 20 km radius (fish catching point)	1	Tritium	Once a month	0.1 Bq/L
		0 -> **10**	**Tritium**	None -> **Once a month**	**0.1 Bq/L**
	Coast outside a 20 km radius	9	Cs-134/137	Once a month	0.003 Bq/L
		0 -> **9**	**Tritium**	None -> **Once a month**	**0.1 Bq/L**
Fish	Coast Within a 20 km radius	11	Cs-134/137	Once a month	10 Bq/kg (raw)
			Sr-90 (Only the top five samples in terms of the Cs concentration)	Quarterly	0.02 Bq/kg (raw)
		1	Tritium (FWT)	Once a month	0.1 Bq/L
			Tritium (OBT)		0.5 Bq/L
		0 -> **10**	**Tritium (FWT)**[*4]	None -> **Once a month**	**0.1 Bq/L**[*6]
			Tritium (OBT)[*5]		**0.5 Bq/L**
Seaweeds	Within the port	1	Cs-134/137	Once a year -> Three times/year	0.2 Bq/kg (raw)
	Outside the port Within a 2 km radius	0 -> **2**	**Cs-134/137**	None -> **Three times/year**	**0.2 Bq/kg (raw)**
			I-129		**0.1 Bq/kg (raw)**
			Tritium (FWT)		**0.1 Bq/L**
			Tritium (OBT)		**0.5 Bq/L**

*1: Get the value of detection by the electrolytic concentration method (concentration method making use of the characteristic of tritium being hard to be decomposed by an electric current) as needed.
*2: The measurement with the detection limit set to 0.1Bq/L is performed once/month
*3: Performed at 0.4Bq/L for the time being depending on the state of the installation of the electrolytic condenser.
*4: Tritium which exists as water in tissues of organisms. It does not remain in organisms for a long time.
*5: Tritium which is connected to tissues in organisms. It remains in organisms longer than organization free water.
*6: The measurement is performed at 0.4Bq/L for the time being depending on the state of the installation of the electrolytic condenser.

For all of these measurements, analyses by not only us but also a third party organization specified by us are performed to secure objectivity and transparency.
For the announcement of measurement data, we will perform the following activities to deepen understanding from inside and outside Japan.

- Announce the results of the measurement and assessment correctly and timely in our web site as soon as they are prepared.
- Announce data in a manner easy for local and domestic consumers to understand Moreover, describe the safety-related information regarding the announced measurement values.
- Prepare a report describing the monitoring result and the assessment, and plan to make it available in our web site, etc., every quarter.
- In the assessment, verify, for example, whether the result is within the marine diffusion simulation result, whether the result is equivalent to the concentration used for the radiological impact assessment, etc., and express them in an easy-to-understand manner.
- Also plan to report the result in opportunities where related parties in local governments, etc. and academics confirm and assess it.

9-3-2. Monitoring by the government and Fukushima prefecture

(1) Previous sea area monitoring performed by the government and Fukushima

This section covers sea area monitoring by implementation entities other than us in the Comprehensive Radiation Monitoring Plan, namely the government (mainly the Ministry of the Environment, the Nuclear Regulation Authority, and the Fisheries Agency), Fukushima prefecture, etc. based on disclosed information. The relevant Ministries and Agencies started monitoring immediately after the accident and has been announcing the result[59] in cooperation with Fukushima, research institutes, fisheries cooperatives, etc., and reviewing the contents, measurement points, etc., of monitoring and announcing the result[60]. Table 9-10 shows the details of sea area monitoring by implementation entities other than us[61]. In the previous plan, sea area monitoring was performed for seawater, seabed sediment, and marine organisms in the following areas:

(1) Sea area vicinity of FDNPS (within about 3 km from the middle between the Unit 2 and 3 exhaust stacks)
(2) Coastal sea area (within about 30 km from the coastline from a part of Aomori and Iwate to Miyagi, Fukushima, and Ibaraki (including the estuary, excluding the vicinity sea area))
(3) Offshore sea area (sea area within about 30 to 90 km from the coastline)
(4) Ocean area (sea area within about 90 km to 300 km from the coastline)
(5) Tokyo Bay (bay about 200 km away from FDNPS)

Table 9-10 Previous sea area monitoring by implementation entities other than us

a. Seawater

Implementation entity	Measurement point	Measured nuclide	Measurement frequency (depending on the location and nuclide)
Government (mainly the Nuclear Regulation Authority and the Ministry of the Environment)	Vicinity sea area, coastal sea area, offshore sea area, ocean sea area, and Tokyo Bay	Cs-134/137, Sr-90, tritium	Every month to every year
Fukushima Prefecture	Vicinity sea area and coastal sea area	Cs-134/137, Sr-90, tritium, Pu-238/239+240	Every month
(Reference) Tokyo Electric Power Company HD	Vicinity sea area and coastal sea area	Cs-134/137, Sr-90, tritium, Pu-238/239+240	Every day or every six months

[59] Radiation monitoring information
https://radioactivity.nsr.go.jp/en/

[60] Comprehensive Radiation Monitoring Plan
https://radioactivity.nsr.go.jp/en/list/191/list-1.html

[61] Attachment of the total monitoring plan formulated at the monitoring adjustment meeting, which is chaired by the Minister of the Environment
https://radioactivity.nsr.go.jp/en/contents/16000/15098/24/274_20210401_s.pdf

b. Seabed sediment

Implementation entity	Measurement point	Measured nuclide	Measurement frequency (depending on the location and nuclide)
Government (mainly the Nuclear Regulation Authority and the Ministry of the Environment)	Coastal sea area, offshore sea area, and Tokyo Bay	Cs-134/137	Every month to every year
Fukushima Prefecture	Vicinity sea area and coastal sea area	Cs-134/137, Sr-90, Pu-238/239+240	Every month to every six months
(Reference) Tokyo Electric Power Company HD	Vicinity sea area and coastal sea area	Cs-134/137, Sr-90, Pu-238/239+240	Every month to every six months

c. Marine organisms

Implementation entity	Measurement point	Measured nuclide	Measurement frequency (depending on the location and nuclide)
Government (Fisheries Agency and Ministry of the Environment)	Coastal sea area, offshore sea area, and ocean area	Cs-134/137	Every week to every three or four months
(Reference) Tokyo Electric Power Company HD	Coastal sea area	Cs-134/137	Every month

(2) Sea area monitoring enhanced and expanded by the government in response to discharge of ALPS treated water

In response to the Basic Policy of the government announced in April 2021, the future sea area monitoring was discussed at the Surveillance and Measurement Task Force of the sea area environment set up under the Monitoring Coordination Meeting, in which the relevant Ministries and Agencies such as the Nuclear Regulation Authority and the Ministry of Environment and the Sea Area Monitoring Expert Meeting on ALPS treated water set up under the Ministry of Environment. Then, the Comprehensive Radiation Monitoring Plan was revised at the Monitoring Coordination Meeting held in March 2022. They plan to enhance and expand the sea area monitoring before and after discharge of ALPS treated water such as setting of more sampling points within 10 km from the discharge outlet considering our discharge plan and the contents of this report[62]. The plan is as follows.

a. Seawater

(1) Perform monitoring to ascertain the variation of the tritium concentration in the sea area before and after discharge.

- There is considered to be almost no significant difference from the condition before discharge in a location about 10 km away from the discharge outlet

[62] Material 1 of the monitoring coordination meeting (March 30, 2022) for enhancement and expansion of sea area monitoring by the government
http://www.env.go.jp/water/shorisui/monitoring/014/mat01.pdf

(The result of the diffusion simulation by TEPCO shows a possibility of a minor variation even in a location about 30 km away depending on the day)

- Set more sampling points within 10 km from the discharge outlet.
- To be on safeside, also perform monitoring at sampling points 30 km and 50 km away, offshore to the south of Miyagi, and offshore to the north of Ibaraki.
- Also perform monitoring at nearby swimming beaches.

(2) Basically, the measurement frequency of newly added points will be four times a year (considering seasonal variations). Immediately after discharge, the frequency of the measurement is increased including the bulletin figure with the detection limit raised.

(3) To be on safeside, measure the seven major nuclides (Cs-134, Cs-137, Co-60, Ru-106, Sb-125, Sr-90, and I-129) four times a year in some sampling points. In addition, perform it once a year for a wide range of related nuclides[63].

Table 9-11 shows the sea area monitoring plan for seawater of FY 2022.

Table 9-11 Sea area monitoring plan of the government for seawater enhanced and expanded

Target nuclide	Sampling point	Sampling depth*1	Analysis frequency	Target detection limit	Analysis method
Tritium	Near the discharge outlet (about 300m from the discharge outlet)	Surface layer/Bottom layer	Four times a year	0.1Bq/L*3	Electrolytic concentration method
	1 km to 10 km from the discharge outlet	Surface layer/Bottom layer	Four times a year	0.1Bq/L*3	Electrolytic concentration method
	About 30 km to 50 km from the discharge outlet, offshore to the south of Miyagi, and offshore to the north of Ibaraki	Surface layer/Bottom layer*2	Four times a year	0.1Bq/L*3	Electrolytic concentration method
	Bathing beaches (Two points in each of the north and south are selected considering the opening conditions)	Surface layer	Twice a year (before and during the season)	0.1Bq/L*3	Electrolytic concentration method
Seven major nuclides	Three points on the boundary with the area switch fishery rights (north, south, and east)	Surface layer/Bottom layer	Four times a year	Basically, follow the radioactivity measurement method series (Set the detection limit of Cs-134, Cs-137, and Sr-90 to 0.001Bq/L)	
Other related nuclides (basically 62 nuclides subject to removal by ALPS, and C-14)	Three points on the boundary with the area switch fishery rights (north, south, and east)	Surface layer/Bottom layer	Once a year	Basically, follow the radioactivity measurement method series (Set the detection limit of Cs-134, Cs-137, and Sr-90 to 0.001Bq/L)	

*1: Surface layer: Sea surface to about 2 m, Bottom layer: About 2 m to 5 m or 10 m to 40 m from the seabed depending on the water depth

*2: Surface layer only for sampling points shown by blue stars and green circles outside the 50 km radius

*3: A detection limit of about 0.05Bq/L (specifically 0.02-0.07Bq/L) was obtained from the result of the measurement of seawater consigned by the Nuclear Regulation Authority based on this target detection limit.

[63] Basically C-14 and 62 nuclides subject to removal by ALPS.

b. Marine biota

(1) Perform monitoring of tritium in marine biota (FWT and OBT) near the boundary with the area switch fishery right.

(2) Also perform monitoring at the same points as (1) for C-14 in fish and I-129 in seaweeds.

Table 9-12 and Figures 9-9 and 9-10 show the sea area monitoring plan for marine biota of FY 2022.

Table 9-12 Sea area monitoring plan of the government for marine biota enhanced and expanded

Target nuclide	Sampling point	Target organisms	Analysis frequency	Target detection limit	Analysis method
Tritium*1	Three points on the boundary with the area switch fishery rights (north, south, and east)	Fish (demersal fish)	Four times a year	FWT: 0.1Bq/L*2 OBT: 0.5Bq/L	FWT: Electrolytic concentration method OBT: Distillation method
I-129	Three points on the boundary with the area switch fishery rights (north, south, and east)	Seaweeds	Four times a year	0.1Bq/kg (raw)	ICP-MS
C-14	Three points on the boundary with the area switch fishery rights (north, south, and east)	Fish (demersal fish)	Four times a year	2Bq/kg (raw)	Follow the radiation measurement series (beta ray analysis)

*1: Freeze-dry or burn aquatic organism samples to measure the concentration of tritium in water
*2: Aim to measure up to 0.05Bq/L, if possible



[Expanded diagram (3-km radius)]

[Wide-area diagram]

* Two additional sampling points of bathing beaches are to be set in the north and south sides, respectively

Figure 9-9 Sea area monitoring sampling point diagram of the government enhanced and expanded



Figure 9-10　Sea area monitoring sampling point diagram enhanced and expanded (wide area)

(3) Seawater monitoring enhanced and expanded by Fukushima prefecture in response to discharge of ALPS treated water

In response to discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, Fukushima prefecture plans to monitor seawater in a wide observation area which consists a total of 9 locations, namely the existing 6 locations around the FDNPS and 1 additional location in each of the northern, eastern, and southern directions, as shown in Table 9-13 in the range where the concentration was assessed to be higher than the tritium concentration in the seawater in the surrounding sea water (0.1 to 1 Bq/L) considering the assessment of the advection and diffusion simulation in our report. Figure 9-11 shows the sampling points[64].

Table 9-13 Seawater monitoring in relation to ALPS treated water by Fukushima prefecture (FY 2-22)

Sampling point	Sampling depth	Analysis frequency	Measurement item	Target detection limit	Analysis method
Existing locations near the FDNPS (six locations)	Surface layer	12 times a year	γ-nuclides Tritium Total-β	Approx. 0.001 to 0.002Bq/L (Cs-134/137) Approx. 0.3 to 0.5Bq/L Approx. 0.01Bq/L	Based on the Series of Radioactivity Measuring Methods
Additional locations (3 locations)		Four times a year (Before discharge) 12 times a year (After discharge)	Sr-90 Pu-238/239+240	Approx. 0.0005Bq/L Approx. 0.000003 to 0.00001Bq/L	

Table 9-14 shows the monitoring to be performed by Fukushima as other seawater monitoring not related to discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea.

Table 9-14 Other seawater monitoring (FY 2022)

Investigation type	Location	Number of points	Nuclides and frequency					
			γ-ray emitting nuclides	Tritium	Total-β radioactivity	Sr-90	Pu-238	Pu-239+240
Surveillance investigation around the nuclear power plant	Near the Fukushima Daiichi NPS	9 points	Existing points **Additional points**			12 times a year **Before discharge** **After discharge**		**4 times a year** **12 times a year**
	Near the Fukushima Daini NPS	2 points	Four times a year				Once a year	
	Comparison points	1 point	Once a year					
Port/Sea surface fishing ground investigation	Important port	3 points	12 times a year (Cs-134, Cs-137)	-	-	-	-	-
	Fishing ports	13 points		-	-	-	-	-
	Shallow fishing ground	7 points		12 times a year (6 points)		-	-	-
Bathing beach investigation	Bathing beach	13 points	Twice a year (Cs-134, Cs-137)	Twice a year (7 points)		-	-	-
Public water area investigation	Sea area	15 points (surface layer and bottom layer)	-	Twice a year	-	-	-	-

[64] 35th Environmental Monitoring and Evaluation Sub-committee of the Safety Monitoring Council on Decommissioning of the Nuclear Power Station of Fukushima Prefecture Material 2-1, p.1 (Revised after discussion) http://www.pref.fukushima.lg.jp/uploaded/attachment/507135.pdf

Investigation type	Location	Number of points	Nuclides and frequency					
			γ-ray emitting nuclides	Tritium	Total-β radioactivity	Sr-90	Pu-238	Pu-239+240
Seawater monitoring associated with discharge of groundwater bypass water	Around the south discharge outlet at the Fukushima Daiichi	1 point	Four times a year (Cs-134, Cs-137)	Four times a year	-	-	-	-
Seawater monitoring associated with discharge of treated water of the subdrain and groundwater drain	Around the north discharge outlet at the Fukushima Daiichi	1 point	Four times a year (Cs-134, Cs-137)	Four times a year	-	-	-	-



Figure9-11 Investigation points of seawater monitoring for ALPS treated water by Fukushima Prefecture

(4) Cooperation with the IAEA for sea area monitoring by the government and IAEA marine monitoring

Since 2014, the government has been conducting the IAEA Marine Monitoring with the aim of obtaining objective evaluation from the IAEA on the appropriateness of monitoring implementation methods and analytical capabilities of Japan's laboratories participating in sea area monitoring conducted by the government.

In the IAEA Marine Monitoring, samples of seawater, sediment off the coast of the FDNPS, and marine biota unloaded in Fukushima Prefecture which had been collected off the coast of the FDNPS were collected in the presence of the IAEA and occasionally from third-country laboratories. The samples were divided into analytical laboratories and analyzed individually, and an interlaboratory comparison (ILC) was conducted to compare the results. ILC Report (2017-2020)[65] published in August 2021 states that "Japan's sample collection procedures follow the appropriate methodological standards required to obtain representative samples" and "The results obtained demonstrate a continued high level of accuracy and competence on the part of the Japanese laboratories involved in the analyses of radionuclides in marine samples for the Sea Area Monitoring Plan." IAEA marine monitoring will be continued in the future.

[65] IAEA, Preliminary Report 2021 Interlaboratory Comparisons 2017–2020: Determination of Radionuclides in Seawater, Sediment and Fish
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/21/07/preliminary-report-2021-interlaboratory-comparison-2017-2020-determination-of-radionuclides-in-seawater-sediment-and-fish.pdf

9-4. Actions to be taken in case of abnormalities

Verify that it is within the assumed range, by comparison with the marine diffusion simulation result, the concentration used for the radiological impact assessment, etc., for the sea area monitoring described in 9-3. If it exceeds the variation range of usual values, verify the results of other implementation entities of monitoring for the investigation of the cause. If any greatly exceeding the variation range of usual values is observed, stop discharge into the sea, measure the corresponding points again, tentatively expand the range and frequency, and verify that there is no abnormality in the surrounding sea area.
Therefore, we will accumulate the analysis results of sea area monitoring from April 2022 to ascertain them as usual values before discharge into the sea.

9-5. Summary of monitoring

As mentioned above, while the government, Fukushima prefecture and we are proceeding with sea area monitoring, sea area monitoring is enhanced and expanded before and after discharge of ALPS treated water. If any abnormal value is detected in enhanced and expanded sea area monitoring or any abnormal value is detected in monitoring, we will make sure to stop discharge until it is verified that discharge can be performed safely.

10. Summary

For planned discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea in the FDNPS, the exposure assessment on human and environment is performed based on the current information (design stage).

The result of a calculation setting multiple source terms and multiple food ingestions assuming that 0.05mSv/year is equivalent to the dose constraint with the optimization based on the Basic Policy of the government in April 2021, shows the annual exposure amount of the set representative person 3E-05 to 4E-04mSv/year, which is much smaller than 1mSv/year, which is the dose limit to public shown in the ICRP recommendation, as well as 0.05mSv/year deemed by the Nuclear Regulation Authority to be equivalent to the dose constraint.

The result of a calculation setting multiple source terms for the impact on the environment as with the assessment for the human shows that the value for the reference plants and animals set based on the ICRP recommendation is 2E-05 to 6E-05mGy/day, which is much lower than 1 to 10mGy/day for flatfish and brown seaweeds and 10 to 100mGy/day for crabs, which as the derived consideration reference levels (DCRL) shown in the ICRP recommendation for the reference plants and animals.

Chapter 8 shows the uncertainty of this assessment result.

We will optimize the risks associated with disposal further as needed by the progress of design and implementation of the plan including rigorous selection of measurement target nuclides, using the knowledge obtained through reviews by experts of the IAEA, cross-checking with third parties, etc., and appropriately reflecting the opinions from various fields. Accordingly, we plan to revise the assessment of this report as needed.

References

[1] International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA Safety Standards Series No.GSG-9 ”Regulatory Control of Radioactive Discharges to the Environment”, 2018.

[2] International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA Safety Standards Series No.GSG-10 ”Prospective Radiological Environmental Impact Assessment for Facilities and Activities”, IAEA, 2018.

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[4] D.Tsumune, T.Tsubono, K.Misumi, Y.Tateda,Y.Toyoda, Y.Onda, and M.Aoyama, "Impacts of direct release and river discharge on oceanic 137Cs derived from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant accident", 2020.

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Terms

Term	Description
Advanced liquid processing system (ALPS)	Water treatment facility which can purify 62 types of radioactive materials other than tritium contained in contaminated water up to a level which meets the standard set by laws. (Multi-Nuclide Removal Facility)
ALPS treated water	Water purified by ALPS, etc. so that the radioactive materials other than tritium surely fall below the regulatory standards for safety. (The sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of nuclides excluding tritium is less than 1)
Treated water to be purified	Water which is purified by ALPS, etc., but does not meet the regulatory standard for safety (The sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of nuclides excluding tritium is less than 1)
ALPS treated water, etc.	Generic term for ALPS treated water and treated water to be purified
Strontium treated water	Contaminated water with most of the cesium and strontium removed.
Secondary treatment	Purifying treated water to be purified in which radioactive materials other than tritium are not purified until the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits is less than 1 by ALPS, etc.
Groundwater bypass	Measure to reduce the amount of groundwater approaching the reactor building, etc., by pumping groundwater flowing from the mountain side to the sea side from a well far away from the reactor building, etc., and discharging it to the sea after verification that the discharge standard is met.
Subdrain	Measure to perform purification by pumping with the subdrain (well near the building) and discharge the sea after verification that the discharge standard is met, in order to reduce the amount of contaminated water increased by inflow of groundwater into the reactor building, etc.
Regulatory concentration limit	Standard of discharge of radioactive waste into the sea set in “Pronouncement which set the dose limit based on the regulations such as the Regulations on Business of Smelting of Nuclear Source Materials or Nuclear Fuel Materials.” If the corresponding radioactive waste contains radioactive materials, the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits has to be less than 1.
Target discharge control value	Target control value set for each nuclide to be discharge in order to control the amount of radioactive materials discharged by the nuclear power plant per year. For the FDNPS, the target discharge control value of tritium before the accident is set to 22 TBq (2.2E+13Bq).
Operation and management value	Concentration limit value set by us for dose reduction for eight nuclides whose impacts on exposure are considered to be great at the time of disposal of ALPS treated water. If any concentration over this is detected, stop discharge and transfer the water to the storage tank.
WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality	Guidelines for drinking water quality set by the World Health Organization for securing of the safety of drinking water. These guidelines show water quality which do not cause any problem when a person keep drinking the water from the viewpoints of radioactive materials, microorganisms, chemical substances, etc. As radioactive material concentrations, 10Bq/L and 10,000Bq/L are shown for Cs-137 and tritium, respectively.
International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) recommendation	Document that shows the Basic Policy (concept) of radiation protection recommended by ICRP and the basic numerical standards.

Term	Description
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safety standard document	Document issued by the IAEA which shows the standards for protection of safety such as human health, lives, and assets in using radiation and radioactive materials as activities for securing nuclear safety. It consists of the safety principles, the safety requirements, the safety guidelines, etc., and shows the policy, the standards, etc., to follow. The IAEA safety standard document is prepared reflecting the comments of all IAEA member countries.
Representative person	Virtual person set as the target of exposure in the exposure assessment of public for consideration of radiation protection. Consider environments, life habits, etc., in which the exposure amounts increase, etc.
Potential exposure	Exposure caused by possible events in operation or events or possible events sequences including accidents of radiation sources or failures and operation mistakes of equipment. It was considered for the future. It is used for consideration of radiation protection.
An area where no fishing is conducted on a daily basis	Area where members of fisheries cooperatives jointly use a certain water area and rights to perform fishing (common fishery rights) are not established. Areas where common fishery rights are not established.
Area sea model	Numerical analysis model of tidal currents developed in Rutgers University in the U.S.
Submersion model	External exposure dose calculation model assuming the state that people are surrounded by radioactive materials (submersion).
Concentration factor	Expedient factor indicating the relationship between the radioactive nuclide concentration in marine organisms (per wet weight) in marine organisms (in principle, edible parts) and the radioactive nuclide concentration in the seawater in the environment where such organisms live, which is used for the assessment model for migration to organisms.
Dose conversion factor for the effective dose	Conversion factor to assess the human exposure amount from radiation from radioactive materials.
Effective dose factor	Conversion factor to assess the human internal exposure dose from the inhalation amount and ingestion of radioactive nuclides.
Environmental protection	Protecting organisms other than human from adverse effects of ionizing radiation.
Reference plants and animals	Specific types of animals and plants assumed in order to associate radiation exposure from the environment with the dose and impact.
Dose conversion coefficients for plants and animals	Conversion factor for simplified calculations of internal and external exposure doses to organism by radioactive nuclides in the environment.
Derived consideration reference level (DCRL)	Range of the dose rate with a range of one order of magnitude set for each species advocated by ICRP. Dose rate level at which the impact has to be considered if is exceeded. (Derived consideration reference level)
Concentration ratio	Migration factor from an empirical calculation of the ratio of the (overall) radioactive nuclide concentration in aquatic organisms to the underwater concentration in the environment to be used for radiation exposure to plants and animals from the environment.
Distribution coefficient	Ratio of radioactive materials at which the concentration in the seawater (Bq/L) and the concentration in the seabed sediment (Bq/kg) are in the equilibrium state. It is used for the assessment of migration of radioactive materials from the seawater to seabed sediment.

Preparation member

For preparation of this report, in-house personnel with knowledge on the radiological impact assessment were appointed and external experts were invited as members in three fields, which are especially important for the radiological impact assessment: human radiation protection, environmental protection, and marine dispersion calculation.

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End

Attachment I　Rationale behind the selection of nuclides subject to removal by ALPS

I-1.　Selection of nuclides subject to removal

It is assumed that the water to be treated in the advanced liquid processing system (fresh water, RO concentrated salt water, and treatment device outlet water) contains radioactive materials derived from the fuel in the Units 1 to 3 reactors (hereinafter called “FP nuclide”) and radioactive materials derived from corrosion products contained in the water retained during plant operation (hereinafter called “CP nuclide”). In order to reduce the risk of radiation exposure to the surrounding public area in the event of leakage of the water to be treated into the environment, it is necessary to estimate the nuclides present at high concentrations so that they can be removed by the advanced liquid processing system among FP nuclides and CP nuclides contained in the water to be treated.

Therefore, in estimating the concentration of radioactive materials contained in the water to be treated, for FP nuclides, nuclides assumed to exist at significant concentrations were selected based on the assessment results of the core inventory; for nuclides for which measurement of radioactive materials was carried out in March 2011, the concentration in the stagnant water was estimated from the measurement results; and for nuclides for which measurement was not carried out, the concentration in the stagnant water was estimated from the assessment results of the core inventory.

The concentration of CP nuclides in the stagnant water was estimated using the measurement results of CP nuclides in the water retained in the reactor and the concentrated waste liquid tank during plant operation, because nuclides contained in the water retained in the reactor during plant operation were transferred to the stagnant water, and it is considered that nuclides contained in the water retained in the concentrated waste liquid tank were mixed when the stagnant water was transferred to the high-temperature incinerator building.

The operation of the advanced liquid processing system was assumed to be started 1 year (365 days) after reactor shutdown for both FP and CP nuclides, so the concentration in the stagnant water was estimated by decay correction 365 days after reactor shutdown considering the half-life. Comparing the estimated concentration obtained by decay correction at 365 days after reactor shutdown and nuclides over 1/100 of the regulatory concentration limit were selected as nuclides subject to removal by the advanced liquid processing system assuming that they exist at significant concentrations in the stagnant water. The sum of the ratio of the estimated concentration to the regulatory concentration limit of nuclides which are excluded because they are below 1/100 of the regulatory concentration limit is about 0.05 at maximum. Therefore the concentration of the excluded nuclides is considered to be sufficiently low.

I-2. Selection method and selection result of nuclides subject to removal

(1) Selection method and selection result of nuclides subject to removal from FP nuclides

Nuclides subject to removal from FP nuclides were selected according to the flow of Figure I-1. As a result, 56 nuclides were selected as nuclides subject to removal.

(2) Selection method and selection result of nuclides subject to removal from CP nuclides

Nuclides subject to removal from CP nuclides were selected according to the flow of Figure I-2. As a result, 6 nuclides were selected as nuclides subject to removal.

(3) Summary of the selection result of nuclides subject to removal

A total of 62 nuclides were selected: 56 nuclides selected from FP nuclides and 6 nuclides selected from CP nuclides (See Table I-1).



Figure I-1: Flow to select the nuclides subject to removal in FP nuclides



Figure I-2 Flow to select the nuclides subject to removal in CP nuclides

Table I-1 List of the nuclides subject to removal

No.	Nuclide	Physical half-life	Radiation type	No	Nuclide	Physical half-life	Radiation type
1	Mn-54	310d	γ	32	I-129	1.6E+07y	βγ
2	Fe-59	44 d	γ	33	Cs-134	2.1y	βγ
3	Co-58	71d	γ	34	Cs-135	2.3E+06y	β
4	Co-60	5.3y	βγ	35	Cs-136	13d	βγ
5	Ni-63	100y	β	36	Cs-137	30y	βγ
6	Zn-65	240d	βγ	37	Ba-137m	2.6m	γ
7	Rb-86	19d	βγ	38	Ba-140	13d	βγ
8	Sr-89	51d	β	39	Ce-141	33d	βγ
9	Sr-90	29y	β	40	Ce-144	280d	βγ
10	Y-90	64h	β	41	Pr-144	17m	βγ
11	Y-91	59d	βγ	42	Pr-144m	7.2m	γ
12	Nb-95	35d	βγ	43	Pm-146	5.5y	βγ
13	Tc-99	2.1E+05y	β	44	Pm-147	2.6y	βγ
14	Ru-103	39d	βγ	45	Pm-148	5.4d	βγ
15	Ru-106	370d	β	46	Pm-148m	41d	γ
16	Rh-103m	56m	βγ	47	Sm-151	90y	βγ
17	Rh-106	30s	γ	48	Eu-152	14y	βγ
18	Ag-110m	250d	βγ	49	Eu-154	8.6y	βγ
19	Cd-113m	14 y	γ	50	Eu-155	4.8y	βγ
20	Cd-115m	45d	βγ	51	Gd-153	240d	γ
21	Sn-119m	290d	γ	52	Tb-160	72d	βγ
22	Sn-123	130d	βγ	53	Pu-238	88y	α
23	Sn-126	2.3E+05y	βγ	54	Pu-239	2.4E+04y	α
24	Sb-124	60d	βγ	55	Pu-240	6.6E+03y	α
25	Sb-125	2.8y	βγ	56	Pu-241	14y	β
26	Te-123m	120d	γ	57	Am-241	430y	α
27	Te-125m	57d	γ	58	Am-242m	140y	α
28	Te-127	9.4h	βγ	59	Am-243	7.4E+03y	α
29	Te-127m	110d	βγ	60	Cm-242	160d	α
30	Te-129	70m	βγ	61	Cm-243	29y	α
31	Te-129m	34d	βγ	62	Cm-244	18y	α

Attachment II　Properties of ALPS treated water, etc.

At the FDNPS, the sequence of events of the station since the accident has led to various analyses. Various analyses also have been conducted on the treatment of contaminated water, which is very complicated.
This section describes the overview of contaminated water treatment and the analysis result of the properties of ALPS treated water.

II-1.　Overview of the occurrence of contaminated water (stagnant water in the building) and the system of the contaminated water treatment facility

In the FDNPS, the residual fuel debris in the building is cooled with water, and mixing of the cooling water and the groundwater or rainwater entering the building causes contaminated water. The daily average amount of contaminated water was reduced to about 140m^3 in the result of FY2020 thanks to the reduction of water entering the reactor building by countermeasures such as land side impermeable wall (frozen soil wall) and sub-drains.
To reduce the risks caused by radioactive materials contained in contaminated water, at first cesium and strontium were removed preferentially, which accounts for most of the radioactive materials contained in contaminated water, using cesium adsorption devices such as Kurion and SARRY. After that, water desalinated with desalination devices is recirculated for cooling the burst slug in the core, and the residual concentrated water is treated with the advanced liquid processing system (hereinafter called “ALPS”) as “strontium treated water (water before treated by ALPS)” to remove the 62 nuclides subject to removal, which accounts for most of the nuclides, other than tritium, and then stored in tanks installed on high ground.



* ALPS treated water, etc., which is purified with the advanced liquid processing system, etc., until the radioactive materials other than tritium surely fall below the regulatory limit of safety is defined as “ALPS treated water,” and the other water as “treated water to be purified”

Figure II-1　Overall outline figure of contaminated water treatment

II-2. Overview of the system of ALPS

ALPS is designed to be able to remove up to less than the regulatory concentration limit without dilution of the 62 nuclides[1] estimated to be contained in the above-mentioned strontium treated water at such high concentrations that they should be removed except tritium, which ALPS cannot remove, by treatment using physical and chemical properties such as coprecipitation with chemicals, adsorption by active carbon and physical materials, and filtration with a physical filter; this capability has already been demonstrated through the actual operation (For details of the performance, see II-3. “Performance of ALPS”).
In the FDNPS, three types of ALPS are installed: existing ALPS, additional ALPS, and high-performance ALPS. Since all of them have similar removal performance (DF: decontamination factor), current treatment is performed mainly in the existing and additional ALPS considering ease of adjustments of the treatment amount. Table II-1 shows the overview of ALPS.

Table II-1 Overview of the facility of ALPS

Name	Put into service	Capacity	Characteristics
Existing ALPS	2013.3	250m^3/day/series × 3 series (Total: 750m^3/day)	After putting into service, added adsorption vessels and changed the adsorption material to improve the performance
Additional ALPS	2014.9	250m^3/day/series × 3 series (Total: 750m^3/day)	Deleted iron coprecipitation by pretreatment with the existing ALPS and performed addition of adsorption vessels, change of the adsorption material, etc.
High-performance ALPS	2014.10	500m^3/day/series × 1 series (Total: 500m^3/day)	Unlike the existing and additional ones, this has no coprecipitation process

Table II-2 shows the overview of the nuclide removal system of ALPS.

Table II-2 Overview of the nuclide Removal system with ALPS

Removal system		Main nuclides subject to removal	Role
Pretreatment facilities	Iron coprecipitation treatment (Existing ALPS only)	α nuclides, Co-60, and Mn-54	Decomposition of the complexes that inhibit adsorption, and removal of heavy metal and α nuclides, etc., by iron coprecipitation
	Carbonate coprecipitation treatment (excluding the high-performance ALPS)	Adsorption inhibition ions (Mg, Ca, etc.) Sr-89/90	Remove the inhibition ions of Sr adsorption and improve the Sr removal performance by adsorption
Advanced liquid processing system (Adsorption	Active carbon	Colloidal nuclides (I-129, Co-60, etc.)	Remove the nuclides that have various ionic and colloidal forms with multiple types of adsorption materials
	Sr adsorbent	Sr-89/90	
	Cs adsorbent	Cs-134/137	

[1] For details of the selection process and the selected nuclides, see Attachment I “Rationale behind the selection of nuclides subject to removal by ALPS.”

vessel)	I,Sb adsorbent	I-129 (IO^{3-}), Sb-125	
	I adsorbent	I-129(I^-)	
	Ru adsorbent	Ru-106	

ALPS is operated efficiently by backing up the subsequent adsorption vessels in the case of break-through of the first vessel and changing the order of the adsorption vessels by merry-go-round operation of some of the adsorption vessels. Figure II-2 shows an example of an adsorption vessel composition[2] and Figure III-3 the details of the merry-go-round operation of some of the adsorption vessels.



Figure II-2 Example of an adsorption vessel composition (example as of September 2018)



Figure II-3 Image of replacement and operation of the adsorption material (merry-go-round operation) (for a composition of three adsorption vessels)

[2] The composition of the adsorption vessels has been reassessed as needed according to the properties of water to be treated, etc.

II-3. Performance of ALPS

In ALPS, the concentrations of radioactive materials, mainly 7 nuclides (Cs-134, Cs-137, Co-60, Sb-125, Ru-106, Sr-90, I-129) which are nuclides to removal by ALPS and significantly detected nuclides through the process of treatment, at the facility inlet and outlet are measured ((1) and (7) in the figure) to verify the removal performance of radioactive materials, as well as in the middle of the treatment process to verify the break-through trend of the adsorption vessels ((2) to (6) in the figure)[3]. Details of this measurement are shown in Figure II-4.



Measured point (1):	Facility inlet (water to be treated)
Measured nuclide:	Cs-134/137, Co-60, Mn-54, Sb-125, Ru-106, Sr-90, Tc-99, I-129, total β, and total α
Measurement frequency:	About once a week
Purpose of measurement:	Confirmation of properties before treatment

Measured point (2):	Outlet of carbonate coprecipitation treatment
Measured nuclide:	Cs-134/137, Co-60, Mn-54, Sb-125, and total β
Measurement frequency:	About once a week
Purpose of measurement:	Confirmation of properties before treatment

Measured point (3):	Outlet of the Sr first adsorption vessel
Measured nuclide:	Sr-90
Measurement frequency:	About once
Purpose of measurement:	Verification of the break-through trend of the adsorption vessels for Sr

Measured point (4):	Outlet of the Cs first adsorption vessel
Measured nuclide:	Cs-134/137
Measurement frequency:	About once a week
Purpose of measurement:	Verification of the break-through trend of the adsorption vessels for Cs

Measured point (5):	Outlet of the I,Sb first adsorption vessel
Measured nuclide:	I-129,Sb-125
Measurement frequency:	About once a week
Purpose of measurement:	Verification of the break-through trend of the adsorption vessels for I-129 and Sb-125

Measured point (6):	Outlet of the Ru first adsorption vessel
Measured nuclide:	Ru-106
Measurement frequency:	About once a week
Purpose of measurement:	Verification of the break-through trend of the adsorption vessels for Ru

Measured point (7):	Facility outlet (treated water)
Measured nuclide:	Cs-134/137, Co-60, Mn-54, Sb-125, Ru-106, Sr-90, Tc-99, I-129, total β, and total α
Measurement frequency:	About once a week
Purpose of measurement:	Confirmation of properties of treated water

Figure II-4 Measurement performed in ALPS

After the start of the operation of ALPS, about 70% of the treated water contains radioactive properties over the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of 1 due to various circumstances (see II-7, “Reason for generation of treated water to be purified”), but ALPS has been working properly except special circumstances.
Figure II-5-1 to 13 show the trend regarding the measurement results of the inlet and outlet of

[3] The measurement items and measurement frequency have been reassessed as needed according to the properties of water to be treated, etc.

ALPS for the seven major nuclides, etc. Especially after 2019, in which the above-mentioned special circumstances disappeared, ALPS has been operated stably and each nuclide has been removed stably and appropriately.



Figure II-5-1 Radioactive concentration in the inlet and outlet of each advanced liquid processing system (Cs-137)
(*1 ND indicates less than the detection limit.)



Figure II-5-2　Radioactive concentration in the inlet and outlet of each advanced liquid processing system (Cs-134)

(*1 ND indicates less than the detection limit.)



Figure II-5-3　Radioactive concentration in the inlet and outlet of each advanced liquid processing system (Sr-90)
(*1 ND indicates less than the detection limit.)



Figure II-5-4 Radioactive concentration in the inlet and outlet of each advanced liquid processing system (Co-60)
(*1 ND indicates less than the detection limit.)



Figure II-5-5 Radioactive concentration in the inlet and outlet of each advanced liquid processing system (Sb-125)
(*1 ND indicates less than the detection limit.)



Figure II-5-6 Radioactive concentration in the inlet and outlet of each advanced liquid processing system (Ru-106)

(*1 ND indicates less than the detection limit.)



Figure II-5-7　Radioactive concentration in the inlet and outlet of each advanced liquid processing system I-129)

(*1 ND indicates less than the detection limit.)



Figure II-5-8 Radioactive concentration in the inlet and outlet of each advanced liquid processing system (Total beta nuclide)
(*1 ND indicates less than the detection limit.)



Figure II-5-9　Radioactive concentration in the inlet and outlet of each advanced liquid processing system (Mn-54)

(*1 ND indicates less than the detection limit.)



Figure II-5-10 Radioactive concentration in the inlet and outlet of each advanced liquid processing system (Sr-89)

(*1 ND indicates less than the detection limit.)



Figure II-5-11 Radioactive concentration in the inlet and outlet of each advanced liquid processing system (Tc-99)

(*1 ND indicates less than the detection limit.)



Figure II-5-12 Radioactive concentration in the inlet and outlet of each advanced liquid processing system (C-14)

(*1 ND indicates less than the detection limit.)



Figure II-5-13 Radioactive concentration in the inlet and outlet of each advanced liquid processing system (Rh-106)
(*1 ND indicates less than the detection limit.)



Figure II-5-14 Radioactive concentration in the inlet and outlet of each advanced liquid processing system (Total alpha nuclide)
(*1 ND indicates less than the detection limit.)

II-4. Secondary treatment performance of ALPS for treated water to be purified

II-4-1 Background of the secondary performance test

As of now, approx. 70% of the water stored in the FDNPS is water of which sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits is assessed to be 1 or more (so-called “treated water to be purified”) due to the various reasons shown in II-7. As described in the section about the discharge method in the main text, the secondary treatment of this treated water to be purified is surely performed before discharge to verify that sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits other than tritium before dilution is less than 1.
ALPS is designed to be able to treat strontium treated water with a high radioactive material concentration, etc., and its capability to remove radioactive materials has been proven in actual operation, but there was an opinion that the secondary treatment of ALPS was very important and it should be proven immediately with measured values that radioactive materials other than tritium can be removed by secondary treatment up to the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentration limits of less than 1[4].
In response to this opinion, we decided to perform the secondary treatment test of treated water to be purified of a high concentration (sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of 100 or more) in ALPS, and started the secondary treatment performance test using the additional ALPS in September 2020 and completed it by December of the same year.

II-4-2 Overview of the secondary performance test

In this secondary treatment performance test, two tank groups (J1-C tank group as the high concentration side (sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits: approx. 2,400) and J1-G tank group as the low concentration side (sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits: approx. 390)) were selected from the tank groups of the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of 100 or higher, and 1,000m^3 was treated from each of the tanks. For the piping used for the transfer, water replacement operation already included in the system was performed before the test.
Afterward, the treated water was sampled and the concentrations of the 62 nuclides subject to removal by ALPS, C-14, and tritium were measured to verify that the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of the 63 nuclides except tritium became less than 1 by secondary treatment, and the procedure and process of the nuclide analysis were performed.

II-4-3 Result of the secondary performance test

Table II-3 and 4 show the results. It was verified that the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of any treated water to be purified became less than 1 by secondary treatment.

[4] Minutes of the 17th Subcommittee on Handling of the ALPS treated water p.11

Table II-3 Secondary treatment performance test result by ALPS (J1-C tank group)

Nuclide (Half-life)	Regulatory concentration limit [Bq/L]	Before secondary treatment[5]		After secondary treatment[6]		Remarks
		Analysis result[7] [Bq/L]	Ratio to regulatory limit[8]	Analysis result[7] [Bq/L]	Ratio to regulatory limit[8]	
H-3 (About 12 years)	6.0E+04	8.51E+05	1.4E+01	8.22E+05	1.4E+01	Dilute to less than 1,500Bq/L before discharge
C-14 (About 5700 years)	2.0E+03	1.53E+01	7.6E-03	1.76E+01	8.8E-03	
Mn-54 (About 310 days)	1.0E+03	< 3.62E-01	3.6E-04	< 3.83E-02	3.8E-05	
Fe-59 (About 44 days)	4.0E+02	< 6.41E-01	1.6E-03	< 8.66E-02	2.2E-04	
Co-58 (About 71 days)	1.0E+03	< 3.44E-01	3.4E-04	< 4.11E-02	4.1E-05	
Co-60 (About 5.3 years)	2.0E+02	3.63E+01	1.8E-01	3.33E-01	1.7E-03	
Ni-63 (About 100 days)	6.0E+03	5.19E+01	8.6E-03	< 8.45E+00	1.4E-03	
Zn-65 (About 240 days)	2.0E+02	< 7.19E-01	3.6E-03	< 9.41E-02	4.7E-04	
Rb-86 (About 19 days)	3.0E+02	< 4.11E+00	1.4E-02	< 4.97E-01	1.7E-03	
Sr-89 (About 51 days)	3.0E+02	< 6.72E+03	2.2E+01	< 5.37E-02	1.8E-04	

[5] Composite (mixing/stirring) was performed for the samples collected between September 19 and 21, 2020, and then analysis was performed.
[6] Samples were collected from the middle layer in the sample tank installed latter part of the additional ALPS outlet on September 27, 2020, and then analysis was performed.
[7] If the result falls below the lower limit of detection, describe the lower limit of detection following "<."
[8] If the analysis result is less than the lower limit of detection, the lower limit of detection is used for the calculation.

Nuclide (Half-life)	Regulatory concentration limit [Bq/L]	Before secondary treatment[5]		After secondary treatment[6]		Remarks
		Analysis result[7] [Bq/L]	Ratio to regulatory limit[8]	Analysis result[7] [Bq/L]	Ratio to regulatory limit[8]	
Sr-90 (About 29 years)	3.0E+01	6.46E+04	2.2E+03	3.57E-02	1.2E-03	
Y-90 (About 64 hours)	3.0E+02	6.46E+04	2.2E+02	3.57E-02	1.2E-04	Radioactive equilibrium with Sr-90
Y-91 (About 59 days)	3.0E+02	< 8.45E+01	2.8E-01	< 1.65E+01	5.5E-02	
Nb-95 (About 35 days)	1.0E+03	< 3.50E-01	3.5E-04	< 4.96E-02	5.0E-05	
Tc-99 (About 210 thousand years)	1.0E+03	1.74E+01	1.7E-02	< 1.23E+00	1.2E-03	
Ru-103 (About 39 days)	1.0E+03	< 7.21E-01	7.2E-04	< 5.27E-02	5.3E-05	
Ru-106 (About 370 days)	1.0E+02	< 5.00E+00	5.0E-02	< 1.43E+00	1.4E-02	
Rh-103m (About 56 minutes)	2.0E+05	< 7.21E-01	3.6E-06	< 5.27E-02	2.6E-07	Radioactive equilibrium with Ru-103
Rh-106 (About 30 seconds)	3.0E+05	< 5.00E+00	1.7E-05	< 1.43E+00	4.8E-06	Radioactive equilibrium with Ru-106
Ag-110m (About 250 days)	3.0E+02	< 5.41E-01	1.8E-03	< 4.26E-02	1.4E-04	
Cd-113m (About 14 years)	4.0E+01	< 2.05E+01	5.1E-01	< 8.52E-02	2.1E-03	
Cd-115m (45 days)	3.0E+02	< 2.26E+01	7.5E-02	< 2.70E+00	9.0E-03	
Sn-119m (About 290 days)	2.0E+03	< 3.90E+02	1.9E-01	< 4.24E+01	2.1E-02	Assessed from the radioactive concentration of Sn-123
Sn-123 (About 130 days)	4.0E+02	< 6.06E+01	1.5E-01	< 6.59E+00	1.6E-02	
Sn-126 (About 230 thousand years)	2.0E+02	< 2.88E+00	1.4E-02	< 2.92E-01	1.5E-03	
Sb-124 (About 60 days)	3.0E+02	< 2.79E-01	9.3E-04	< 9.67E-02	3.2E-04	
Sb-125 (About 2.8 years)	8.0E+02	8.30E+01	1.0E-01	2.26E-01	2.8E-04	
Te-123m (About 120 days)	6.0E+02	< 8.32E-01	1.4E-03	< 9.19E-02	1.5E-04	

Nuclide (Half-life)	Regulatory concentration limit [Bq/L]	Before secondary treatment[5]		After secondary treatment[6]		Remarks
		Analysis result[7] [Bq/L]	Ratio to regulatory limit[8]	Analysis result[7] [Bq/L]	Ratio to regulatory limit[8]	
Te-125m (About 57 days)	9.0E+02	8.30E+01	9.2E-02	2.26E-01	2.5E-04	Radioactive equilibrium with Sb-125
Te-127 (About 9.4 hours)	5.0E+03	< 7.25E+01	1.5E-02	< 4.69E+00	9.4E-04	
Te-127m (About 110 days)	3.0E+02	< 7.53E+01	2.5E-01	< 4.87E+00	1.6E-02	Assessed from the radioactive concentration of Te-127
Te-129 (About 70 minutes)	1.0E+04	< 1.27E+01	1.3E-03	< 6.15E-01	6.1E-05	
Te-129m (About 34 days)	3.0E+02	< 1.31E+01	4.4E-02	< 1.37E+00	4.6E-03	
I-129 (About 16 million years)	9.0E+00	2.99E+01	3.3E+00	1.16E+00	1.3E-01	
Cs-134 (About 2.1 years)	6.0E+01	< 2.93E+01	4.9E-01	< 7.60E-02	1.3E-03	
Cs-135 (About 2.3 million years)	6.0E+02	3.81E-03	6.4E-06	< 1.18E-06	2.0E-09	Assessed from the radioactive concentration of Cs-137
Cs-136 (About 13 days)	3.0E+02	< 3.77E-01	1.3E-03	< 4.68E-02	1.6E-04	
Cs-137 (About 30 years)	9.0E+01	< 5.99E+02	6.7E+00	< 1.85E-01	2.1E-03	
Ba-137m (About 2.6 minutes)	8.0E+05	5.99E+02	7.5E-04	< 1.85E-01	2.3E-07	Radioactive equilibrium with Cs-137
Ba-140 (About 13 days)	3.0E+02	< 2.40E+00	8.0E-03	< 2.02E-01	6.7E-04	
Ce-141 (About 33 days)	1.0E+03	< 1.51E+00	1.5E-03	< 2.62E-01	2.6E-04	
Ce-144 (About 280 days)	2.0E+02	< 6.84E+00	3.4E-02	< 5.69E-01	2.8E-03	
Pr-144 (About 17 minutes)	2.0E+04	< 6.84E+00	3.4E-04	< 5.69E-01	2.8E-05	Radioactive equilibrium with Ce-144
Pr-144m (About 7.2 minutes)	4.0E+04	< 6.84E+00	1.7E-04	< 5.69E-01	1.4E-05	Radioactive equilibrium with Ce-144
Pm-146 (About 5.5 years)	9.0E+02	< 1.23E+00	1.4E-03	< 6.66E-02	7.4E-05	
Pm-147 (About 2.6 years)	3.0E+03	< 4.08E+00	1.4E-03	< 8.04E-01	2.7E-04	Assessed from the radioactive concentration of Eu-154

Nuclide (Half-life)	Regulatory concentration limit [Bq/L]	Before secondary treatment[5]		After secondary treatment[6]		Remarks
		Analysis result[7] [Bq/L]	Ratio to regulatory limit[8]	Analysis result[7] [Bq/L]	Ratio to regulatory limit[8]	
Pm-148 (About 5.4 days)	3.0E+02	< 6.49E-01	2.2E-03	< 2.33E-01	7.8E-04	
Pm-148m (About 41 days)	5.0E+02	< 6.34E-01	1.3E-03	< 4.84E-02	9.7E-05	
Sm-151 (About 90 years)	8.0E+03	< 5.77E-02	7.2E-06	< 1.14E-02	1.4E-06	Assessed from the radioactive concentration of Eu-154
Eu-152 (About 14 years)	6.0E+02	< 2.70E+00	4.5E-03	< 2.84E-01	4.7E-04	
Eu-154 (About 8.6 years)	4.0E+02	< 5.77E-01	1.4E-03	< 1.14E-01	2.8E-04	
Eu-155 (About 4.8 years)	3.0E+03	< 3.43E+00	1.1E-03	< 3.36E-01	1.1E-04	
Gd-153 (About 240 days)	3.0E+03	< 3.17E+00	1.1E-03	< 2.64E-01	8.8E-05	
Tb-160 (About 72 days)	5.0E+02	< 1.66E+00	3.3E-03	< 1.43E-01	2.9E-04	
Pu-238 (About 88 years)	4.0E+00	< 5.70E-01	1.4E-01	< 3.25E-02	8.1E-03	Assessed as included in the measurement value of the total α radioactivity
Pu-239 (About 24000 years)	4.0E+00	< 5.70E-01	1.4E-01	< 3.25E-02	8.1E-03	Assessed as included in the measurement value of the total α radioactivity
Pu-240 (About 6600 years)	4.0E+00	< 5.70E-01	1.4E-01	< 3.25E-02	8.1E-03	Assessed as included in the measurement value of the total α radioactivity
Pu-241 (About 14 years)	2.0E+02	< 2.07E+01	1.0E-01	< 1.18E+00	5.9E-03	Assessed from the radioactive concentration of Pu-238
Am-241 (About 430 years)	5.0E+00	< 5.70E-01	1.1E-01	< 3.25E-02	6.5E-03	Assessed as included in the measurement value of the total α radioactivity
Am-242m (About 140 years)	5.0E+00	< 1.03E-02	2.1E-03	< 5.87E-04	1.2E-04	Assessed from the radioactive concentration of Am-241
Am-243 (About 7400 years)	5.0E+00	< 5.70E-01	1.1E-01	< 3.25E-02	6.5E-03	Assessed as included in the measurement value of the total α radioactivity
Cm-242 (About 160 days)	6.0E+01	< 5.70E-01	9.5E-03	< 3.25E-02	5.4E-04	Assessed as included in the measurement value of the total α radioactivity
Cm-243 (About 29 years)	6.0E+00	< 5.70E-01	9.5E-02	< 3.25E-02	5.4E-03	Assessed as included in the measurement value of the total α radioactivity
Cm-244 (About 18 years)	7.0E+00	< 5.70E-01	8.1E-02	< 3.25E-02	4.6E-03	Assessed as included in the measurement value of the total α radioactivity
Sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of nuclides other than tritium		-	2.4E+03	-	3.5E-01	

Table II-4 Secondary treatment performance test result by ALPS (J1-G tank group)

Nuclide (Half-life)	Regulatory concentration limit [Bq/L]	Before secondary treatment[9]		After secondary treatment[10]		Remarks
		Analysis result[7] [Bq/L]	Ratio to regulatory limit[8]	Analysis result[7] [Bq/L]	Ratio to regulatory limit[8]	
H-3 (About 12 years)	6.0E+04	2.73E+05	4.6E+00	2.72E+05	4.5E+00	Dilute to less than 1,500Bq/L before discharge
C-14 (About 5700 years)	2.0E+03	1.26E+01	6.3E-03	1.56E+01	7.8E-03	
Mn-54 (About 310 days)	1.0E+03	< 2.02E-01	2.0E-04	< 3.79E-02	3.8E-05	
Fe-59 (About 44 days)	4.0E+02	< 3.51E-01	8.8E-04	< 7.17E-02	1.8E-04	
Co-58 (About 71 days)	1.0E+03	< 2.11E-01	2.1E-04	< 3.74E-02	3.7E-05	
Co-60 (About 5.3 years)	2.0E+02	1.31E+01	6.5E-02	2.33E-01	1.2E-03	
Ni-63 (About 100 days)	6.0E+03	< 1.84E+01	3.1E-03	< 8.84E+00	1.5E-03	
Zn-65 (About 240 days)	2.0E+02	< 4.35E-01	2.2E-03	< 7.97E-02	4.0E-04	
Rb-86 (About 19 days)	3.0E+02	< 2.56E+00	8.5E-03	< 4.67E-01	1.6E-03	
Sr-89 (About 51 days)	3.0E+02	< 7.87E+02	2.6E+00	< 4.52E-02	1.5E-04	
Sr-90 (About 29 years)	3.0E+01	1.04E+04	3.5E+02	< 3.18E-02	1.1E-03	
Y-90 (About 64 hours)	3.0E+02	1.04E+04	3.5E+01	< 3.18E-02	1.1E-04	Radioactive equilibrium with Sr-90
Y-91 (About 59 days)	3.0E+02	< 4.82E+01	1.6E-01	< 1.18E+01	3.9E-02	
Nb-95 (About 35 days)	1.0E+03	< 2.56E-01	2.6E-04	< 4.70E-02	4.7E-05	
Tc-99 (About 210 thousand years)	1.0E+03	1.20E+00	1.2E-03	< 1.29E+00	1.3E-03	
Ru-103 (About 39 days)	1.0E+03	< 3.39E-01	3.4E-04	< 5.06E-02	5.1E-05	

[9] Composite (mixing/stirring) was performed for the samples collected between October 5 and 7, 2020, and then analysis was performed.

[10] Samples were collected from the middle layer in the sample tank installed latter part of the additional ALPS outlet on October 13, 2020, and then analysis was performed.

Nuclide (Half-life)	Regulatory concentration limit [Bq/L]	Before secondary treatment[9]		After secondary treatment[10]		Remarks
		Analysis result[7] [Bq/L]	Ratio to regulatory limit[8]	Analysis result[7] [Bq/L]	Ratio to regulatory limit[8]	
Ru-106 (About 370 days)	1.0E+02	< 2.27E+00	2.3E-02	4.83E-01	4.8E-03	
Rh-103m (About 56 minutes)	2.0E+05	< 3.39E-01	1.7E-06	< 5.06E-02	2.5E-07	Radioactive equilibrium with Ru-103
Rh-106 (About 30 seconds)	3.0E+05	< 2.27E+00	7.6E-06	4.83E-01	1.6E-06	Radioactive equilibrium with Ru-106
Ag-110m (About 250 days)	3.0E+02	< 2.92E-01	9.7E-04	< 4.00E-02	1.3E-04	
Cd-113m (About 14 years)	4.0E+01	< 2.04E+01	5.1E-01	< 8.55E-02	2.1E-03	
Cd-115m (45 days)	3.0E+02	< 1.16E+01	3.9E-02	< 2.29E+00	7.6E-03	
Sn-119m (About 290 days)	2.0E+03	< 2.13E+02	1.1E-01	< 4.03E+01	2.0E-02	Assessed from the radioactive concentration of Sn-123
Sn-123 (About 130 days)	4.0E+02	< 3.31E+01	8.3E-02	< 6.26E+00	1.6E-02	
Sn-126 (About 230 thousand years)	2.0E+02	< 1.16E+00	5.8E-03	< 1.47E-01	7.3E-04	
Sb-124 (About 60 days)	3.0E+02	< 2.20E-01	7.3E-04	< 8.42E-02	2.8E-04	
Sb-125 (About 2.8 years)	8.0E+02	3.23E+01	4.0E-02	1.37E-01	1.7E-04	
Te-123m (About 120 days)	6.0E+02	< 3.83E-01	6.4E-04	< 6.67E-02	1.1E-04	
Te-125m (About 57 days)	9.0E+02	3.23E+01	3.6E-02	1.37E-01	1.5E-04	Radioactive equilibrium with Sb-125
Te-127 (About 9.4 hours)	5.0E+03	< 3.53E+01	7.1E-03	< 4.33E+00	8.7E-04	
Te-127m (About 110 days)	3.0E+02	< 3.67E+01	1.2E-01	< 4.50E+00	1.5E-02	Assessed from the radioactive concentration of Te-127
Te-129 (About 70 minutes)	1.0E+04	< 4.71E+00	4.7E-04	< 5.94E-01	5.9E-05	
Te-129m (About 34 days)	3.0E+02	< 6.61E+00	2.2E-02	< 1.21E+00	4.0E-03	
I-129 (About 16 million years)	9.0E+00	2.79E+00	3.1E-01	3.28E-01	3.6E-02	
Cs-134 (About 2.1 years)	6.0E+01	5.94E+00	9.9E-02	< 6.65E-02	1.1E-03	

Nuclide (Half-life)	Regulatory concentration limit [Bq/L]	Before secondary treatment[9]		After secondary treatment[10]		Remarks
		Analysis result[7] [Bq/L]	Ratio to regulatory limit[8]	Analysis result[7] [Bq/L]	Ratio to regulatory limit[8]	
Cs-135 (About 2.3 million years)	6.0E+02	7.51E-04	1.3E-06	2.10E-06	3.5E-09	Assessed from the radioactive concentration of Cs-137
Cs-136 (About 13 days)	3.0E+02	< 1.96E-01	6.5E-04	< 3.63E-02	1.2E-04	
Cs-137 (About 30 years)	9.0E+01	1.18E+02	1.3E+00	3.29E-01	3.7E-03	
Ba-137m (About 2.6 minutes)	8.0E+05	1.18E+02	1.5E-04	3.29E-01	4.1E-07	Radioactive equilibrium with Cs-137
Ba-140 (About 13 days)	3.0E+02	< 1.22E+00	4.1E-03	< 1.73E-01	5.8E-04	
Ce-141 (About 33 days)	1.0E+03	< 9.39E-01	9.4E-04	< 1.19E-01	1.2E-04	
Ce-144 (About 280 days)	2.0E+02	< 3.02E+00	1.5E-02	< 5.53E-01	2.8E-03	
Pr-144 (About 17 minutes)	2.0E+04	< 3.02E+00	1.5E-04	< 5.53E-01	2.8E-05	Radioactive equilibrium with Ce-144
Pr-144m (About 7.2 minutes)	4.0E+04	< 3.02E+00	7.6E-05	< 5.53E-01	1.4E-05	Radioactive equilibrium with Ce-144
Pm-146 (About 5.5 years)	9.0E+02	< 5.26E-01	5.8E-04	< 6.30E-02	7.0E-05	
Pm-147 (About 2.6 years)	3.0E+03	< 2.53E+00	8.4E-04	< 7.20E-01	2.4E-04	Assessed from the radioactive concentration of Eu-154
Pm-148 (About 5.4 days)	3.0E+02	< 5.19E-01	1.7E-03	< 4.52E-01	1.5E-03	
Pm-148m (About 41 days)	5.0E+02	< 2.76E-01	5.5E-04	< 4.09E-02	8.2E-05	
Sm-151 (About 90 years)	8.0E+03	< 3.57E-02	4.5E-06	< 1.02E-02	1.3E-06	Assessed from the radioactive concentration of Eu-154
Eu-152 (About 14 years)	6.0E+02	< 1.21E+00	2.0E-03	< 1.90E-01	3.2E-04	
Eu-154 (About 8.6 years)	4.0E+02	< 3.57E-01	8.9E-04	< 1.02E-01	2.5E-04	
Eu-155 (About 4.8 years)	3.0E+03	< 1.38E+00	4.6E-04	< 1.75E-01	5.8E-05	
Gd-153 (About 240 days)	3.0E+03	< 1.21E+00	4.0E-04	< 1.85E-01	6.2E-05	
Tb-160 (About 72 days)	5.0E+02	< 6.88E-01	1.4E-03	< 1.35E-01	2.7E-04	

Nuclide (Half-life)	Regulatory concentration limit [Bq/L]	Before secondary treatment[9]		After secondary treatment[10]		Remarks
		Analysis result[7] [Bq/L]	Ratio to regulatory limit[8]	Analysis result[7] [Bq/L]	Ratio to regulatory limit[8]	
Pu-238 (About 88 years)	4.0E+00	< 3.19E-02	8.0E-03	< 2.80E-02	7.0E-03	Assessed as included in the measurement value of the total α radioactivity
Pu-239 (About 24000 years)	4.0E+00	< 3.19E-02	8.0E-03	< 2.80E-02	7.0E-03	Assessed as included in the measurement value of the total α radioactivity
Pu-240 (About 6600 years)	4.0E+00	< 3.19E-02	8.0E-03	< 2.80E-02	7.0E-03	Assessed as included in the measurement value of the total α radioactivity
Pu-241 (About 14 years)	2.0E+02	< 1.16E+00	5.8E-03	< 1.02E+00	5.1E-03	Assessed from the radioactive concentration of Pu-238
Am-241 (About 430 years)	5.0E+00	< 3.19E-02	6.4E-03	< 2.80E-02	5.6E-03	Assessed as included in the measurement value of the total α radioactivity
Am-242m (About 140 years)	5.0E+00	< 5.77E-04	1.2E-04	< 5.05E-04	1.0E-04	Assessed from the radioactive concentration of Am-241
Am-243 (About 7400 years)	5.0E+00	< 3.19E-02	6.4E-03	< 2.80E-02	5.6E-03	Assessed as included in the measurement value of the total α radioactivity
Cm-242 (About 160 days)	6.0E+01	< 3.19E-02	5.3E-04	< 2.80E-02	4.7E-04	Assessed as included in the measurement value of the total α radioactivity
Cm-243 (About 29 years)	6.0E+00	< 3.19E-02	5.3E-03	< 2.80E-02	4.7E-03	Assessed as included in the measurement value of the total α radioactivity
Cm-244 (About 18 years)	7.0E+00	< 3.19E-02	4.6E-03	< 2.80E-02	4.0E-03	Assessed as included in the measurement value of the total α radioactivity
Sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of nuclides other than tritium		-	3.9E+02	-	2.2E-01	

II-5. Analysis of the radioactive materials in the stored ALPS treated water, etc.

As shown in II-3. “Performance of ALPS”, in measured point (7) of the ALPS outlet, mainly the seven nuclides detected significantly in the process of treatment among those subject to removal by ALPS (Cs-134, Cs-137, Co-60, Sb-125, Ru-106, Sr-90, and I-129) were measured. The result is shown on our web site.

Our web site:
https://www.tepco.co.jp/decommission/progress/watertreatment/images/exit.pdf (ja)
https://www.tepco.co.jp/en/decommission/progress/watertreatment/images/exit_en.pdf (en)

The judgment of whether stored water is regarded as “ALPS treated water” and “treated water to be purified” shall be performed according to the following procedure based on this measurement result.
In other words, when the transfer destination tank group (8 to 10 tanks connected at the time of water reception) becomes full, water of which ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of 63 nuclides other than tritium were estimated to be less than 1 using the following formula is judged as ALPS treated water and the other water as treated water to be purified, based on the measurement result of the sample (water) collected in the ALPS outlet (measured point (7)) during reception of water in the corresponding tanks group from ALPS.

$$C_{All} = C_{M7} + C_{C-14} + C_{55} < 1$$

where

- C_{All}: Sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of 63 nuclides other than tritium
- C_{M7}: Sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits calculated from the measurement results of the seven major nuclides
- $C_{C\text{-}14}$: Ratio to the regulatory concentrations limit of C-14 (conservatively set to the ratio to the regulatory concentrations limit of 0.11 calculated from the maximum concentration (215Bq/L) measured in the past)
- C_{55}: Estimated value of the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of the 55 nuclides not included in the 7 nuclides among the 62 nuclides (The estimated value based on the past measurement results is set to 0.3)

Based on the result of the measurement, nuclides deemed to be less than the detection limit (ND) are assumed to be included at the concentration of the lower limit of detection and the lower limit of detection is used for the assessment of the above formula. The following table shows examples of measurement results and values in the calculation of the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentration limits.

Table II-5 Relationship between the analysis results of the seven major nuclides and the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentration limits of the seven major nuclides

Nuclide	Cs-137	Cs-134	Co-60	Sb-125	Ru-106	Sr-90	I-129
Measured concentration	ND (<1.26E-01)	ND (<1.66E-01)	2.35E-01	ND (<4.57E-01)	ND (<1.15E00)	ND (<3.90E-01)	2.02E-01
Calculated concentration	1.26E-01	1.66E-01	2.35E-01	4.57E-01	1.15E+00	3.90E-01	2.02E-01
Regulatory concentration limit	9.00E+01	6.00E+01	2.00E+02	8.00E+02	1.00E+02	3.00E+01	9.00E+00
Ratio to regulatory concentration limit	1.40E-03	2.76E-03	1.18E-03	5.71E-04	1.15E-02	1.30E-02	2.24E-02
Sum of the regulatory ratios of the 7 nuclides (C_{M7})	0.05 (5.28E-02)						
Sum of the regulatory ratios of the 63 nuclides (C_{All})	0.05 (=C_{M7})+0.11(=$C_{C\text{-}14}$)+0.3(=C_{55})=0.46						

Figure II-5 shows the concentration distribution of the seven major nuclides arranged from the

analysis result of the tank group of which sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits other than tritium is estimated to be less than 1.

- Measured value of the radioactive concentration of each tank group (excluding reused tanks) (as of March 31, 2021)
- Secondary treatment test water
  https://www.tepco.co.jp/decommission/information/newsrelease/reference/pdf/2020/2h/rf_20201224_1.pdf



Figure II-5 Concentration distribution of the seven major nuclides in the analysis result of ALPS treated water (as of the end of March 2021)

* The analysis results in which sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of the 7 major nuclides is less than 0.59 (for 80 tanks) (excluding secondary treatment test water)

* The vertical axis indicates the number of tanks (counted as the lower detection limit if not detected)

* Values are measured values at the times and no half-life correction is considered.

Figure II-6 shows the analysis result concentration distribution created by extracting the analysis results of the analyzed tanks for tritium and C-14, which are not subject to removal by ALPS.



Figure II-6 Concentration distribution of tritium and C-14 in the analysis result of ALPS treated water, etc. (as of the end of March 2021)

* The analysis results of the tank group (189 tanks for tritium and 81 tanks for C-14) are plotted (excluding secondary treatment test water)
* The vertical axis indicates the number of tanks (counted as the lower detection limit if not detected)
* Values are measured values at the times and no half-life correction is considered.

As a result of the above-mentioned estimation, approx. 70% of the water currently stored in the tanks is judged to be “treated water to be purified,” which does not satisfy the above formula: in other words, the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of 63 nuclides (C_{All}) is greater than 1. “Treated water to be purified” is discharged only after secondary treatment is conducted immediately before future discharge into the sea, and after it is confirmed that the regulatory concentration limit is less than 1 with the facility for measurement and confirmation. In addition, this sample is not representative because each tank group does not have a necessary stirring device to guarantee the homogeneity. Therefore, for the actual judgment of whether the discharge is possible, the correct regulatory concentration limit obtained from the result of the measurement and assessment in the facility for measurement and confirmation is used.
All data of the past measurement and estimation results of the above-mentioned method are published on our web site. Our treatment water portal shows the measurement results of each tank group. The latest data is available in the following links.

Our web site (Japanese only):
https://www.tepco.co.jp/decommission/data/daily_analysis/tank/index-j.html

Treated water portal:
https://www.tepco.co.jp/decommission/progress/watertreatment/ (ja)
https://www.tepco.co.jp/en/decommission/progress/watertreatment/images/tankarea_en.pdf (en)

For the K4 tank group of which sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits becomes less than 1 after treated by ALPS once, the 64 nuclides included in the collected sample are measured and assessed according to the measurement and assessment method shown in Table II-6 (however, the representativeness of the sample is not secured). The K4 tank group is the receiving tank group in the operation considering the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of less than 1 in ALPS in FY 2016. For analysis, samples were collected from 24 locations, which are upper, middle, and lower layer of each 8 out of 35 tanks, the water samples were mixed (composite sample), and 62 nuclides were analyzed. For C-14, the average value of the results of analyses of samples taken from middle layer of five tanks after verification of the presence is shown. Table II-7 shows the results.

Table II-6 Measurement and assessment methods of each nuclide

No.	Nuclide	Radiation type	Measurement or assessment method
1	Mn-54	γ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
2	Fe-59	γ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
3	Co-58	γ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
4	Co-60	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
5	Ni-63	β	Isolated by resin, mixed with a scintillator, and counted by a low back liquid scintillation counter.
6	Zn-65	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
7	Rb-86	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
8	Sr-89	β	Isolated with resin, precipitated and recovered, mounted, and counted with the β nuclide analyzer in stainless steel dish
9	Sr-90	β	Isolated with resin, precipitated and recovered, mounted, and counted with the β nuclide analyzer in stainless steel dish
10	Y-90	β	Concentration assessment as Sr -90 and radioactive equilibrium
11	Y-91	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
12	Nb-95	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
13	Tc-99	β	Samples are diluted with dilute nitric acid and counted with the inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS).
14	Ru-103	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
15	Ru-106	β	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
16	Rh-103m	βγ	Concentration assessment as radioactive equilibrium with Ru-103
17	Rh-106	γ	Concentration assessment as radioactive equilibrium with Ru-106
18	Ag-110m	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
19	Cd-113m	γ	Isolated by ion exchange, mixed with a scintillator, and counted by a low back liquid scintillation counter.
20	Cd-115m	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
21	Sn-119m	γ	Assessed from the measured value of the radioactive concentration of Sn-123 and the calculated nuclide abundance ratio
22	Sn-123	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.

No.	Nuclide	Radiation type	Measurement or assessment method
23	Sn-126	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
24	Sb-124	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
25	Sb-125	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
26	Te-123m	γ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
27	Te-125m	γ	Concentration assessment as radioactive equilibrium with Sb-125
28	Te-127	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container, counted with a Ge semiconductor detector, and assessed using the half-life of the parent nuclide (Te-127m).
29	Te-127m	βγ	Assessed from the measured value of the radioactive concentration of Te-127 and the calculated nuclide abundance ratio
30	Te-129	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container, counted with a Ge semiconductor detector, and assessed using the half-life of the parent nuclide (Te-129m).
31	Te-129m	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
32	I-129	βγ	Samples were counted with the inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) after adjusting to iodate ion by the addition of reagents.
33	Cs-134	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
34	Cs-135	β	Assessed from the measured value of the radioactive concentration of Cs-137 and the calculated nuclide abundance ratio
35	Cs-136	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
36	Cs-137	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
37	Ba-137m	γ	Concentration assessment as radioactive equilibrium with Cs-137
38	Ba-140	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
39	Ce-141	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
40	Ce-144	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
41	Pr-144	βγ	Concentration assessment as radioactive equilibrium with Ce-144, using half-life of parent nuclide (Pr-144m)
42	Pr-144m	γ	Concentration assessment as radioactive equilibrium with Ce-144
43	Pm-146	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
44	Pm-147	βγ	Assessed from the measured value of the radioactive concentration of Eu-154 and the calculated nuclide abundance ratio
45	Pm-148	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
46	Pm-148m	γ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
47	Sm-151	βγ	Assessed from the measured value of the radioactive concentration of Eu-154 and the calculated nuclide abundance ratio
48	Eu-152	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
49	Eu-154	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
50	Eu-155	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and

No.	Nuclide	Radiation type	Measurement or assessment method
			counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
51	Gd-153	γ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
52	Tb-160	βγ	Homogenized samples are collected in a Marinelli container and counted with a Ge semiconductor detector.
53	Pu-238	α	After iron is removed by iron coprecipitation, the sample is evaporated to dryness in a stainless steel dish and the total α measured value counted with the ZnSα automatic measuring device is used as it is without proportionate division with other nuclides
54	Pu-239	α	After iron is removed by iron coprecipitation, the sample is evaporated to dryness in a stainless steel dish and the total α measured value counted with the ZnSα automatic measuring device is used as it is without proportionate division with other nuclides
55	Pu-240	α	After iron is removed by iron coprecipitation, the sample is evaporated to dryness in a stainless steel dish and the total α measured value counted with the ZnSα automatic measuring device is used as it is without proportionate division with other nuclides
56	Pu-241	β	Assessed from the total α discrete value and the isotopic ratio of Pu-238
57	Am-241	α	After iron is removed by iron coprecipitation, the sample is evaporated to dryness in a stainless steel dish and the total α measured value counted with the ZnSα automatic measuring device is used as it is without proportionate division with other nuclides
58	Am-242m	α	Assessed from the isotopic ratio of Am-241
59	Am-243	α	After iron is removed by iron coprecipitation, the sample is evaporated to dryness in a stainless steel dish and the total α measured value counted with the ZnSα automatic measuring device is used as it is without proportionate division with other nuclides
60	Cm-242	α	After iron is removed by iron coprecipitation, the sample is evaporated to dryness in a stainless steel dish and the total α measured value counted with the ZnSα automatic measuring device is used as it is without proportionate division with other nuclides
61	Cm-243	α	After iron is removed by iron coprecipitation, the sample is evaporated to dryness in a stainless steel dish and the total α measured value counted with the ZnSα automatic measuring device is used as it is without proportionate division with other nuclides
62	Cm-244	α	After iron is removed by iron coprecipitation, the sample is evaporated to dryness in a stainless steel dish and the total α measured value counted with the ZnSα automatic measuring device is used as it is without proportionate division with other nuclides
-	H-3(FWT)	β	Isolated by distillation, mixed with a scintillator, and counted by a low back liquid scintillation counter.
-	C-14	β	Converted to CO_2, collected and isolated on absorbent, mixed with a scintillator, and counted by a low back liquid scintillation counter.

Table II-7 Analysis result of the K4 tank group

Nuclide (Half-life)	Regulatory concentration limit [Bq/L]	Analysis result [Bq/L]	Ratio to regulatory limit	Remarks
H-3 (About 12 years)	6.0E+04	1.9E+05	3.2E+00	Dilute to less than 1,500Bq/L before discharge
C-14 (About 5700 years)	2.0E+03	1.5E+01	7.5E-03	
Mn-54 (About 310 days)	1.0E+03	< 6.7E-03	6.7E-06	
Fe-59 (About 44 days)	4.0E+02	< 1.7E-02	4.3E-05	
Co-58 (About 71 days)	1.0E+03	< 8.0E-03	8.0E-06	
Co-60 (About 5.3 years)	2.0E+02	4.4E-01	2.2E-03	
Ni-63 (About 100 days)	6.0E+03	2.2E+00	3.7E-04	
Zn-65 (About 240 days)	2.0E+02	< 1.5E-02	7.5E-05	
Rb-86 (About 19 days)	3.0E+02	< 1.9E-01	6.3E-04	
Sr-89 (About 51 days)	3.0E+02	< 1.0E-01	3.3E-04	
Sr-90 (About 29 years)	3.0E+01	2.2E-01	7.3E-03	
Y-90 (About 64 hours)	3.0E+02	2.2E-01	7.3E-04	Radioactive equilibrium with Sr-90
Y-91 (About 59 days)	3.0E+02	< 2.2E+00	7.3E-03	
Nb-95 (About 35 days)	1.0E+03	< 1.0E-02	1.0E-05	
Tc-99 (About 210 thousand years)	1.0E+03	7.0E-01	7.0E-04	
Ru-103 (About 39 days)	1.0E+03	< 1.0E-02	1.0E-05	
Ru-106 (About 370 days)	1.0E+02	1.6E+00	1.6E-02	
Rh-103m (About 56 minutes)	2.0E+05	< 1.0E-02	5.0E-08	Radioactive equilibrium with Ru-103
Rh-106 (About 30 seconds)	3.0E+05	1.6E+00	5.3E-06	Radioactive equilibrium with Ru-106
Ag-110m (About 250 days)	3.0E+02	< 5.6E-03	1.9E-05	
Cd-113m (About 14 years)	4.0E+01	< 1.8E-02	4.5E-04	
Cd-115m (45 days)	3.0E+02	< 6.4E-01	2.1E-03	
Sn-119m (About 290 days)	2.0E+03	< 1.7E-01	8.5E-05	Assessed from the radioactive concentration of Sn-123
Sn-123 (About 130 days)	4.0E+02	< 1.2E+00	3.0E-03	
Sn-126 (About 230 thousand years)	2.0E+02	< 2.7E-02	1.4E-04	

Nuclide (Half-life)	Regulatory concentration limit [Bq/L]	Analysis result [Bq/L]	Ratio to regulatory limit	Remarks
Sb-124 (About 60 days)	3.0E+02	< 9.5E-03	3.2E-05	
Sb-125 (About 2.8 years)	8.0E+02	3.3E-01	4.1E-04	
Te-123m (About 120 days)	6.0E+02	< 9.2E-03	1.5E-05	
Te-125m (About 57 days)	9.0E+02	3.3E-01	3.7E-04	Radioactive equilibrium with Sb-125
Te-127 (About 9.4 hours)	5.0E+03	< 3.2E-01	6.4E-05	
Te-127m (About 110 days)	3.0E+02	< 3.2E-01	1.1E-03	Assessed from the radioactive concentration of Te-127
Te-129 (About 70 minutes)	1.0E+04	< 8.1E-02	8.1E-06	
Te-129m (About 34 days)	3.0E+02	< 3.2E-01	1.1E-03	
I-129 (About 16 million years)	9.0E+00	2.1E+00	2.3E-01	
Cs-134 (About 2.1 years)	6.0E+01	4.5E-02	7.5E-04	
Cs-135 (About 2.3 million years)	6.0E+02	2.5E-06	4.2E-09	Assessed from the radioactive concentration of Cs-137
Cs-136 (About 13 days)	3.0E+02	< 3.0E-02	1.0E-04	
Cs-137 (About 30 years)	9.0E+01	4.2E-01	4.7E-03	
Ba-137m (About 2.6 minutes)	8.0E+05	4.2E-01	5.3E-07	Radioactive equilibrium with Cs-137
Ba-140 (About 13 days)	3.0E+02	< 9.5E-02	3.2E-04	
Ce-141 (About 33 days)	1.0E+03	< 2.5E-02	2.5E-05	
Ce-144 (About 280 days)	2.0E+02	< 6.3E-02	3.2E-04	
Pr-144 (About 17 minutes)	2.0E+04	< 6.3E-02	3.2E-06	Radioactive equilibrium with Ce-144
Pr-144m (About 7.2 minutes)	4.0E+04	< 6.3E-02	1.6E-06	Radioactive equilibrium with Ce-144
Pm-146 (About 5.5 years)	9.0E+02	< 9.8E-02	1.1E-04	
Pm-147 (About 2.6 years)	3.0E+03	< 1.9E-01	6.3E-05	Assessed from the radioactive concentration of Eu-154
Pm-148 (About 5.4 days)	3.0E+02	< 5.0E-01	1.7E-03	
Pm-148m (About 41 days)	5.0E+02	< 8.4E-03	1.7E-05	
Sm-151 (About 90 years)	8.0E+03	< 9.0E-04	1.1E-07	Assessed from the radioactive concentration of Eu-154

Nuclide (Half-life)	Regulatory concentration limit [Bq/L]	Analysis result [Bq/L]	Ratio to regulatory limit	Remarks
Eu-152 (About 14 years)	6.0E+02	< 2.8E-02	4.7E-05	
Eu-154 (About 8.6 years)	4.0E+02	< 1.2E-02	3.0E-05	
Eu-155 (About 4.8 years)	3.0E+03	< 3.3E-02	1.1E-05	
Gd-153 (About 240 days)	3.0E+03	< 3.2E-02	1.1E-05	
Tb-160 (About 72 days)	5.0E+02	< 2.8E-02	5.6E-05	
Pu-238 (About 88 years)	4.0E+00	< 6.3E-04	1.6E-04	Assessed as included in the measurement value of the total α radioactivity
Pu-239 (About 24000 years)	4.0E+00	< 6.3E-04	1.6E-04	Assessed as included in the measurement value of the total α radioactivity
Pu-240 (About 6600 years)	4.0E+00	< 6.3E-04	1.6E-04	Assessed as included in the measurement value of the total α radioactivity
Pu-241 (About 14 years)	2.0E+02	< 2.8E-02	1.4E-04	Assessed from the radioactive concentration of Pu-238
Am-241 (About 430 years)	5.0E+00	< 6.3E-04	1.3E-04	Assessed as included in the measurement value of the total α radioactivity
Am-242m (About 140 years)	5.0E+00	< 3.9E-05	7.8E-06	Assessed from the radioactive concentration of Am-241
Am-243 (About 7400 years)	5.0E+00	< 6.3E-04	1.3E-04	Assessed as included in the measurement value of the total α radioactivity
Cm-242 (About 160 days)	6.0E+01	< 6.3E-04	1.1E-05	Assessed as included in the measurement value of the total α radioactivity
Cm-243 (About 29 years)	6.0E+00	< 6.3E-04	1.1E-04	Assessed as included in the measurement value of the total α radioactivity
Cm-244 (About 18 years)	7.0E+00	< 6.3E-04	9.0E-05	Assessed as included in the measurement value of the total α radioactivity
Sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of 63 nuclides other than tritium			2.9E-01	

*The analysis result of C-14 is the average value of measurement results of samples from middle layer of five tanks (K4-A1, B1, C5, D1, E1) taken between on May 21 and June 2, 2020, the analysis result of H-3 is the average value of measurement results of samples from three tanks (K4-A6, B6, E5; average value of measurement results of samples from upper, middle, lower layer respectively) taken between on October 26 and 31, 2017 and samples from five tanks, (K4-A1, B1, C5, D1, E1; measurement results of samples from middle layer) taken between on May 21 an Jun2, 2020.
The analysis results of the other nuclides are the results of composite sample of total of 24 sampling locations of upper, middle, and lower layer in each eight tanks (K4-A1, A6, B1, B6, C5, D1, E1, E5) taken between on October 26 and 31, 2017.

II-6. Water quality other than radioactive materials

As mentioned above, ALPS is equipped with coprecipitation, adsorption, and physical filters, etc., all of which are used to remove the 62 nuclides subject to removal regardless of their chemical forms. Judging from the past analysis results, not only radioactive materials but also materials that may affect the water quality are removed when passing through the filters.
Table II-8 shows the tank group from which samples were collected and the timing of receiving water stored in the tanks[11]. Table II-9-1 and 2 show the results of the 46 measurement items based on our "general wastewater treatment management guideline." It was verified that all of them met the standards set by the laws and ordinances in Japan. It should be noted that since no facility to secure the representativeness of samples is installed in the tank group, in this analysis, one tank is randomly selected from the tank group and samples collected from the middle layer of the tank are analyzed without stirring or circulation, so the representativeness is not necessarily secured.

Table II-8 Tank group of which chemical substances were analyzed based on the general wastewater standard, and timing of receiving water

Area	Groups	Time of receiving ALPS treated water, etc.
G3	A	FY 2013
J4	B	FY 2014
H1	E	FY 2015
K3	A	FY 2016
K4	A	FY 2016
H2	C	FY 2017
G1S	A	FY 2018

Table II-9-1 Results of analyses of chemical substances, etc., in tanks containing ALPS treated water, etc. (Part 1)

Item	Guideline or permissible limit	Unit	Area and tank group			
			G3	J4	H1	K3
			A	B	E	A
Hydrogen ion	5.0< /<9.0	pH	8.8	8.3	7.8	8.3
Mass of suspended solids (SS)	Permissible limit 200 (Daily average 150)	mg/L	<1	<1	<1	<1
Chemical oxygen demand (COD)	Permissible limit 160 (Daily average 120)	mg/L	2.4	2.8	3.9	3.9

[11] December 28, 2018, "Analysis of chemical substance in tanks containing ALPS treated water etc." https://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/osensuitaisaku/committtee/takakusyu/pdf/012_04_01.pdf

Item	Guideline or permissible limit	Unit	Area and tank group			
			G3	J4	H1	K3
			A	B	E	A
Boron (mg/L)	Permissible limit 230 (Sea area)	mg/L	3.5	4.4	2.3	0.9
Soluble iron	Permissible limit 10	mg/L	<1	<1	<1	<1
Copper	Permissible limit 3	mg/L	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Nickel	Permissible limit 2	mg/L	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Chromium	Permissible limit 2	mg/L	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Zinc	Permissible limit 2	mg/L	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Biochemical oxygen demand (BOD)	Permissible limit 160 (Daily average 120)	mg/L	<1	<1	<1	<1
Coliform count	Permissible limit Daily average 3000	Pieces/cm3	0	0	0	0
Cadmium	Permissible limit 0.03	mg/L	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01
Cyan	Permissible limit 1	mg/L	<0.05	<0.05	<0.05	<0.05
Organic phosphorus	Permissible limit 1	mg/L	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Lead	Permissible limit 0.1	mg/L	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01
Hexavalent chromium	Permissible limit 0.5	mg/L	<0.05	<0.05	<0.05	<0.05
Arsenic	Permissible limit 0.1	mg/L	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01
Mercury	Permissible limit 0.005	mg/L	<0.0005	<0.0005	<0.0005	<0.0005
Alkyl mercury	It should not be detected	mg/L	<0.0005	<0.0005	<0.0005	<0.0005
Polychlorinated biphenyls	Permissible limit 0.003	mg/L	<0.0005	<0.0005	<0.0005	<0.0005
Trichloroethylene	Permissible limit 0.1	mg/L	<0.03	<0.03	<0.03	<0.03
Tetrachloroethylene	Permissible limit 0.1	mg/L	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01
Dichloromethane	Permissible limit 0.2	mg/L	<0.02	<0.02	<0.02	<0.02
Carbon tetrachloride	Permissible limit 0.02	mg/L	<0.002	<0.002	<0.002	<0.002
1,2-dichloroethane	Permissible limit 0.04	mg/L	<0.004	<0.004	<0.004	<0.004
1,1-dichloroethane	Permissible limit 1	mg/L	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Cis-1, 2-dichloroethylene	Permissible limit 0.4	mg/L	<0.04	<0.04	<0.04	<0.04
1,1,1-trichloroethane	Permissible limit 3	mg/L	<0.3	<0.3	<0.3	<0.3
1,1,2-trichloroethane	Permissible limit 0.06	mg/L	<0.006	<0.006	<0.006	<0.006
1,3-dichloropropene	Permissible limit 0.02	mg/L	<0.002	<0.002	<0.002	<0.002
Thiuram	Permissible limit 0.06	mg/L	<0.006	<0.006	<0.006	<0.006
Simazine	Permissible limit 0.03	mg/L	<0.003	<0.003	<0.003	<0.003
Thiobencarb	Permissible limit 0.2	mg/L	<0.02	<0.02	<0.02	<0.02
Benzene	Permissible limit 0.1	mg/L	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01

Item	Guideline or permissible limit	Unit	Area and tank group			
			G3	J4	H1	K3
			A	B	E	A
Selenium	Permissible limit 0.1	mg/L	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01
Fenitrothion	Permissible limit 0.03	mg/L	<0.003	<0.003	<0.003	<0.003
Phenols	Permissible limit 5	mg/L	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Fluorine	Permissible element 15 (Sea area)	mg/L	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Soluble manganese	Permissible limit 10	mg/L	<1	<1	<1	<1
Ammonia, ammonium compounds	Permissible limit 100	mg/L	<1	<1	<1	<1
Nitrous acid compound and nitrous acid compound		mg/L	2	2	<1	11
1,4-dioxane	Permissible limit 0.5	mg/L	<0.05	<0.05	<0.05	<0.05
n-Hexane Extract (Mineral oil)	Permissible limit 5	mg/L	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
n-Hexane Extract (Animal and vegetable oil)	Permissible limit 30	mg/L	<1	<1	<1	<1
Nitrogen	Permissible limit 120 (Daily average 60)	mg/L	2	2.3	0.7	11.1
Phosphate	Permissible limit 16 (Daily average 8)	mg/L	<0.05	<0.05	<0.05	<0.05

Table II-9-2 Results of analyses of chemical substances, etc. in tanks containing ALPS treated water, etc. (Part 2)

Item	Guideline or permissible limit	Unit	Area and tank group		
			K4	H2	G1S
			A	C	A
Hydrogen ion	5.0< /<9.0	pH	8.3	8.5	8.3
Mass of suspended solids (SS)	Permissible limit 200 (Daily average 150)	mg/L	<1	<1	<1
Chemical oxygen demand (COD)	Permissible limit 160 (Daily average 120)	mg/L	0.9	1.8	1.5
Boron (mg/L)	Permissible limit 230 (Sea area)	mg/L	0.4	1.1	1.1
Soluble iron	Permissible limit 10	mg/L	<1	<1	<1
Copper	Permissible limit 3	mg/L	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Nickel	Permissible limit 2	mg/L	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Chromium	Permissible limit 2	mg/L	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1

Item	Guideline or permissible limit	Unit	Area and tank group		
			K4	H2	G1S
			A	C	A
Zinc	Permissible limit 2	mg/L	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Biochemical oxygen demand (BOD)	Permissible limit 160 (Daily average 120)	mg/L	2	<1	<1
Coliform count	Permissible limit Daily average 3000	Pieces/cm3	0	0	0
Cadmium	Permissible limit 0.03	mg/L	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01
Cyan	Permissible limit 1	mg/L	<0.05	<0.05	<0.05
Organic phosphorus	Permissible limit 1	mg/L	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Lead	Permissible limit 0.1	mg/L	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01
Hexavalent chromium	Permissible limit 0.5	mg/L	<0.05	<0.05	<0.05
Arsenic	Permissible limit 0.1	mg/L	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01
Mercury	Permissible limit 0.005	mg/L	<0.0005	<0.0005	<0.0005
Alkyl mercury	It should not be detected	mg/L	<0.0005	<0.0005	<0.0005
Polychlorinated biphenyls	Permissible limit 0.003	mg/L	<0.0005	<0.0005	<0.0005
Trichloroethylene	Permissible limit 0.1	mg/L	<0.03	<0.03	<0.03
Tetrachloroethylene	Permissible limit 0.1	mg/L	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01
Dichloromethane	Permissible limit 0.2	mg/L	<0.02	<0.02	<0.02
Carbon tetrachloride	Permissible limit 0.02	mg/L	<0.002	<0.002	<0.002
1,2-dichloroethane	Permissible limit 0.04	mg/L	<0.004	<0.004	<0.004
1,1-dichloroethane	Permissible limit 1	mg/L	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Cis-1, 2-dichloroethylene	Permissible limit 0.4	mg/L	<0.04	<0.04	<0.04
1,1,1-trichloroethane	Permissible limit 3	mg/L	<0.3	<0.3	<0.3
1,1,2-trichloroethane	Permissible limit 0.06	mg/L	<0.006	<0.006	<0.006
1,3-dichloropropene	Permissible limit 0.02	mg/L	<0.002	<0.002	<0.002
Thiuram	Permissible limit 0.06	mg/L	<0.006	<0.006	<0.006
Simazine	Permissible limit 0.03	mg/L	<0.003	<0.003	<0.003
Thiobencarb	Permissible limit 0.2	mg/L	<0.02	<0.02	<0.02
Benzene	Permissible limit 0.1	mg/L	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01
Selenium	Permissible limit 0.1	mg/L	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01
Fenitrothion	Permissible limit 0.03	mg/L	<0.003	<0.003	<0.003
Phenols	Permissible limit 5	mg/L	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1
Fluorine	Permissible element 15 (Sea area)	mg/L	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
Soluble manganese	Permissible limit 10	mg/L	<1	<1	<1

Item	Guideline or permissible limit	Unit	Area and tank group		
			K4	H2	G1S
			A	C	A
Ammonia, ammonium compounds	Permissible limit 100	mg/L	<1	<1	<1
Nitrous acid compound and nitrous acid compound		mg/L	25	7	10
1,4-dioxane	Permissible limit 0.5	mg/L	<0.05	<0.05	<0.05
n-Hexane Extract (Mineral oil)	Permissible limit 5	mg/L	<0.5	<0.5	<0.5
n-Hexane Extract (Animal and vegetable oil)	Permissible limit 30	mg/L	<1	<1	<1
Nitrogen	Permissible limit 120 (Daily average 60)	mg/L	24.6	7.5	10
Phosphate	Permissible limit 16 (Daily average 8)	mg/L	<0.05	<0.05	<0.05

II-7. Reason for generation of treated water to be purified

ALPS can remove the 62 nuclides subject to removal from contaminated water and make the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits less than 1 by performing treatment once, but as a result of estimation by the above-mentioned method, “treated water to be purified” of which contained radioactive material concentration is equivalent to or higher than the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of 1 and which is to be subject to secondary treatment accounts for 70% of all water stored in the tank (about 67% as of February 2022). The following shows the reason depending on the timing of each treatment.

a. FY 2013 to 2015

Highly contaminated water with only cesium removed was stored in tanks at the site prior to the start of the operation of ALPS. Due to the direct radiation and skyshine rays from the highly contaminated water, the radiation dose at the boundary of the site was very large and assessed to be 9.76mSv/year at the site boundary, which greatly exceeded the standard set by the government, “The effective dose at the site boundary is less than 1mSv/year.”
In response to this situation, we continued the operation while accepting the outlet concentration of each adsorption vessel slightly exceeding the replacement standard and treated highly contaminated water raising the operating rate, aiming at early achievement of the effective dose of 1mSv/year at the site boundary.
As a result, the effective dose of 1mSv/year at the site boundary was achieved at the end of FY 2015, but naturally, treated water to be purified of which radioactive material concentration is equivalent to or higher than the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of 1 was stored in the tanks.
It was immediately after the start of the operation of ALPS, so excessive concentrations also occurred due to facility trouble. Treated water to be purified of which sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits exceeds 10 thousand was caused by the facility trouble, but the cause of the facility trouble has been removed and the event has not reoccurred.

b. FY 2016

In this period, the treatment capacity exceeded the speed of tank construction due to the advancement of treatment of highly concentrated water up to the preceding fiscal year, so tanks for storage of treated water were lacking, but treatment was performed to make the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits less than 1 by accelerating construction of tanks for storage of treated water and making use of the performance of ALPS.
Like this, the original performance of ALPS was used more appropriately than before, which reduced the frequency of treated water to be treated of which sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits is 1 or more.

c. FY 2017 to 2018

Immediately after the accident, we hastened to collect tanks from all over Japan and used them for storage of contaminated water, etc. However, among these flange tanks, leak events occurred one after another, and the storage of strontium treated water (water from which most of the cesium and strontium has been removed before the treatment by ALPS) became an issue during this period.
Therefore, we decided to perform early treatment of the stored strontium treated water (water before treatment by ALPS) by ALPS to solve the issue of storage in flange tanks aiming at completion by the end of FY 2018, and raised the operating ratio while accepting slightly excessive concentrations at the outlet of each adsorption vessel again.
As a result, the treatment of all strontium treated water in the flange tanks was completed in November 2018, but compared to FY2016, the frequency of exceeding the regulatory concentration limit was higher.
All ALPS treated water, etc., stored in flange tanks have been transferred to weld tanks by March 2019.

Attachment III Impact of the organically bound tritium in the exposure assessment of tritium

ALPS treated water contains a lot of tritium water (HTO). If ingested, tritium water is converted to free water tritium (FWT), which behaves as normal water (H_2O) keeping the form of tritium water to organically bound tritium (OBT), a part of which is ingested into the tissue. OBT remains in the body longer and has greater exposure effects than FWT, so ICRP sets its effective dose factor of ingestion of OBT separately from tritium water. FWT is a name representing behavior in the body, but it is the same as tritium water, so it is written as HTO in this document.

III-1. Disposition of tritium

According to the model of ICRP Publication 56[III-1], about 3% of tritiated water (HTO) taken into the body changes into OBT and remains in the body longer than HTO. The half-life of HTO in the body is about 10 days, while that of OBT is about 40 days. (Figure III-1)
On the other hand, when tritium is taken into the body as OBT, 50% is assumed to be immediately converted to HTO in the blood. With the half-life mentioned above, each of OBT and HTO is eventually excreted from the blood as HTO. (Figure III-2)
Based on such a pharmacokinetic model in the body, ICRP Publication 72 [III-2] sets the effective dose factors for tritium as follows.

- Tritiated water (HTO) 1.8E-11 Sv/Bq
- Organically bound tritium (OBT) 4.2E-11 Sv/Bq



Figure III-1ICRP model for ingestion of tritiated water (HTO)
(Source: Annex C [III-3] of UNSCEAR2016)



Figure III-2 ICRP model for ingestion of OBT

(Source: Annex C of UNSCEAR2016)

The ICRP Publication 134 [III-4] provides a new pharmacokinetic model that incorporates OBT with a biological half-life of about 40 days and OBT with a biological half-life of about 1 year, which remains in the body for a more extended period. (Figures III-3 and III-4)

The effective dose factors based on this model are higher than those presented in ICRP Publication 72, as shown below. Even so, calculating exposures using those factors does not significantly affect the exposure assessment results.

- Tritiated water (HTO) 1.9E-11 Sv/Bq
- Organically bound tritium (OBT) 5.1E-11 Sv/Bq

The model predicts that about 6% of total tritium in the body will be OBT if HTO is ingested continuously.



Figure III-3 New ICRP model for ingestion of HTO

(Source: Annex C of UNSCEAR2016)



Figure III-4 New ICRP model for ingestion of OBT

(Source: Annex C of UNSCEAR2016)

III-2. Impact of ingestion of OBT on the exposure assessment

ALPS is equipped with coprecipitation, adsorption, and physical filters, etc., which are used to eliminate the 62 nuclides subject to removal regardless of their chemical forms. None of the past analysis results shows the inclusion of a lot of organic matters (See Attachment II "Water quality of ALPS treated water, etc."). Therefore, all tritium contained in ALPS treated water was assumed to be HTO in the assessment of internal exposure by drinking and ingestion of seawater spray without considering OBT.

On the other hand, a part of HTO is converted to OBT in animals and vegetables in the environment, so a part of the tritium ingested as seafood is considered to be OBT. However, since no concentration in the environment that changes the isotopic ratio between tritium and hydrogen is seen, and water accounts for about 70 to 90% of seafood, it is considered that OBT does not change the tritium concentration in seafood significantly.

The effective dose factor $DC_{correction}$ can be represented by the following formula where the effective dose factor of ingestion of HTO is DC_{FWT}, that of ingestion of OBT is DC_{OBT}, and the ratio of OBT to the ingested tritium is X%.

$$DC_{correction} = (1-X/100)\cdot DC_{FWT} + X/100\cdot DC_{OBT} \quad \text{(III-1)}$$

Table III-1 shows the effective dose factor corrected by the formula (III-1).

In this report, the calculation was made with the percentage of OBT as 10% in the assessment of internal exposure from ingestion of seafood.

Table III-1 Effective dose factor corrected by the percentage of OBT in tritium ingested from seafood

Percentage of OBT of seafood (%)	Effective dose factor (mSv/Bq)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
0	1.8E-08	3.1E-08	6.4E-08	
10	2.0E-08	3.5E-08	7.0E-08	Used for the assessment
20	2.3E-08	3.9E-08	7.5E-08	
100	4.2E-08	7.3E-08	1.2E-07	

III-3. OBT of marine plants and animals

For the isotopic ratio between HTO and OBT in the environment, the result of monitoring performed around the La Hague reprocessing plant in France is shown (Figure III-5) [III-5]. The isotopic ratio is the same in any species including fish and seaweed, so no trend of concentration has been observed.



Figure III-5 Investigation result of the OBT and HTO concentrations in marine plants and animals performed in the sea area around the La Hague reprocessing plant

In our monitoring of fish continued since 2014 around the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, OBT has never been observed in the 83 samples measured so far.

References

[III-1] ICRP Publication 56 "Age-dependent Doses to Members of the Public from Intake of Radionuclides - Part1",1989

[III-2] ICRP Publication 72 " Age-dependent Doses to the Members of the Public from Intake of Radionuclides - Part 5 Compilation of Ingestion and Inhalation Coefficients",1995

[III-3] UNSCEAR 2016 Report “SOURCES, EFFECTS AND RISKS OF IONIZING RADIATION UNSCEAR 2016 Report ANNEX C BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF SELECTED INTERNAL EMITTERS - TRITIUM”,2017

[III-4] ICRP Publication 134 "Occupational Intakes of Radionuclides: Part 2",2016

[III-5] Bruno Fiévet, Julien Pommier, Claire Voiseux, Pascal Bailly du Bois, Philippe Laguionie, Catherine Cossonnet, and Luc Solier “Transfer of Tritium Released into the Marine Environment by French Nuclear Facilities Bordering the English Channel”,2013

Attachment IV　Analysis on the period of discharge of ALPS treated water

At the FDNPS, it is planned to secure the site necessary for decommissioning based on the "Mid- and Long-term Roadmap toward Decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station of Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc." and the "Reduction Target Map of Mid-term Risks of TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi NPS" by installing facilities for dilution and discharge of ALPS treated water and related facilities to discharge ALPS treated water stored in the tanks.
The following shows that the site necessary for decommissioning can be secured by discharging ALPS treated water and reducing the tanks according to the plan, using the ALPS treated water discharge simulation.

IV-1. Prerequisites for ALPS treated water discharge simulation

The following describes the simulation period, the specifications of the dilution and discharge facilities, and the conditions regarding the ALPS treated water to be discharged as the prerequisites of ALPS treated water discharge simulation.
The unit of the simulation period shall be one year from FY 2021[1]; discharge is to be started in FY 2023 and discharge is to be completed in FY 2051[2].
As the specifications of the dilution and discharge facilities, the flow rate of ALPS treated water is assumed to be up to 500m^3/day and the annual operating rate 80% (292 days of discharge). The seawater flow rate is assumed to be 170 to 510 thousand m^3/day with 1 to 3 seawater pumps assumed to be in operation.
As conditions regarding ALPS treated water to be discharged, the upper limit of the annual discharge amount of tritium is assumed to be 22 TBq. The tank capacity in each fiscal year shall be a constraint condition because the purpose of discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea is to secure the site necessary for decommissioning. In addition, tritium is a radioactive material of which half-life is about 12 years, so the annual reduction amount is assumed to be about 5.5%. It is planned to discharge a small amount in the early stage of discharge so the annual discharge amount of tritium of FY 2023 is set to half of that of FY 2024.
In addition, the ALPS treated water to be discharged in the future includes "(A) ALPS treated water to be generated daily" and "(B) ALPS treated water, etc., stored in the tanks." As the discharge order of the water, it is assumed that about 30 thousand m^3 of "ALPS treated water stored in the tank" in the K4 tanks used as facilities for measurement and confirmation will be discharged and then "ALPS treated water to be generated daily" and "ALPS treated water

[1] The business year in Japan starts on April 1st and ends on March 31st of the following year.
[2] In the Mid- and Long-term Roadmap, the goal is set to the completion of decommissioning 30 to 40 years after December 2011, in which the discharge of radioactive materials was managed and the radiation dose was greatly inhibited.

stored in the tank" will be discharged in ascending order of the tritium concentration. Discharge of "ALPS treated water to be generated daily" is to be continued as long as it is generated until the total amount of tritium in the building becomes 0. In doing so, the generation amount of contaminated water is assumed to decrease 10m^3/day every year step by step so that the daily generation amount of "ALPS treated water to be generated daily" will become 100m^3/day after 2025.

Table IV-1 Prerequisites for ALPS treated water discharge simulation

Annual release of tritium (Less than 22 TBq/year)	Set the total amount of discharge so that discharge into the sea will be completed in FY 2051 to the extent that it will not affect the site utilization plan
Simulation assessment start date	April 1, 2021 (simulation by year)
Discharge start date	April 1, 2023
ALPS treated water flow rate	Up to 500 m^3/day
Seawater flow rate for dilution	170 thousand m^3/day (1 seawater pump) to 510 thousand m^3/day (3 seawater pumps)
ALPS treated water discharge order	About 30 thousand m^3 of water in the K4 tank used as facilities for measurement and confirmation will be discharged in ascending order of the tritium concentration After that, the water in the other tanks and the newly generated ALPS treated water will also be discharged in ascending order of the tritium concentration
Tritium decay	The half-life is considered to be about 12 years (decrease by about 5.5% in 1 year) and decay is considered for newly generation one as well
ALPS treated water generation amount	The generation amount of contaminated water is assumed to decrease 10m^3/day every year step by step so that it will become 100m^3/day after FY 2025
Number of days of discharge	292 days (Operating rate: 80%)

"ALPS treated water to be generated daily" will be generated in the future and is highly uncertain, so the assessment was performed in two cases: cases with the largest and smallest total amounts of tritium, respectively. In the case with the largest total amount of tritium, it is assumed that the concentration of newly generated tritium is the largest value, 448 thousand Bq/L, between January and June 2021 and the total amount of tritium in the building is about 1150 TBq assuming that the whole of 3400 TBq remain in the building or tanks at the time of the accident. In the case with the smallest total amount of tritium, it is assumed that the concentration of newly generated tritium is the smallest value, 215 thousand Bq/L, between January and June 2021 and the total amount of tritium in the building estimated from the stagnant water storage amount and concentration in the building is about 81 TBq.

Table IV-2 Assessment case of ALPS treated water discharge simulation

Case	Case with the largest total amount of tritium	Case with the smallest total amount of tritium
Concentration of newly generated tritium	448 thousand Bq/L (January 5, 2021, Largest in 2021)	215 thousand Bq/L (June 1, 2021, Smallest in 2021)
Total amount of tritium in the building (As of April 1, 2021)	About 1150 TBq (At the time of the accident, the whole of 3400 TBq remained in the building and tanks)	About 81 TBq (Estimated from the stagnant water storage amount and concentration in the building)

Based on these prerequisites, we assessed the minimum value of the annual tritium discharge amount of every year, the water storage amount of ALPS treated water, etc., the average flow rate of ALPS treated water, and the average tritium concentration before and after seawater dilution.

IV-2. ALPS treated water discharge simulation result

For each case, we changed the annual total tritium charge amount not to affect the site usage plan and assessed the total discharge amount, with which discharge into the sea will be assessed in FY 2051. As a result, it was verified that the maximum and minimum annual tritium discharge amounts of the case with the largest and smallest total tritium amount are up to 22 and 16 TBq, respectively, and discharge will be completed by FY 2051 with the annual amount below 22 TBq in both cases.
The annual tritium discharge amount of each fiscal year was 11 TBq/year in FY 2023, 22 TBq/year between FY 2024 and FY 2029, 18 TBq/year between FY 2030 and FY 2032, and 16 TBq/year in and after FY 2033 in the case with the largest total tritium amount. On the other hand, it was 8 TBq/year in FY 2023, 16 TBq/year between FY 2024 and FY 2028, and 11 TBq/year in and after FY 2029 in the case with the smallest total tritium amount.



Figure IV-1 Case with the largest total amount of tritium



Figure IV-2 Case with the smallest total amount of tritium

Attachment V　Impacts of intake and discharge of diluted water on outside

For discharge of ALPS treated water, the concentration of tritium, which is difficult to remove, is diluted with seawater 100 or more times until it becomes less than 1,500Bq/L, which is much lower than that specified in laws and regulations, before discharge. The seawater for diluting the ALPS treated water is planned to be taken from the unit 5 intake. However, regarding the seawater concentration within the port, the concentration of radioactive materials is slightly higher than that of the seawater in the surrounding sea area. Considering this point, as well as the impact of the seabed soil within the port, the seawater will be drawn from the north side of the unit 5/6 discharge outlet in the plan.

V-1.　State of the concentration in seawater in the port

The current state of Cs-137 concentration in the port is shown in Figure V-1. The concentration near the water intake of units 1 to 4 is high, and it becomes lower as measurement points are away from the water intake of units 1 to 4 toward the port outlet or units 5/6.



Figure V-1　State of the Cs-137 concentration in the port

V-2.　Assumed impacts of intake and discharge of seawater for dilution on outside and countermeasures

As shown in V-1., the radioactive material concentration in seawater in the port tends to be high near units 1 - 4 intake. Seawater for dilution is planned to be taken from near the unit 5 intake and seawater with high concentration may be drawn from the unit 1 - 4 intake open-channel to the unit 5/6 side.

As a countermeasure in the installation of intake facilities, a unit 5/6 intake open-channel will be separated with a partition weir (riprap sloping weir + sheet) for prevention of inflow of seawater from the units 1 - 4 side, and instead a part of the north breakwater permeation prevention work will be remodeled so that the seawater for dilution is taken in from outside the port. (Figure V-2)

As a result, the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater in the unit 5/6 intake open-channel may decrease. In contrast, the concentration around the unloading wharf, where diffusion to the unit 5/6 intake channel will be restricted, may slightly increase, but the impact of intake and discharge of seawater for dilution on outside is considered to be inhibited.



Figure V-2 Intake and discharge plan and state of the Cs-137 concentration in the port

V-3. Assessment of the impacts of intake and discharge of seawater for dilution on outside

To verify the effect of the countermeasure, external effects were compared and assessed in cases where seawater inside the port (area on the side of units 1 to 4) is taken in and where seawater outside the port (north side of the unit 5/6 discharge outlet) is taken in.

The assessment was performed by adding the movement amount of the radioactive materials that move to outside the port with seawater for dilution to the source term in the human exposure assessment of discharge of ALPS treated water.

(1) Setting of the movement amount of the radioactive materials added to the source term

Concentrations of seawater for dilution used for comparison and assessment are set based on the monitoring results (for about 3 years from FY 2019). The water taken from the outside of the port was on the north of the unit 5/6 discharge outlet, and the water taken within the port was north side within the port. (Figure V-3)

The target nuclides are Cs-137, Sr-90, and tritium whose presence in the seawater in the port was verified and which are subject to monitoring (For Cs-137 and Sr-90, the progeny nuclides, Ba-137 and Y-90, are assumed to be contained at the same concentration in the equilibrium state).

The minimum detection limits differ between the port and outside the port (it is higher within the port). Based on this, there is a possibility that the Cs-137 and tritium on the north side within the port are overestimated, but it is clear that the concentrations on the north side of the unit 5/6 discharge outlet are lower.



Figure V-3 Radioactive material concentration of seawater for dilution used for comparison and assessment

The movement amount M(i) of nuclide i, which is a radioactive material included in seawater for dilution (if three seawater pumps for dilution are in operation) and moving to outside the port, was calculated from the concentration in seawater for diluted water, $C_D(i)$, set above by the following equation:

$M(i)$ [Bq/year] = $C_D(i)$ [Bq/L] × 510,000 [m^3/day] × 1000 [L/m^3] × 365 [day/year] × 0.8 (availability rate)

Two types of source terms were used for the assessment: “measured values of the K4 tank group” and “measured values of the J1-G tank group” used for radiological impact assessment. The amount of added radioactivity transferred is shown in Table V-1.

Table V-1 Annual amount of radioactivity transferred by nuclide of seawater for dilution

Nuclide	Water intake outside the port (North side of the unit 5/6 discharge outlet)		Water intake inside the port (North side within the port)	
	Concentration for assessment (Bq/L)	Volume to be transferred (Bq/year)	Concentration for assessment (Bq/L)	Volume to be transferred (Bq/year)
Cs-137	2.4E-01	3.6E+10	4.6E-01	6.9E+10
Sr-90	1.3E-02	1.9E+09	4.3E-02	6.4E+09
H-3	1.1E+00	1.6E+11	2.1E+00	3.1E+11

(2) Study results

The results of the exposure assessment are shown in Tables V-2 and V-3. Water intake outside the port has fewer impacts on the external exposures.

However, the results in both assessments are more minor compared with the dose limit of 1 mSv/year and the target dose for domestic nuclear power plant of 0.05 mSv/year, which is corresponding to the dose constraint. Even if seawater inside the port is taken in for dilution, the impact of radiation exposure is more minor.

Table V-2 Comparison of the exposure assessment results of representative persons (Large amount of ingestion of seafood)

Assessed case		Source term of the K4 tank group based on measured values			Source term of the J1-G tank group based on measured values			Remarks
		Exposure assessment under normal conditions	Water intake outside the port (North side of the unit 5/6 discharge outlet)	Water intake inside the port (North side within the port)	Exposure assessment under normal conditions	Water intake outside the port (North side of the unit 5/6 discharge outlet)	Water intake inside the port (North side within the port)	
External exposure (mSv/year)	Sea surface	6.5E-09	7.4E-08	1.4E-07	4.7E-08	1.1E-07	1.8E-07	
	Hull	4.8E-09	5.8E-08	1.1E-07	3.3E-08	8.7E-08	1.4E-07	
	During swimming	4.5E-09	5.1E-08	9.4E-08	3.2E-08	7.9E-08	1.2E-07	
	Beach sand	7.8E-06	9.4E-05	1.7E-04	5.6E-05	1.4E-04	2.2E-04	
	Fishing net	1.6E-06	1.7E-05	3.1E-05	1.2E-05	2.7E-05	4.1E-05	
Internal exposure (mSv/year)	Ingestion of water	3.3E-07	7.3E-07	1.2E-06	3.2E-07	7.2E-07	1.2E-06	Value of an adult
	Inhalation of spray	9.3E-08	4.1E-07	7.8E-07	4.0E-07	7.2E-07	1.1E-06	
	Ingestion of seafood	6.1E-05	7.3E-05	8.4E-05	3.0E-04	3.1E-04	3.2E-04	
Total		7E-05	2E-04	3E-04	4E-04	5E-04	6E-04	

Table V-3 Results of internal exposures assessment by age (Large amount of ingestion of seafood)

Assessed case		Source term of the K4 tank group based on measured values			Source term of the J1-G tank group based on measured values			Remarks
		Exposure assessment under normal conditions	Water intake outside the port (North side of the unit 5/6 discharge outlet)	Water intake inside the port (North side within the port)	Exposure assessment under normal conditions	Water intake outside the port (North side of the unit 5/6 discharge outlet)	Water intake inside the port (North side within the port)	
Internal exposure from ingestion of water (mSv/year)	Adult	3.3E-07	7.3E-07	1.2E-06	3.2E-07	7.2E-07	1.2E-06	
	Child under school year	5.7E-07	9.2E-07	1.4E-06	5.5E-07	9.0E-07	1.3E-06	
	Infant	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Internal exposure from inhalation of spray (mSv/year)	Adult	9.3E-08	4.1E-07	7.8E-07	4.0E-07	7.2E-07	1.1E-06	
	Child under school year	6.2E-08	2.8E-07	5.4E-07	2.2E-07	4.4E-07	6.9E-07	
	Infant	4.0E-08	1.5E-07	2.9E-07	1.2E-07	2.3E-07	3.6E-07	
Internal exposure from ingestion of seafood (mSv/year)	Adult	6.1E-05	7.3E-05	8.4E-05	3.0E-04	3.1E-04	3.2E-04	
	Child under school year	9.4E-05	9.9E-05	1.1E-04	5.6E-04	5.6E-04	5.7E-04	
	Infant	1.1E-04	1.1E-04	1.2E-04	7.1E-04	7.1E-04	7.2E-04	

Attachment VI Transfer pathways and exposure pathways other than the assessment targets

The Radiological Impact Assessment Report Regarding the Discharge of ALPS Treated Water into the Sea (design stage) (November 2021, hereinafter called “the original report”) refers to “Dose Assessment to the General Public in the Safety Review of Commercial Light Water Reactor Facilities” approved by the former Nuclear Safety Commission, which had been formulating the domestic safety guidelines, (hereinafter called “Dose Assessment of Light Water Reactor”) and the Application for the Designation of Reprocessing Business of Rokkasho Plant, (hereinafter called “Rokkasho Application”) which is a precedent case, in the selection of the migration and exposure pathways, as well as using IAEA GSG-10 as a reference. In “Dose Assessment of Light Water Reactor,” case studies of potentially important exposure pathways are performed as the examination of the basic concept of the dose assessment to the public in the safety review of reactor facilities for power generation, and the following pathways are simulated as the dose assessment with the radioactive materials in liquid waste.

(1) External exposure during work at sea
(2) External exposure during swimming
(3) External exposure during work at a beach
(4) External exposure during fishing operation
(5) Internal exposure from ingestion of seafood

As a result of the simulation, internal exposure from ingestion of seafood is considered to be the most important form of exposure from intake of liquid waste.
On the other hand, the following exposure pathways were assessed and reviewed in the Rokkasho Application.

(1) External exposure from sea surface
(2) External exposure from hulls
(3) External exposure during underwater work
(4) External exposure from fishing nets
(5) Internal exposure from ingestion of seafood

External exposure during work at a beach was not selected because there is no beach in the vicinity. In the original report, migration and exposure pathways were first selected based on these documents.
On the other hand, IAEA GSG-10 shows pathways to be considered for transfer and exposure pathways. These transfer pathways and exposure pathways were examined again from the viewpoint of the comprehensiveness of the pathways, and after the simulation of the exposure dose, the additional pathways were examined from the viewpoint of the scale and comprehensiveness of exposure.
Specifically, the transfer and exposure pathways described in the IAEA-TECDOC-1759 [VI-1] (radiological assessment procedures for determining the suitability of materials for sea dumping) were assessed using the assessment method shown in this document and

compared with the exposure assessment results in the original report, and studied on needs of immigration and addition of exposure pathway.

VI-1. Comparative assessment by the method of TECDOC -1759

VI-1-1. Source term

Since nuclides with large exposure impacts differ depending on the exposure assessment method and pathway, the source term based on the measured values including all the 64 nuclides was used.

VI-1-2. Modeling of diffusion and transfer in the environment

The following migration pathways were selected in accordance with the pathways shown by IAEA in GSG-10.

(1) Direct radiation

The radioactive materials handled in the disposal of ALPS treated water is limited to ALPS treated water or diluted ALPS treated water. ALPS treated water is water purified in advance until the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of the radioactive materials other than tritium becomes less than 1. Therefore, it was not selected as a migration pathway in the original report considering that there is almost no impact of exposure from ALPS treated water and the direct radiation from the facility.

Not selected in this assessment either.

(2) Diffusion in air, and deposition from the atmosphere onto the ground surface and subsequent resuspension

Since ALPS treated water is diluted with seawater and discharged into the sea as liquid and further diluted in the sea before migration to air, it was not selected as a migration pathway in the original report considering that there is almost no impact of exposure from the radioactive materials diffused into the air.

Not selected in this assessment either.

(3) Advection and diffusion in seawater

Since ALPS treated water is discharged into the sea as liquid, advection and diffusion in seawater were selected in the original report.

Selected in this assessment as well.

(4) Migration from seawater to hulls

Radioactive materials diffused in seawater may migrate to the hulls of ships continuously operating in the surrounding sea area, so it was selected as a migration pathway in the original report.
In TECDOC-1759, no example of a pathway or calculation method is exemplified, so it is not subject to simulation in this assessment.

(5) Migration from seawater to coastal sediment
Since radioactive materials advected and diffused in seawater may migrate to coastal sediment, it was selected as a migration pathway in the original report.
In TECDOC-1759, examples of a pathway and a calculation method are also exemplified, so it was also selected in this assessment.

(6) Migration from seawater to suspended particles and seabed sediment
Radioactive materials advected and diffused in seawater are partly adsorbed by suspended particles and seabed sediment, and the concentration in seawater decreases due to the migration. On the other hand, radioactive materials accumulate in seabed sediment, and the concentration in seawater and the concentration in seabed sediment will reach equilibrium in the long term. In the original report, it was not conservatively considered in the stage of advection or diffusion and it was considered that the equilibrium state was achieved with the distribution factor with seabed sediment in the exposure assessment of marine plants and animals.
In TECDOC-1759, an example of a calculation method was exemplified with a model of discharged radioactive materials migrating from seawater to suspended particles and seabed sediment, so it was also selected in this assessment.

(7) Migration from seawater to fishing nets
Radioactive materials advected and diffused in seawater may migrate to fishing nets used in seawater. Since it was assessed in the domestic precedent case, it was selected in the original report.
In TECDOC-1759, no example of a pathway or calculation method is shown, so it was not selected in this assessment.

(8) Migration from seawater to the atmosphere
Since ALPS treated water was diluted with seawater as liquid before being discharged into the sea and diluted in the sea before migration to air, it was not

selected as a migration pathway in the report considering that there is almost no impact of exposure from the radioactive materials diffused from seawater to air.
In TECDOC-1759, examples of a pathway of migration as spray from seawater and a calculation method are exemplified, so it was selected as a pathway.

(9) Migration from coastal sediment to air

Since only a small amount of coastal sediment migrates to the air, and it remains on the seashore for only a short time, so the exposure impact was negligible and it was not selected as a migration pathway in the original report.
In TECDOC-1759, examples of a pathway and a calculation method are exemplified, so it was selected as a pathway.

(10) Migration from seawater to seafood

Migration (concentration) from seawater to seafood is widely known and has been assessed in domestic precedent cases including light water reactors, so it was selected in the original report.
In TECDOC-1759, examples of a pathway and a calculation method are exemplified, so it was also selected as a pathway.

Though the diffusion simulation uses the same calculation result as that of the report, in TECDOC-1759, the dissolved concentration $C_{DW}(j)$ is calculated considering the suspended particle concentration and migration to seabed sediment from the equilibrium concentration $C_{BOX}(j)$ of nuclide j calculated from the annual discharge amount of the nuclides discharged into the calculation area and the amount of seawater which passes through the calculation area by the following equation:

$$C_{DW}(j)=\frac{C_{BOX}(j)}{1+K_d(j)\left(S+\frac{L_B\rho_B}{D}\right)} \quad \text{(VI-1)}$$

where

Kd(j) is the sediment partition factor of radionuclide j (m^3/kg)
S is the suspended sediment concentration (kg/m^3), 3E-03 kg/m^3 is used
L_B is the thickness of the sediment boundary layer (m), 1E-02 m is used
ρ_B is the density of the sediment boundary layer (kg/m^3), 1500 kg/m^3 is used
D is the water depth of the model (m), A water depth of 12 m, the depth of the discharge point, is used

The mass density $C_p(j)$ (Bq/kg) of the suspended particles was obtained by the following equation:

$$C_P(j)=K_d(j)C_{DW}(j) \quad \text{(VI-2)}$$

The total concentration in seawater $C_w(j)$ of dissolved and suspended particles was obtained by the following equation:

$$C_W(j)=(1+K_d(j)S)\ C_{DW}(j) \quad \text{(VI-3)}$$

VI-1-3. Identification of exposure pathways

The following exposure pathways were simulated from the pathways and calculation methods shown in TECDOC-1759.

- External exposure from beach sand
- Internal exposure from accidental ingestion of coastal sediment
- Internal exposure from accidental ingestion of seawater
- Internal exposure from accidental inhalation of dispersed coastal sediment
- Internal exposure from inhalation of seawater spray
- Internal exposure from ingestion of seafood
- Exposure due to skin contamination

The calculation method is as follows:

(1) External exposure from beach sand

The external exposure from nuclide migrated to beaches $E_{ext,shore,public}$(Sv) is calculated by the following equation:

$$E_{ext,shore,public}=t_{public}\sum_j C_S(j)DC_{gr}(j) \quad \text{(VI-4)}$$

$$Cs(j)=\frac{C_P(j)\rho_s d_s}{10} \quad \text{(VI-5)}$$

where

t_{public} is the time spent at the beach (h)

$DC_{gr}(j)$ is the dose conversion factor for ground contamination of radionuclide j ((Sv/h)/(Bq/m^2)); Dose conversion factors for ground surface contamination specified in the latest FGR 15[VI-2] prepared by the United States Environmental Protection Agency were used (See in Table VI -1).

$C_s(j)$ is the surface contamination density of radionuclide j in the shore sediments (in Bq/m^2)

ρ_s is the density of coastal sediment (kg/m^3), 1.5 E + 03 kg/m^3 is used

d_s is the effective thickness of coastal sediment (m), 0.1 m is used

The activity concentration radionuclide j in suspended particles $C_p(j)$ (Bq/kg-dry weight) is calculated by equation (VI-2).

(2) Internal exposure from accidental ingestion of coastal sediment

The internal exposure from accidental ingestion of coastal sediment $E_{ing, shore, public}$ (Sv) is calculated by the following equation:

$$E_{ing,shore,public}=t_{public}H_{shore}\sum_j \frac{C_s(j)}{\rho_s L_B} DC_{ing}(j) \quad \text{(VI-6)}$$

where

t_{public} is the time spent at the beach (h)

H_{shore} is the hourly ingestion rate of beach sediment (kg/h), 5.0E-06kg/h, the recommended value of TECDOC-1759, is used

$C_s(j)$ is the surface contamination density of radionuclide j in the shore sediments (Bq/m^2)

ρ_s is the density of coastal sediment (kg/m^3), 1.5 E + 03 kg/m^3 is used

d_s is the effective thickness of coastal sediment (m), 0.1 m is used

$DC_{ing}(j)$ is the effective dose (Sv/Bq) [VI-3] per unit intake by ingestion of radionuclide j (See Table VI -2).

(3) Internal exposure from ingestion of seawater

The internal exposure from accidental drinking of seawater during swimming on the seashore $E_{drink,public}$ (Sv) is calculated by the following equation:

$$E_{drink,public}=t_{public}H_{swim}\sum_j C_w(j)\, DC_{ing}(j) \quad \text{(VI-7)}$$

where

t_{public} is the time spent while swimming (h)

H_{swim} is the intake rate of seawater during swimming (L/h); conservatively, 0.2L/h is used.

$C_w(j)$ is the concentration of nuclide j in the seawater calculated by equation (VI-3) (Bq/m^3);

$DC_{ing}(j)$ is the effective dose (Sv/Bq) [VI-3] per unit intake by ingestion of radionuclide j (See Table VI -2).

(4) Internal exposure from accidental inhalation of dispersed coastal sediment

The internal exposure from inhalation of dispersed coastal sediment on the shore $E_{inh,shore,public}$ (Sv) is calculated by the following equation:

$$E_{inh,shore,public}=t_{public}R_{inh,public}DL_{shore}\sum_j C_p(j)DC_{inh}(j) \quad \text{(VI-8)}$$

where

t_{public} is the time spent at the beach (h)

$R_{inh,\ public}$ is the inhalation rate of a member of the public in m^3/h, the recommended value of TECDOC-1759 ($0.92 m^3/h$ for adults) is used

DL_{shore} is the load factor (kg/m^3) for dust from coastal sediment, 2.5E-09 kg/m^3, the recommended value of TECDOC-1759, is used

$DC_{inh}(j)$ is the effective dose (Sv/Bq) per unit intake by inhalation of radionuclide j (See in Table VI -3).

The concentration of radionuclides in sediment $C_p(j)$ (Bq/kg) can be calculated by equation (VI-2).

(5) Internal exposure from inhalation of seawater spray

The internal exposure from seawater spray caused by wave, etc., on the shore $E_{inh,spray,public}$ (Sv) is calculated by the following equation:

$$E_{inh,spray,public}=t_{public}\bullet R_{inh,public}\frac{C_{spray}}{\rho_w}\sum_j C_w(j)DC_{inh}(j) \quad \text{(VI-9)}$$

where

t_{public} is the time spent at the beach (h)

$R_{inh,\ public}$ is the inhalation rate of a member of the public (m^3/h), the recommended value ($0.92\ m^3/h$ for adults) is used

C_{spray} is the concentration of seawater spray in the air (kg/m^3), 1.0E-02kg/m^3, the recommended value of TECDOC-1759, is used

ρ_w is the density of seawater (kg/m^3), 1E+03 kg/m^3 is used

$C_w(j)$ is the concentration of radionuclide j in the seawater (Bq/m^3)

$DC_{inh}(j)$ is the effective dose per unit intake by inhalation (Sv/Bq) (See Table VI -3).

(6) Internal exposure from ingestion of seafood

The internal exposure from ingestion of seafood $E_{ing,food,public}$ (Sv) is calculated by the following equation:

$$E_{ing,food,public}=\sum_k H_B(k)\sum_j C_{EB}(j,k)DC_{ing}(j) \quad \text{(VI-10)}$$

where

$H_B(k)$ is the annual ingestion of seafood k (kg)

$DC_{ing}(j)$ is the effective dose per unit intake by ingestion of radionuclide j (Sv/Bq) (See Table VI -2).

$C_{EB}(j,k)$ is the concentration of nuclide j in the edible part of seafood k and calculated by the following equation:

$$C_{EB}(j,k)=CF(j,k)C_{DW}(j) \quad \text{(VI-11)}$$

where

CF(j,k) is the concentration factor for nuclide j of seafood k ((Bq/kg)/(Bq/L)).

$C_{DW}(j)$ is the dissolved concentration of radionuclide j in the seawater (Bq/m^3) and is calculated by equation (VI-1).

(7) Exposure of the skin from sea seabed sediment settled on the skin

Exposure from sea seabed sediment that is adhered to fishing nets during fishing operation and settled on the skin was simulated and the skin effective dose E_{skin}(Sv) is calculated by the following equation:

$$E_{skin}=0.01t_{public}\sum_j S_d\, DC_{skin}(j)/8760 \quad \text{(VI-12)}$$

where

0.01 is the skin tissue loading factor.

t_{public} is the duration of exposure (h).

$DC_{skin}(j)$ is the dose conversion factor for the skin ((Sv/y)/(Bq/cm^2)) specified in IAEA SRS44[VI-4] (beta and gamma-ray emitting nuclides) (See Table VI - 4).

8760 is the unit conversion factor (h/y)

S_d is the surface contamination density (Bq/cm^2) calculated by the following equation:

$$S_d = K_d(j) C_{DW}(j) \rho_d \quad \text{(VI-13)}$$

where

$K_d(j)$ is the distribution factor of the nuclide j between seawater and sea seabed sediment ((Bq/kg)/(Bq/L))

$C_{DW}(j)$ is the concentration of nuclide j in seawater (Bq/L)

ρ is the density of sea seabed sediment (kg/cm^3), 1.5 E-03 kg/cm^3 is used.

d is the thickness of the sea seabed sediment settled on the skin (cm), 0.01 cm is used.

VI-1-4. Setting of the representative person subject to the exposure assessment

The features of representative persons subject to the exposure assessment were the same as 6-1-2.(4).

- Engage in fishing 120 days (2,880 hours) a year, of which 80 days (1,920 hours) are spent near fishing nets.
- Stay at the beach 500 hours a year and swim for 96 hours.
- The ingestion of seafood is the intake of persons who consume a large amount of seafood. (Table VI-5)

Table VI-1 Dose conversion factor for the effective dose from radiation from beach sand (Source: U.S. EPA FGR15)

Nuclide	Dose conversion factor for the effective dose ((Sv/s)/(Bq/m^2))	Remarks
H-3	6.7E-22	
C-14	6.1E-19	
Mn-54	5.3E-16	
Fe-59	7.3E-16	
Co-58	6.2E-16	
Co-60	1.5E-15	
Ni-63	8.0E-20	
Zn-65	3.6E-16	
Rb-86	1.6E-16	
Sr-89	8.9E-17	
Sr-90	6.5E-18	
Y-90	1.5E-16	
Y-91	9.4E-17	
Nb-95	4.9E-16	
Tc-99	2.0E-18	
Ru-103	3.2E-16	
Ru-106	1.7E-20	
Rh-103m	4.3E-20	
Rh-106	3.4E-16	
Ag-110m	1.7E-15	
Cd-113m	6.3E-18	
Cd-115m	1.1E-16	
Sn-119m	9.6E-19	
Sn-123	8.1E-17	
Sn-126	1.1E-15	Sb-126m is considered
Sb-124	1.2E-15	
Sb-125	2.7E-16	
Te-123m	7.7E-17	
Te-125m	4.1E-18	
Te-127	1.5E-17	
Te-127m	1.7E-18	Te-127 is considered
Te-129	1.1E-16	

Nuclide	Dose conversion factor for the effective dose ((Sv/s)/(Bq/m^2))	Remarks
Te-129m	5.1E-17	Te-129 is considered
I-129	4.4E-18	
Cs-134	1.0E-15	
Cs-135	1.6E-18	
Cs-136	1.3E-15	
Cs-137	7.9E-18	
Ba-137m	3.9E-16	
Ba-140	1.6E-15	La-140 is considered
Ce-141	4.5E-17	
Ce-144	1.1E-17	
Pr-144	2.0E-16	
Pr-144m	3.5E-18	
Pm-146	4.8E-16	
Pm-147	9.4E-19	
Pm-148	4.6E-16	
Pm-148m	1.3E-15	
Sm-151	1.1E-19	
Eu-152	7.2E-16	
Eu-154	7.9E-16	
Eu-155	3.1E-17	
Gd-153	4.3E-17	
Tb-160	7.1E-16	
Pu-238	2.1E-20	
Pu-239	4.2E-20	
Pu-240	2.2E-20	
Pu-241	1.7E-21	
Am-241	9.9E-18	
Am-242m	1.4E-17	Am-242 is considered
Am-243	1.3E-16	Np-239 is considered
Cm-242	2.6E-20	
Cm-243	7.1E-17	
Cm-244	3.1E-20	

Table VI-2 Committed effective dose per unit intake for ingestion (Source: IAEA GSR-Part3)

Target Nuclide	Effective dose factor (Sv/Bq)			Remarks
	Adult	Child under school age	Infant	
H-3 (HTO)	1.8E-11	3.1E-11	6.4E-11	Used for the assessment of ingestion of water
H-3 (considering OBT)	2.0E-11	3.5E-11	7.0E-11	Used for the assessment of ingestion of seafood assuming that 10% of tritium to be ingested is OBT
C-14	5.8E-10	9.9E-10	1.4E-09	
Mn-54	7.1E-10	1.9E-09	5.4E-09	
Fe-59	1.8E-09	7.5E-09	3.9E-08	
Co-58	7.4E-10	2.6E-09	7.3E-09	
Co-60	3.4E-09	1.7E-08	5.4E-08	
Ni-63	1.5E-10	4.6E-10	1.6E-09	
Zn-65	3.9E-09	9.7E-09	3.6E-08	
Rb-86	2.8E-09	9.9E-09	3.1E-08	
Sr-89	2.6E-09	8.9E-09	3.6E-08	
Sr-90	2.8E-08	4.7E-08	2.3E-07	Including the impact of the progeny nuclide
Y-90	2.7E-09	1.0E-08	3.1E-08	
Y-91	2.4E-09	8.8E-09	2.8E-08	
Nb-95	5.8E-10	1.8E-09	4.6E-09	
Tc-99	6.4E-10	2.3E-09	1.0E-08	
Ru-103	7.3E-10	2.4E-09	7.1E-09	Including the impact of the progeny nuclide
Ru-106	7.0E-09	2.5E-08	8.4E-08	Including the impact of the progeny nuclide
Rh-103m	3.8E-12	1.3E-11	4.7E-11	
Rh-106	–	–	–	Independent intake is not considered because the half-life is short enough (about 30 seconds).
Ag-110m	2.8E-09	7.8E-09	2.4E-08	
Cd-113m	2.3E-08	3.9E-08	1.2E-07	
Cd-115m	3.3E-09	9.7E-09	4.1E-08	
Sn-119m	3.4E-10	1.3E-09	4.1E-09	
Sn-123	2.1E-09	7.8E-09	2.5E-08	
Sn-126	4.7E-09	1.6E-08	5.0E-08	
Sb-124	2.5E-09	8.4E-09	2.5E-08	
Sb-125	1.1E-09	3.4E-09	1.1E-08	
Te-123m	1.4E-09	4.9E-09	1.9E-08	
Te-125m	8.7E-10	3.3E-09	1.3E-08	
Te-127	1.7E-10	6.2E-10	1.5E-09	

Target Nuclide	Effective dose factor (Sv/Bq)			Remarks
	Adult	Child under school age	Infant	
Te-127m	2.3E-09	9.5E-09	4.1E-08	
Te-129	6.3E-11	2.1E-10	7.5E-10	
Te-129m	3.0E-09	1.2E-08	4.4E-08	Including the impact of the progeny nuclide
I-129	1.1E-07	1.7E-07	1.8E-07	
Cs-134	1.9E-08	1.3E-08	2.6E-08	
Cs-135	2.0E-09	1.7E-09	4.1E-09	
Cs-136	3.0E-09	6.1E-09	1.5E-08	
Cs-137	1.3E-08	9.6E-09	2.1E-08	Including the impact of the progeny nuclide
Ba-137m	–	–	–	Independent intake is not considered because the half-life is short enough (about 2.6 minutes).
Ba-140	2.6E-09	9.2E-09	3.2E-08	
Ce-141	7.1E-10	2.6E-09	8.1E-09	
Ce-144	5.2E-09	1.9E-08	6.6E-08	Including the impact of the progeny nuclide
Pr-144	5.0E-11	1.7E-10	6.4E-10	
Pr-144m	–	–	–	Independent intake is not considered because the half-life is short enough (about 7.2 minutes).
Pm-146	9.0E-10	2.8E-09	1.0E-08	
Pm-147	2.6E-10	9.6E-10	3.6E-09	
Pm-148	2.7E-09	9.7E-09	3.0E-08	
Pm-148m	1.7E-09	5.5E-09	1.5E-08	
Sm-151	9.8E-11	3.3E-10	1.5E-09	
Eu-152	1.4E-09	4.1E-09	1.6E-08	
Eu-154	2.0E-09	6.5E-09	2.5E-08	
Eu-155	3.2E-10	1.1E-09	4.3E-09	
Gd-153	2.7E-10	9.4E-10	2.9E-09	
Tb-160	1.6E-09	5.4E-09	1.6E-08	
Pu-238	2.3E-07	3.1E-07	4.0E-06	
Pu-239	2.5E-07	3.3E-07	4.2E-06	
Pu-240	2.5E-07	3.3E-07	4.2E-06	
Pu-241	4.8E-09	5.5E-09	5.6E-08	
Am-241	2.0E-07	2.7E-07	3.7E-06	
Am-242m	1.9E-07	2.3E-07	3.1E-06	
Am-243	2.0E-07	2.7E-07	3.6E-06	
Cm-242	1.2E-08	3.9E-08	5.9E-07	
Cm-243	1.5E-07	2.2E-07	3.2E-06	
Cm-244	1.2E-07	1.9E-07	2.9E-06	

Table VI-3 Committed effective dose per unit intake from inhalation (Source: IAEA GSR-Part3)

Target Nuclide	Effective dose factor (Sv/Bq)			Remarks
	Adult	Child under school age	Infant	
H-3	1.8E-11	3.1E-11	6.4E-11	The conversion factor of tritium vapor is used
C-14	5.8E-09	1.1E-08	1.9E-08	
Mn-54	1.5E-09	3.8E-09	7.5E-09	
Fe-59	4.0E-09	8.1E-09	2.1E-08	
Co-58	2.1E-09	4.5E-09	9.0E-09	
Co-60	3.1E-08	5.9E-08	9.2E-08	
Ni-63	1.3E-09	2.7E-09	4.8E-09	
Zn-65	2.2E-09	5.7E-09	1.5E-08	
Rb-86	9.3E-10	3.4E-09	1.2E-08	
Sr-89	7.9E-09	1.7E-08	3.9E-08	
Sr-90	1.6E-07	2.7E-07	4.2E-07	Including the impact of the progeny nuclide
Y-90	1.5E-09	4.2E-09	1.3E-08	
Y-91	8.9E-09	1.9E-08	4.3E-08	
Nb-95	1.8E-09	3.6E-09	7.7E-09	
Tc-99	1.3E-08	2.4E-08	4.1E-08	
Ru-103	3.0E-09	6.0E-09	1.3E-08	Including the impact of the progeny nuclide
Ru-106	6.6E-08	1.4E-07	2.6E-07	Including the impact of the progeny nuclide
Rh-103m	2.7E-12	6.7E-12	2.0E-11	
Rh-106	–	–	–	Independent intake is not considered because the half-life is short enough (about 30 seconds).
Ag-110m	1.2E-08	2.6E-08	4.6E-08	
Cd-113m	1.1E-07	1.8E-07	3.0E-07	
Cd-115m	7.7E-09	1.7E-08	4.6E-08	
Sn-119m	2.2E-09	4.7E-09	1.0E-08	
Sn-123	8.1E-09	1.8E-08	4.0E-08	
Sn-126	2.8E-08	6.2E-07	1.2E-07	
Sb-124	8.6E-09	1.8E-08	3.9E-08	
Sb-125	1.2E-08	2.4E-08	4.2E-08	
Te-123m	5.1E-09	9.8E-09	2.0E-08	
Te-125m	4.2E-09	7.8E-09	1.7E-08	
Te-127	1.4E-10	3.9E-10	1.2E-09	
Te-127m	9.8E-09	2.0E-08	4.1E-08	
Te-129	3.9E-11	1.0E-10	3.5E-10	

Target Nuclide	Effective dose factor (Sv/Bq)			Remarks
	Adult	Child under school age	Infant	
Te-129m	7.9E-09	1.7E-08	3.8E-08	Including the impact of the progeny nuclide
I-129	3.6E-08	6.1E-08	7.2E-08	
Cs-134	2.0E-08	4.1E-08	7.0E-08	
Cs-135	8.6E-09	1.6E-08	2.7E-08	
Cs-136	2.8E-09	6.0E-09	1.5E-08	
Cs-137	3.9E-08	7.0E-08	1.1E-07	Including the impact of the progeny nuclide
Ba-137m	–	–	–	Independent intake is not considered because the half-life is short enough (about 2.6 minutes).
Ba-140	5.8E-09	1.2E-08	2.9E-08	
Ce-141	3.8E-09	7.1E-09	1.6E-08	
Ce-144	5.3E-08	1.4E-07	3.6E-07	Including the impact of the progeny nuclide
Pr-144	1.8E-11	5.2E-11	1.9E-10	
Pr-144m	–	–	–	Independent intake is not considered because the half-life is short enough (about 7.2 minutes).
Pm-146	2.1E-08	3.9E-08	6.4E-08	
Pm-147	5.0E-09	1.1E-08	2.1E-08	
Pm-148	2.2E-09	5.5E-09	1.5E-08	
Pm-148m	5.7E-09	1.2E-08	2.5E-08	
Sm-151	4.0E-09	6.7E-09	1.1E-08	
Eu-152	4.2E-08	7.0E-08	1.1E-07	
Eu-154	5.3E-08	9.7E-08	1.6E-07	
Eu-155	6.9E-09	1.4E-08	2.6E-08	
Gd-153	2.1E-09	6.5E-09	1.5E-08	
Tb-160	7.0E-09	1.5E-08	3.2E-08	
Pu-238	1.1E-04	1.4E-04	2.0E-04	
Pu-239	1.2E-04	1.5E-04	2.1E-04	
Pu-240	1.2E-04	1.5E-04	2.1E-04	
Pu-241	2.3E-06	2.6E-06	2.8E-06	
Am-241	9.6E-05	1.2E-04	1.8E-04	
Am-242m	9.2E-05	1.1E-04	1.6E-04	
Am-243	9.6E-05	1.2E-04	1.8E-04	
Cm-242	5.9E-06	1.2E-05	2.7E-05	
Cm-243	6.9E-05	9.5E-05	1.6E-04	
Cm-244	5.7E-05	8.3E-05	1.5E-04	

Table VI-4 Skin equivalent dose conversion factors (β and γ emitting nuclides)

Nuclide	Skin equivalent dose conversion factors ((Sv/year)/(Bq/cm^2))	Remarks
H-3	0.0E+00	
C-14	7.9E-03	
Mn-54	5.3E-04	
Fe-59	1.8E-02	
Co-58	4.2E-03	
Co-60	1.7E-02	
Ni-63	1.6E-04	
Zn-65	7.7E-04	
Rb-86	2.3E-02	
Sr-89	2.3E-02	
Sr-90	4.5E-02	
Y-90	2.4E-02	
Y-91	2.3E-02	
Nb-95	6.4E-03	
Tc-99	1.4E-02	
Ru-103	1.1E-02	
Ru-106	2.5E-02	
Rh-103m	1.4E-05	
Rh-106	0.0E+00	
Ag-110m	8.5E-03	
Cd-113m	2.0E-02	
Cd-115m	2.3E-02	
Sn-119m	0.0E+00	
Sn-123	0.0E+00	
Sn-126	1.6E-02	
Sb-124	2.2E-02	
Sb-125	1.8E-02	
Te-123m	2.0E-02	
Te-125m	2.6E-02	
Te-127	2.1E-02	
Te-127m	3.7E-02	

Nuclide	Skin equivalent dose conversion factors ((Sv/year)/(Bq/cm^2))	Remarks
Te-129	2.3E-02	
Te-129m	3.7E-02	
I-129	5.8E-03	
Cs-134	1.7E-02	
Cs-135	9.6E-03	
Cs-136	2.1E-02	
Cs-137	2.2E-02	
Ba-137m	0.0E+00	
Ba-140	5.3E-02	
Ce-141	2.5E-02	
Ce-144	3.9E-02	
Pr-144	0.0E+00	
Pr-144m	0.0E+00	
Pm-146	0.0E+00	
Pm-147	1.1E-02	
Pm-148	0.0E+00	
Pm-148m	0.0E+00	
Sm-151	2.5E-04	
Eu-152	1.5E-02	
Eu-154	3.1E-02	
Eu-155	7.6E-03	
Gd-153	3.6E-03	
Tb-160	3.1E-02	
Pu-238	9.5E-04	
Pu-239	1.3E-05	
Pu-240	9.1E-07	
Pu-241	1.4E-08	
Am-241	6.3E-04	
Am-242m	1.7E-02	
Am-243	3.7E-02	
Cm-242	2.1E-05	
Cm-243	1.7E-02	

Nuclide	Skin equivalent dose conversion factors ((Sv/year)/(Bq/cm^2))	Remarks
Cm-244	1.9E-05	

Table VI-5 Intake of persons who consume a large amount of seafood (g/day)

	Fish	Invertebrate	Seaweeds
Adult	190	62	52
Children under school	97	31	26
Infants	39	12	10

VI-2. Exposure assessment result

The source terms of the following three cases were assessed by the assessment method of TECDOC-1759 and compared with the results in the original report.

i. K4 tank group (Sum of the ratios to regulatory concentration limits of 63 nuclides other than tritium: 0.29)

ii. J1-C tank group (Sum of the ratios to regulatory concentration limits of 63 nuclides other than tritium: 0.35)

iii. J1-G tank group (Sum of the ratios to regulatory concentration limits of 63 nuclides other than tritium: 0.22)

The results of the comparison are shown in Table VI-6(1) to (3).

Regardless of the source term, none of the assessment results exceeded the exposure from the ingestion of seafood, fishing nets, and beach sand in the original report. However, because the exposure from ingestion of seawater and inhalation of seawater spray are larger than the exposure from sea surface, etc. described in the original report, it was decided to select them as additional pathways for this report as well.

Table VI-6(1) Comparison of the exposure assessment results by the source term of the K4 tank group

Assessed case		Original report	TECDOC-1759	Remarks
External exposure (mSv/year)	Exposure from sea surface	6.5E-09	Not to be assessed	
	Exposure from hulls	4.8E-09	Not to be assessed	
	Exposure during swimming	4.5E-09	Not to be assessed	
	Exposure from beach sand	7.8E-06	4.0E-07	In the assessment of the original report, conservative dose conversion factors were used for external exposures, and therefore the results are considered to be conservative.
	Exposure from fishing nets	1.6E-06	Not to be assessed	
Internal exposure (mSv/year) (Adult)	Ingestion of coastal sediment	Not to be assessed	7.8E-10	
	Ingestion of seawater	Not to be assessed	3.3E-07	Since the tritium in the ALPS treated water before dilution, of which concentration exceed the regulatory concentration limit, has higher concentration than the other nuclides after discharge into the sea as well, the exposure through accidently ingestion of seawater is mainly caused by tritium.
	Inhalation of dispersed coastal sediment	Not to be assessed	5.1E-12	
	Inhalation of seawater spray	Not to be assessed	7.7E-08	
	Ingestion of seafood	6.1E-05	1.6E-05	In the assessment of the original report, the concentration in seafood was assessed using conservative concentrations in seawater rather than taking into account adhesion to suspended particles and sea seabed sediment. Therefore, the assessment result is considered to be conservative.
Exposure of the skin (mSv/year)	When seabed sediment settles on the skin	Not to be assessed	1.5E-09	
Total (mSv/year)		7E-05	2E-05	

Table VI-6(2) Comparison of the exposure assessment results by the source term of the J1-C tank group

Assessed case		Original report	TECDOC-1759	Remarks
External exposure (mSv/year)	Exposure from sea surface	1.7E-08	Not to be assessed	
	Exposure from hulls	1.2E-08	Not to be assessed	
	Exposure during swimming	1.2E-08	Not to be assessed	
	Exposure from beach sand	2.1E-05	2.1E-07	In the assessment of the original report, conservative dose conversion factors were used for external exposures, and therefore the results are considered to be conservative.
	Exposure from fishing nets	4.3E-06	Not to be assessed	
Internal exposure (mSv/year) (Adult)	Ingestion of coastal sediment	Not to be assessed	6.6E-10	
	Ingestion of seawater	Not to be assessed	3.1E-07	Since the tritium in the ALPS treated water before dilution, of which concentration exceed the regulatory concentration limit, has higher concentration than the other nuclides after discharge into the sea as well, the exposure through accidently ingestion of seawater is mainly caused by tritium.
	Inhalation of dispersed coastal sediment	Not to be assessed	4.2E-11	
	Inhalation of seawater spray	Not to be assessed	7.5E-08	
	Ingestion of seafood	1.1E-04	2.9E-06	In the assessment of the original report, the concentration in seafood was assessed using conservative concentrations in seawater rather than taking into account adhesion to suspended particles and sea seabed sediment. Therefore, the assessment result is considered to be conservative.
Exposure of the skin (mSv/year)	When seabed sediment settles on the skin	Not to be assessed	2.2E-09	
Total (mSv/year)		1E-04	3E-06	

Table VI-6(3) Comparison of the exposure assessment results by the source term of the J1-G tank group

Assessed case		Original report	TECDOC-1759	Remarks
External exposure (mSv/year)	Exposure from sea surface	4.7E-08	Not to be assessed	
	Exposure from hulls	3.3E-08	Not to be assessed	
	Exposure during Swimming	3.2E-08	Not to be assessed	
	Exposure from beach sand	5.6E-05	2.1E-07	In the assessment of the original report, conservative dose conversion factors were used for external exposures, and therefore the results are considered to be conservative.
	Exposure from fishing nets	1.2E-05	Not to be assessed	
Internal exposure (mSv/year) (Adult)	Ingestion of coastal sediment	Not to be assessed	6.6E-10	
	Ingestion of seawater	Not to be assessed	3.1E-07	Since the tritium in the ALPS treated water before dilution, of which concentration exceed the regulatory concentration limit, has higher concentration than the other nuclides after discharge into the sea as well, the exposure through accidently ingestion of seawater is mainly caused by tritium.
	Inhalation of dispersed coastal sediment	Not to be assessed	4.2E-11	
	Inhalation of seawater spray	4.0E-07	7.5E-08	
	Ingestion of seafood	Not to be assessed	4.6E-06	In the assessment of the original report, the concentration in seafood was assessed using conservative concentrations in seawater rather than taking into account adhesion to suspended particles and sea seabed sediment. Therefore, the assessment result is considered to be conservative.
Exposure of the skin (mSv/year)	When seabed sediment settles on the skin	Not to be assessed	5.2E-09	
Total (mSv/year)		4E-04	5E-06	

References

[VI-1] IAEA, TECDOC-1759" Determining the Suitability of Materials for Disposal at Sea under the London Convention 1972 and London Protocol 1996: A Radiological Assessment Procedure",2015

[VI-2] EPA, FEDERAL GUIDANCE REPORT NO.15 "EXTERNAL EXPOSURE TO RADIONUCLIDES IN AIR, WATER AND SOIL",2019

[VI-3] IAEA, General Safety Requirements Part 3" Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards",2014

[VI-4] IAEA, Safety Report Series No. 44" Derivation of Activity Concentration Values for Exclusion, Exemption and Clearance",2005

Attachment VII　Validity of the diffusion simulation

In the chapter 6-1-2.(2) “Modeling of diffusion and transfer after discharge”, the simulation model used to calculate the advection and diffusion of tritium is the model for the reproduction calculation of the diffusion of cesium leaked into the sea area due to the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.
The following describes the validity of the diffusion simulation from various viewpoints.

VII-1.　Reproducibility of the flow rate

As described in the chapter 6-1-2.(2) “Modeling of diffusion and transfer after discharge”, this simulation used actual meteorological and oceanographic data for the reproduction calculation of cesium leaked from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, and confirmed the reproducibility by comparing it with actual sea area monitoring data.
Figure VII-1 shows a comparison of the north and south components of the flow rate measured with the acoustic doppler current profiler (ADCP; 600 kHz, RDI) in the locations about 5 km to the south of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station and about 2.8 km offshore (37°22.6’ N, 141°3.7’E) and the flow rate reproduced by simulation between October 8 and December 10, 2014 and between April 22 and June 25, 2015 [VII-1]. The match rate between the simulation and measured value is high no matter whether the river flow rate is considered.

Figure VII-1 Comparison between the flow rate measured near the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and the reproduction calculation by simulation

VII-2. Reproducibility of the cesium concentration

Figure VII-2 shows the result of comparison between the annual average value of the cesium 137 concentration [VII-2] of surface seawater obtained by coastal seawater monitoring in Fukushima by TEPCO and the annual average concentration distribution of the surface reproduced by simulation between 2013 and 2016. “〇” shows the monitoring points, the colors show the measured Cs-137 concentrations, and the contour figure shows the calculation result of simulation. Similarly, Figure VII-3 shows a comparison with the annual average value of the cesium 137 concentration [VII-2] of surface seawater obtained by seawater monitoring in the offshore sea area by the Secretariat of the Nuclear Regulation Authority. The high concentration in the coastal area around the power station and the general concentration trend are reproduced well.

Moreover, Figure VII-4 shows the data in the scatter diagram. The measured values are almost similar to the simulated ones in the upper right region, where the concentration is high (blue dashed line).

On the other hand, in the lower-left region where the concentration is low (red dashed line), the measured values tend to be higher than the simulated results. Measured values are higher in the low concentration region probably because the simulation results do not adequately reflect some sources, such as the supply of cesium from rivers and inflow of cesium due to recirculation by currents in the North Pacific Ocean. Thus, this does not raise issues regarding the reproducibility of simulation results in this assessment conducted to evaluate the impact of the discharge of the ALPS treated water.



Figure VII-2 Comparison between the measured value and simulation of the Cs-137 concentration in the coastal area around the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station



Figure VII-3　Comparison between the measured value and simulation of the Cs-137 concentration offshore in the sea area around the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station



Figure VII-4　Comparison between the measured value and simulation of the Cs-137 concentration in the sea area around the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (Blue and red mainly show coast and offshore, respectively.)

VII-3. Concentration distribution around the discharge outlet

The tritium simulation model used in 6-1-2.(2) “Modeling of diffusion and transfer after discharge” is a model to simulate migration and diffusion in vast areas and did not simulate the physical flow around the discharge outlet. Therefore, despite the upward discharge of water, the concentration near the seabed around the discharge outlet is higher than in the surrounding areas. Still, the result is that the concentration just above the discharge outlet does not show an increase much.

On the other hand, during the actual discharge, it will entrain surrounding seawater, facilitating the mixing and dilution. In addition, since the ALPS treated water to be discharged has already been diluted more than 100 times with seawater, the salinity and specific gravity of the water will be almost the same as those of the surrounding seawater. Therefore, although there is a slight difference in the concentration distribution around the discharge outlet, the diffusion in areas away from the outlet will not be expected to differ significantly to the simulated results.

Attachment VIII “Difference in the diffusion area by discharge location” of the report compares the simulated tritium diffusion when the discharge point is 1 km off the coast with the result when a discharge point is a unit 5/6 discharge outlet.

Although the concentration distribution around the discharge outlet is different, as shown in Figures VII-5 and VII-6, there is no notable difference in the diffusion in the surrounding sea area.



(Discharge from an outlet 1 km off the coast)

(Discharge from unit 5/6 discharge outlet)

Figure VII-5 Comparison of the distribution of annual mean tritium concentration in the sea between different discharge locations (sea surface)



(Discharge from an outlet 1 km off the coast)

(Discharge from unit 5/6 discharge outlet)

Figure VII-6 Comparison of the distribution of annual mean tritium concentration in the sea between different discharge locations (cross-sectional view)

In addition, even when the upward flow is not considered, the mean concentration in the 10 km × 10 km area calculated in the simulation is higher in the upper layer than the concentration around the discharge outlet, because as shown in Figures VII-7 to 10, the water depth in the surrounding sea gradually becomes deeper, and the concentration on the bottom offshore is much lower than in the surface layer.



Figure VII-7 Cross-sectional view of the seabed up to about 10 km offshore



Figure VII-8 Cross-sectional view of distribution of annual mean tritium concentration up to 10 km offshore



Figure VII-9 Distribution of annual mean tritium concentration on the sea surface up to 3 km offshore



Figure VII-10 Distribution of annual mean tritium concentration on the sea bottom up to 3 km offshore

VII-4. Calculation period

As shown in 6-1-3, a simulation calculation of 7 years was performed in order to verify the fluctuation caused by the fluctuation in annual meteorological and oceanographic data. The result shows that the fluctuation in the annual average concentration of all layers within the range of 10 km × 10 km was small. Figure VII-11 shows the change in the daily average concentration in the same calculation. The concentration fluctuates significantly and no accumulation trend was observed in each calculation period (one year). No significant difference is expected to occur between the result of the calculations performed each year and the result of calculations performed for multiple consecutive years. Therefore, the result of the calculations for each year will be used because there is considered to be no problem in evaluating the impact over a long period of discharge with the assessment based on the result of one-year's calculations.



Figure VII-11 Calculation result of the daily average concentration within the range of 10 km × 10 km of each year

VII-5. Validity of the calculation area

The calculation area of the simulation used in the report is approximately 490 km north-south and 270 km east-west. Table VII-1 shows the maximum value and position of the area boundary from the annual average concentration calculated from meteorological and oceanographic data for the years 2014 to 2020. Table VII-2 shows the annual maximum value, position, and date of occurrence of the area boundary based on the daily average concentration. The annual average concentration distribution diagram of tritium concentration of the entire area (result shown diagrammatically down to the lower limit of 1E-05Bq/L) is shown in Figure VII-12.

The maximum value of the annual average concentration range on the boundary of the calculation area is from 1.1E-04 to 2.6E-04Bq/L and maximum daily average concentration range is from 5.3E-03 to 1.4E-02Bq/L, all in the east side, but compared to the tritium concentration in sea water in sea area around Japan (about 1.0E-1Bq/L) [VII-3], which is sufficiently low.

In addition, the exposure assessment result calculated from the annual average concentration of 10 km × 10 km area around the power station is much lower than the dose limit for the general public of 1mSv/year, as well as the dose constraint of 0.05mSv/year, and it is not necessary to assess the impact of radioactivity outside of the calculation area.

Table VII-1 Maximum value and position of the annual average concentration on the model boundary (north, south, and east) of each year

Year	Concentration (Bq/L)	Coordinate		
		East - West (0: West boundary, 460: East boundary)	North - South (0: South boundary, 658: North boundary)	Depth (0: Bottom layer, 29: Top layer)
2014	1.1E-04	460 (East boundary)	80	23
2015	2.6E-04	460 (East boundary)	145	29
2016	1.4E-04	460 (East boundary)	318	25
2017	2.4E-04	460 (East boundary)	224	23
2018	1.9E-04	460 (East boundary)	150	29
2019	1.6E-04	460 (East boundary)	181	28
2020	1.9E-04	460 (East boundary)	232	28

Table VII-2 Maximum value, position, and date occurred of the daily average concentration on the model boundary (north, south, and east) of each year

Date occurred	Concentration (Bq/L)	Coordinate		
		East - West (0: West boundary, 460: East boundary)	North - South (0: South boundary, 658: North boundary)	Depth (0: Bottom layer, 29: Top layer)
2014/9/21	6.7E-03	460 (East boundary)	198	19
2015/8/2	7.2E-03	460 (East boundary)	158	25
2016/8/6	1.4E-02	460 (East boundary)	341	28
2017/7/28	6.5E-03	460 (East boundary)	252	29
2018/8/15	5.3E-03	460 (East boundary)	215	21
2019/8/1	1.0E-02	460 (East boundary)	177	27
2020/5/30	1.1E-02	460 (East boundary)	234	28



Figure VII-12 Annual average concentration distribution diagram of the tritium concentration (result shown diagrammatically up to 1E-05Bq/L as the lowest limit)

References

[VII-1] D.Tsumune, T.Tsubono, K.Misumi, Y.Tateda,Y.Toyoda, Y.Onda, and M.Aoyama, "Impacts of direct release and river discharge on oceanic 137Cs derived from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant accident", 2020

[VII-2] https://radioactivity.nsr.go.jp/ja/list/428/list-1.html

[VII-3] Marine Ecology Research Institute “FY2020 Commissioned Project Survey Report such as Disaster Prevention Measures, etc. for Nuclear Facilities (Investigation of radioactivity and comprehensive assessment in marine environment)” March 2021

Attachment VIII　Difference in the diffusion area by discharge location

In the consideration of the discharge method of ALPS treated water, initially a plan of discharging from the unit 5/6 discharge outlet was considered as with the normal operation of units 5 and 6. Figure VIII-1 shows the water discharge position under consideration in this plan and the position of the unit 5/6 discharge outlet.
Figures VIII-2 to 4 show a comparison of diffusion simulation results among different discharge positions. Though no significant difference is observed in the concentration range of 0.1Bq/L, the concentration around the power station is lower in discharge from 1 km offshore.



Source: This map was created by Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc. based on a map published by the Geographical Survey Institute (Electronic Map Web)
https://maps.gsi.go.jp/#13/37.422730/141.044970/&base=std&ls=std&disp=1&vs=c1j0h0k0l0u0t0z0r0s0m0f1
*Area where common fishery rights are not set.

Figure VIII-1　Discharge position and position of the unit 5/6 discharge outlet in the current plan



(Discharge from an outlet 1 km off the coast) (Discharge from unit 5/6 discharge outlet)

Figure VIII-2 Comparison of the distribution of annual mean concentration of the sea surface between different discharge locations (wide area)



(Discharge from an outlet 1 km off the coast) (Discharge from unit 5/6 discharge outlet)

Figure VIII-3 Comparison of the distribution of annual mean concentration of the sea surface between different discharge locations (enlarged diagram)



(Discharge from an outlet 1 km off the coast)



(Discharge from unit 5/6 discharge outlet)

Figure VIII-4 Comparison of the distribution of annual mean concentration between different discharge locations (cross-sectional view)

Attachment IX Contribution to the undetected nuclides in the source term based on the measured value

The 64 nuclides subject to this assessment include many undetected nuclides which have never been detected in the past analysis assessments. As shown in 6-1-2.(1) “Source term (annual discharge amount of each nuclide)” annual discharge amount is conservatively assumed to include nuclides below the detection limit in the source term based on actual measurement. However, it is estimated that the actual concentrations of many of the nuclides which have never been detected are much lower than the detection limit considering their half-lives, etc.
In order to verify conservativeness in the result of the exposure assessment, the exposure assessment result of each nuclide is aggregated separating detected nuclides from undetected nuclides
Tables IX-1 to 4 show the result.
In both cases, it is considered that the contribution from undetected nuclides is significant, and the assessment result contains high conservativeness.

Table IX-1 Contributions of detected and undetected nuclides (human exposure)

Assessed case	Source term	Source term based on measured values					
		i. K4 tank group		ii. J1-C tank group		iii. J1-G tank group	
	Ingestion of seafood	Average	Large	Average	Large	Average	Large
Exposure* (mSv/year)	Detected nuclide	5.7E-06	2.0E-05	1.4E-06	4.0E-06	2.1E-06	6.4E-06
	Undetected nuclide	1.9E-05	5.1E-05	5.2E-05	1.3E-04	1.5E-04	3.6E-04
	Total	2.5E-05	7.1E-05	5.4E-05	1.3E-04	1.5E-04	3.7E-04
Percentage of undetected nuclides in total		77%	71%	97%	97%	99%	98%

* Exposure is the total of external exposure and internal exposure

Table IX-2 Contributions of detected and undetected nuclides (environmental protection and K4 tank group)

Assessed case		K4 tank group		
		Flatfish	Crab	Brown seaweed
Exposure (mGy/day)	Detected nuclide	7.5E-07	7.6E-07	8.3E-07
	Undetected nuclide	1.7E-05	1.7E-05	1.8E-05
	Total	1.7E-05	1.7E-05	1.9E-05
Percentage of undetected nuclides in total		96%	96%	96%

Table IX-3 Contributions of detected and undetected nuclides (environmental protection and J1-C tank group)

Assessed case		J1-C tank group		
		Flatfish	Crab	Brown seaweed
Exposure (mGy/day)	Detected nuclide	1.4E-07	1.4E-07	1.5E-07
	Undetected nuclide	2.2E-05	2.2E-05	2.3E-05
	Total	2.2E-05	2.2E-05	2.3E-05
Percentage of undetected nuclides in total		99%	99%	99%

Table IX-4 Contributions of detected and undetected nuclides (environmental protection and J1-G tank group)

Assessed case		J1-G tank group		
		Flatfish	Crab	Brown seaweed
Exposure (mGy/day)	Detected nuclide	2.9E-07	2.8E-07	3.0E-07
	Undetected nuclide	5.6E-05	5.5E-05	5.8E-05
	Total	5.6E-05	5.5E-05	5.9E-05
Percentage of undetected nuclides in total		99%	99%	99%

Attachment X Breakdown of the exposure assessment result by nuclide

X-1. Internal exposures assessment of human

For the following exposure assessments shown in 6-1. “Exposure assessment under normal conditions”, Tables X-1-1 to 4, X-2-1 to 4, and X-3-1 to 4 show the internal exposure assessment result of each nuclide.

Source term based on measured values of 64 nuclides

i. K4 tank group (Sum of the ratios to regulatory concentration limits of 63 nuclides other than tritium: 0.29)
ii. J1-C tank group (Sum of the ratios to regulatory concentration limits of 63 nuclides other than tritium: 0.35)
iii. J1-G tank group (Sum of the ratios to regulatory concentration limits of 63 nuclides other than tritium: 0.22)

Table X-1-1 Internal exposure assessment result from ingestion of seawater (Source term based on measured values (K4 tank group))

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
H-3	3.0E-07	5.2E-07	Exempted	
I-129	2.1E-08	3.2E-08	Exempted	
Ru-106	1.0E-09	3.6E-09	Exempted	
C-14	7.7E-10	1.3E-09	Exempted	
Sr-90	5.5E-10	9.2E-10	Exempted	
Cs-137	4.9E-10	3.6E-10	Exempted	
Y-91	4.7E-10	1.7E-09	Exempted	
Sn-123	2.2E-10	8.3E-10	Exempted	
Cd-115m	1.9E-10	5.5E-10	Exempted	
Co-60	1.3E-10	6.7E-10	Exempted	
Pm-148	1.2E-10	4.3E-10	Exempted	
Te-129m	8.5E-11	3.4E-10	Exempted	
Cs-134	7.6E-11	5.2E-11	Exempted	
Te-127m	6.5E-11	2.7E-10	Exempted	
Y-90	5.3E-11	2.0E-10	Exempted	
Rb-86	4.7E-11	1.7E-10	Exempted	
Tc-99	4.0E-11	1.4E-10	Exempted	
Cd-113m	3.7E-11	6.2E-11	Exempted	
Sb-125	3.2E-11	1.0E-10	Exempted	
Ni-63	2.9E-11	9.0E-11	Exempted	
Ce-144	2.9E-11	1.1E-10	Exempted	

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
Te-125m	2.6E-11	9.7E-11	Exempted	
Sr-89	2.3E-11	7.9E-11	Exempted	
Ba-140	2.2E-11	7.8E-11	Exempted	
Pu-239	1.4E-11	1.8E-11	Exempted	
Pu-240	1.4E-11	1.8E-11	Exempted	
Pu-238	1.3E-11	1.7E-11	Exempted	
Pu-241	1.2E-11	1.4E-11	Exempted	
Sn-126	1.1E-11	3.8E-11	Exempted	
Am-241	1.1E-11	1.5E-11	Exempted	
Am-243	1.1E-11	1.5E-11	Exempted	
Cm-243	8.4E-12	1.2E-11	Exempted	
Cs-136	8.0E-12	1.6E-11	Exempted	
Pm-146	7.8E-12	2.4E-11	Exempted	
Cm-244	6.7E-12	1.1E-11	Exempted	
Zn-65	5.2E-12	1.3E-11	Exempted	
Sn-119m	5.1E-12	2.0E-11	Exempted	
Te-127	4.8E-12	1.8E-11	Exempted	
Pm-147	4.4E-12	1.6E-11	Exempted	
Tb-160	4.0E-12	1.3E-11	Exempted	
Eu-152	3.5E-12	1.0E-11	Exempted	
Fe-59	2.7E-12	1.1E-11	Exempted	
Eu-154	2.1E-12	6.9E-12	Exempted	
Sb-124	2.1E-12	7.1E-12	Exempted	
Te-129	1.8E-12	6.0E-12	Exempted	
Ce-141	1.6E-12	5.8E-12	Exempted	
Ag-110m	1.4E-12	3.9E-12	Exempted	
Pm-148m	1.3E-12	4.1E-12	Exempted	
Te-123m	1.1E-12	4.0E-12	Exempted	
Eu-155	9.4E-13	3.2E-12	Exempted	
Gd-153	7.7E-13	2.7E-12	Exempted	
Cm-242	6.7E-13	2.2E-12	Exempted	
Am-242m	6.6E-13	8.0E-13	Exempted	
Ru-103	6.5E-13	2.1E-12	Exempted	
Co-58	5.3E-13	1.8E-12	Exempted	
Nb-95	5.2E-13	1.6E-12	Exempted	
Mn-54	4.2E-13	1.1E-12	Exempted	

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
Pr-144	2.8E-13	9.5E-13	Exempted	
Sm-151	7.8E-15	2.6E-14	Exempted	
Rh-103m	3.4E-15	1.2E-14	Exempted	
Cs-135	4.4E-16	3.8E-16	Exempted	
Rh-106	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Exempted	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Ba-137m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Exempted	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Pr-144m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Exempted	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Total	3.3E-07	5.7E-07	Exempted	

Table X-1-2 Assessment result of internal exposure from inhalation of seawater spray (Source term based on measured values (K4 tank group))

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
H-3	7.3E-08	5.0E-08	3.4E-08	
Ru-106	2.3E-09	1.9E-09	1.1E-09	
C-14	1.9E-09	1.4E-09	7.9E-10	
I-129	1.6E-09	1.1E-09	4.2E-10	
Pu-239	1.6E-09	7.9E-10	3.6E-10	
Pu-240	1.6E-09	7.9E-10	3.6E-10	
Pu-238	1.5E-09	7.4E-10	3.5E-10	
Pu-241	1.4E-09	6.1E-10	2.2E-10	
Am-241	1.3E-09	6.4E-10	3.1E-10	
Am-243	1.3E-09	6.4E-10	3.1E-10	
Cm-243	9.3E-10	5.0E-10	2.8E-10	
Cm-244	7.7E-10	4.4E-10	2.6E-10	
Sr-90	7.5E-10	5.0E-10	2.5E-10	
Y-91	4.2E-10	3.5E-10	2.6E-10	
Cs-137	3.5E-10	2.5E-10	1.3E-10	
Co-60	2.9E-10	2.2E-10	1.1E-10	
Sn-123	2.1E-10	1.8E-10	1.3E-10	
Tc-99	1.9E-10	1.4E-10	7.9E-11	
Cd-115m	1.1E-10	9.1E-11	8.1E-11	
Sb-125	8.5E-11	6.7E-11	3.8E-11	
Cm-242	8.0E-11	6.4E-11	4.7E-11	

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
Am-242m	7.7E-11	3.6E-11	1.7E-11	
Ce-144	7.2E-11	7.4E-11	6.3E-11	
Te-127m	6.7E-11	5.4E-11	3.6E-11	
Ni-63	6.1E-11	5.0E-11	2.9E-11	
Te-129m	5.4E-11	4.6E-11	3.4E-11	
Pm-146	4.4E-11	3.2E-11	1.7E-11	
Cd-113m	4.2E-11	2.7E-11	1.5E-11	
Te-125m	3.0E-11	2.2E-11	1.5E-11	
Eu-152	2.5E-11	1.6E-11	8.5E-12	
Pm-148	2.4E-11	2.3E-11	2.1E-11	
Pm-147	2.0E-11	1.8E-11	1.1E-11	
Cs-134	1.9E-11	1.6E-11	8.7E-12	
Sr-89	1.7E-11	1.4E-11	1.1E-11	
Sn-126	1.6E-11	1.4E-10	8.9E-12	
Eu-154	1.4E-11	9.8E-12	5.3E-12	
Ba-140	1.2E-11	9.6E-12	7.6E-12	
Sn-119m	8.0E-12	6.7E-12	4.7E-12	
Y-90	7.1E-12	7.8E-12	7.9E-12	
Eu-155	4.9E-12	3.9E-12	2.4E-12	
Tb-160	4.2E-12	3.5E-12	2.5E-12	
Rb-86	3.8E-12	5.4E-12	6.3E-12	
Ce-141	2.0E-12	1.5E-12	1.1E-12	
Cs-136	1.8E-12	1.5E-12	1.2E-12	
Sb-124	1.8E-12	1.4E-12	1.0E-12	
Fe-59	1.5E-12	1.2E-12	9.8E-13	
Ag-110m	1.4E-12	1.2E-12	7.1E-13	
Gd-153	1.4E-12	1.7E-12	1.3E-12	
Pm-148m	1.0E-12	8.5E-13	5.8E-13	
Te-123m	1.0E-12	7.6E-13	5.1E-13	
Te-127	9.6E-13	1.0E-12	1.1E-12	
Zn-65	7.1E-13	7.2E-13	6.2E-13	
Ru-103	6.4E-13	5.0E-13	3.6E-13	
Nb-95	3.9E-13	3.0E-13	2.1E-13	
Co-58	3.6E-13	3.0E-13	2.0E-13	
Te-129	2.7E-13	2.7E-13	3.1E-13	
Mn-54	2.2E-13	2.1E-13	1.4E-13	

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
Sm-151	7.7E-14	5.1E-14	2.7E-14	
Pr-144	2.4E-14	2.8E-14	3.3E-14	
Rh-103m	5.8E-16	5.6E-16	5.5E-16	
Cs-135	4.6E-16	3.4E-16	1.9E-16	
Rh-106	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Ba-137m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Pr-144m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Total	9.3E-08	6.2E-08	4.0E-08	

Table X-1-3 Assessment result of internal exposure from ingestion of seafood (Source term based on measured values (K4 tank group), Average ingestion)

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
Sn-123	9.8E-06	1.8E-05	2.4E-05	
I-129	2.7E-06	2.0E-06	8.6E-07	
C-14	1.4E-06	1.2E-06	6.8E-07	
Sn-126	4.9E-07	8.4E-07	1.1E-06	
Cd-115m	3.0E-07	4.4E-07	7.4E-07	
Sn-119m	2.3E-07	4.3E-07	5.6E-07	
Cd-113m	5.8E-08	5.0E-08	6.1E-08	
Co-60	4.9E-08	1.2E-07	1.6E-07	
H-3	3.3E-08	2.8E-08	2.3E-08	
Ru-106	3.3E-08	5.7E-08	7.6E-08	
Fe-59	2.3E-08	4.8E-08	1.0E-07	
Te-129m	1.8E-08	3.6E-08	5.3E-08	
Pm-148	1.7E-08	3.1E-08	3.9E-08	
Tc-99	1.6E-08	2.8E-08	4.9E-08	
Te-127m	1.4E-08	2.8E-08	4.9E-08	
Y-91	1.3E-08	2.3E-08	2.9E-08	
Zn-65	5.5E-09	7.0E-09	1.0E-08	
Te-125m	5.5E-09	1.0E-08	1.6E-08	
Cs-137	4.1E-09	1.5E-09	1.4E-09	
Ni-63	3.6E-09	5.4E-09	7.6E-09	
Ce-144	2.7E-09	4.9E-09	6.8E-09	

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
Ag-110m	2.1E-09	2.9E-09	3.6E-09	
Sb-125	1.5E-09	2.3E-09	3.1E-09	
Y-90	1.4E-09	2.6E-09	3.2E-09	
Am-241	1.4E-09	9.2E-10	5.0E-09	
Am-243	1.4E-09	9.2E-10	4.9E-09	
Pu-239	1.4E-09	8.8E-10	4.4E-09	
Pu-240	1.4E-09	8.8E-10	4.4E-09	
Pu-238	1.2E-09	8.3E-10	4.2E-09	
Pu-241	1.2E-09	6.5E-10	2.6E-09	
Pm-146	1.1E-09	1.8E-09	2.5E-09	
Te-127	1.0E-09	1.9E-09	1.8E-09	
Cm-243	7.2E-10	5.1E-10	3.0E-09	
Pm-147	6.4E-10	1.2E-09	1.8E-09	
Cs-134	6.4E-10	2.2E-10	1.8E-10	
Cm-244	5.8E-10	4.4E-10	2.7E-09	
Eu-152	5.1E-10	7.4E-10	1.2E-09	
Te-129	3.9E-10	6.3E-10	9.0E-10	
Mn-54	3.2E-10	4.3E-10	4.8E-10	
Eu-154	3.1E-10	5.1E-10	7.7E-10	
Tb-160	2.7E-10	4.5E-10	5.3E-10	
Sr-90	2.5E-10	2.1E-10	4.2E-10	
Te-123m	2.5E-10	4.2E-10	6.6E-10	
Co-58	2.0E-10	3.4E-10	3.8E-10	
Pm-148m	1.8E-10	3.0E-10	3.2E-10	
Ce-141	1.5E-10	2.7E-10	3.3E-10	
Eu-155	1.4E-10	2.4E-10	3.6E-10	
Gd-153	1.1E-10	2.0E-10	2.4E-10	
Sb-124	9.7E-11	1.6E-10	2.0E-10	
Am-242m	8.3E-11	4.9E-11	2.6E-10	
Cs-136	6.7E-11	6.8E-11	6.9E-11	
Cm-242	5.8E-11	9.1E-11	5.5E-10	
Rb-86	5.0E-11	8.9E-11	1.1E-10	
Ba-140	3.9E-11	6.7E-11	9.4E-11	
Nb-95	2.8E-11	4.2E-11	4.3E-11	
Pr-144	2.3E-11	3.7E-11	5.6E-11	
Ru-103	2.1E-11	3.4E-11	4.0E-11	

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
Sr-89	1.1E-11	1.8E-11	3.0E-11	
Sm-151	1.1E-12	1.9E-12	3.5E-12	
Rh-103m	1.7E-13	2.9E-13	4.2E-13	
Cs-135	3.7E-15	1.6E-15	1.6E-15	
Rh-106	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Ba-137m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Pr-144m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Total	1.5E-05	2.4E-05	2.9E-05	

Table X-1-4 Assessment result of internal exposure from ingestion of seafood (Source term based on measured values (K4 tank group), More ingestion)

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
Sn-123	3.7E-05	7.0E-05	8.9E-05	
I-129	1.3E-05	1.0E-05	4.1E-06	
C-14	5.2E-06	4.5E-06	2.5E-06	
Sn-126	1.9E-06	3.2E-06	4.0E-06	
Cd-115m	1.6E-06	2.3E-06	3.8E-06	
Sn-119m	8.5E-07	1.6E-06	2.1E-06	
Cd-113m	3.1E-07	2.6E-07	3.1E-07	
Co-60	2.7E-07	6.8E-07	8.4E-07	
Ru-106	1.6E-07	2.9E-07	3.8E-07	
H-3	1.3E-07	1.1E-07	8.7E-08	
Fe-59	1.2E-07	2.6E-07	5.3E-07	
Pm-148	9.4E-08	1.7E-07	2.0E-07	
Te-129m	8.0E-08	1.6E-07	2.3E-07	
Tc-99	7.7E-08	1.4E-07	2.3E-07	
Y-91	6.7E-08	1.2E-07	1.5E-07	
Te-127m	6.1E-08	1.3E-07	2.1E-07	
Zn-65	3.3E-08	4.1E-08	5.9E-08	
Te-125m	2.4E-08	4.5E-08	7.0E-08	
Cs-137	1.5E-08	5.6E-09	4.9E-09	
Ni-63	1.5E-08	2.3E-08	3.1E-08	
Ce-144	1.4E-08	2.5E-08	3.4E-08	

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
Ag-110m	9.9E-09	1.4E-08	1.7E-08	
Y-90	7.5E-09	1.4E-08	1.7E-08	
Pu-239	7.0E-09	4.6E-09	2.3E-08	
Pu-240	7.0E-09	4.6E-09	2.3E-08	
Am-241	6.7E-09	4.6E-09	2.4E-08	
Am-243	6.7E-09	4.6E-09	2.3E-08	
Pu-238	6.4E-09	4.3E-09	2.2E-08	
Pm-146	6.1E-09	9.6E-09	1.3E-08	
Pu-241	6.0E-09	3.4E-09	1.3E-08	
Sb-125	5.2E-09	8.2E-09	1.1E-08	
Te-127	4.5E-09	8.3E-09	7.8E-09	
Cm-243	3.5E-09	2.5E-09	1.4E-08	
Pm-147	3.4E-09	6.4E-09	9.2E-09	
Cm-244	2.8E-09	2.2E-09	1.3E-08	
Eu-152	2.7E-09	4.0E-09	6.1E-09	
Cs-134	2.3E-09	8.1E-10	6.4E-10	
Mn-54	1.8E-09	2.5E-09	2.7E-09	
Te-129	1.7E-09	2.8E-09	3.9E-09	
Eu-154	1.7E-09	2.7E-09	4.1E-09	
Tb-160	1.5E-09	2.5E-09	2.8E-09	
Sr-90	1.1E-09	9.6E-10	1.8E-09	
Co-58	1.1E-09	1.9E-09	2.1E-09	
Te-123m	1.1E-09	1.9E-09	2.8E-09	
Pm-148m	9.9E-10	1.6E-09	1.7E-09	
Ce-141	7.5E-10	1.4E-09	1.7E-09	
Eu-155	7.4E-10	1.3E-09	1.9E-09	
Gd-153	6.0E-10	1.0E-09	1.3E-09	
Am-242m	4.0E-10	2.4E-10	1.2E-09	
Sb-124	3.4E-10	5.8E-10	6.9E-10	
Cm-242	2.8E-10	4.5E-10	2.6E-09	
Cs-136	2.5E-10	2.5E-10	2.5E-10	
Rb-86	2.1E-10	3.7E-10	4.6E-10	
Ba-140	1.6E-10	2.9E-10	4.0E-10	
Nb-95	1.4E-10	2.2E-10	2.1E-10	
Pr-144	1.1E-10	1.9E-10	2.7E-10	
Ru-103	1.1E-10	1.7E-10	2.0E-10	

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
Sr-89	4.8E-11	8.2E-11	1.3E-10	
Sm-151	6.1E-12	1.0E-11	1.8E-11	
Rh-103m	9.4E-13	1.6E-12	2.2E-12	
Cs-135	1.4E-14	5.9E-15	5.6E-15	
Rh-106	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Ba-137m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Pr-144m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Total	6.1E-05	9.4E-05	1.1E-04	

Table X-2-1 Internal exposure assessment result from ingestion of seawater (Source term based on measured values (J1-C tank group))

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
H-3	3.0E-07	5.2E-07	Exempted	
I-129	2.7E-09	4.2E-09	Exempted	
Y-91	8.4E-10	3.1E-09	Exempted	
Sn-119m	2.9E-10	1.1E-09	Exempted	
Sn-123	2.9E-10	1.1E-09	Exempted	
Te-127m	2.3E-10	9.6E-10	Exempted	
C-14	2.2E-10	3.7E-10	Exempted	
Ru-106	2.0E-10	7.2E-10	Exempted	
Cd-115m	1.8E-10	5.4E-10	Exempted	
Pu-239	1.7E-10	2.2E-10	Exempted	
Pu-240	1.7E-10	2.2E-10	Exempted	
Pu-238	1.6E-10	2.1E-10	Exempted	
Am-241	1.4E-10	1.8E-10	Exempted	
Am-243	1.4E-10	1.8E-10	Exempted	
Pu-241	1.2E-10	1.4E-10	Exempted	
Cm-243	1.0E-10	1.5E-10	Exempted	
Te-129m	8.7E-11	3.5E-10	Exempted	
Cm-244	8.2E-11	1.3E-10	Exempted	
Ce-144	6.1E-11	2.2E-10	Exempted	
Cs-137	5.1E-11	3.8E-11	Exempted	
Cd-113m	4.0E-11	6.8E-11	Exempted	

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
Cs-134	3.0E-11	2.0E-11	Exempted	
Rb-86	2.9E-11	1.0E-10	Exempted	
Sn-126	2.8E-11	9.6E-11	Exempted	
Ni-63	2.6E-11	8.1E-11	Exempted	
Co-60	2.3E-11	1.2E-10	Exempted	
Sr-90	2.1E-11	3.5E-11	Exempted	
Te-127	1.6E-11	6.0E-11	Exempted	
Tc-99	1.6E-11	5.7E-11	Exempted	
Pm-148	1.3E-11	4.6E-11	Exempted	
Ba-140	1.1E-11	3.8E-11	Exempted	
Cm-242	8.2E-12	2.7E-11	Exempted	
Eu-152	8.1E-12	2.4E-11	Exempted	
Zn-65	7.6E-12	1.9E-11	Exempted	
Sb-125	5.2E-12	1.6E-11	Exempted	
Sb-124	5.0E-12	1.7E-11	Exempted	
Tb-160	4.6E-12	1.6E-11	Exempted	
Eu-154	4.5E-12	1.5E-11	Exempted	
Pm-147	4.3E-12	1.6E-11	Exempted	
Te-125m	4.1E-12	1.6E-11	Exempted	
Ce-141	3.8E-12	1.4E-11	Exempted	
Fe-59	3.2E-12	1.3E-11	Exempted	
Cs-136	2.9E-12	5.9E-12	Exempted	
Sr-89	2.9E-12	9.9E-12	Exempted	
Te-123m	2.7E-12	9.3E-12	Exempted	
Ag-110m	2.5E-12	6.9E-12	Exempted	
Am-242m	2.3E-12	2.8E-12	Exempted	
Eu-155	2.2E-12	7.7E-12	Exempted	
Y-90	2.0E-12	7.4E-12	Exempted	
Te-129	1.8E-12	6.1E-12	Exempted	
Pm-148m	1.7E-12	5.4E-12	Exempted	
Gd-153	1.4E-12	5.0E-12	Exempted	
Pm-146	1.2E-12	3.9E-12	Exempted	
Ru-103	8.0E-13	2.6E-12	Exempted	
Co-58	6.3E-13	2.2E-12	Exempted	
Nb-95	6.0E-13	1.9E-12	Exempted	
Pr-144	5.9E-13	2.0E-12	Exempted	

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
Mn-54	5.6E-13	1.5E-12	Exempted	
Sm-151	2.2E-14	7.5E-14	Exempted	
Rh-103m	4.1E-15	1.4E-14	Exempted	
Cs-135	4.9E-17	4.2E-17	Exempted	
Rh-106	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Exempted	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Ba-137m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Exempted	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Pr-144m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Exempted	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Total	3.1E-07	5.4E-07	Exempted	

Table X-2-2 Assessment result of internal exposure from inhalation of seawater spray (Source term based on measured values (J1-C tank group))

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
H-3	7.3E-08	5.0E-08	3.4E-08	
Pu-239	2.0E-08	9.6E-09	4.4E-09	
Pu-240	2.0E-08	9.6E-09	4.4E-09	
Pu-238	1.8E-08	9.0E-09	4.2E-09	
Am-241	1.6E-08	7.7E-09	3.8E-09	
Am-243	1.6E-08	7.7E-09	3.8E-09	
Pu-241	1.4E-08	6.1E-09	2.1E-09	
Cm-243	1.1E-08	6.1E-09	3.4E-09	
Cm-244	9.3E-09	5.3E-09	3.2E-09	
Cm-242	9.7E-10	7.7E-10	5.7E-10	
Y-91	7.5E-10	6.3E-10	4.7E-10	
C-14	5.2E-10	3.9E-10	2.2E-10	
Ru-106	4.6E-10	3.8E-10	2.3E-10	
Sn-119m	4.6E-10	3.8E-10	2.7E-10	
Am-242m	2.7E-10	1.3E-10	6.0E-11	
Sn-123	2.7E-10	2.3E-10	1.7E-10	
Te-127m	2.4E-10	1.9E-10	1.3E-10	
I-129	2.1E-10	1.4E-10	5.5E-11	
Ce-144	1.5E-10	1.6E-10	1.3E-10	
Cd-115m	1.0E-10	8.9E-11	7.9E-11	
Tc-99	7.7E-11	5.6E-11	3.1E-11	
Eu-152	5.8E-11	3.8E-11	2.0E-11	

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
Te-129m	5.5E-11	4.6E-11	3.4E-11	
Ni-63	5.5E-11	4.5E-11	2.6E-11	
Co-60	5.1E-11	3.8E-11	1.9E-11	
Cd-113m	4.6E-11	3.0E-11	1.6E-11	
Sn-126	4.0E-11	3.5E-10	2.2E-11	
Cs-137	3.7E-11	2.6E-11	1.3E-11	
Eu-154	2.9E-11	2.1E-11	1.1E-11	
Sr-90	2.9E-11	1.9E-11	9.7E-12	
Pm-147	2.0E-11	1.7E-11	1.1E-11	
Sb-125	1.4E-11	1.1E-11	6.2E-12	
Eu-155	1.2E-11	9.3E-12	5.6E-12	
Cs-134	7.5E-12	6.1E-12	3.4E-12	
Pm-146	7.0E-12	5.1E-12	2.7E-12	
Ba-140	5.8E-12	4.7E-12	3.7E-12	
Ce-141	4.9E-12	3.6E-12	2.7E-12	
Tb-160	4.9E-12	4.1E-12	2.9E-12	
Te-125m	4.8E-12	3.5E-12	2.5E-12	
Sb-124	4.1E-12	3.4E-12	2.4E-12	
Te-127	3.3E-12	3.6E-12	3.6E-12	
Gd-153	2.7E-12	3.3E-12	2.5E-12	
Ag-110m	2.6E-12	2.2E-12	1.3E-12	
Pm-148	2.5E-12	2.5E-12	2.2E-12	
Te-123m	2.3E-12	1.8E-12	1.2E-12	
Rb-86	2.3E-12	3.3E-12	3.8E-12	
Sr-89	2.1E-12	1.8E-12	1.3E-12	
Fe-59	1.7E-12	1.4E-12	1.2E-12	
Pm-148m	1.4E-12	1.1E-12	7.7E-13	
Zn-65	1.0E-12	1.0E-12	9.0E-13	
Ru-103	7.9E-13	6.2E-13	4.4E-13	
Cs-136	6.5E-13	5.5E-13	4.5E-13	
Nb-95	4.5E-13	3.5E-13	2.5E-13	
Co-58	4.3E-13	3.6E-13	2.4E-13	
Mn-54	2.8E-13	2.8E-13	1.8E-13	
Te-129	2.7E-13	2.7E-13	3.1E-13	
Y-90	2.7E-13	2.9E-13	3.0E-13	
Sm-151	2.2E-13	1.4E-13	7.7E-14	

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
Pr-144	5.1E-14	5.8E-14	6.9E-14	
Rh-103m	7.1E-16	6.9E-16	6.8E-16	
Cs-135	5.1E-17	3.7E-17	2.1E-17	
Rh-106	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Ba-137m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Pr-144m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Total	2.0E-07	1.1E-07	6.5E-08	

Table X-2-3 Assessment result of internal exposure from ingestion of seafood (Source term based on measured values (J1-C tank group), Average ingestion)

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
Sn-119m	1.3E-05	2.5E-05	3.2E-05	
Sn-123	1.3E-05	2.3E-05	3.1E-05	
Sn-126	1.2E-06	2.1E-06	2.7E-06	
C-14	3.8E-07	3.3E-07	1.9E-07	
I-129	3.6E-07	2.7E-07	1.1E-07	
Cd-115m	2.9E-07	4.3E-07	7.2E-07	
Cd-113m	6.4E-08	5.4E-08	6.7E-08	
Te-127m	5.0E-08	1.0E-07	1.8E-07	
H-3	3.3E-08	2.8E-08	2.3E-08	
Fe-59	2.7E-08	5.7E-08	1.2E-07	
Y-91	2.3E-08	4.1E-08	5.1E-08	
Te-129m	1.9E-08	3.6E-08	5.4E-08	
Am-241	1.7E-08	1.1E-08	6.1E-08	
Am-243	1.7E-08	1.1E-08	5.9E-08	
Pu-239	1.6E-08	1.1E-08	5.4E-08	
Pu-240	1.6E-08	1.1E-08	5.4E-08	
Pu-238	1.5E-08	1.0E-08	5.1E-08	
Pu-241	1.1E-08	6.5E-09	2.6E-08	
Cm-243	8.7E-09	6.2E-09	3.6E-08	
Co-60	8.6E-09	2.2E-08	2.7E-08	
Zn-65	8.0E-09	1.0E-08	1.5E-08	
Cm-244	7.0E-09	5.4E-09	3.3E-08	
Ru-106	6.6E-09	1.2E-08	1.5E-08	

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
Tc-99	6.5E-09	1.1E-08	1.9E-08	
Ce-144	5.8E-09	1.0E-08	1.4E-08	
Ag-110m	3.7E-09	5.2E-09	6.4E-09	
Te-127	3.5E-09	6.3E-09	6.2E-09	
Ni-63	3.2E-09	4.9E-09	6.8E-09	
Pm-148	1.9E-09	3.4E-09	4.1E-09	
Eu-152	1.2E-09	1.7E-09	2.7E-09	
Te-125m	8.9E-10	1.6E-09	2.6E-09	
Cm-242	7.0E-10	1.1E-09	6.6E-09	
Eu-154	6.6E-10	1.1E-09	1.6E-09	
Pm-147	6.2E-10	1.2E-09	1.7E-09	
Te-123m	5.7E-10	9.8E-10	1.5E-09	
Cs-137	4.3E-10	1.6E-10	1.4E-10	
Mn-54	4.2E-10	5.7E-10	6.4E-10	
Te-129	3.9E-10	6.4E-10	9.2E-10	
Ce-141	3.6E-10	6.4E-10	7.9E-10	
Eu-155	3.3E-10	5.6E-10	8.7E-10	
Tb-160	3.1E-10	5.2E-10	6.1E-10	
Am-242m	2.9E-10	1.7E-10	9.1E-10	
Cs-134	2.5E-10	8.5E-11	7.0E-11	
Pm-148m	2.4E-10	4.0E-10	4.3E-10	
Sb-125	2.4E-10	3.7E-10	4.9E-10	
Co-58	2.3E-10	4.1E-10	4.6E-10	
Sb-124	2.3E-10	3.9E-10	4.7E-10	
Gd-153	2.1E-10	3.7E-10	4.5E-10	
Pm-146	1.8E-10	2.8E-10	4.0E-10	
Y-90	5.4E-11	9.9E-11	1.2E-10	
Pr-144	4.7E-11	7.8E-11	1.2E-10	
Nb-95	3.2E-11	4.9E-11	5.0E-11	
Rb-86	3.1E-11	5.4E-11	6.9E-11	
Ru-103	2.6E-11	4.2E-11	4.9E-11	
Cs-136	2.4E-11	2.5E-11	2.5E-11	
Ba-140	1.9E-11	3.3E-11	4.6E-11	
Sr-90	9.6E-12	8.1E-12	1.6E-11	
Sm-151	3.2E-12	5.5E-12	9.8E-12	
Sr-89	1.3E-12	2.3E-12	3.7E-12	
Rh-103m	2.1E-13	3.6E-13	5.2E-13	

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
Cs-135	4.2E-16	1.8E-16	1.7E-16	
Rh-106	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Ba-137m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Pr-144m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Total	2.8E-05	5.1E-05	6.7E-05	

Table X-2-4 Assessment result of internal exposure from ingestion of seafood (Source term based on measured values (J1-C tank group), More ingestion)

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
Sn-119m	4.9E-05	9.4E-05	1.2E-04	
Sn-123	4.7E-05	8.9E-05	1.1E-04	
Sn-126	4.6E-06	8.0E-06	9.9E-06	
I-129	1.7E-06	1.3E-06	5.4E-07	
Cd-115m	1.5E-06	2.3E-06	3.7E-06	
C-14	1.4E-06	1.3E-06	7.0E-07	
Cd-113m	3.4E-07	2.9E-07	3.4E-07	
Te-127m	2.2E-07	4.5E-07	7.6E-07	
Fe-59	1.5E-07	3.1E-07	6.2E-07	
H-3	1.3E-07	1.1E-07	8.7E-08	
Y-91	1.2E-07	2.2E-07	2.7E-07	
Pu-239	8.5E-08	5.6E-08	2.8E-07	
Pu-240	8.5E-08	5.6E-08	2.8E-07	
Am-241	8.2E-08	5.5E-08	2.9E-07	
Am-243	8.2E-08	5.5E-08	2.8E-07	
Te-129m	8.1E-08	1.6E-07	2.3E-07	
Pu-238	7.8E-08	5.3E-08	2.6E-07	
Pu-241	5.9E-08	3.4E-08	1.3E-07	
Zn-65	4.8E-08	6.0E-08	8.6E-08	
Co-60	4.7E-08	1.2E-07	1.5E-07	
Cm-243	4.2E-08	3.1E-08	1.7E-07	
Cm-244	3.4E-08	2.7E-08	1.6E-07	
Ru-106	3.3E-08	5.9E-08	7.6E-08	
Tc-99	3.1E-08	5.5E-08	9.2E-08	
Ce-144	2.9E-08	5.3E-08	7.1E-08	
Ag-110m	1.8E-08	2.5E-08	3.0E-08	
Te-127	1.5E-08	2.8E-08	2.7E-08	
Ni-63	1.3E-08	2.1E-08	2.8E-08	
Pm-148	1.0E-08	1.8E-08	2.2E-08	
Eu-152	6.3E-09	9.3E-09	1.4E-08	
Te-125m	3.9E-09	7.3E-09	1.1E-08	
Eu-154	3.5E-09	5.8E-09	8.6E-09	
Cm-242	3.4E-09	5.5E-09	3.2E-08	
Pm-147	3.4E-09	6.2E-09	9.0E-09	

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
Te-123m	2.5E-09	4.4E-09	6.6E-09	
Mn-54	2.4E-09	3.2E-09	3.6E-09	
Ce-141	1.8E-09	3.3E-09	4.0E-09	
Eu-155	1.8E-09	3.0E-09	4.6E-09	
Te-129	1.7E-09	2.8E-09	4.0E-09	
Tb-160	1.7E-09	2.8E-09	3.3E-09	
Cs-137	1.6E-09	5.8E-10	5.1E-10	
Am-242m	1.4E-09	8.4E-10	4.4E-09	
Pm-148m	1.3E-09	2.1E-09	2.3E-09	
Co-58	1.3E-09	2.2E-09	2.4E-09	
Gd-153	1.1E-09	2.0E-09	2.4E-09	
Pm-146	9.7E-10	1.5E-09	2.1E-09	
Cs-134	9.1E-10	3.2E-10	2.5E-10	
Sb-125	8.4E-10	1.3E-09	1.7E-09	
Sb-124	8.1E-10	1.4E-09	1.6E-09	
Y-90	2.9E-10	5.3E-10	6.3E-10	
Pr-144	2.3E-10	3.9E-10	5.7E-10	
Nb-95	1.6E-10	2.5E-10	2.5E-10	
Ru-103	1.3E-10	2.1E-10	2.4E-10	
Rb-86	1.3E-10	2.3E-10	2.8E-10	
Cs-136	8.9E-11	9.2E-11	9.0E-11	
Ba-140	8.0E-11	1.4E-10	1.9E-10	
Sr-90	4.3E-11	3.6E-11	7.0E-11	
Sm-151	1.7E-11	2.9E-11	5.2E-11	
Sr-89	6.0E-12	1.0E-11	1.6E-11	
Rh-103m	1.2E-12	2.0E-12	2.8E-12	
Cs-135	1.5E-15	6.5E-16	6.3E-16	
Rh-106	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Ba-137m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Pr-144m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Total	1.1E-04	2.0E-04	2.5E-04	

Table X-3-1 Internal exposure assessment result from ingestion of seawater (Source term based on measured values (J1-C tank group))

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
H-3	3.0E-07	5.2E-07	Exempted	
I-129	2.3E-09	3.5E-09	Exempted	
Y-91	1.8E-09	6.6E-09	Exempted	
Sn-119m	8.5E-10	3.3E-09	Exempted	
Sn-123	8.3E-10	3.1E-09	Exempted	
Te-127m	6.5E-10	2.7E-09	Exempted	
C-14	5.8E-10	9.9E-10	Exempted	
Cd-115m	4.7E-10	1.4E-09	Exempted	
Pu-239	4.4E-10	5.8E-10	Exempted	
Pu-240	4.4E-10	5.8E-10	Exempted	
Pu-238	4.0E-10	5.4E-10	Exempted	
Am-241	3.5E-10	4.7E-10	Exempted	
Am-243	3.5E-10	4.7E-10	Exempted	
Pu-241	3.0E-10	3.4E-10	Exempted	
Cs-137	2.7E-10	2.0E-10	Exempted	
Cm-243	2.6E-10	3.9E-10	Exempted	
Te-129m	2.3E-10	9.0E-10	Exempted	
Cm-244	2.1E-10	3.3E-10	Exempted	
Ru-106	2.1E-10	7.5E-10	Exempted	
Ce-144	1.8E-10	6.5E-10	Exempted	
Cd-113m	1.2E-10	2.1E-10	Exempted	
Ni-63	8.3E-11	2.5E-10	Exempted	
Rb-86	8.2E-11	2.9E-10	Exempted	
Cs-134	8.0E-11	5.5E-11	Exempted	
Pm-148	7.6E-11	2.7E-10	Exempted	
Sr-90	5.6E-11	9.4E-11	Exempted	
Tc-99	5.2E-11	1.9E-10	Exempted	
Co-60	4.9E-11	2.4E-10	Exempted	
Te-127	4.6E-11	1.7E-10	Exempted	
Sn-126	4.4E-11	1.5E-10	Exempted	
Ba-140	2.8E-11	9.8E-11	Exempted	
Cm-242	2.1E-11	6.8E-11	Exempted	
Zn-65	2.0E-11	4.9E-11	Exempted	
Eu-152	1.7E-11	4.9E-11	Exempted	
Tb-160	1.4E-11	4.7E-11	Exempted	

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
Sb-124	1.3E-11	4.4E-11	Exempted	
Eu-154	1.3E-11	4.1E-11	Exempted	
Pm-147	1.2E-11	4.3E-11	Exempted	
Sb-125	9.6E-12	3.0E-11	Exempted	
Fe-59	8.1E-12	3.4E-11	Exempted	
Te-125m	7.6E-12	2.9E-11	Exempted	
Sr-89	7.3E-12	2.5E-11	Exempted	
Ag-110m	7.0E-12	2.0E-11	Exempted	
Cs-136	6.8E-12	1.4E-11	Exempted	
Am-242m	6.1E-12	7.3E-12	Exempted	
Te-123m	5.9E-12	2.1E-11	Exempted	
Y-90	5.4E-12	2.0E-11	Exempted	
Ce-141	5.3E-12	2.0E-11	Exempted	
Te-129	4.7E-12	1.6E-11	Exempted	
Pm-148m	4.4E-12	1.4E-11	Exempted	
Eu-155	3.6E-12	1.2E-11	Exempted	
Pm-146	3.5E-12	1.1E-11	Exempted	
Gd-153	3.2E-12	1.1E-11	Exempted	
Ru-103	2.3E-12	7.7E-12	Exempted	
Pr-144	1.7E-12	5.9E-12	Exempted	
Co-58	1.7E-12	6.0E-12	Exempted	
Nb-95	1.7E-12	5.3E-12	Exempted	
Mn-54	1.7E-12	4.5E-12	Exempted	
Sm-151	6.1E-14	2.1E-13	Exempted	
Rh-103m	1.2E-14	4.1E-14	Exempted	
Cs-135	2.6E-16	2.2E-16	Exempted	
Rh-106	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Exempted	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Ba-137m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Exempted	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Pr-144m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Exempted	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Total	3.2E-07	5.5E-07	Exempted	

Table X-3-2 Assessment result of internal exposure from inhalation of seawater spray (Source term based on measured values (J1-G tank group))

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
H-3	7.3E-08	5.0E-08	3.4E-08	
Pu-239	5.1E-08	2.5E-08	1.1E-08	
Pu-240	5.1E-08	2.5E-08	1.1E-08	
Pu-238	4.6E-08	2.3E-08	1.1E-08	
Am-241	4.1E-08	2.0E-08	9.8E-09	
Am-243	4.1E-08	2.0E-08	9.8E-09	
Pu-241	3.5E-08	1.5E-08	5.4E-09	
Cm-243	2.9E-08	1.6E-08	8.7E-09	
Cm-244	2.4E-08	1.4E-08	8.1E-09	
Cm-242	2.5E-09	2.0E-09	1.5E-09	
Y-91	1.6E-09	1.3E-09	1.0E-09	
C-14	1.4E-09	1.0E-09	5.9E-10	
Sn-119m	1.3E-09	1.1E-09	7.8E-10	
Sn-123	7.7E-10	6.7E-10	4.9E-10	
Am-242m	7.1E-10	3.3E-10	1.6E-10	
Te-127m	6.6E-10	5.3E-10	3.6E-10	
Ru-106	4.8E-10	4.0E-10	2.4E-10	
Ce-144	4.4E-10	4.6E-10	3.8E-10	
Cd-115m	2.7E-10	2.3E-10	2.1E-10	
Tc-99	2.5E-10	1.8E-10	1.0E-10	
Cs-137	1.9E-10	1.4E-10	7.0E-11	
I-129	1.8E-10	1.2E-10	4.6E-11	
Ni-63	1.7E-10	1.4E-10	8.2E-11	
Te-129m	1.4E-10	1.2E-10	8.8E-11	
Cd-113m	1.4E-10	9.2E-11	5.0E-11	
Eu-152	1.2E-10	7.9E-11	4.1E-11	
Co-60	1.1E-10	8.0E-11	4.1E-11	
Eu-154	8.0E-11	5.7E-11	3.1E-11	
Sr-90	7.7E-11	5.1E-11	2.6E-11	
Sn-126	6.3E-11	5.5E-10	3.5E-11	
Pm-147	5.4E-11	4.7E-11	2.9E-11	
Sb-125	2.5E-11	2.0E-11	1.1E-11	
Cs-134	2.0E-11	1.6E-11	9.1E-12	
Pm-146	2.0E-11	1.5E-11	7.8E-12	

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
Eu-155	1.9E-11	1.5E-11	9.1E-12	
Pm-148	1.5E-11	1.5E-11	1.3E-11	
Ba-140	1.5E-11	1.2E-11	9.6E-12	
Tb-160	1.5E-11	1.2E-11	8.7E-12	
Sb-124	1.1E-11	8.9E-12	6.4E-12	
Te-127	9.1E-12	9.9E-12	1.0E-11	
Te-125m	8.9E-12	6.5E-12	4.6E-12	
Ag-110m	7.2E-12	6.2E-12	3.6E-12	
Ce-141	6.9E-12	5.0E-12	3.7E-12	
Rb-86	6.6E-12	9.5E-12	1.1E-11	
Gd-153	6.0E-12	7.3E-12	5.5E-12	
Sr-89	5.4E-12	4.5E-12	3.4E-12	
Te-123m	5.2E-12	3.9E-12	2.6E-12	
Fe-59	4.3E-12	3.4E-12	2.9E-12	
Pm-148m	3.5E-12	2.9E-12	2.0E-12	
Zn-65	2.7E-12	2.7E-12	2.3E-12	
Ru-103	2.3E-12	1.8E-12	1.3E-12	
Cs-136	1.5E-12	1.3E-12	1.0E-12	
Nb-95	1.3E-12	1.0E-12	7.0E-13	
Co-58	1.2E-12	9.8E-13	6.5E-13	
Mn-54	8.6E-13	8.5E-13	5.5E-13	
Y-90	7.2E-13	8.0E-13	8.1E-13	
Te-129	7.1E-13	7.1E-13	8.1E-13	
Sm-151	6.0E-13	4.0E-13	2.1E-13	
Pr-144	1.5E-13	1.7E-13	2.0E-13	
Rh-103m	2.1E-15	2.0E-15	2.0E-15	
Cs-135	2.7E-16	2.0E-16	1.1E-16	
Rh-106	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Ba-137m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Pr-144m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Total	4.0E-07	2.2E-07	1.2E-07	

Table X-3-3 Assessment result of internal exposure from ingestion of seafood (Source term based on measured values (J1-G tank group), Average ingestion)

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
Sn-119m	3.7E-05	7.1E-05	9.2E-05	
Sn-123	3.6E-05	6.7E-05	8.8E-05	
Sn-126	1.9E-06	3.3E-06	4.2E-06	
C-14	1.0E-06	8.8E-07	5.1E-07	
Cd-115m	7.5E-07	1.1E-06	1.9E-06	
I-129	3.0E-07	2.3E-07	9.5E-08	
Cd-113m	2.0E-07	1.7E-07	2.0E-07	
Te-127m	1.4E-07	2.8E-07	4.9E-07	
Fe-59	6.8E-08	1.4E-07	3.0E-07	
Te-129m	4.9E-08	9.5E-08	1.4E-07	
Y-91	4.8E-08	8.8E-08	1.1E-07	
Am-241	4.4E-08	2.9E-08	1.6E-07	
Am-243	4.4E-08	2.9E-08	1.5E-07	
Pu-239	4.2E-08	2.8E-08	1.4E-07	
Pu-240	4.2E-08	2.8E-08	1.4E-07	
Pu-238	3.9E-08	2.6E-08	1.3E-07	
H-3	3.3E-08	2.8E-08	2.3E-08	
Pu-241	2.9E-08	1.6E-08	6.6E-08	
Cm-243	2.3E-08	1.6E-08	9.3E-08	
Tc-99	2.1E-08	3.7E-08	6.4E-08	
Zn-65	2.1E-08	2.6E-08	3.8E-08	
Co-60	1.8E-08	4.6E-08	5.7E-08	
Cm-244	1.8E-08	1.4E-08	8.4E-08	
Ce-144	1.7E-08	3.0E-08	4.1E-08	
Pm-148	1.1E-08	2.0E-08	2.4E-08	
Ag-110m	1.0E-08	1.5E-08	1.8E-08	
Ni-63	1.0E-08	1.5E-08	2.2E-08	
Te-127	9.9E-09	1.8E-08	1.7E-08	
Ru-106	6.9E-09	1.2E-08	1.6E-08	
Eu-152	2.4E-09	3.6E-09	5.5E-09	
Cs-137	2.3E-09	8.3E-10	7.5E-10	
Eu-154	1.8E-09	3.0E-09	4.5E-09	
Cm-242	1.8E-09	2.9E-09	1.7E-08	
Pm-147	1.7E-09	3.2E-09	4.7E-09	
Te-125m	1.6E-09	3.0E-09	4.8E-09	

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
Mn-54	1.3E-09	1.7E-09	1.9E-09	
Te-123m	1.3E-09	2.2E-09	3.4E-09	
Te-129	1.0E-09	1.7E-09	2.4E-09	
Tb-160	9.4E-10	1.6E-09	1.9E-09	
Am-242m	7.6E-10	4.5E-10	2.4E-09	
Cs-134	6.7E-10	2.3E-10	1.9E-10	
Co-58	6.4E-10	1.1E-09	1.2E-09	
Pm-148m	6.4E-10	1.0E-09	1.1E-09	
Sb-124	6.0E-10	1.0E-09	1.2E-09	
Eu-155	5.3E-10	9.0E-10	1.4E-09	
Pm-146	5.2E-10	8.1E-10	1.1E-09	
Ce-141	5.0E-10	9.0E-10	1.1E-09	
Gd-153	4.7E-10	8.2E-10	1.0E-09	
Sb-125	4.4E-10	6.9E-10	9.1E-10	
Y-90	1.4E-10	2.7E-10	3.3E-10	
Pr-144	1.4E-10	2.3E-10	3.4E-10	
Nb-95	9.2E-11	1.4E-10	1.4E-10	
Rb-86	8.8E-11	1.5E-10	2.0E-10	
Ru-103	7.6E-11	1.2E-10	1.4E-10	
Cs-136	5.7E-11	5.8E-11	5.8E-11	
Ba-140	4.9E-11	8.4E-11	1.2E-10	
Sr-90	2.6E-11	2.2E-11	4.3E-11	
Sm-151	8.9E-12	1.5E-11	2.7E-11	
Sr-89	3.4E-12	5.8E-12	9.4E-12	
Rh-103m	6.2E-13	1.1E-12	1.5E-12	
Cs-135	2.2E-15	9.4E-16	9.3E-16	
Rh-106	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Ba-137m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Pr-144m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Total	7.9E-05	1.5E-04	1.9E-04	

Table X-3-4 Assessment result of internal exposure from ingestion of seafood (Source term based on measured values (J1-C tank group), More ingestion)

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
Sn-119m	1.4E-04	2.7E-04	3.4E-04	
Sn-123	1.4E-04	2.6E-04	3.3E-04	
Sn-126	7.3E-06	1.3E-05	1.6E-05	
Cd-115m	4.0E-06	5.9E-06	9.7E-06	
C-14	3.9E-06	3.4E-06	1.9E-06	
I-129	1.4E-06	1.1E-06	4.5E-07	
Cd-113m	1.0E-06	8.8E-07	1.1E-06	
Te-127m	6.0E-07	1.3E-06	2.1E-06	
Fe-59	3.7E-07	7.7E-07	1.6E-06	
Y-91	2.6E-07	4.7E-07	5.8E-07	
Pu-239	2.2E-07	1.4E-07	7.1E-07	
Pu-240	2.2E-07	1.4E-07	7.1E-07	
Am-241	2.1E-07	1.4E-07	7.5E-07	
Am-243	2.1E-07	1.4E-07	7.3E-07	
Te-129m	2.1E-07	4.2E-07	6.0E-07	
Pu-238	2.0E-07	1.4E-07	6.8E-07	
Pu-241	1.5E-07	8.6E-08	3.4E-07	
H-3	1.3E-07	1.1E-07	8.7E-08	
Zn-65	1.2E-07	1.5E-07	2.2E-07	
Cm-243	1.1E-07	8.0E-08	4.5E-07	
Tc-99	1.0E-07	1.8E-07	3.0E-07	
Co-60	1.0E-07	2.5E-07	3.1E-07	
Cm-244	8.7E-08	6.9E-08	4.1E-07	
Ce-144	8.5E-08	1.6E-07	2.1E-07	
Pm-148	6.0E-08	1.1E-07	1.3E-07	
Ag-110m	5.0E-08	7.0E-08	8.4E-08	
Te-127	4.3E-08	7.8E-08	7.4E-08	
Ni-63	4.2E-08	6.5E-08	8.8E-08	
Ru-106	3.4E-08	6.1E-08	8.0E-08	
Eu-152	1.3E-08	1.9E-08	2.9E-08	
Eu-154	9.8E-09	1.6E-08	2.4E-08	
Pm-147	9.2E-09	1.7E-08	2.5E-08	
Cm-242	8.7E-09	1.4E-08	8.2E-08	
Cs-137	8.2E-09	3.1E-09	2.7E-09	

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mSv/year)			Remarks
	Adult	Children under school age	Infants	
Mn-54	7.4E-09	9.9E-09	1.1E-08	
Te-125m	7.1E-09	1.4E-08	2.1E-08	
Te-123m	5.5E-09	9.6E-09	1.5E-08	
Tb-160	5.1E-09	8.6E-09	9.9E-09	
Te-129	4.4E-09	7.4E-09	1.0E-08	
Am-242m	3.6E-09	2.2E-09	1.1E-08	
Co-58	3.5E-09	6.1E-09	6.7E-09	
Pm-148m	3.4E-09	5.5E-09	5.9E-09	
Eu-155	2.8E-09	4.9E-09	7.4E-09	
Pm-146	2.8E-09	4.3E-09	6.0E-09	
Ce-141	2.5E-09	4.6E-09	5.6E-09	
Gd-153	2.5E-09	4.4E-09	5.2E-09	
Cs-134	2.4E-09	8.5E-10	6.8E-10	
Sb-124	2.1E-09	3.6E-09	4.3E-09	
Sb-125	1.6E-09	2.5E-09	3.2E-09	
Y-90	7.7E-10	1.4E-09	1.7E-09	
Pr-144	6.8E-10	1.2E-09	1.7E-09	
Nb-95	4.6E-10	7.2E-10	7.1E-10	
Ru-103	3.8E-10	6.3E-10	7.1E-10	
Rb-86	3.6E-10	6.5E-10	8.0E-10	
Cs-136	2.1E-10	2.1E-10	2.1E-10	
Ba-140	2.1E-10	3.7E-10	5.0E-10	
Sr-90	1.2E-10	9.8E-11	1.9E-10	
Sm-151	4.8E-11	8.1E-11	1.4E-10	
Sr-89	1.5E-11	2.6E-11	4.1E-11	
Rh-103m	3.4E-12	5.8E-12	8.1E-12	
Cs-135	8.1E-15	3.5E-15	3.3E-15	
Rh-106	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Ba-137m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Pr-144m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Total	3.0E-04	5.6E-04	7.1E-04	

X-2. Assessment result regarding environmental protection

For the following exposure assessments shown in chapter 7. “Assessment regarding environmental protection”, Tables X-4 to 6 show the assessment result of each nuclide.

Source term based on measured values of 64 nuclides

i. K4 tank group (Sum of the ratios to regulatory concentration limits of 63 nuclides other than tritium: 0.29)
ii. J1-C tank group (Sum of the ratios to regulatory concentration limits of 63 nuclides other than tritium: 0.35)
iii. J1-G tank group (Sum of the ratios to regulatory concentration limits of 63 nuclides other than tritium: 0.22)

Table X-4 Assessment result of environmental protection (Source term based on measured values (K4 tank group))

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mGy/day)			Remarks
	Flatfish	Crab	Brown seaweed	
Fe-59	1.2E-05	1.2E-05	1.3E-05	
Sn-123	1.6E-06	1.5E-06	1.7E-06	
Pm-148	1.3E-06	1.2E-06	1.7E-06	
Sn-126	6.9E-07	6.6E-07	6.4E-07	
Co-60	6.5E-07	6.5E-07	7.1E-07	
Pm-146	2.9E-07	2.8E-07	3.1E-07	
Y-91	1.4E-07	8.4E-08	6.3E-07	
Eu-152	1.3E-07	1.2E-07	1.3E-07	
Tb-160	1.2E-07	1.2E-07	1.3E-07	
Ce-144	7.8E-08	4.6E-08	7.8E-08	
Pm-148m	6.6E-08	6.4E-08	7.2E-08	
Eu-154	6.1E-08	5.7E-08	6.1E-08	
Ru-106	5.4E-08	5.4E-08	6.4E-08	
Cd-115m	4.9E-08	2.2E-07	9.3E-09	
Sn-119m	4.3E-08	4.1E-08	3.0E-08	
C-14	4.0E-08	3.3E-08	2.7E-08	
Mn-54	2.3E-08	2.1E-08	2.3E-08	
Gd-153	1.2E-08	1.1E-08	1.4E-08	
Nb-95	1.2E-08	1.2E-08	1.2E-08	
Ce-141	1.1E-08	1.1E-08	1.2E-08	
Eu-155	7.7E-09	7.5E-09	7.7E-09	
H-3	4.7E-09	4.7E-09	1.8E-09	
Co-58	4.6E-09	4.6E-09	4.6E-09	
Cs-137	2.0E-09	1.9E-09	2.0E-09	
Zn-65	1.3E-09	2.6E-09	1.3E-09	

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mGy/day)			Remarks
	Flatfish	Crab	Brown seaweed	
Ba-140	9.3E-10	1.3E-09	1.7E-09	
Te-129m	9.1E-10	9.2E-10	8.4E-09	
Sb-125	7.0E-10	6.6E-10	8.7E-10	
Am-243	5.8E-10	7.1E-10	6.4E-10	
Cs-134	5.8E-10	5.4E-10	5.7E-10	
Cs-136	5.0E-10	5.0E-10	5.0E-10	
Te-127m	4.3E-10	4.3E-10	4.1E-09	
Cd-113m	4.1E-10	1.8E-09	3.4E-11	
Ag-110m	4.0E-10	2.2E-09	3.5E-10	
Ru-103	3.9E-10	3.9E-10	4.0E-10	
Cm-243	3.2E-10	8.3E-10	5.2E-10	
Te-127	3.2E-10	3.2E-10	2.9E-09	
Rb-86	2.7E-10	2.0E-10	4.8E-10	
Te-125m	1.9E-10	2.0E-10	1.7E-09	
Pm-147	9.7E-11	1.3E-09	9.0E-10	
Sb-124	8.5E-11	8.0E-11	1.0E-10	
Am-241	6.3E-11	2.0E-10	6.4E-11	
Ni-63	4.5E-11	1.1E-09	3.3E-10	
Sr-90	4.3E-11	1.6E-10	4.2E-11	
Pu-238	3.8E-11	2.6E-11	6.3E-11	
Pu-240	3.6E-11	2.4E-11	5.9E-11	
Pu-239	3.6E-11	2.4E-11	5.9E-11	
Tc-99	2.5E-11	5.6E-09	1.6E-08	
I-129	1.1E-11	6.4E-09	2.8E-09	
Sr-89	1.1E-11	3.7E-11	1.1E-11	
Te-123m	7.3E-12	7.4E-12	4.4E-11	
Cm-242	4.3E-12	5.5E-10	2.1E-10	
Cm-244	4.1E-12	5.2E-10	2.0E-10	
Am-242m	3.0E-12	3.3E-12	5.2E-12	
Pu-241	1.6E-12	1.1E-12	2.7E-12	
Sm-151	9.1E-14	1.9E-12	7.9E-13	
Cs-135	1.2E-16	6.4E-17	9.5E-17	
Y-90	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Rh-103m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Rh-106	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Te-129	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Ba-137m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Pr-144	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mGy/day)			Remarks
	Flatfish	Crab	Brown seaweed	
Pr-144m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Total	1.7E-05	1.7E-05	1.9E-05	

Table X-5 Assessment result of environmental protection (Source term based on measured values (J1-C tank group))

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mGy/day)			Remarks
	Flatfish	Crab	Brown seaweed	
Fe-59	1.4E-05	1.4E-05	1.5E-05	
Sn-119m	2.5E-06	2.3E-06	1.7E-06	
Sn-123	2.0E-06	2.0E-06	2.1E-06	
Sn-126	1.7E-06	1.6E-06	1.6E-06	
Eu-152	3.1E-07	2.9E-07	3.1E-07	
Y-91	2.5E-07	1.5E-07	1.1E-06	
Ce-144	1.6E-07	9.5E-08	1.6E-07	
Tb-160	1.4E-07	1.4E-07	1.5E-07	
Pm-148	1.4E-07	1.3E-07	1.9E-07	
Eu-154	1.3E-07	1.2E-07	1.3E-07	
Co-60	1.1E-07	1.1E-07	1.2E-07	
Pm-148m	8.8E-08	8.5E-08	9.5E-08	
Cd-115m	4.8E-08	2.1E-07	9.1E-09	
Pm-146	4.7E-08	4.5E-08	4.9E-08	
Mn-54	3.1E-08	2.8E-08	3.1E-08	
Ce-141	2.7E-08	2.6E-08	2.8E-08	
Gd-153	2.3E-08	2.1E-08	2.7E-08	
Eu-155	1.8E-08	1.8E-08	1.8E-08	
Nb-95	1.4E-08	1.4E-08	1.4E-08	
C-14	1.1E-08	9.2E-09	7.4E-09	
Ru-106	1.1E-08	1.1E-08	1.3E-08	
Am-243	7.1E-09	8.6E-09	7.8E-09	
Co-58	5.5E-09	5.4E-09	5.4E-09	
H-3	4.7E-09	4.7E-09	1.8E-09	
Cm-243	3.9E-09	1.0E-08	6.3E-09	
Zn-65	1.9E-09	3.8E-09	1.8E-09	
Te-127m	1.5E-09	1.5E-09	1.4E-08	
Te-127	1.1E-09	1.1E-09	1.0E-08	
Te-129m	9.2E-10	9.4E-10	8.5E-09	
Am-241	7.6E-10	2.5E-09	7.8E-10	

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mGy/day)			Remarks
	Flatfish	Crab	Brown seaweed	
Ag-110m	7.2E-10	4.0E-09	6.2E-10	
Ru-103	4.8E-10	4.8E-10	4.9E-10	
Pu-238	4.7E-10	3.2E-10	7.6E-10	
Ba-140	4.6E-10	6.3E-10	8.5E-10	
Cd-113m	4.5E-10	2.0E-09	3.7E-11	
Pu-240	4.4E-10	3.0E-10	7.1E-10	
Pu-239	4.3E-10	3.0E-10	7.1E-10	
Cs-134	2.3E-10	2.1E-10	2.2E-10	
Cs-137	2.1E-10	2.0E-10	2.1E-10	
Sb-124	2.0E-10	1.9E-10	2.4E-10	
Cs-136	1.8E-10	1.8E-10	1.8E-10	
Rb-86	1.6E-10	1.2E-10	3.0E-10	
Sb-125	1.1E-10	1.1E-10	1.4E-10	
Pm-147	9.5E-11	1.3E-09	8.8E-10	
Cm-242	5.2E-11	6.7E-09	2.5E-09	
Cm-244	4.9E-11	6.3E-09	2.4E-09	
Ni-63	4.0E-11	9.6E-10	3.0E-10	
Te-125m	3.1E-11	3.2E-11	2.7E-10	
Te-123m	1.7E-11	1.7E-11	1.0E-10	
Pu-241	1.6E-11	1.1E-11	2.7E-11	
Am-242m	1.0E-11	1.1E-11	1.8E-11	
Tc-99	9.8E-12	2.2E-09	6.5E-09	
Sr-90	1.6E-12	5.9E-12	1.6E-12	
I-129	1.5E-12	8.5E-10	3.7E-10	
Sr-89	1.3E-12	4.7E-12	1.3E-12	
Sm-151	2.6E-13	5.5E-12	2.2E-12	
Cs-135	1.3E-17	7.1E-18	1.1E-17	
Y-90	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Rh-103m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Rh-106	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Te-129	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Ba-137m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Pr-144	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Pr-144m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Total	2.2E-05	2.2E-05	2.3E-05	

Table X-6 Assessment result of environmental protection (Source term based on measured values (J1-G tank group))

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mGy/day)			Remarks
	Flatfish	Crab	Brown seaweed	
Fe-59	3.6E-05	3.6E-05	3.8E-05	
Sn-119m	7.1E-06	6.8E-06	5.0E-06	
Sn-123	5.9E-06	5.7E-06	6.1E-06	
Sn-126	2.7E-06	2.6E-06	2.5E-06	
Pm-148	8.1E-07	7.8E-07	1.1E-06	
Eu-152	6.3E-07	5.9E-07	6.3E-07	
Y-91	5.3E-07	3.2E-07	2.4E-06	
Ce-144	4.8E-07	2.8E-07	4.8E-07	
Tb-160	4.4E-07	4.4E-07	4.7E-07	
Eu-154	3.6E-07	3.4E-07	3.6E-07	
Co-60	2.4E-07	2.4E-07	2.6E-07	
Pm-148m	2.3E-07	2.2E-07	2.5E-07	
Pm-146	1.3E-07	1.3E-07	1.4E-07	
Cd-115m	1.2E-07	5.5E-07	2.4E-08	
Mn-54	9.3E-08	8.5E-08	9.3E-08	
Gd-153	5.1E-08	4.7E-08	5.9E-08	
Nb-95	4.0E-08	3.9E-08	4.1E-08	
Ce-141	3.8E-08	3.7E-08	3.9E-08	
C-14	3.0E-08	2.5E-08	2.0E-08	
Eu-155	3.0E-08	2.9E-08	3.0E-08	
Am-243	1.8E-08	2.2E-08	2.0E-08	
Co-58	1.5E-08	1.5E-08	1.5E-08	
Ru-106	1.1E-08	1.1E-08	1.3E-08	
Cm-243	1.0E-08	2.6E-08	1.6E-08	
Zn-65	4.9E-09	9.8E-09	4.8E-09	
H-3	4.7E-09	4.7E-09	1.8E-09	
Te-127m	4.3E-09	4.3E-09	4.0E-08	
Te-127	3.0E-09	3.0E-09	2.8E-08	
Te-129m	2.4E-09	2.4E-09	2.2E-08	
Ag-110m	2.0E-09	1.1E-08	1.7E-09	
Am-241	2.0E-09	6.4E-09	2.0E-09	
Ru-103	1.4E-09	1.4E-09	1.4E-09	
Cd-113m	1.4E-09	6.2E-09	1.1E-10	

Nuclide	Exposure assessment result (mGy/day)			Remarks
	Flatfish	Crab	Brown seaweed	
Pu-238	1.2E-09	8.2E-10	2.0E-09	
Ba-140	1.2E-09	1.6E-09	2.2E-09	
Pu-240	1.1E-09	7.6E-10	1.8E-09	
Pu-239	1.1E-09	7.6E-10	1.8E-09	
Cs-137	1.1E-09	1.0E-09	1.1E-09	
Cs-134	6.0E-10	5.7E-10	6.0E-10	
Sb-124	5.3E-10	5.0E-10	6.4E-10	
Rb-86	4.7E-10	3.5E-10	8.4E-10	
Cs-136	4.2E-10	4.2E-10	4.2E-10	
Pm-147	2.6E-10	3.5E-09	2.4E-09	
Sb-125	2.1E-10	2.0E-10	2.6E-10	
Cm-242	1.3E-10	1.7E-08	6.5E-09	
Ni-63	1.3E-10	3.0E-09	9.4E-10	
Cm-244	1.3E-10	1.6E-08	6.2E-09	
Te-125m	5.7E-11	6.0E-11	5.0E-10	
Pu-241	4.1E-11	2.8E-11	6.8E-11	
Te-123m	3.7E-11	3.8E-11	2.2E-10	
Tc-99	3.2E-11	7.3E-09	2.1E-08	
Am-242m	2.7E-11	3.0E-11	4.8E-11	
Sr-90	4.4E-12	1.6E-11	4.3E-12	
Sr-89	3.4E-12	1.2E-11	3.3E-12	
I-129	1.2E-12	7.1E-10	3.1E-10	
Sm-151	7.1E-13	1.5E-11	6.2E-12	
Cs-135	6.9E-17	3.8E-17	5.6E-17	
Y-90	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Rh-103m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Rh-106	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Te-129	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Ba-137m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Pr-144	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Pr-144m	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
Total	5.6E-05	5.5E-05	5.9E-05	

Attachment XI Conservativeness of the external exposure dose conversion factor

The dose conversion factor used for the dose assessment of external exposure is quoted from the Handbook for Determining Environmental Impacts of Decommissioning Work (hereinafter called “Decommissioning Handbook”). It has some defects: for example, its target is only the gamma radiation and conversion factors are not prepared for some of the 64 nuclides. For the unprepared conversion factors, conservativeness is secured by quoting the most conservative conversion factor for each of the βγ and α nuclides, Co-60 and Am-241, respectively. For verification, comparison was performed using the dose conversion factor of external exposure created overseas.

As the target of comparison, we used Federal Guidance Report No.15, “External Exposure to Radionuclides in Air, Water and Soil” (Environmental Protection Agency, 2019; hereinafter called “FGR15”) [XI-1] provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for radiation protection of U.S. citizens. FGR15 shows the dose conversion factor for the calculation of external exposure of humans from radioactive materials on the ground surface and in the soil, air, and water, and the target nuclides include all of the 64 nuclides subject to the assessment of ALPS treated water, so we attempted an assessment using the dose conversion factor shown in FGR15.

XI-1. Assessment method

Same as the exposure assessment method shown in the chapter 6-1. “Exposure assessment under normal conditions” and only the dose conversion factor is switched. However, external exposure from radioactive materials adhered to fishing nets are excluded from comparison targets because there is no appropriate dose conversion factor in FGR15. The following shows the assessment model and used parameters of each exposure pathway in FGR15.

(1) External exposure from the seawater surface

The effective dose conversion factor from radiation from seawater is calculated by multiplying the external dose conversion factor in immersion in water shown in Table 4-7. Reference person effective dose rate coefficients for water immersion. of FGR15 by the reduction factor of 0.5 considering that there is no radiation source (seawater) upward (Table XI-1). Figure XI-1 shows an image diagram of the assessment model. Shielding by hulls was ignored in the safe side.

Equation (XI-1) shows the calculation equation of the effective dose D_1(mSv/year) from radiation from the seawater surface.

$$\mathrm{D}_1 = 1000 \cdot 1000 \cdot 3600 \cdot \sum_i (K_1)_i \cdot (x_1)_i \cdot t_1 \qquad \text{(XI-1)}$$

Attachment XI-1

where

$(K_1)_i$ is the effective dose conversion factor from radiation from nuclide *i* in immersion in water ((Sv/s)/(Bq/m^3))

$(x_1)_i$ is the concentration of nuclide i in seawater (Bq/L)

t_1 is the annual exposure time (h/year)

1000 is the factor of unit conversion (Sv to mSv) of the effective dose

1000 is the factor of unit conversion (Bq/L to Bq/m^3) of the concentration in seawater

3600 is the factor of unit conversion (h/year to s/year) of the annual exposure time

As in the chapter 6-1. “Exposure assessment under normal conditions”, the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater used for the assessment was the annual average concentration of the sea surface (top layer) within the 10 km × 10 km area around the power plant.



Figure XI-1 Conceptual diagram of the exposure assessment model from radioactive materials in seawater during work at sea

(2) External exposure from hulls

Assess the external radiation exposure from radioactive materials migrated from seawater to hulls during work at sea. The effective dose conversion factor from radiation from radioactive materials migrated from seawater to hulls is the external dose conversion factor in immersion in water shown in Table 4-1. Reference person effective dose rate coefficients for ground surface. of FGR15. (Table XI-2). Figure XI-2 shows an image diagram of the assessment model.

Equations (XI-2) and (XI-3) show the calculation equation of the effective dose D_2(mSv/year) from radioactive materials adhered to hulls.

$$\mathrm{D}_2 = 1000 \cdot 3600 \cdot \sum_i (K_2)_i \cdot (S_2)_i \cdot t_2 \qquad \text{(XI-2)}$$

$$(S_2)_i = (F_2)_i \cdot (x_2)_i \qquad \text{(XI-3)}$$

where

$(K_2)_i$ is the effective dose conversion factor from radiation from nuclide *i* from hulls ((Sv/s)/(Bq/m^2))

$(S_2)_i$ is the contamination density of nuclide *i* in hulls (Bq/m^2)

t_2 is the annual exposure time (h/year)

$(F_2)_i$ is the migration factor of nuclide *i* from seawater to hulls ((Bq/m^2)/(Bq/L))

$(x_2)_i$ is the concentration of nuclide *i* in seawater (Bq/L) at the assessment point

1000 is the factor of unit conversion (Sv to mSv) of the effective dose

3600 is the factor of unit conversion (h/year to s/year) of the annual exposure time

As in the chapter 6-1. “Exposure assessment under normal conditions”, the migration factor to hulls is 100((Bq/m^2)/(Bq/L)) from the Application for the Designation of Reprocessing Business at Rokkasho business facility.

As in the chapter 6-1. “Exposure assessment under normal conditions, the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater used for the assessment was the annual average concentration of the sea surface (top layer) within the 10 km × 10 km area around the power plant.



Figure XI-2 Conceptual diagram of the exposure assessment model from radioactive materials adhered to hulls during work at sea

(3) External exposure under water such as during swimming

Assess the external exposure from radioactive materials in the surrounding seawater during swimming and underwater work. The effective dose conversion factor from radiation from radioactive materials in seawater is the external dose conversion factor in immersion in water shown in Table 4-7. Reference person effective dose rate coefficients for water immersion. of FGR15 (Table XI-3). Figure XI-3 shows an image diagram of the assessment model.

Equation (XI-4) shows the calculation equation of the effective dose D_3 (mSv/year) from radiation during swimming and underwater work.

$$\mathrm{D}_3 = 1000 \cdot 1000 \cdot 3600 \cdot \sum_i (K_3)_i \cdot (x_3)_i \cdot t_3 \qquad \text{(XI-4)}$$

where

$(K_3)_i$ is the effective dose conversion factor from radiation from nuclide *i* from seawater ((Sv/s)/(Bq/m^3))

$(x_3)_i$ is the concentration of nuclide i in seawater (Bq/L)

t_3 is the annual exposure time (h/year)

1000 is the factor of unit conversion (Sv to mSv) of the effective dose

1000 is the factor of unit conversion (Bq/L to Bq/m^3) of the concentration in seawater

3600 is the factor of unit conversion (h/year to s/year) of the annual exposure time

As in the chapter 6-1. “Exposure assessment under normal conditions”, the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater used for the assessment site and for the assessment is the average concentration in sea water around the beach to the north of the power plant where the evacuation order has been lifted.



Figure XI-3 Conceptual diagram of the exposure assessment model from radioactive materials in seawater

(4) External exposure from beach sand

Assess the external exposure from radioactive materials migrated from seawater to beach sand while staying at a beach. The effective dose conversion factor from radiation from radioactive materials at a beach is the external dose conversion factor regarding exposure from radioactive materials in the soil shown in Table 4-5. Reference person effective dose rate coefficients for soil to infinite depth. of FGR15 (Table XI-4). Figure XI-4 shows an image diagram of the assessment model.

Equation (XI-5) shows the calculation equation of the effective dose D_4 (mSv/year) from the gamma radiation from beach sand.

$$D_4 = 1000 \cdot 1600 \cdot 3600 \cdot \sum_i (K_4)_i \cdot (x_4)_i \cdot (F_4)_i \cdot t_4 \qquad \text{(XI-5)}$$

where

$(K_4)_i$ is the effective dose conversion factor from radiation from nuclide *i* from beach sand ((Sv/s)/(Bq/m^3))

$(x_4)_i$ is the concentration of nuclide i in seawater (Bq/L)
$(F_4)_i$ is the migration factor of nuclide i from seawater to beaches ((Bq/kg)/(Bq/L))
t_4 is the annual exposure time (h/year)
1000 is the factor of unit conversion (Sv to mSv) of the effective dose
1600 is the factor of unit conversion (Bq/kg to Bq/m^3) of the radioactive material concentration in the soil
3600 is the factor of unit conversion (h/year to s/year) of the annual exposure time

As with the chapter 6-1. “Exposure assessment under normal conditions”, the migration factor of nuclides to beaches is 1,000[(Bq/kg)/(Bq/L)] for all nuclides based on “Dose Assessment to the General Public in the Safety Review of Commercial Light Water Reactor Facilities.”
As in the chapter 6-1. “Exposure assessment under normal conditions”, the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater used for the assessment site and for the assessment is the average concentration in sea water around the beach to the north of the power plant where the evacuation order has been lifted.



Figure XI-4 Conceptual diagram of the exposure assessment model from radioactive materials adhered to beach sand

XI-2. Setting of the representative person subject to the exposure assessment
The features of representative persons subject to the exposure assessment were the same as 6-2-5. as follows.

- Engage in fishing 120 days (2,880 hours) a year, of which 80 days (1,920 hours) are spent near fishing nets.
- Stay at the beach 500 hours a year and swim for 96 hours.

Table XI-1 Dose conversion factor for the effective dose from the radiation from the sea surface using FGR15

Nuclide	Dose conversion factor for the effective dose ((Sv/s)/(Bq/m^3))	Remarks
H-3	3.1E-27	
C-14	1.4E-21	
Mn-54	4.0E-17	
Fe-59	6.0E-17	
Co-58	4.6E-17	
Co-60	1.3E-16	
Ni-63	3.9E-24	
Zn-65	2.9E-17	
Rb-86	4.9E-18	
Sr-89	2.5E-19	
Sr-90	5.4E-20	
Y-90	4.7E-19	
Y-91	4.2E-19	
Nb-95	3.6E-17	
Tc-99	1.5E-20	
Ru-103	2.2E-17	
Ru-106	2.8E-25	
Rh-103m	5.1E-21	
Rh-106	1.0E-17	
Ag-110m	1.3E-16	
Cd-113m	5.2E-20	
Cd-115m	1.9E-18	
Sn-119m	8.3E-20	
Sn-123	5.6E-19	
Sn-126	7.4E-17	The progeny nuclide Sb-126m is considered
Sb-124	9.3E-17	
Sb-125	1.9E-17	
Te-123m	5.5E-18	
Te-125m	3.0E-19	
Te-127	2.8E-19	

Nuclide	Dose conversion factor for the effective dose ((Sv/s)/(Bq/m^3))	Remarks
Te-127m	9.9E-20	
Te-129	2.9E-18	
Te-129m	1.5E-18	
I-129	2.6E-19	
Cs-134	7.3E-17	
Cs-135	1.2E-20	
Cs-136	1.0E-16	
Cs-137	5.2E-20	
Ba-137m	2.8E-17	
Ba-140	1.2E-16	The progeny nuclide La-140 is considered
Ce-141	2.9E-18	
Ce-144	6.8E-19	
Pr-144	2.2E-18	
Pr-144m	2.4E-19	
Pm-146	3.4E-17	
Pm-147	4.7E-21	
Pm-148	2.9E-17	
Pm-148m	9.3E-17	
Sm-151	3.1E-23	
Eu-152	5.6E-17	
Eu-154	6.1E-17	
Eu-155	2.0E-18	
Gd-153	2.8E-18	
Tb-160	5.5E-17	
Pu-238	3.3E-21	
Pu-239	3.6E-21	
Pu-240	3.2E-21	
Pu-241	5.7E-23	
Am-241	6.0E-19	
Am-242m	5.5E-19	The progeny nuclide Am-242 is considered
Am-243	8.6E-18	The progeny nuclide Np-239 is considered
Cm-242	3.8E-21	

Nuclide	Dose conversion factor for the effective dose ((Sv/s)/(Bq/m^3))	Remarks
Cm-243	5.0E-18	
Cm-244	3.9E-21	

Table XI-2 Dose conversion factor for the effective dose from the radiation from hulls using FGR15

Nuclide	Dose conversion factor for the effective dose ((Sv/s)/(Bq/m^2))	Remarks
H-3	6.7E-22	
C-14	6.1E-19	
Mn-54	5.3E-16	
Fe-59	7.3E-16	
Co-58	6.2E-16	
Co-60	1.5E-15	
Ni-63	8.0E-20	
Zn-65	3.6E-16	
Rb-86	1.6E-16	
Sr-89	8.9E-17	
Sr-90	6.5E-18	
Y-90	1.5E-16	
Y-91	9.4E-17	
Nb-95	4.9E-16	
Tc-99	2.0E-18	
Ru-103	3.2E-16	
Ru-106	1.7E-20	
Rh-103m	4.3E-20	
Rh-106	3.4E-16	
Ag-110m	1.7E-15	
Cd-113m	6.3E-18	
Cd-115m	1.1E-16	
Sn-119m	9.6E-19	
Sn-123	8.1E-17	
Sn-126	1.1E-15	The progeny nuclide Sb-126m is considered
Sb-124	1.2E-15	

Nuclide	Dose conversion factor for the effective dose ((Sv/s)/(Bq/m^2))	Remarks
Sb-125	2.7E-16	
Te-123m	7.7E-17	
Te-125m	4.1E-18	
Te-127	1.5E-17	
Te-127m	1.7E-18	
Te-129	1.1E-16	
Te-129m	5.1E-17	
I-129	4.4E-18	
Cs-134	1.0E-15	
Cs-135	1.6E-18	
Cs-136	1.3E-15	
Cs-137	7.9E-18	
Ba-137m	3.9E-16	
Ba-140	1.6E-15	The progeny nuclide La-140 is considered
Ce-141	4.5E-17	
Ce-144	1.1E-17	
Pr-144	2.0E-16	
Pr-144m	3.5E-18	
Pm-146	4.8E-16	
Pm-147	9.4E-19	
Pm-148	4.6E-16	
Pm-148m	1.3E-15	
Sm-151	1.1E-19	
Eu-152	7.2E-16	
Eu-154	7.9E-16	
Eu-155	3.1E-17	
Gd-153	4.3E-17	
Tb-160	7.1E-16	
Pu-238	2.1E-20	
Pu-239	4.2E-20	
Pu-240	2.2E-20	
Pu-241	1.7E-21	
Am-241	9.9E-18	
Am-242m	1.4E-17	The progeny nuclide Am-242 is considered

Nuclide	Dose conversion factor for the effective dose ((Sv/s)/(Bq/m^2))	Remarks
Am-243	1.3E-16	The progeny nuclide Np-239 is considered
Cm-242	2.6E-20	
Cm-243	7.1E-17	
Cm-244	3.1E-20	

Table XI-3 Dose conversion factor for the effective dose from seawater during swimming and underwater work using FGR15

Nuclide	Dose conversion factor for the effective dose ((Sv/s)/(Bq/m^3))	Remarks
H-3	6.2E-27	
C-14	2.8E-21	
Mn-54	8.0E-17	
Fe-59	1.2E-16	
Co-58	9.2E-17	
Co-60	2.5E-16	
Ni-63	7.8E-24	
Zn-65	5.7E-17	
Rb-86	9.8E-18	
Sr-89	5.1E-19	
Sr-90	1.1E-19	
Y-90	9.5E-19	
Y-91	8.4E-19	
Nb-95	7.3E-17	
Tc-99	3.1E-20	
Ru-103	4.5E-17	
Ru-106	5.7E-25	
Rh-103m	1.0E-20	
Rh-106	2.1E-17	
Ag-110m	2.7E-16	
Cd-113m	1.0E-19	
Cd-115m	3.8E-18	
Sn-119m	1.7E-19	
Sn-123	1.1E-18	

Nuclide	Dose conversion factor for the effective dose ((Sv/s)/(Bq/m^3))	Remarks
Sn-126	1.5E-16	The progeny nuclide Sb-126m is considered
Sb-124	1.9E-16	
Sb-125	3.8E-17	
Te-123m	1.1E-17	
Te-125m	6.0E-19	
Te-127	5.6E-19	
Te-127m	2.0E-19	
Te-129	5.7E-18	
Te-129m	3.1E-18	
I-129	5.1E-19	
Cs-134	1.5E-16	
Cs-135	2.3E-20	
Cs-136	2.1E-16	
Cs-137	1.0E-19	
Ba-137m	5.5E-17	
Ba-140	2.5E-16	The progeny nuclide La-140 is considered
Ce-141	5.8E-18	
Ce-144	1.4E-18	
Pr-144	4.3E-18	
Pr-144m	4.8E-19	
Pm-146	6.8E-17	
Pm-147	9.4E-21	
Pm-148	5.8E-17	
Pm-148m	1.9E-16	
Sm-151	6.1E-23	
Eu-152	1.1E-16	
Eu-154	1.2E-16	
Eu-155	3.9E-18	
Gd-153	5.6E-18	
Tb-160	1.1E-16	
Pu-238	6.6E-21	
Pu-239	7.3E-21	
Pu-240	6.5E-21	

Nuclide	Dose conversion factor for the effective dose ((Sv/s)/(Bq/m^3))	Remarks
Pu-241	1.1E-22	
Am-241	1.2E-18	
Am-242m	1.1E-18	The progeny nuclide Am-242 is considered
Am-243	1.7E-17	The progeny nuclide Np-239 is considered
Cm-242	7.5E-21	
Cm-243	1.0E-17	
Cm-244	7.9E-21	

Table XI-4 Dose conversion factor for the effective dose from the radiation from beach sand using FGR15

Nuclide	Dose conversion factor for the effective dose ((Sv/s)/(Bq/m^3))	Remarks
H-3	3.4E-23	
C-14	3.1E-20	
Mn-54	2.6E-17	
Fe-59	3.9E-17	
Co-58	3.0E-17	
Co-60	8.3E-17	
Ni-63	4.1E-21	
Zn-65	1.9E-17	
Rb-86	4.4E-18	
Sr-89	1.2E-18	
Sr-90	2.6E-19	
Y-90	2.3E-18	
Y-91	1.4E-18	
Nb-95	2.4E-17	
Tc-99	1.0E-19	
Ru-103	1.4E-17	
Ru-106	8.6E-22	
Rh-103m	6.6E-22	
Rh-106	1.0E-17	
Ag-110m	8.7E-17	
Cd-113m	2.5E-19	

Nuclide	Dose conversion factor for the effective dose ((Sv/s)/(Bq/m^3))	Remarks
Cd-115m	2.3E-18	
Sn-119m	1.2E-20	
Sn-123	1.3E-18	
Sn-126	4.8E-17	The progeny nuclide Sb-126m is considered
Sb-124	6.1E-17	
Sb-125	1.2E-17	
Te-123m	3.1E-18	
Te-125m	5.1E-20	
Te-127	4.6E-19	
Te-127m	2.9E-20	
Te-129	2.7E-18	
Te-129m	1.3E-18	
I-129	7.9E-20	
Cs-134	4.8E-17	
Cs-135	8.4E-20	
Cs-136	6.6E-17	
Cs-137	2.6E-19	
Ba-137m	1.8E-17	
Ba-140	8.3E-17	The progeny nuclide La-140 is considered
Ce-141	1.8E-18	
Ce-144	4.2E-19	
Pr-144	4.2E-18	
Pr-144m	8.7E-20	
Pm-146	2.2E-17	
Pm-147	4.8E-20	
Pm-148	2.0E-17	
Pm-148m	6.0E-17	
Sm-151	5.5E-21	
Eu-152	3.6E-17	
Eu-154	3.9E-17	
Eu-155	9.5E-19	
Gd-153	1.2E-18	
Tb-160	3.5E-17	
Pu-238	5.3E-22	

Nuclide	Dose conversion factor for the effective dose ((Sv/s)/(Bq/m^3))	Remarks
Pu-239	1.5E-21	
Pu-240	5.5E-22	
Pu-241	7.5E-23	
Am-241	2.2E-19	
Am-242m	1.2E-18	The progeny nuclide Am-242 is considered
Am-243	4.8E-18	The progeny nuclide Np-239 is considered
Cm-242	5.9E-22	
Cm-243	2.9E-18	
Cm-244	1.0E-21	

XI-3. Exposure assessment result

Table XI-6 shows comparison with the assessment result of Table 6-1-22 in the results of the external exposure dose assessments of the following three cases.

Source term based on the composition of nuclides of the measured value

i. K4 tank group (Sum of the ratios to regulatory concentration limits of 63 nuclides other than tritium: 0.29)
ii. J1-C tank group (Sum of the ratios to regulatory concentration limits of 63 nuclides other than tritium: 0.35)
iii. J1-G tank group (Sum of the ratios to regulatory concentration limits of 63 nuclides other than tritium: 0.22)

In all assessments, the result using the conversion factor in the Decommissioning Handbook was larger than those using the conversion factor in FGR15. In the assessment using the conversion factor of the Decommissioning Handbook, the assessment results are considered to be conservative because conservative conversion factors such as Co-60 were used for the nuclides for which conversion factors were not calculated.

Table XI-6 Comparison with the external exposure dose assessment result using the dose conversion factor of FGR15

Source term	Source term based on measured values					
	i. K4 tank group		ii. J1-C tank group		iii. J1-G tank group	
Dose conversion factor	Decommissioning Handbook	FGR15	Decommissioning Handbook	FGR15	Decommissioning Handbook	FGR15
Seawater surface	6.5E-09	9.4E-10	1.7E-08	3.5E-10	4.7E-08	8.4E-10
Hull	4.8E-09	1.7E-09	1.2E-08	8.9E-10	3.3E-08	2.1E-09
Swimming	4.5E-09	4.6E-10	1.2E-08	1.7E-10	3.2E-08	4.1E-10
Beach sand	7.8E-06	1.4E-06	2.1E-05	5.7E-07	5.6E-05	1.4E-06

References

[XI-1] EPA, FEDERAL GUIDANCE REPORT NO.15 "EXTERNAL EXPOSURE TO RADIONUCLIDES IN AIR, WATER AND SOIL",2019

Attachment XII Impact of the assessment range of concentrations in seawater used for the assessment of exposures

In the chapter 6-1-2. (4) ”Setting of the representative person”, for the concentration in the seawater used for the exposure assessment, the average concentration within 10 km × 10 km around the FDNPS is used considering the distance from the nearby fishing port (about 6 km) because fishing is assumed as the feature of the representative person. However, since the actual behaviors of the representative person is uncertain, we changed the assessment target range from 5 km × 5 km to 20 km in the north-south direction × 10 km in the east-west direction to calculate exposure.
The target range of the sea area is set to 5 km × 5 km and 20 km × 10 km around the power plant as shown in Figure XII-1.



*Areas where common fishery rights are not established

Figure XII-1 Assessment range to confirm the impact of the range of concentrations in seawater used for the assessment of exposures

XII-1. Assessment method

We performed the same assessment as 6-1. Exposure assessment under normal conditions and changed the calculation range of the average concentration of tritium only for the concentration in the seawater used for the assessment.

Table XII-1 shows the annual average concentration within 5 km × 5 km and 20 km × 10 km around the FDNPS in the case of the annual discharge amount of 22 TBq (2.2E+13Bq) of tritium. We compared the concentrations in 2014 and 2019 and decided to use the concentration of 2019, which is higher, for the exposure assessment.

Tables XII-2 to 4 show this result and the radioactive material concentration in the seawater for the assessment calculated from the annual discharge amount of each nuclide shown in Tables 6-1-1 to 6-1-3 used for the assessment in each term. Since the sandy beach assessment point was the same, the concentration in the seawater used for the assessment of exposure from swimming, ingestion of water, inhalation of seawater spray, and beach sand was set to the same regardless of the assessment target range.

Table XII-1 Tritium concentration in the seawater in the case of the annual tritium discharge amount of 2.2E+13Bq

	Depth	Calculation result (Bq/L)			Concentration for assessment (Bq/L)
		Meteorological and oceanographic data of 2014	Meteorological and oceanographic data of 2019	Difference (%)	
Annual average concentration within 5 km × 5 km around the FDNPS	All layers	1.5E-01	1.7E-01	13	1.7E-01
	Top layer	2.1E-01	2.4E-01	14	2.4E-01
Annual average concentration within 20 km × 10 km around the FDNPS	All layers	4.1E-02	4.8E-02	17	4.8E-02
	Top layer	8.8E-02	1.1E-01	25	1.1E-01

Table XII-2 Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Source term based on measured values (K4 tank group))

Target nuclide	Annual volume of discharge (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Bq/L)			
		Average of all layers within 5km×5km	Average of the top layers within 5km×5km	Average of all layers within 20km×10km	Average of the top layers within 20km×10km
H-3	2.2E+13	1.7E-01	2.4E-01	4.8E-02	1.1E-01
C-14	1.7E+09	1.3E-05	1.9E-05	3.8E-06	8.7E-06
Mn-54	7.8E+05	6.0E-09	8.5E-09	1.7E-09	3.9E-09

Target nuclide	Annual volume of discharge (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Bq/L)			
		Average of all layers within 5km×5km	Average of the top layers within 5km×5km	Average of all layers within 20km×10km	Average of the top layers within 20km×10km
Fe-59	2.0E+06	1.5E-08	2.1E-08	4.3E-09	9.8E-09
Co-58	9.3E+05	7.2E-09	1.0E-08	2.0E-09	4.6E-09
Co-60	5.1E+07	3.9E-07	5.6E-07	1.1E-07	2.5E-07
Ni-63	2.5E+08	2.0E-06	2.8E-06	5.6E-07	1.3E-06
Zn-65	1.7E+06	1.3E-08	1.9E-08	3.8E-09	8.7E-09
Rb-86	2.2E+07	1.7E-07	2.4E-07	4.8E-08	1.1E-07
Sr-89	1.2E+07	8.9E-08	1.3E-07	2.5E-08	5.8E-08
Sr-90	2.5E+07	2.0E-07	2.8E-07	5.6E-08	1.3E-07
Y-90	2.5E+07	2.0E-07	2.8E-07	5.6E-08	1.3E-07
Y-91	2.5E+08	2.0E-06	2.8E-06	5.6E-07	1.3E-06
Nb-95	1.2E+06	8.9E-09	1.3E-08	2.5E-09	5.8E-09
Tc-99	8.1E+07	6.3E-07	8.8E-07	1.8E-07	4.1E-07
Ru-103	1.2E+06	8.9E-09	1.3E-08	2.5E-09	5.8E-09
Ru-106	1.9E+08	1.4E-06	2.0E-06	4.0E-07	9.3E-07
Rh-103m	1.2E+06	8.9E-09	1.3E-08	2.5E-09	5.8E-09
Rh-106	1.9E+08	1.4E-06	2.0E-06	4.0E-07	9.3E-07
Ag-110m	6.5E+05	5.0E-09	7.1E-09	1.4E-09	3.2E-09
Cd-113m	2.1E+06	1.6E-08	2.3E-08	4.5E-09	1.0E-08
Cd-115m	7.4E+07	5.7E-07	8.1E-07	1.6E-07	3.7E-07
Sn-119m	2.0E+07	1.5E-07	2.1E-07	4.3E-08	9.8E-08
Sn-123	1.4E+08	1.1E-06	1.5E-06	3.0E-07	6.9E-07
Sn-126	3.1E+06	2.4E-08	3.4E-08	6.8E-09	1.6E-08
Sb-124	1.1E+06	8.5E-09	1.2E-08	2.4E-09	5.5E-09
Sb-125	3.8E+07	3.0E-07	4.2E-07	8.3E-08	1.9E-07
Te-123m	1.1E+06	8.2E-09	1.2E-08	2.3E-09	5.3E-09
Te-125m	3.8E+07	3.0E-07	4.2E-07	8.3E-08	1.9E-07
Te-127	3.7E+07	2.9E-07	4.0E-07	8.1E-08	1.9E-07
Te-127m	3.7E+07	2.9E-07	4.0E-07	8.1E-08	1.9E-07
Te-129	3.7E+07	2.9E-07	4.0E-07	8.1E-08	1.9E-07
Te-129m	3.7E+07	2.9E-07	4.0E-07	8.1E-08	1.9E-07
I-129	2.4E+08	1.9E-06	2.7E-06	5.3E-07	1.2E-06
Cs-134	5.2E+06	4.0E-08	5.7E-08	1.1E-08	2.6E-08

Target nuclide	Annual volume of discharge (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Bq/L)			
		Average of all layers within 5km×5km	Average of the top layers within 5km×5km	Average of all layers within 20km×10km	Average of the top layers within 20km×10km
Cs-135	2.9E+02	2.2E-12	3.2E-12	6.3E-13	1.4E-12
Cs-136	3.5E+06	2.7E-08	3.8E-08	7.6E-09	1.7E-08
Cs-137	4.9E+07	3.8E-07	5.3E-07	1.1E-07	2.4E-07
Ba-137m	4.9E+07	3.8E-07	5.3E-07	1.1E-07	2.4E-07
Ba-140	1.1E+07	8.5E-08	1.2E-07	2.4E-08	5.5E-08
Ce-141	2.9E+06	2.2E-08	3.2E-08	6.3E-09	1.4E-08
Ce-144	7.3E+06	5.6E-08	8.0E-08	1.6E-08	3.6E-08
Pr-144	7.3E+06	5.6E-08	8.0E-08	1.6E-08	3.6E-08
Pr-144m	7.3E+06	5.6E-08	8.0E-08	1.6E-08	3.6E-08
Pm-146	1.1E+07	8.8E-08	1.2E-07	2.5E-08	5.7E-08
Pm-147	2.2E+07	1.7E-07	2.4E-07	4.8E-08	1.1E-07
Pm-148	5.8E+07	4.5E-07	6.3E-07	1.3E-07	2.9E-07
Pm-148m	9.7E+05	7.5E-09	1.1E-08	2.1E-09	4.9E-09
Sm-151	1.0E+05	8.1E-10	1.1E-09	2.3E-10	5.2E-10
Eu-152	3.2E+06	2.5E-08	3.5E-08	7.1E-09	1.6E-08
Eu-154	1.4E+06	1.1E-08	1.5E-08	3.0E-09	6.9E-09
Eu-155	3.8E+06	3.0E-08	4.2E-08	8.3E-09	1.9E-08
Gd-153	3.7E+06	2.9E-08	4.0E-08	8.1E-09	1.9E-08
Tb-160	3.2E+06	2.5E-08	3.5E-08	7.1E-09	1.6E-08
Pu-238	7.3E+04	5.6E-10	8.0E-10	1.6E-10	3.6E-10
Pu-239	7.3E+04	5.6E-10	8.0E-10	1.6E-10	3.6E-10
Pu-240	7.3E+04	5.6E-10	8.0E-10	1.6E-10	3.6E-10
Pu-241	3.2E+06	2.5E-08	3.5E-08	7.1E-09	1.6E-08
Am-241	7.3E+04	5.6E-10	8.0E-10	1.6E-10	3.6E-10
Am-242m	4.5E+03	3.5E-11	4.9E-11	9.9E-12	2.3E-11
Am-243	7.3E+04	5.6E-10	8.0E-10	1.6E-10	3.6E-10
Cm-242	7.3E+04	5.6E-10	8.0E-10	1.6E-10	3.6E-10
Cm-243	7.3E+04	5.6E-10	8.0E-10	1.6E-10	3.6E-10
Cm-244	7.3E+04	5.6E-10	8.0E-10	1.6E-10	3.6E-10
Target exposure assessment		From fishing nets Ingestion of seafood	From sea surface From hulls	From fishing nets Ingestion of seafood	From sea surface From hulls

Table XII-3 Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Source term based on measured values (J1-C tank group))

Target nuclide	Annual volume of discharge (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Bq/L)			
		Average of all layers within 5km×5km	Average of the top layers within 5km×5km	Average of all layers within 20km×10km	Average of the top layers within 20km×10km
H-3	2.2E+13	1.7E-01	2.4E-01	4.8E-02	1.1E-01
C-14	4.8E+08	3.7E-06	5.3E-06	1.1E-06	2.4E-06
Mn-54	1.0E+06	7.9E-09	1.1E-08	2.2E-09	5.1E-09
Fe-59	2.3E+06	1.8E-08	2.5E-08	5.1E-09	1.2E-08
Co-58	1.1E+06	8.5E-09	1.2E-08	2.4E-09	5.5E-09
Co-60	8.9E+06	6.8E-08	9.7E-08	1.9E-08	4.4E-08
Ni-63	2.3E+08	1.8E-06	2.5E-06	5.0E-07	1.1E-06
Zn-65	2.5E+06	1.9E-08	2.8E-08	5.5E-09	1.3E-08
Rb-86	1.3E+07	1.0E-07	1.5E-07	2.9E-08	6.7E-08
Sr-89	1.4E+06	1.1E-08	1.6E-08	3.2E-09	7.2E-09
Sr-90	9.7E+05	7.5E-09	1.1E-08	2.1E-09	4.8E-09
Y-90	9.7E+05	7.5E-09	1.1E-08	2.1E-09	4.8E-09
Y-91	4.6E+08	3.5E-06	5.0E-06	1.0E-06	2.3E-06
Nb-95	1.3E+06	1.0E-08	1.5E-08	2.9E-09	6.7E-09
Tc-99	3.2E+07	2.5E-07	3.5E-07	7.0E-08	1.6E-07
Ru-103	1.4E+06	1.1E-08	1.6E-08	3.1E-09	7.1E-09
Ru-106	3.8E+07	2.9E-07	4.1E-07	8.2E-08	1.9E-07
Rh-103m	1.4E+06	1.1E-08	1.6E-08	3.1E-09	7.1E-09
Rh-106	3.8E+07	2.9E-07	4.1E-07	8.2E-08	1.9E-07
Ag-110m	1.2E+06	8.9E-09	1.3E-08	2.5E-09	5.8E-09
Cd-113m	2.3E+06	1.8E-08	2.5E-08	5.0E-09	1.1E-08
Cd-115m	7.2E+07	5.6E-07	7.9E-07	1.6E-07	3.6E-07
Sn-119m	1.1E+09	8.7E-06	1.2E-05	2.5E-06	5.6E-06
Sn-123	1.8E+08	1.4E-06	1.9E-06	3.9E-07	8.9E-07
Sn-126	7.8E+06	6.0E-08	8.5E-08	1.7E-08	3.9E-08
Sb-124	2.6E+06	2.0E-08	2.8E-08	5.7E-09	1.3E-08
Sb-125	6.2E+06	4.8E-08	6.7E-08	1.3E-08	3.1E-08
Te-123m	2.5E+06	1.9E-08	2.7E-08	5.4E-09	1.2E-08
Te-125m	6.2E+06	4.8E-08	6.7E-08	1.3E-08	3.1E-08
Te-127	1.3E+08	9.7E-07	1.4E-06	2.8E-07	6.3E-07

Target nuclide	Annual volume of discharge (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Bq/L)			
		Average of all layers within 5km×5km	Average of the top layers within 5km×5km	Average of all layers within 20km×10km	Average of the top layers within 20km×10km
Te-127m	1.3E+08	1.0E-06	1.4E-06	2.9E-07	6.6E-07
Te-129	3.8E+07	2.9E-07	4.1E-07	8.2E-08	1.9E-07
Te-129m	3.8E+07	2.9E-07	4.1E-07	8.2E-08	1.9E-07
I-129	3.2E+07	2.5E-07	3.5E-07	7.0E-08	1.6E-07
Cs-134	2.0E+06	1.6E-08	2.2E-08	4.4E-09	1.0E-08
Cs-135	3.2E+01	2.5E-13	3.5E-13	7.0E-14	1.6E-13
Cs-136	1.3E+06	9.7E-09	1.4E-08	2.8E-09	6.3E-09
Cs-137	5.1E+06	3.9E-08	5.6E-08	1.1E-08	2.5E-08
Ba-137m	5.1E+06	3.9E-08	5.6E-08	1.1E-08	2.5E-08
Ba-140	5.4E+06	4.1E-08	5.9E-08	1.2E-08	2.7E-08
Ce-141	7.0E+06	5.4E-08	7.6E-08	1.5E-08	3.5E-08
Ce-144	1.5E+07	1.2E-07	1.7E-07	3.3E-08	7.6E-08
Pr-144	1.5E+07	1.2E-07	1.7E-07	3.3E-08	7.6E-08
Pr-144m	1.5E+07	1.2E-07	1.7E-07	3.3E-08	7.6E-08
Pm-146	1.8E+06	1.4E-08	2.0E-08	3.9E-09	9.0E-09
Pm-147	2.1E+07	1.7E-07	2.3E-07	4.7E-08	1.1E-07
Pm-148	6.2E+06	4.8E-08	6.7E-08	1.3E-08	3.1E-08
Pm-148m	1.3E+06	1.0E-08	1.4E-08	2.8E-09	6.4E-09
Sm-151	3.0E+05	2.3E-09	3.2E-09	6.4E-10	1.5E-09
Eu-152	7.5E+06	5.8E-08	8.2E-08	1.6E-08	3.8E-08
Eu-154	3.0E+06	2.3E-08	3.2E-08	6.4E-09	1.5E-08
Eu-155	9.1E+06	7.0E-08	1.0E-07	2.0E-08	4.6E-08
Gd-153	7.0E+06	5.4E-08	7.6E-08	1.5E-08	3.5E-08
Tb-160	3.8E+06	2.9E-08	4.1E-08	8.2E-09	1.9E-08
Pu-238	8.9E+05	6.8E-09	9.7E-09	1.9E-09	4.4E-09
Pu-239	8.9E+05	6.8E-09	9.7E-09	1.9E-09	4.4E-09
Pu-240	8.9E+05	6.8E-09	9.7E-09	1.9E-09	4.4E-09
Pu-241	3.2E+07	2.5E-07	3.5E-07	7.0E-08	1.6E-07
Am-241	8.9E+05	6.8E-09	9.7E-09	1.9E-09	4.4E-09
Am-242m	1.6E+04	1.2E-10	1.7E-10	3.5E-11	7.9E-11
Am-243	8.9E+05	6.8E-09	9.7E-09	1.9E-09	4.4E-09
Cm-242	8.9E+05	6.8E-09	9.7E-09	1.9E-09	4.4E-09

Target nuclide	Annual volume of discharge (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Bq/L)			
		Average of all layers within 5km×5km	Average of the top layers within 5km×5km	Average of all layers within 20km×10km	Average of the top layers within 20km×10km
Cm-243	8.9E+05	6.8E-09	9.7E-09	1.9E-09	4.4E-09
Cm-244	8.9E+05	6.8E-09	9.7E-09	1.9E-09	4.4E-09
Target exposure assessment		From fishing nets Ingestion of seafood	From sea surface From hulls	From fishing nets Ingestion of seafood	From sea surface From hulls

Table XII-4 Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Source term based on measured value (J1-G tank group))

Target nuclide	Annual volume of discharge (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Bq/L)			
		Average of all layers within 5km×5km	Average of the top layers within 5km×5km	Average of all layers within 20km×10km	Average of the top layers within 20km×10km
H-3	2.2E+13	1.7E-01	2.4E-01	4.8E-02	1.1E-01
C-14	1.3E+09	1.0E-05	1.4E-05	2.8E-06	6.5E-06
Mn-54	3.1E+06	2.4E-08	3.4E-08	6.8E-09	1.5E-08
Fe-59	5.9E+06	4.5E-08	6.4E-08	1.3E-08	2.9E-08
Co-58	3.0E+06	2.3E-08	3.3E-08	6.6E-09	1.5E-08
Co-60	1.9E+07	1.4E-07	2.0E-07	4.1E-08	9.4E-08
Ni-63	7.2E+08	5.5E-06	7.8E-06	1.6E-06	3.6E-06
Zn-65	6.5E+06	5.0E-08	7.1E-08	1.4E-08	3.3E-08
Rb-86	3.8E+07	3.0E-07	4.2E-07	8.4E-08	1.9E-07
Sr-89	3.7E+06	2.8E-08	4.0E-08	8.0E-09	1.8E-08
Sr-90	2.6E+06	2.0E-08	2.8E-08	5.7E-09	1.3E-08
Y-90	2.6E+06	2.0E-08	2.8E-08	5.7E-09	1.3E-08
Y-91	9.8E+08	7.6E-06	1.1E-05	2.1E-06	4.9E-06
Nb-95	3.8E+06	3.0E-08	4.2E-08	8.4E-09	1.9E-08
Tc-99	1.1E+08	8.2E-07	1.2E-06	2.3E-07	5.3E-07
Ru-103	4.2E+06	3.2E-08	4.5E-08	9.1E-09	2.1E-08
Ru-106	3.9E+07	3.0E-07	4.3E-07	8.5E-08	2.0E-07
Rh-103m	4.2E+06	3.2E-08	4.5E-08	9.1E-09	2.1E-08
Rh-106	3.9E+07	3.0E-07	4.3E-07	8.5E-08	2.0E-07
Ag-110m	3.3E+06	2.5E-08	3.6E-08	7.1E-09	1.6E-08
Cd-113m	7.0E+06	5.4E-08	7.6E-08	1.5E-08	3.5E-08

Target nuclide	Annual volume of discharge (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Bq/L)			
		Average of all layers within 5km×5km	Average of the top layers within 5km×5km	Average of all layers within 20km×10km	Average of the top layers within 20km×10km
Cd-115m	1.9E+08	1.4E-06	2.0E-06	4.1E-07	9.4E-07
Sn-119m	3.3E+09	2.5E-05	3.6E-05	7.1E-06	1.6E-05
Sn-123	5.1E+08	4.0E-06	5.6E-06	1.1E-06	2.6E-06
Sn-126	1.2E+07	9.4E-08	1.3E-07	2.7E-08	6.1E-08
Sb-124	6.8E+06	5.3E-08	7.5E-08	1.5E-08	3.4E-08
Sb-125	1.1E+07	8.8E-08	1.2E-07	2.5E-08	5.7E-08
Te-123m	5.5E+06	4.2E-08	6.0E-08	1.2E-08	2.7E-08
Te-125m	1.1E+07	8.8E-08	1.2E-07	2.5E-08	5.7E-08
Te-127	3.5E+08	2.7E-06	3.8E-06	7.6E-07	1.8E-06
Te-127m	3.7E+08	2.8E-06	4.0E-06	8.0E-07	1.8E-06
Te-129	9.8E+07	7.6E-07	1.1E-06	2.1E-07	4.9E-07
Te-129m	9.8E+07	7.6E-07	1.1E-06	2.1E-07	4.9E-07
I-129	2.7E+07	2.1E-07	2.9E-07	5.9E-08	1.3E-07
Cs-134	5.5E+06	4.2E-08	6.0E-08	1.2E-08	2.7E-08
Cs-135	1.7E+02	1.3E-12	1.9E-12	3.7E-13	8.6E-13
Cs-136	2.9E+06	2.3E-08	3.2E-08	6.4E-09	1.5E-08
Cs-137	2.7E+07	2.1E-07	2.9E-07	5.9E-08	1.3E-07
Ba-137m	2.7E+07	2.1E-07	2.9E-07	5.9E-08	1.3E-07
Ba-140	1.4E+07	1.1E-07	1.5E-07	3.0E-08	6.9E-08
Ce-141	9.8E+06	7.6E-08	1.1E-07	2.1E-08	4.9E-08
Ce-144	4.5E+07	3.5E-07	4.9E-07	9.8E-08	2.2E-07
Pr-144	4.5E+07	3.5E-07	4.9E-07	9.8E-08	2.2E-07
Pr-144m	4.5E+07	3.5E-07	4.9E-07	9.8E-08	2.2E-07
Pm-146	5.1E+06	4.0E-08	5.6E-08	1.1E-08	2.6E-08
Pm-147	5.9E+07	4.5E-07	6.4E-07	1.3E-07	2.9E-07
Pm-148	3.7E+07	2.8E-07	4.0E-07	8.0E-08	1.8E-07
Pm-148m	3.3E+06	2.6E-08	3.6E-08	7.3E-09	1.7E-08
Sm-151	8.1E+05	6.3E-09	8.9E-09	1.8E-09	4.1E-09
Eu-152	1.5E+07	1.2E-07	1.7E-07	3.4E-08	7.7E-08
Eu-154	8.1E+06	6.3E-08	8.9E-08	1.8E-08	4.1E-08
Eu-155	1.5E+07	1.1E-07	1.6E-07	3.2E-08	7.3E-08
Gd-153	1.5E+07	1.2E-07	1.7E-07	3.4E-08	7.7E-08

Target nuclide	Annual volume of discharge (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Bq/L)			
		Average of all layers within 5km×5km	Average of the top layers within 5km×5km	Average of all layers within 20km×10km	Average of the top layers within 20km×10km
Tb-160	1.1E+07	8.8E-08	1.2E-07	2.5E-08	5.7E-08
Pu-238	2.3E+06	1.8E-08	2.5E-08	5.0E-09	1.1E-08
Pu-239	2.3E+06	1.8E-08	2.5E-08	5.0E-09	1.1E-08
Pu-240	2.3E+06	1.8E-08	2.5E-08	5.0E-09	1.1E-08
Pu-241	8.1E+07	6.3E-07	8.9E-07	1.8E-07	4.1E-07
Am-241	2.3E+06	1.8E-08	2.5E-08	5.0E-09	1.1E-08
Am-242m	4.2E+04	3.2E-10	4.5E-10	9.1E-11	2.1E-10
Am-243	2.3E+06	1.8E-08	2.5E-08	5.0E-09	1.1E-08
Cm-242	2.3E+06	1.8E-08	2.5E-08	5.0E-09	1.1E-08
Cm-243	2.3E+06	1.8E-08	2.5E-08	5.0E-09	1.1E-08
Cm-244	2.3E+06	1.8E-08	2.5E-08	5.0E-09	1.1E-08
Target exposure assessment		From fishing nets Ingestion of seafood	From sea surface From hulls	From fishing nets Ingestion of seafood	From sea surface From hulls

XII-2. Assessment results

Tables XII-5 to 10 show the assessment results. The assessment result with the assessment area set to 10 km × 10 km was 0.00003 (3E-05) to 0.0004 (4E-04) mSv/year while that of 5 km × 5 km was 0.00006 (6E-05) to 0.001 (1E-03) mSv/ year, which is two to three times higher.

Moreover, when the assessment area is set to 20 km × 10 km, the result is 0.00002 (2E-05) to 0.0003 (3E-04) mSv/year, which is slightly lower than that of 10 km × 10 km.

In all cases, the results remained significantly smaller than the dose limit of 1 mSv/year for the general public and the dose target of 0.05 mSv/year for domestic nuclear power plants, which is equivalent to the dose constraint value.

In addition, for infants whose effective dose factor and the assessment value of internal exposure are high, the assessment result of internal exposure from ingestion of seafood is 0.000087 (8.7E-05) to 0.0022 (2.2E-03) mSv/year with the assessment area set to 5 km × 5 km, which is about 3 times higher than 0.000029 (2.9E-05) to 0.00071 (7.1E-04) mSv/year with 10 km × 10 km.

Moreover, when the assessment area is set to 20 km × 10 km, the result is 0.000025 (2.5E-05) to 0.00061 (6.1E-04) mSv/year, which is lower than that of 10 km × 10 km.

Table XII-5 Human exposure assessment result (Source term based on measured values (K4 tank group))

Assessed case	Assessment area of the concentration	10 km × 10 km		5 km × 5 km		20 km × 10 km	
	Ingestion of seafood	Average	Large	Average	Large	Average	Large
External exposure (mSv/year)	Sea surface	6.5E-09		1.3E-08		6.0E-09	
	Hull	4.8E-09		9.5E-09		4.4E-09	
	During swimming	4.5E-09		4.5E-09		4.5E-09	
	Beach sand	7.8E-06		7.8E-06		7.8E-06	
	Fishing net	1.6E-06		4.9E-06		1.4E-06	
Internal exposure (mSv/year)	Ingestion of water	3.3E-07		3.3E-07		3.3E-07	
	Inhalation of spray	9.3E-08		9.3E-08		9.3E-08	
	Ingestion of seafood	1.5E-05	6.1E-05	4.6E-05	1.9E-04	1.3E-05	5.2E-05
Total (mSv/year)		3E-05	7E-05	6E-05	2E-04	2E-05	6E-05

Table XII-6 Human exposure assessment result (Source term based on measured values (J1-C tank group))

Assessed case	Assessment range of the concentration	10 km × 10 km		5 km × 5 km		20 km × 10 km	
	Ingestion of seafood	Average	Large	Average	Large	Average	Large
External exposure (mSv/year)	Sea surface	1.7E-08		3.5E-08		1.6E-08	
	Hull	1.2E-08		2.5E-08		1.1E-08	
	During swimming	1.2E-08		1.2E-08		1.2E-08	
	Beach sand	2.1E-05		2.1E-05		2.1E-05	
	Fishing net	4.3E-06		1.3E-05		3.7E-06	
Internal exposure (mSv/year)	Ingestion of water	3.1E-07		3.1E-07		3.1E-07	
	Inhalation of spray	2.0E-07		2.0E-07		2.0E-07	
	Ingestion of seafood	2.8E-05	1.1E-04	8.5E-05	3.2E-04	2.4E-05	9.2E-05
Total (mSv/year)		5E-05	1E-04	1E-04	4E-04	5E-05	1E-04

Table XII-7 Human exposure assessment result (Source term based on measured values (J1-G tank group))

Assessed case	Assessment range of the concentration	10 km × 10 km		5 km × 5 km		20 km × 10 km	
	Ingestion of seafood	Average	Large	Average	Large	Average	Large
External exposure (mSv/year)	Sea surface	4.7E-08		9.4E-08		4.3E-08	
	Hull	3.3E-08		6.6E-08		3.0E-08	
	During swimming	3.2E-08		3.2E-08		3.2E-08	
	Beach sand	5.6E-05		5.6E-05		5.6E-05	
	Fishing net	1.2E-05		3.5E-05		9.9E-06	
Internal exposure (mSv/year)	Ingestion of water	3.2E-07		3.2E-07		3.2E-07	
	Inhalation of spray	4.0E-07		4.0E-07		4.0E-07	
	Ingestion of seafood	7.9E-05	3.0E-04	2.4E-04	9.1E-04	6.7E-05	2.6E-04
Total (mSv/year)		1E-04	4E-04	3E-04	1E-03	1E-04	3E-04

Table XII-8 Age-specific internal exposure assessment result (Source term based on measured values (K4 tank group))

Assessed case	Assessment range of the concentration	10 km × 10 km		5 km × 5 km		20 km × 10 km	
	Ingestion of seafood	Average	Large	Average	Large	Average	Large
Internal exposure from ingestion of water (mSv/year)	Adult	3.3E-07		3.3E-07		3.3E-07	
	Child under school age	5.7E-07		5.7E-07		5.7E-07	
	Infant	-		-		-	
Internal exposure from inhalation of spray (mSv/year)	Adult	9.3E-08		9.3E-08		9.3E-08	
	Child under school age	6.2E-08		6.2E-08		6.2E-08	
	Infant	4.0E-08		4.0E-08		4.0E-08	
Internal exposure from ingestion of seafood (mSv/year)	Adult	1.5E-05	6.1E-05	4.6E-05	1.9E-04	1.3E-05	5.2E-05
	Child under school age	2.4E-05	9.4E-05	7.2E-05	2.9E-04	2.0E-05	8.1E-05
	Infants	2.9E-05	1.1E-04	8.7E-05	3.3E-04	2.5E-05	9.3E-05

Table XII-9 Age-specific internal exposure assessment result (Source term based on measured values (J1-C tank group))

Assessed case	Assessment range of the concentration	10 km × 10 km		5 km × 5 km		20 km × 10 km	
	Ingestion of seafood	Average	Large	Average	Large	Average	Large
Internal exposure from ingestion of water (mSv/year)	Adult	3.1E-07		3.1E-07		3.1E-07	
	Child under school age	5.4E-07		5.4E-07		5.4E-07	
	Infant	-		-		-	
Internal exposure from inhalation of spray (mSv/year)	Adult	2.0E-07		2.0E-07		2.0E-07	
	Child under school age	1.1E-07		1.1E-07		1.1E-07	
	Infant	6.5E-08		6.5E-08		6.5E-08	
Internal exposure from ingestion of seafood (mSv/year)	Adult	2.8E-05	1.1E-04	8.5E-05	3.2E-04	2.4E-05	9.2E-05
	Child under school age	5.1E-05	2.0E-04	1.6E-04	6.0E-04	4.4E-05	1.7E-04
	Infant	6.7E-05	2.5E-04	2.0E-04	7.6E-04	5.7E-05	2.2E-04

Table XII-10 Age-specific internal exposure assessment result (Source term based on measured values (J1-G tank group))

Assessed case	Assessment range of the concentration	10 km × 10 km		5 km × 5 km		20 km × 10 km	
	Ingestion of seafood	Average	Large	Average	Large	Average	Large
Internal exposure from ingestion of water (mSv/year)	Adult	3.2E-07		3.2E-07		3.2E-07	
	Child under school age	5.5E-07		5.5E-07		5.5E-07	
	Infant	-		-		-	
Internal exposure from inhalation of spray (mSv/year)	Adult	4.0E-07		4.0E-07		4.0E-07	
	Child under school age	2.2E-07		2.2E-07		2.2E-07	
	Infant	1.2E-07		1.2E-07		1.2E-07	
Internal exposure from ingestion of seafood (mSv/year)	Adult	7.9E-05	3.0E-04	2.4E-04	9.1E-04	6.7E-05	2.6E-04
	Child under school age	1.5E-04	5.6E-04	4.4E-04	1.7E-03	1.2E-04	4.8E-04
	Infant	1.9E-04	7.1E-04	5.8E-04	2.2E-03	1.6E-04	6.1E-04

Reference A Site boundary dose assessment of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and the regulatory concentration limit in the Japanese laws

In the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, which is a specific nuclear facility, it is required to take appropriate inhibition measures for radioactive materials discharged to the environment including air, sea, etc., to reduce the dose around the site as much as possible, and make the effective dose on the site boundary from debris, contaminated water, etc., generated and stored in the facility after the accident (assessment value of the effective dose including additional discharge of radioactive materials from the entire facility) less than 1 mSv/year.

In addition, to dispose of liquid waste including radioactive materials, it is required to reduce the concentration of radioactive materials in wastewater as much as possible by filtration, evaporation, adsorption by the ion exchange resin method, etc., attenuation of radioactivity over time, dilution with a large amount of water, etc., at the wastewater facility, and keep the concentration of radioactive materials in wastewater below the concentration limit set by the Nuclear Regulation Authority at drains and the wastewater surveillance facility.

In accordance with “public notice that stipulates the required matters regarding the safety of TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station reactor facilities and the protection of specified nuclear fuel materials”, the concentration limit set by the Nuclear Regulation Authority is defined as the concentration set by Appended table 1 “Pronouncement which set the dose limit based on the regulations such as the Regulations on Business of Smelting of Nuclear Source Materials or Nuclear Fuel Materials”, if only one type of a radioactive material is contained and the type of the radioactive material is identified. This concentration is called “regulatory concentration limit.”

This concentration is set so that the average dose from internal exposure of adults drinking 2L of the water every day for 70 years will be 1 mSv/year. In other words, the laws set a limit so that even if a person drinks water directly from a drain, the average does of 70 years will not exceed 1 mSv/year.

For example, the limits for tritium and Cs-137 are 60Bq/cm^3 (60,000Bq/L) and 0.09 Bq/cm^3 (90Bq/L), respectively. Therefore, if a person drinks 2L of water containing 60,000Bq/L of tritium alone or 90Bq/L of Cs-137 alone every day for 70 years, the average exposure of 70 years will be 1 mSv/year.

On the other hand, if liquid waste containing two or more types of radioactive materials is disposed of and a person drinks 2L of water containing the nuclides each of which reaches the regulatory concentration limit (e.g. water containing 60,000Bq/L of tritium and 90Bq/L of Cs-137) every day for 70 years, the exposure from each nuclide alone will reach 1 mSv/year, 2 mSv/year in total, thereby the overall exposure exceeding 1 mSv/year. Therefore, to not exceed 1 mSv/year, the regulatory concentration limits of nuclides are set in a way that the sum of their ratios does not exceed 1. In other words, it is set in a way that $\boldsymbol{R_n}$ in the following equation does not exceed 1.

$$R_n = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{C_{i,measured}}{C_{i,limit}}$$

where

R_n	Sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits (dimensionless)
$C_{i,\ measured}$	Concentration of nuclide *i* in liquid waste to be discharged (Bq/cm^3)
$C_{i,\ limit}$	Regulatory concentration limit of nuclide *i* (Bq/cm^3)
n	Number of types of nuclides contained in liquid waste to be discharged

For discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea we are currently planning, the following conditions are to be verified:

(1) The sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of 63 nuclides excluding tritium falls below 1 in the facility for measurement and confirmation before dilution with seawater;
(2) The sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of 64 nuclides excluding tritium falls below 1 in the discharge vertical shaft after dilution with seawater.

In (2), the water shall be diluted with seawater 100 or more times so that the tritium concentration falls below 1,500Bq/L. If the tritium concentration can be diluted by 100 times up to 1,500Bq/L, the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of radioactive materials at the discharge vertical shaft will be up to

(Sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of 63 nuclides) + (Regulatory concentration ratio of tritium)

$$= \frac{R_{(1),63}}{100} + \frac{1{,}500}{60{,}000} = \frac{1}{100} + \frac{1}{40} = 0.035$$

because the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of other than tritium before dilution is managed to be less than 1 in (1) and the concentration of tritium is 1,500Bq/L. Among the dose assessments on the site boundary mentioned at the beginning, the assessment of the contribution of the wastewater of liquid waste is also calculated according to this concept. If the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits is exactly 1, exposure of this discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea is assessed to be less than 0.035 mSv/ in this assessment method because the exposure dose on the site boundary (drain) is assessed to be 1 mSv/year.

Reference B　Timeline of consideration of each disposal method of ALPS treated water

B1. Timeline of consideration

At the Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment[1] on December 10, 2013, the risks associated with storage of water treated (hereinafter called “ALPS treated water”) with the advanced liquid processing system (hereinafter called “ALPS”), etc. at the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (hereinafter called “FDNPS”) were clarified. On December 4, 2013, the review team of the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter called “IAEA”) advised to “examine all options” for handling of ALPS treated water.

Therefore, the government extracted all options from the neutral viewpoint as the basic material for the determination of long-term treatment of ALPS treated water, as well as set up the Tritiated Water Taskforce (hereinafter called “the Taskforce”) under the Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment for the purpose of the technical assessment of each option (not for harmonizing views among stakeholders or unifying options) and has been proceeding with technical consideration for 2 years and 5 months.

After that, the government established the Subcommittee on Handling of the ALPS Treated Water (hereinafter called “the Subcommittee”) under the Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment and have conducted comprehensive consideration for 38 months from the professional perspective, in terms of international best practices, options with the least adverse impact on human health and the environment, social impacts such as reputation damage, and technical feasibility in accordance with the knowledge summarized in the Taskforce report.

(1)　Overview of consideration by the Taskforce

The Taskforce took place a total of 15 times from December 25, 2013 to May 27, 2016, with the participation of the Nuclear Regulation Authority and related ministries and agencies, in addition to nine members who are experts in the fields of nuclear energy, environmental science, radiation medicine, radiation biology, and fishery chemistry.

The Taskforce organized the basic knowledge as such on tritium regarding its property, dynamics in the atmospheric/geosphere/marine environment, and impacts on the environment and human body (radiation dose, biological concentration, in vivo half-life,

[1] Committee set up under the ministerial meeting on measures for decommissioning/ contaminated water/ treated water. This committee was set up to totally examine the contaminated treatment measures of Fukushima Daiichi and consider the measures to radically solve the problems and to handle leakage accidents of contaminated water including tritium treatment measures.

etc.)[2] [3] [4], set the assessment cases based on the uniformed handling conditions for parallel comparison of 11 options combining five methods (geosphere injection, discharge into the sea, vapor release, hydrogen release, and underground burial) with the presence or absence of pretreatment such as dilution or isotope separation considering foreign cases, etc., and performed technical assessments.
For technical assessments, technical feasibility and regulatory feasibility were set as the basic requirements (items used as criteria to judge feasibility). As conditions which may be constraints on selection, the following evaluation items were set: time and cost required for disposal, scale (area required for disposal), whether any secondary waste is generated/its type and amount, the occurrence of excessive worker exposure from the disposal, and incidental conditions (other conditions which may be constraints).

(2) Overview of consideration by the Subcommittee

The Subcommittee met a total 17 times from November 11, 2016 to January 31, 2020, with the participations of 13 experts in the fields of nuclear power, geotechnical engineering, sociology, environmental science, agriculture, radiobiology, radiation science, and fishery chemistry, and related ministries. The Subcommittee had further discussions about the impact of tritium on organisms[5] [6] as well as comprehensively

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[2] Regarding the environment dynamics of tritium, it was reported that tritium discharged into air exhibited such behaviors such as turbulent dispersion in air, dry or wet deposition on the ground surface, underground advection and diffusion, and evaporation from the ground surface; that a simple assessment is difficult due to a big variation in the dispersion state depending on the weather conditions at the time of discharge; and that the concentration is reduced as it gets away from the location of discharge though it depends on the discharge method and discharge position (Summary of an explanation by Mr. Haruyasu Nagai at the 4th Taskforce, Pages 1 to 9 of the minutes).

[3] As for the environmental impact of tritium, it was explained that there were two types of tritium in organic substances, namely free water tritium (hereinafter called “FWT”) and organically bound tritium (hereinafter called “OBT”), OBT was easy to be absorbed by organisms and has long biological half-life, the in vivo FWT concentration and water tritium concentration counterweighed (becomes almost equal) immediately in the aquatic environment, the concentration factor of tritium (ratio of the in vivo concentration to the water concentration) is 1 or less, dose assessments of marine organisms were performed for “reference animals” (e.g. marine organisms with different shapes such as flatfish and crab), generally the calculation was performed from the radioactive material concentration (Bq/kg - raw organism), and there would be no significant impact on aquatic habitat unless an extremely high concentration of tritium is retained in the aquatic environment (Summary of an explanation by the Taskforce Member Mr. Hideki Kakiuchi at the 3rd meeting of the Taskforce, pp.2-10 of the minutes, Summary of an explanation by the Taskforce Member Takami Morita in the 3rd Taskforce, Pages 14 to 18 of the minutes).

[4] As for the impact of tritium on human bodies, it was explained that the impact of tritium on human bodies was much smaller than that of radioactive cesium set as the standard of radioactive materials in foods, about 1/1,000; tritium caused almost no external exposure, and internal exposure would be considered because it is radionuclide with low-energy beta rays; and tritium exists in two forms, namely FWT and OBT, in organisms and, according to ICRP (International Commission on Radiological Protection), the in vivo half-lives of FWT and OBT were about 10 days and 40 days, respectively (Summary of an explanation by the Taskforce Member Mr. Hideki Kakiuchi in the 3rd Taskforce, Pages 2 to 10 of the minutes; Summary of an explanation by the Taskforce Member Mr. Hideo Tatsuzaki at the 3rd Taskforce, Pages 21 to 25 of the minutes; Summary of an explanation by the Taskforce Member Mr. Hiroshi Tauchi at the 3rd Taskforce, Pages 26 to 33 of the minutes).

[5] It was explained that tritium just emits weak beta rays, the only exposure form with significant impact was internal exposure, it is said that there was almost no in-vivo concentration as characteristics, and it was passed out of the human body by metabolism about 10 days after entering the body since it was a kind of water (Summary of a statement by the Subcommittee Member Yamanishi at the 2nd Subcommittee, Page 34 of the minutes).

[6] It was explained that tritium was not concentrated on specific organisms or organs because molecules containing tritium had

considered the expansion of the tank storage capacity, the possibility to continue tank storage, etc., in addition to the technical viewpoints of the disposal methods and the advantages and disadvantages of the disposal methods taking into consideration the social and environmental impacts of disposal for each of the five disposal methods of ALPS treated water.

The proceedings of the meetings were open to the public, and those who applied and were registered in advance were able to listen to the proceedings at the venue as observers. All of the contents and materials from the discussion of each meeting are available on the website of METI[7]. The following shows the details of consideration at the Taskforce and the Subcommittee.

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the same properties as normal water molecules (Summary of an explanation by the Subcommittee Member Tauchi at the 11th Subcommittee, Page 19 to 24, 32 of the minutes). The following shows the discussion related to these:

(1) "For example, data from Sellafield Bay in the UK shows that the concentration of organically bound tritium in fish is higher than the concentration in seawater when measured at a certain point in time. However, this is because there was a very high concentration of tritiated water that was previously discharged into the sea. When that was taken in, the OBT remained because it has a longer half-life than water. The data shows that, as the years go by, the organic-bound form of the substance decreases rapidly when its concentration in seawater is almost undetectable. Therefore, this is not something that should be called bioaccumulation. Bioaccumulation means that substances in the environment accumulate and become more concentrated in living organisms. I hope you understand that this will not happen with tritium" (statement by the Subcommittee Member Tauchi at the 11th Subcommittee, Page 32 of the minutes).

(2) In response to the question "Have there been any examples of tritium concentrated in nature?" (statement by the Committee Member Mr. Tauchi at the 11th meeting of the Subcommittee, p.32 of the minutes), the answer was "As far as I know, there have been no such cases. If there had been, the tritiated water in the tank could be concentrated by living organisms and removed, but that is not the case" (statement by the Subcommittee Member Tauchi at the 11th Subcommittee, Pages 32 to 33 of the minutes).

(3) "As far as I know, there have been no cases where microorganisms have been cultured in tritiated water in so-called laboratory experiments, and where water-to-biological concentration has been observed. In addition, as Mr. Hiroshi Tauchi mentioned, the tritium concentration in living organisms can appear to be high in the environment. This is due to the fact that organic matter has been accidentally discharged from factories in the past. Because fish migrate, the opposite phenomenon is observed when fish grown in areas with low tritium concentrations go to areas with high concentrations. We have observed that living organisms grown in a place with high tritium concentration appear to be highly tritium-concentrated when they go to a place with low tritium concentration. This is the reality of the situation" (statement of the Subcommittee Member Kakiuchi at the 11th Subcommittee, Pages 33 to 34 of the minutes).

[7] https://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/osensuitaisaku/archive/task_force3.html
https://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/osensuitaisaku/archive/task_force4.html
https://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/osensuitaisaku.html#osensuitaisaku_mt

B2. Discussion about each disposal method and result of the comparison

(1) Taskforce

The Taskforce set and evaluated the basic requirements (technical feasibility and regulatory feasibility) as well as conditions which may be constraints (time, cost, scale, secondary waste, worker exposure, etc.) as evaluation items for each case (as shown in the Table B-1) and prepared a report as a basic material for future consideration ("Tritiated Water Taskforce Report"[8]) in June 3, 2016 after the discussion and consideration on the technical point of view of each disposal method, environmental impacts, difficulty of monitoring, issues to secure the site, comparisons to precedents, increasing capacity of storage in tanks, and issues arising from storing water in tanks as mentioned below in footnotes of B2. (2) (ii), (3) and (4) using excerption of the discussions,

This report suggests that consideration should be proceeded with from comprehensive viewpoints including not only technical ones such as the feasibility, economy, required time, etc., as well as social ones such as reputation damage because the result may cause big impact on the reputation.

Table: Conditions which may be constraints

Disposal method	Geosphere injection	Discharge into the sea	Vapor release	Hydrogen release	Underground burial
Period[9]	104+20n months 912 months (for monitoring) (n=Number of survey points)	91 months	120 months	106 months	98 months 912 months (for monitoring)
Cost[10]	18+0.65n billion yen+Monitoring cost (n=Number of survey points)	3.4 billion yen	34.9 billion yen	100 billion yen	243.1 billion yen
Scale	380 m^2	400 m^2	2000 m^2	2.000 m^2	285.000 m^2

[8] Available on the web site of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.
https://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/decommissioning/pdf/20160915_01a.pdf

[9] The procedure is divided in to the plant construction phase and treatment phase, but depending on the method, technical development and some lead time may be required before plant construction (summary of a statement by the Taskforce Member Tokuhiro Yamamoto at the 12th meeting, Page 19 of the minutes)

[10] The following shows the related discussion in the Taskforce.

(1) It turned out that there is no realistic technology to solve the problem with the treatment method of tritium in France within the allowable range of costs. Such a technology may exist but will be too costly. Therefore, it was concluded that such technologies would not be feasible (Summary of a statement by Mr. Jean-Luc Lachaume, at the 7th Taskforce, Page 15 of the minutes).

(2) In France, not segregation but direct discharge of tritium into a river or the sea was adopted considering the cost, advantages, etc. (Summary of a statement by the Committee Member, Mr. Jean-Luc Lachaume, at the 7th Taskforce, Page 21 of the minutes).

Disposal method	Geosphere injection	Discharge into the sea	Vapor release	Hydrogen release	Underground burial
Secondary waste	N/A	N/A	Depending on the components of treated water, incineration ash may be generated.	Residues may be generated as secondary waste.	N/A
Radiation Exposure of Workers [11]	No points to consider in particular	No points to consider in particular	There are no points to consider in particular since the height of the exhaust pipe will be sufficiently high.	There are no points to consider in particular since the height of the exhaust pipe will be sufficiently high.	To prevent radiation exposure of workers during the burial operation, installing a cover etc. is needed.
Others	The costs and duration of the exploration will increase in the event that it is difficult to find a suitable geosphere layer.	In the case of using a divider between the intake water pit and the discharge port, the cost will increase.[12]	The duration may be extended, in case the release operation needs to be suspended due to precipitation.[13]	The duration may be extended, in case the release operation needs to be suspended due to precipitation.[14]	A large amount of concrete and bentonite will be needed. Construction spoil will be produced.[15]

(2) Subcommittee

On February 10, 2020, the Subcommittee prepared a report ("The Subcommittee on Handling of the ALPS Treated Water Report"[16]) considering the result of the Taskforce. The following shows the major contents of consideration.

[11] "I believe the exposure of workers is quite important, and it should be taken into account. With regard to exposure of workers, if the workers to be deployed were changed rapidly, it would be possible to comply with laws and regulations, but I would like to keep this to a realistic level" (statement by the Taskforce Member Hideo Tatsuzaki at the 13th Taskforce, Page 14 of the minutes).

[12] "In the case of discharge into the sea, if tritium were released and the same water was taken in again, it would make no sense whatsoever. In order to deal with this, some methods of partitioning with wharves, etc. are described, but I'm wondering whether or not it is necessary to state this as an ancillary condition when the cost is calculated" (statement by the Taskforce Member Takami Morita at the 14th Taskforce, Page 13 of the minutes).

[13] "When it comes to implementation of vapor release or hydrogen release, I wonder if it is possible to do so in the midst of heavy snow or rain. If so, I believe the annual operating results, or the actual number of operations, may vary" (statement by the Taskforce Member Mr. Takami Morita at the 13th meeting of the Taskforce, p.13 of the minutes).

[14] Same as the above.

[15] "There is a problem of residual soil buried underground, which hardly arises when it is placed above the groundwater level. This makes me think that the story will be quite different depending on whether we build the plant above or below this groundwater level" (statement by the Taskforce Member Takami Morita at the 13th Taskforce, Page 13 of the minutes).

[16] Available on the web site of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. https://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/osensuitaisaku/committtee/takakusyu/pdf/018_00_01.pdf

(i) Social impacts of each disposal method

As for social impacts, the impacts on life and economy (reputation damage) are assumed but it is difficult to comprehensively compare their significance.[17] Therefore, it was concluded that no matter which disposal method of discharge into the sea/vapor release is selected, it will be necessary to prepare for possible reputation damage after disposal considering the characteristics of each disposal method.

(ii) Technical viewpoints of each disposal method considering environmental and social impacts

The Subcommittee considered the realistic options considering in terms of environmental impacts including the continuation of tank storage (as shown in B2. (4) below) based on the technical viewpoint in accordance with the five disposal methods consideration results proposed at the Taskforce (geosphere injection, hydrogen release, underground burial, vapor release, and discharge into the sea.) As a result, for geosphere injection, there was an issue with securing of the site and also the method had not been established to monitor the behavior and effects of tritiated water after geosphere injection[18] [19]. For hydrogen release, further technical development

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[17] "I do not believe that the superiority of social impact is necessarily clear in our discussions so far, as to which has a greater or lesser social impact" (Summary of a statement by the Subcommittee Member Tokuhiro Yamamoto at the 16th Subcommittee, Page 25 of the minutes).

[18] As for geosphere injection, lack of knowledge of appropriate stratum, monitoring, etc. are difficult (Summary of our statement at the 14th Subcommittee, Page 37 of the minutes).

[19] The following shows the related matters discussed at the Subcommittee and then the Taskforce.

(1) If geosphere injection is performed other than at the site, thousands of trucks with water will drive on roads in the prefecture and even an accident of one of the truck will stop the entire process, which is risky (Summary of a statement by Mr. Chuck Negin at the 6th Taskforce, Page 36 of the minutes).

(2) The French regulations prohibit geosphere disposable of radioactive materials (Summary of a statement by Mr. Jean-Luc Lachaume, at the 7th Taskforce, Page 5 of the minutes).

(3) Of course, those without standards require much time and effort. Other one than discharge into the sea after dilution and vapor release after dilution are difficult to assess without knowing the details (Summary of a statement by the regulatory authorities (Chief Mr. Shinji Kinjo) at the 8th Taskforce, Page 35 of the minutes).

(4) It is very important how to explain the option of underground burial while there is a case in France. It cannot be assessed because no underground experiment has been conducted (Summary of a statement by the Taskforce Member Hiroshi Tauchi at the 8th Taskforce, Page 40 of the minutes).

(5) The current legal system does not assume burial disposal of fluid, so it is not an easy task (Summary of a statement by Taskforce Member Hideo Tatsuzaki at the 9th Taskforce, Page 27 of the minutes).

(6) Judging from the requirements of the international guidelines of IAEA and ICRP, direct injection of tritium water is not allowed globally (Summary of a statement by the regulatory authorities (Chief Shinji Kinjo) at the 12th Taskforce, Page 11 of the minutes).

(7) Especially as for geosphere injection, there is no precedent case, so there is no regulation. However, it is a waste of opportunity to abandon it due to the lack of regulatory standards. It would be appreciated if consideration could be made (Summary of a statement by Mr. Takasaka, an expert observer, at the 13th Taskforce, Page 17 of the minutes).

(8) For example, though the method is underground burial, the disposal site of even low-level radioactive waste is a great concern. There may be no candidate for the place of storage of tritium water. If so, the span of time up to construction will be massive (Summary of a statement by the Taskforce Member Yoshihisa Takakura at the 14th Taskforce, Page 16 of the minutes).

was required and there is the possibility of hydrogen explosion[20]. For underground burial, there was a risk of vapor release of tritium caused by heat generated by solidification, new legislation was required, and there was an issue of securing of the site[21] [22] [23]. In addition, the Subcommittee showed its view that there was no realistic model of assessment of environmental impacts of geosphere injection, hydrogen release, and underground burial. However, for vapor release and discharge into the

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[20] The following shows the related discussion in the Taskforce.

(1) With hydrogen distillation, even a small device can achieve a high segregation efficiency thanks to the large separation factor, which is an advantage, but it also has disadvantages: the cost is high due to the necessity for ancillary facilities for achieving a very low liquid hydrogen temperature of about 20 kelvin and it is necessary to consider safety measures for the issue of explosion protection of hydrogen gas, etc., due to high pressure caused by gasification of hydrogen when running out of the coolant and use of massive hydrogen gas (Summary of an explanation by the Taskforce Member Toshihiko Yamanishi at the 2nd Taskforce, Page 11 of the minutes).

(2) The electrolysis method consumes a lot of energy, so as of now electrolysis is rarely used alone for segregation (Summary of an explanation by the Taskforce Member Toshihiko Yamanishi at the 2nd Taskforce, Page 13 of the minutes).

(3) Though the concentration is low, it is significantly different from past research and development and actually operating plants in that extensive treatment is required. Water treatment in Fukushima is much different from that of the past plants and had no track record (Summary of an explanation by the Taskforce Member Toshihiko Yamanishi at the 2nd Taskforce, Page 16 of the minutes).

(4) The treatment amount is thousands of times greater than that of currently operating plants. Normally, in the engineering field, scale-up means making the scale 10 or less times greater, not applying a three-digit figure as it is. It is a difficult question whether the current technology is applicable (Summary of a statement by the Taskforce Member Toshihiko Yamanishi at the 2nd Taskforce, Page 17 of the minutes).

[21] The following shows the related discussion in the Taskforce.

(1) Currently, it is not assumed at all to dispose of liquid waste by injection in Japan. It is only assumed to dispose of solid waste. It is stipulated in the rules (Summary of an explanation by Mr. Yoshiaki Sakamoto at the 4th Taskforce, Page 22 of the minutes)

(2) Basically, the result of the safety assessment depends on the assumed extent of deterioration of concrete; based on it, the degree of leakage is assessed (Summary of an explanation by the Committee Member Yoshiaki Sakamoto at the 4th Taskforce, Page 24 of the minutes)

(3) “For the 800,000 cubic meters, we will need at least 300,000 square meters of land, which will be a very difficult situation” (Summary of an explanation by Mr. Yoshiaki Sakamoto at the 10th Taskforce, Page 7 of the minutes).

(4) In the case of tritium, some effects may appear due to combination of flow of water and dispersion (Summary of an explanation by Mr. Yoshiaki Sakamoto at the 10th Taskforce, Page 12 of the minutes).

(5) For treatment and disposal of radioactive waste, the current basic philosophy is that it should be disposed of in waste body. Cementation of tritium water is somewhat out of the course of this philosophy (Summary of a statement by the regulatory authorities (Chief Shinji Kinjo) at the 10th Taskforce, Page 14 of the minutes)

(6) “I think you are assuming concrete burial but this is only for solid waste from demolition. Also, it is clearly stated in the laws and regulations. However, there is nothing that allows to bury liquid waste as well” (Summary of a statement by the regulatory authorities (Chief Shinji Kinjo) at the 13th Taskforce, Page 19 of the minutes).

(7) For example, though the method is underground burial, the disposal site of even low-level radioactive waste is a great concern. There may be no candidate for the place of storage of tritium water. If so, the span of time up to construction will be massive (Summary of a statement by the Taskforce Member Yoshihisa Takakura at the 14th Taskforce, Page 16 of the minutes)

[22] As for underground burial, there is no track record of disposal, a larger land is required than continuation of storage because solidification makes the volume three or six times larger, and it was reported that solidification generates heat, which causes evaporation of moisture. For this report, no opinion was provided from the Committee (Summary of our report at the 14th Subcommittee, Page 22 of the minutes)

[23] Hydrogen release is the same as vapor release because even if waste is buried underground, tritium will move from the corresponding location, which makes monitoring difficult (Summary of an explanation by the Subcommittee Member Toshihiko Yamanishi at the 16th Subcommittee, Page 31 of the minutes)

sea, environmental impacts were assessed using the assessment model of public exposure in the event of exposure of radioactive nuclides to the environment set by the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) and all results were sufficiently lower than the annual exposure amount from the nature in Japan, 2.1 mSv (the environmental impact of discharge into the sea is half or less than that of vapor release)[24].

On one hand, since it is difficult to expect the time required to solve these issues and temporal constraints have to be considered, so geosphere injection, hydrogen discharge, and underground burial are associated with many issues from regulatory, technical, and temporal viewpoints. On the other hand, vapor release and discharge into the sea[25] were concluded as realistic options[26] [27].

(3) Advantages and disadvantages of vapor release and discharge into the sea

The Subcommittee compared the advantages and disadvantages of the realistic options, namely vapor release and discharge into the sea.

As a result, it was concluded that though vapor release had a precedent case of the accident reactor at Three Mile Island in the United States occurred in 1979 as well as actual cases of discharge at the time of ventilation even in normal reactors, the wastewater amount in the precedent case of Three Mile Island was significantly smaller than ALPS treated water and there was no domestic case of vaporizing liquid for vapor

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[24] Explanation by the Secretariat at the 15th Subcommittee, Pages 13 to 16 of the minutes. Even if all treated water stored in tanks is treated in one year, the environmental impact is about 0.052μSV to 0.62μSV per year and 1.3μSV per year in discharge into the sea and air, respectively. The following shows the discussion related to these:

(1) To the question of whether the impact is an order of magnitude smaller than exposure from natural radiation even under excessive assumption that the total amount stored in tanks, 860 trillion Bq, is discharged every year for 100 years (Summary of a statement by the Subcommittee Member Sakita at the 15 Subcommittee, Page 19 of the minutes), the answer was yes (Summary of the answer by the Secretariat at the 15th Subcommittee, Page 19 of the minutes).

(2) Even in the case of a heavy water moderated reactor in Canada, which discharges a lot of tritium, the impact of the concentration of tritium drops to a level close to the background in a location about 5 km away, so there was a statement that the simulation result based on UNSCEAR was appropriate as a simulation result of the impact on residents in locations about 5 km away from the facility (Summary of a statement by the Subcommittee Member Kakiuchi at the 15th Subcommittee, Pages 19 to 20 of the minutes).

[25] It was explained that tritium had been generated by domestic and foreign nuclear power plants, etc., associated with their operation and a part of such tritium had been discharged into the sea, rivers, lakes and marshes, and air according to the regulations in each country (Summary of an explanation by the Secretariat at the 8th Subcommittee, Pages 4 of the minutes).

[26] It is important to commit to perform the proven options, namely discharge into the sea and vapor release, among the five disposal methods (Summary of an explanation by the Subcommittee Member Yuko Sakita at the 16th Taskforce, Page 28 of the minutes).

[27] Among the five disposal methods, only discharge into the sea and vapor discharge are technically feasible (Summary of an explanation by the Subcommittee Member Toshihiko Yamanishi at the 16th Subcommittee, Page 31 of the minutes).

release for the purpose of disposal of liquid radioactive waste[28] [29]. In addition, prediction is difficult due to deposition on the ground surface and evaporation into the air after vapor release, and there will be demerit that the fluctuation of the monitoring result caused by the weather conditions is larger than discharge into the sea[30] [31]. Moreover, from social viewpoints, a wider range of industries are expected to be affected as compared to the case of discharge into the sea and reputation damage may occur in

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[28] The following shows the related discussion in the Taskforce.

(1) The amount of water handled at TMI (Note: Three Mile Island) is completely different from that of Fukushima, so naturally technical discussion will be different. It was reported that the amounts of contaminated water were about 10 thousand tons and the evaporated amount was about 8,400 tons. Therefore, naturally the technologies to be provided and the assessment will be different, but even TMI achieved the goal in more than 10 years (Summary of a statement by the regulatory authorities (Chief Shinji Kinjo) at the 1st Taskforce, Page 28 of the minutes).

(2) Though the concentration is low, it is significantly different from past research and development and actually operating plants in that extensive treatment is required. Water treatment in Fukushima is much different from that of the past plants and had no track record (Summary of an explanation by the Taskforce Member Toshihiko Yamanishi at the 2nd Taskforce, Page 16 of the minutes).

(3) The scales of Three Mile and Fukushima are completely different. In the case of Three Mile, an accident occurred in only one reactor and the condition has calmed down, but the condition of Fukushima has yet to calm down (Summary of a statement by the Taskforce Member Yoshihisa Takakura at the 6th Taskforce, Page 18 of the minutes).

(4) I understand that there is a big difference between the two accidents. And I also understand that the problem in Japan is much more significant than in TMI. In principle, we had no problem of accumulation. So we could wait and see. However, in the case of Fukushima, it is very important to solve the problem as soon as possible (Summary of a statement by Mr. Chuck Negin at the 6th Taskforce, Page 18 of the minutes).

(5) It is necessary to proceed with discussion understanding the similarity to and difference from TMI, but we must remember that although the concentration of the tritium is very close, the amount is much larger in Fukushima. In the case of TMI, in reality, the reactor is 160 km away from the coast, which would be almost equivalent to the case of a reactor at an inland site in the case of Japan, so the geographical environment seems to be much different (Summary of a statement by the Taskforce Member Tokuhiro Yamamoto at the 6th Taskforce, Page 21 of the minutes).

(6) In France, the amount of tritium discharged in liquid is much greater than that discharged into air. This is because tritium causes a greater impact on human body when released in gas than in liquid (Summary of an explanation by Mr. Jean-Luc Lachaume, at the 7th Taskforce, Page 7 of the minutes).

(7) In the case of Three Mile, it was possible because the amount was very limited, but it is too different from the case of Fukushima to be applicable (Summary of a statement by the Committee Member Yoshihisa Takakura at the 13th Taskforce, Page 11 of the minutes).

[29] In terms of the required time and cost, discharge into the sea is easier. The reason vapor release was performed in the case of the Three Mile accident is that the reactor was not adjacent to the sea (Summary of a statement by the Subcommittee Member Ichiro Yamamoto at the 14th Subcommittee, Page 39 of the minutes).

[30] It was reported that there was a problem with monitoring for vapor release because it is difficult to predict generation and dispersion of waste, especially salt, caused by evaporation of ALPS water. For this report, no opinion was provided from the Committee (Summary of our report at the 14th Subcommittee, Page 22 of the minutes).

[31] The following shows the related discussion in the Taskforce.

(1) As for atmospheric dispersion, the speed of especially redispersion of tritium is high. Tritium is much different from other radioactive materials in that most of it evaporates again and returns to the air (Summary of an explanation by Mr. Haruyasu Nagai at the 4th Taskforce, Page 2 of the minutes).

(2) The dispersion condition greatly depends on the weather conditions at the time of discharge. It also greatly varies within a day. As the weather condition varies from hour to hour, the conditions change from moment to moment, so the necessity for adjusting the assessment based on the conditions is a difficult point in atmospheric dispersion (Summary of an explanation by Mr. Haruyasu Nagai at the 4th Taskforce, Pages 2 and 3 of the minutes).

(3) We assessed the reduction of the concentration caused by marine dispersion from the viewpoint of the degree of dilution by advection and diffusion assuming discharge from a typical Pacific coast. The concentration of the lattice in the discharge position and 2 km lattice decreases by 1, 2, and 3 digits about 10 km, 50 km, and 100 km downstream. This is different from air. The current varies little, so prediction is easier (Summary of an explanation by Mr. Haruyasu Nagai at the 4th Taskforce, Page 8 of the minutes).

industries in Fukushima and the whole of the surrounding areas.

On the other hand, there are many actual cases of discharge into the sea as being implemented in domestic and foreign nuclear facilities on daily bases and about 31.6 billion to 83 trillion Bq/year (actual average of 3 years before the accident) per site is diluted and discharged into the sea, etc., from the domestic nuclear power plants. Therefore, the discharge into the sea was concluded to be possible within the proven range even considering the disposal amount. In addition, because the composition of the discharge facility is simpler than the composition of the vapor release facility, and knowhow on the design of the discharge system and its handling are known. Thus, it was concluded that it will be able to surely dispose the waster better than vapor release in knowledge of the facility and operation point of view. Moreover, in the case of discharge into the sea, the condition of dilution dispersion after discharge is relatively easy to predict because the variation in the current is smaller than the impacts of rain and wind direction in the case of vapor release, so it was easier to consider the construction of the surveillance framework by monitoring[32] [33] [34].

From social viewpoints, discharge into the sea may cause reputation damage in the fishing industry and tourism in Fukushima and the surrounding sea area. Especially, the catches of the fishing industry in Fukushima, which is now in test operation, are yet to be less than 20% of that before the earthquake and the Fukushima Daiichi accident. Considering these, it is necessary to consider countermeasures[35].

(4) Consideration of the expansion of the tank storage capacity and continuation of tank storage

The Subcommittee considered the measure to expand the tank storage capacity and continue tank storage without disposing of ALPS treated water as follows[36].

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[32] See footnote [31] (3)

[33] For our explanation that there is no technically difficult issue in discharge into the sea, no opinion was shown (Summary of our report at the 14th Subcommittee, Page 21 of the minutes).

[34] There are several methods of discharge into the sea including construction of a new pool or equalizing the concentration before discharge in a new tank, etc., and then rechecking them, which is not technically difficult up to construction (Summary of a statement by the Subcommittee Member Yoshihisa Takakura at the 16th Subcommittee, Page 37 of the minutes).

[35] It was explained that the social impacts of discharge in the sea widely affects areas outside Fukushima, but the impacts on land areas are limited and the directly affected parties are limited to the fishing industry and a part of tourism, such as sea bathing while vapor release widely affects up to areas outside Fukushima and may directly affects all products. There was no objection (Summary of an explanation by the Secretariat at the 12th Subcommittee, Pages 13 of the minutes).

[36] The following shows the related discussion in the Taskforce.

(1) “Even if it is stored, there is a possibility of sudden leakage.”, “Even if it is stored in tanks, is it enough to just store it? I think that some sort of tank maintenance will probably be necessary during that period, and depending on the endurance of the tanks, it may be necessary to transfer it from one tank to another, and so on, and the risk of accidents, including radiation exposure of workers, must be considered.” (Statement of the Taskforce Member Hideo Tatsuzaki at the 1st Taskforce, Pages 18 and 19 of the minutes).

(2) As long as a lot of tritium water is stored, the risk will not become zero. There must be some risks associated with

(i) Expansion of the tank storage capacity

The Subcommittee considered storage in large-capacity aboveground tanks and storage in underground and offshore tanks. As a result, it was concluded that the storage capacity of large-capacity aboveground and underground tanks is not significantly larger than that of the existing standard tanks but had issues such as much greater leakage amounts in the case of damage. Offshore tanks of the size adopted for oil storage bases are difficult to install because the water depth is shallow in the Fukushima Daiichi port. Moreover, it is difficult to collect leaked water before dilution. In accordance of those considerations, there was no advantage in installation of the large tanks, etc. at Fukushima Daiichi[37].

Though storage by transfer to outside of the site was also considered, in order to prevent leakage or accident caused by transfer of water before dilution, it takes much time to plan and prepare a method to transfer a lot of treated water due to the necessity for transfer facilities compliant with laws and regulations (e.g. nuclear material protection facility surrounding the piping for transfer (fence, etc.)) as well as getting approval from the local governments on the transfer route. In addition, it was concluded to take much time because proper facilities, diverse preliminary adjustments, and procedures for permission are required due to the necessity for permission as a radioactive waste storage facility since radioactive materials are handled[38].

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continuation of storage (Summary of a statement by the Taskforce Member Tokuhiro Yamamoto at the 1st Taskforce, Page 22 of the minutes).

(3) In reality, one 1,000-ton tank is prepared every two days, which is associated with concerns of leakage and human errors. Tritium must be handled smoothly, otherwise there will be so many tanks that management, etc., may be very difficult. If it continues for 30 or 40 years, we will run out of space for tanks (Summary of a statement by the Taskforce Member Yoshihisa Takakura at the 4th Taskforce, Page 28 of the minutes).

(4) For storage, it is necessary to consider the possibility of future relocation of the storage space; if we wait for the half-life, it will be unrealistic to wait for, for example, three half-lives because it is too long. In addition, we have to take some countermeasures against the risk of unexpected accidents during storage such as the risk of discharge of stored water (Summary of a statement by the Taskforce Member Hideo Tatsuzaki at the 4th Taskforce, Pages 32 and 33 of the minutes).

(5) “Of course, accidents can occur in the course of the construction of the tanks, and there is also the risk of massive leakage if the tanks are damaged. In that sense, we think it is riskier to keep the water in the tanks on the site” (Statement of the regulatory authorities (Chief Shinji Kinjo) at the 13th Taskforce, Page 22 of the minutes).

(6) “At present, for example, we have already built almost all the tanks in the areas that are relatively close to where contaminated water is generated and where tanks can be placed. If we build new tanks in the future, we would have to set up pipes to transfer the water over a long distance, and if we transfer the water over such a long distance, there would naturally be risks of leakage and other problems. Even if we manage to increase the capacity of the current area by replacing the tanks with new ones with a larger capacity, there is not much room left in the current area.” (Our statement at the 14th Taskforce, Pages 17 and 18 of the minutes).

[37] The advantages and disadvantages of each of the following methods assumed in the case of continuation of storage were explained: storage in large-capacity tanks, storage in large-capacity underground tanks, and storage in offshore tanks (Summary of our explanation at the 13th Subcommittee, Pages 34 and 35 of the minutes)

[38] It was explained that storage outside the site requires approval from the local governments on the transfer route in the case of transfer without dilution and transfer facilities, etc., compliant with laws and regulations were required, and there was no opinion to it (Summary of our explanation at the 13th Subcommittee, Page 35 of the minutes).

(ii) Continuation of tank storage

At the Subcommittee, the possibility of continuation of storage in tanks was also taken into consideration, however there is an issue pointed out as actual risk of handling of remaining ALPS treated water after storage, including the fracture of the tank due to the earthquake[39] [40]. In principle, it is important to proceed with reconstruction of Fukushima and decommissioning in parallel and it is necessary to finish disposal of ALPS treated water as a part of decommissioning in order to complete decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi, so it was concluded that the water would have to be treated by the end of decommissioning even if storage was continued[41].

In addition, the Subcommittee concluded that transfer of radioactive waste to outside the site and expansion of the site to continue tank storage required understanding from the local governments, etc., of the area where the storage facility would be constructed and get permission as a radioactive waste storage facility, which would require so much adjustments and time up to implementation that the only possible method was to use standard tanks with improved installation efficiency at the site and the room for addition of more tanks than specified in the current plan was limited.

The Subcommittee pointed out that decommissioning required securing of places for construction of various facilities such temporary storage facilities for spent fuel and fuel debris, analysis facilities for various samples, storage facilities for fuel debris retrieval equipment, mock-up and training facilities for fuel debris retrieval, and waste recycling facilities[42].

B3. Assessment by IAEA

While the government had been proceeding with consideration, IAEA reviewed the disposal methods of ALPS treated water at all of the 4th peer review missions and recommended the Government of Japan to urgently determine how to dispose of ALPS treated water, which had been accumulated in the tanks at the Fukushima Daiichi site in the report of the 4th mission issued on January 31, 2019[43] [44].

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[39] Continuation of storage in tanks is associated with a fracture risk of tanks due to earthquake (Summary of a statement by the Subcommittee Member Hideki Kakiuchi at the 13th Subcommittee, Page 25 of the minutes).

[40] Even if we select continuation of storage, eventually it will be necessary to treat remaining tritium (Summary of a statement by the Subcommittee Member Hideki Kakiuchi at the 13th Subcommittee, Page 25 of the minutes)

[41] To the question “Will decommissioning continue as long as storage continues?” the Secretariat answered yes (Summary of a statement by the Subcommittee Member Takami Morita and summary of our statement at the 14th Subcommittee, Pages 24 and 25 of the minutes).

[42] Decommissioning required securing of areas in order not to hinder other operations (Summary of a statement by the Subcommittee Member Tokuhiro Yamamoto at the 13th Subcommittee, Page 26 of the minutes).

[43] IAEA “Mission Report IAEA International Peer Review Mission on Mid-And-Long-Term Roadmap Towards the Decommissioning of TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (Fourth Mission) Tokyo and Fukushima Daiichi NPS, Japan 5-13 November,” Page 8, etc.

[44] The IAEA also emphasized that the decision of the basic policy on handling of treated water by the Japanese government would encourage the whole procedure of decommissioning saying “The decision on ALPS treated water disposition path

Then, IAEA appraised the consideration result of the disposal methods of ALPS treated water by the government as mentioned above as follows in the report issued on April 2, 2020, in the review performed as follow-up for the 4th mission.

“Regarding the technical aspects, the IAEA Review Team considers that the recommendations made by the ALPS Subcommittee are based on a sufficiently comprehensive analysis and on a sound scientific and technical basis. The IAEA Review Team considers that the proposed objective of completing the disposition of the ALPS treated water by the time of the end of the decommissioning work is aligned with current international good practices. The IAEA Review Team considers the two options (namely controlled vapor release and controlled discharges into the sea, the latter of which is routinely used by operating nuclear power plants and fuel cycle facilities in Japan and worldwide) selected out of the initial five options are technically feasible and would allow the timeline objective to be achieved.

With the volume of ALPS treated water expected to reach the planned tank capacity of approximately 1.37 million m3 around the summer of 2022[45], s and taking into account that further treatment to meet regulatory standards for discharge before dilution and control of the stored water before disposition would be needed for implementation of any of the solutions considered by the Government of Japan, a decision on the disposition path should be taken urgently engaging all stakeholders."[46] [47]

B4. Summary

As described above, the Taskforce and Subcommittee discussed disposal of ALPS treated water, which had been an issue in decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi, in detail for as long as six years, and considered the five disposal methods (geosphere injection, hydrogen release, underground burial, vapor release, and discharge into the sea) and continuation of tank storage from technical viewpoints. Based on the consideration result, the Subcommittee presented the conclusion that proven vapor release or discharge into the sea are the realistic options. Then the Subcommittee compared vapor release and discharge into the sea to present a view that discharge into the sea had more track records in terms of the relationship with the discharge disposal amount and was more reliable

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was an important advisory point of previous reviews, and it will facilitate the implementation of the whole decommissioning plan.” (Acknowledgement 2) in the 5th review mission report prepared after the policy was decided.

[45] The timing when the tanks are expected to be full is as of 2020 and may change depending on conditions.

[46] IAEA “Review Report IAEA Follow-up Review of Progress Made on Management of ALPS Treated Water and the Report of the Subcommittee on Handling of ALPS Treated water at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station,” Page 6.

[47] The Director General Grossi of IAEA also made a similar statement when the Japanese government decided the Basic Policy. “... Controlled water discharges into the sea are routinely used by operating nuclear power plants in the world and in the region under specific regulatory authorisations based on safety and environmental impact assessments.”, IAEA website dated April 13, 2021.
https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-ready-to-support-japan-on-fukushima-water-disposal-director-general-grossi-says

including ease of handling of discharge facilities and monitoring methods.
The Subcommittee also presented a negative view on the continuation of storage in tanks considering the necessity for disposal of ALPS treated water for decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi, the substantial need for the land required for future decommissioning due to the limited room for the additional tanks than specified in the current plan, and the risk factors such as the risk of leakage of treated water caused by a rupture of a tank.
Thus, the Subcommittee assessed disposal of ALPS treated water is appropriate based on the premise of the disadvantage of continuation of storage in tanks and the advantage of discharge, which has no issue with safety as long as discharge complies with the regulatory standard.
This consideration result of the government was appraised by IAEA.

Reference C　Setting of Management Values and Exposure Assessment of Hypothetical ALPS Treated Water

In discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, sufficient safety is secured by verifying that the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of 63 nuclides other than tritium (62 nuclides to removal by ALPS and C-14) is less than 1 and diluting with seawater 100 or more times at the time of discharge so that the tritium concentration greatly falls below the regulatory concentration limit, but migration in the environment varies among nuclides, so the impact on exposure is different even among nuclides with the same regulatory concentrations limit. We decided to individually manage eight nuclides important in terms of exposure in order to limit this uncertainty of the source term and reduce the impacts on the external environment further. The management values were set by the following procedure.

1. Selection of nuclides important in terms of exposure
2. Setting of the management values of the selected nuclides

If any concentration exceeding the set management value is detected, we do not discharge the water and transfer it to secondary treatment. However, these eight nuclides shall be reviewed as needed based on the review result of nuclides subject to measurement before future discharge.

C1. Selection of nuclides subject to management

Regulatory concentration limits are set so that the annual exposure does not exceed 1mSv even in the case of ingestion of radioactive materials contained in the liquid on a daily basis. Therefore, the annual exposure amount from direct ingestion is comparable among different nuclides as long as their regulatory concentration ratios are the same, and the annual exposure will not exceed 1 mSv and as long as the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits is less than 1 even if multiple nuclides are included.

On the other hand, the behavior varies among elements such as migration to organisms in the environment, so the impact on exposure varies among nuclides discharged even with the same regulator concentration limit.

Therefore, to verify the exposure impact of each nuclide discharged with the same regulator concentration limit, we assessed exposure from discharge of ALPS treated water containing the corresponding nuclides only at the regulatory concentration limits (the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits is 1) for one year, though it is unrealistic, and selected nuclides important in terms of exposure assessment.

a. Source term

Based on the following conditions, we set the source term of each nuclide (annual discharge amount) of each nuclide as shown in Table C-1.

- Set the tritium concentration used for assessment at 100,000 Bq/L, which is the lower than the ever since measured tritium concentration of about 150,000 Bq/L, to estimate larger annual discharge volume of water and annual discharge amount of the nuclides other than tritium which proportion to the annual discharge volume of water.
- Set the annual discharge amount by multiplying the regulatory concentration of each nuclide by the annual discharge volume of water.

b. Concentration of each nuclide used for the exposure assessment in the seawater

The concentration of each nuclide in the seawater used for exposure assessment was calculated from the ratio of tritium to the annual discharge amount of each nuclide based on the annual average concentration within 10 km × 10 km of the tritium concentration in the seawater (all layers) in Table 6-1-17. Table C-2 shows the concentration of each nuclide in the seawater used for the assessment.

c. Assessment targets

The assessment targets are internal exposure from beach sand, which is significantly affected by external exposure, internal exposure from ingestion of seafood, and exposure for environment protection.

The exposure assessment method is the same as 6-1-2. “Assessment method” and persons subject to the assessment evaluation are those who ingest a large amount of seafood.

d. Exposure assessment result and selection of nuclides subject to management

Table C-3 shows the assessment result of internal exposure of adults from each nuclide discharged at the regulatory concentration limit in descending order of the value. We selected the eight nuclides whose exposure amount exceeds 0.001 mSv/year when discharged at the regulatory concentration limit as nuclides subject to management, which are nuclides with significant impacts on the exposure assessment.

As for external exposure from beach sand, there are some nuclides whose exposure amount exceeds 0.001 mSv/year when discharged at the regulatory concentration limit, but as shown in Table C-4, the dose conversion factor of Co-60 is used for all of these nuclides and the actual impact on external exposure is much smaller than Co-60 considering the energy and discharge rate of photons discharged by each nuclide, so such nuclides are deemed not to be subject to management.

e. Confirmation regarding environmental protection

Consideration had focused on the impact of human exposure, but this time we confirmed whether there is any nuclide subject to management from the viewpoint of environmental protection.

Specifically, we assessed the impact of exposure of each nuclide on marine plants and animals by the assessment method shown in 7-2. “Assessment method” using the source term of a. Table C-5 shows the assessment results in descending order of the value.

The nuclide with the greatest impact of exposure is Fe-59, but it is lower than the lower limit value of the derived consideration reference level (DCRL). We judged that there was no nuclide to be added as a management target from the viewpoint of environmental protection because Fe-59 had been subject to management for reduction of human exposure and the assessment values of the other nuclides are an order of magnitude smaller than that of Fe-59.

Table C-1 Source term to verify the impacts of 63 nuclides other than tritium (annual discharge amount)

Target nuclide	Nuclide concentration (Bq/L)	Annual discharge volume of water (L)	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Remarks
H-3	1.0E+05	2.2E+08	2.2E+13	• For the annual discharge amount of tritium, the upper limit value is used. • The concentration of tritium is set to a lower value than the concentration of stored ALPS treated water, etc., because a relatively large annual discharge volume of water is set. • This source term is used for the assessment of the case of discharge of ALPS treated water containing only the corresponding nuclides at their regulatory concentration limits (the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits is 1) to verify the impact of exposure of each nuclide, and water of such quality will be never been discharged actually.
C-14	2.0E+03	2.2E+08	4.4E+11	
Mn-54	1.0E+03	2.2E+08	2.2E+11	
Fe-59	4.0E+02	2.2E+08	8.8E+10	
Co-58	1.0E+03	2.2E+08	2.2E+11	
Co-60	2.0E+02	2.2E+08	4.4E+10	
Ni-63	6.0E+03	2.2E+08	1.3E+12	
Zn-65	2.0E+02	2.2E+08	4.4E+10	
Rb-86	3.0E+02	2.2E+08	6.6E+10	
Sr-89	3.0E+02	2.2E+08	6.6E+10	
Sr-90	3.0E+01	2.2E+08	6.6E+09	
Y-90	3.0E+02	2.2E+08	6.6E+10	
Y-91	3.0E+02	2.2E+08	6.6E+10	
Nb-95	1.0E+03	2.2E+08	2.2E+11	
Tc-99	1.0E+03	2.2E+08	2.2E+11	
Ru-103	1.0E+03	2.2E+08	2.2E+11	
Ru-106	1.0E+02	2.2E+08	2.2E+10	
Rh-103m	2.0E+05	2.2E+08	4.4E+13	
Rh-106	3.0E+05	2.2E+08	6.6E+13	
Ag-110m	3.0E+02	2.2E+08	6.6E+10	
Cd-113m	4.0E+01	2.2E+08	8.8E+09	
Cd-115m	3.0E+02	2.2E+08	6.6E+10	
Sn-119m	2.0E+03	2.2E+08	4.4E+11	
Sn-123	4.0E+02	2.2E+08	8.8E+10	
Sn-126	2.0E+02	2.2E+08	4.4E+10	
Sb-124	3.0E+02	2.2E+08	6.6E+10	
Sb-125	8.0E+02	2.2E+08	1.8E+11	
Te-123m	6.0E+02	2.2E+08	1.3E+11	
Te-125m	9.0E+02	2.2E+08	2.0E+11	
Te-127	5.0E+03	2.2E+08	1.1E+12	
Te-127m	3.0E+02	2.2E+08	6.6E+10	
Te-129	1.0E+04	2.2E+08	2.2E+12	
Te-129m	3.0E+02	2.2E+08	6.6E+10	

Target nuclide	Nuclide concentration (Bq/L)	Annual discharge volume of water (L)	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Remarks
I-129	9.0E+00	2.2E+08	2.0E+09	
Cs-134	6.0E+01	2.2E+08	1.3E+10	
Cs-135	6.0E+02	2.2E+08	1.3E+11	
Cs-136	3.0E+02	2.2E+08	6.6E+10	
Cs-137	9.0E+01	2.2E+08	2.0E+10	
Ba-137m	8.0E+05	2.2E+08	1.8E+14	
Ba-140	3.0E+02	2.2E+08	6.6E+10	
Ce-141	1.0E+03	2.2E+08	2.2E+11	
Ce-144	2.0E+02	2.2E+08	4.4E+10	
Pr-144	2.0E+04	2.2E+08	4.4E+12	
Pr-144m	4.0E+04	2.2E+08	8.8E+12	
Pm-146	9.0E+02	2.2E+08	2.0E+11	
Pm-147	3.0E+03	2.2E+08	6.6E+11	
Pm-148	3.0E+02	2.2E+08	6.6E+10	
Pm-148m	5.0E+02	2.2E+08	1.1E+11	
Sm-151	8.0E+03	2.2E+08	1.8E+12	
Eu-152	6.0E+02	2.2E+08	1.3E+11	
Eu-154	4.0E+02	2.2E+08	8.8E+10	
Eu-155	3.0E+03	2.2E+08	6.6E+11	
Gd-153	3.0E+03	2.2E+08	6.6E+11	
Tb-160	5.0E+02	2.2E+08	1.1E+11	
Pu-238	4.0E+00	2.2E+08	8.8E+08	
Pu-239	4.0E+00	2.2E+08	8.8E+08	
Pu-240	4.0E+00	2.2E+08	8.8E+08	
Pu-241	2.0E+02	2.2E+08	4.4E+10	
Am-241	5.0E+00	2.2E+08	1.1E+09	
Am-242m	5.0E+00	2.2E+08	1.1E+09	
Am-243	5.0E+00	2.2E+08	1.1E+09	
Cm-242	6.0E+01	2.2E+08	1.3E+10	
Cm-243	6.0E+00	2.2E+08	1.3E+09	
Cm-244	7.0E+00	2.2E+08	1.5E+09	

Table C-2 Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment

Target nuclide	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (within 10 km × 10 km)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Sandy beach assessment point)
		Mean concentration of all layers (Bq/L)	Mean concentration of all layers (Bq/L)
H-3	2.2E+13	5.6E-02	8.8E-01
C-14	4.4E+11	1.1E-03	1.8E-02
Mn-54	2.2E+11	5.6E-04	8.8E-03
Fe-59	8.8E+10	2.2E-04	3.5E-03
Co-58	2.2E+11	5.6E-04	8.8E-03
Co-60	4.4E+10	1.1E-04	1.8E-03
Ni-63	1.3E+12	3.4E-03	5.3E-02
Zn-65	4.4E+10	1.1E-04	1.8E-03
Rb-86	6.6E+10	1.7E-04	2.6E-03
Sr-89	6.6E+10	1.7E-04	2.6E-03
Sr-90	6.6E+09	1.7E-05	2.6E-04
Y-90	6.6E+10	1.7E-04	2.6E-04
Y-91	6.6E+10	1.7E-04	2.6E-03
Nb-95	2.2E+11	5.6E-04	8.8E-03
Tc-99	2.2E+11	5.6E-04	8.8E-03
Ru-103	2.2E+11	5.6E-04	8.8E-03
Ru-106	2.2E+10	5.6E-05	8.8E-04
Rh-103m	4.4E+13	1.1E-01	8.8E-03
Rh-106	6.6E+13	1.7E-01	8.8E-04
Ag-110m	6.6E+10	1.7E-04	2.6E-03
Cd-113m	8.8E+09	2.2E-05	3.5E-04
Cd-115m	6.6E+10	1.7E-04	2.6E-03
Sn-119m	4.4E+11	1.1E-03	1.8E-02
Sn-123	8.8E+10	2.2E-04	3.5E-03
Sn-126	4.4E+10	1.1E-04	1.8E-03
Sb-124	6.6E+10	1.7E-04	2.6E-03
Sb-125	1.8E+11	4.5E-04	7.0E-03
Te-123m	1.3E+11	3.4E-04	5.3E-03
Te-125m	2.0E+11	5.0E-04	7.9E-03
Te-127	1.1E+12	2.8E-03	4.4E-02
Te-127m	6.6E+10	1.7E-04	2.6E-03
Te-129	2.2E+12	5.6E-03	2.6E-03
Te-129m	6.6E+10	1.7E-04	2.6E-03

Target nuclide	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (within 10 km × 10 km)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Sandy beach assessment point)
		Mean concentration of all layers (Bq/L)	Mean concentration of all layers (Bq/L)
I-129	2.0E+09	5.0E-06	7.9E-05
Cs-134	1.3E+10	3.4E-05	5.3E-04
Cs-135	1.3E+11	3.4E-04	5.3E-03
Cs-136	6.6E+10	1.7E-04	2.6E-03
Cs-137	2.0E+10	5.0E-05	7.9E-04
Ba-137m	1.8E+14	4.5E-01	7.9E-04
Ba-140	6.6E+10	1.7E-04	2.6E-03
Ce-141	2.2E+11	5.6E-04	8.8E-03
Ce-144	4.4E+10	1.1E-04	1.8E-03
Pr-144	4.4E+12	1.1E-02	1.8E-03
Pr-144m	8.8E+12	2.2E-02	1.8E-03
Pm-146	2.0E+11	5.0E-04	7.9E-03
Pm-147	6.6E+11	1.7E-03	2.6E-02
Pm-148	6.6E+10	1.7E-04	2.6E-03
Pm-148m	1.1E+11	2.8E-04	4.4E-03
Sm-151	1.8E+12	4.5E-03	7.0E-02
Eu-152	1.3E+11	3.4E-04	5.3E-03
Eu-154	8.8E+10	2.2E-04	3.5E-03
Eu-155	6.6E+11	1.7E-03	2.6E-02
Gd-153	6.6E+11	1.7E-03	2.6E-02
Tb-160	1.1E+11	2.8E-04	4.4E-03
Pu-238	8.8E+08	2.2E-06	3.5E-05
Pu-239	8.8E+08	2.2E-06	3.5E-05
Pu-240	8.8E+08	2.2E-06	3.5E-05
Pu-241	4.4E+10	1.1E-04	1.8E-03
Am-241	1.1E+09	2.8E-06	4.4E-05
Am-242m	1.1E+09	2.8E-06	4.4E-05
Am-243	1.1E+09	2.8E-06	4.4E-05
Cm-242	1.3E+10	3.4E-05	5.3E-04
Cm-243	1.3E+09	3.4E-06	5.3E-05
Cm-244	1.5E+09	3.9E-06	6.2E-05
Target exposure pathway		Ingestion of seafood	From beach sand

Table C-3 Internal exposure assessment result from ingestion of seafood in the case of discharge of each nuclide at the regulatory concentration limit (adult)

(Selected 8 nuclides exceeding 0.001 mSv/year as management targets)

No.	Target nuclide	Regulatory concentration limit (Bq/L)	Internal exposure dose from ingestion of seafood (mSv/year)	Remarks
1	Sn-126	6.0E+04	2.6E-02	Operation and management targets
2	Sn-123	2.0E+03	2.3E-02	Operation and management targets
3	Sn-119m	1.0E+03	1.9E-02	Operation and management targets
4	Fe-59	4.0E+02	5.6E-03	Operation and management targets
5	Cd-115m	1.0E+03	1.4E-03	Operation and management targets
6	C-14	2.0E+02	1.3E-03	Operation and management targets
7	Cd-113m	6.0E+03	1.3E-03	Operation and management targets
8	Ag-110m	2.0E+02	1.0E-03	Operation and management targets
9	Zn-65	3.0E+02	8.4E-04	
10	Mn-54	3.0E+02	5.2E-04	
11	Co-58	3.0E+01	2.5E-04	
12	Co-60	3.0E+02	2.3E-04	
13	Tc-99	3.0E+02	2.1E-04	
14	Te-129m	1.0E+03	1.4E-04	
15	Te-127	1.0E+03	1.3E-04	
16	Te-123m	1.0E+03	1.3E-04	
17	Eu-155	1.0E+02	1.3E-04	
18	Te-125m	2.0E+05	1.2E-04	
19	Pm-148m	3.0E+05	1.1E-04	
20	Eu-152	3.0E+02	1.1E-04	
21	Te-127m	4.0E+01	1.1E-04	
22	Gd-153	3.0E+02	1.1E-04	
23	Pm-146	2.0E+03	1.1E-04	
24	Pm-148	4.0E+02	1.1E-04	
25	Eu-154	2.0E+02	1.1E-04	
26	I-129	3.0E+02	1.1E-04	
27	Sm-151	8.0E+02	1.0E-04	
28	Pm-147	6.0E+02	1.0E-04	
29	Am-241	9.0E+02	1.0E-04	
30	Am-243	5.0E+03	1.0E-04	
31	Am-242m	3.0E+02	9.7E-05	
32	Pu-239	1.0E+04	8.4E-05	
33	Pu-240	3.0E+02	8.4E-05	

No.	Target nuclide	Regulatory concentration limit (Bq/L)	Internal exposure dose from ingestion of seafood (mSv/year)	Remarks
34	Ce-144	9.0E+00	8.4E-05	
35	Pu-241	6.0E+01	8.1E-05	
36	Pu-238	6.0E+02	7.8E-05	
37	Ni-63	3.0E+02	7.7E-05	
38	Cm-243	9.0E+01	6.3E-05	
39	Cm-244	8.0E+05	5.9E-05	
40	Ce-141	3.0E+02	5.7E-05	
41	Cm-242	1.0E+03	5.0E-05	
42	Tb-160	2.0E+02	4.9E-05	
43	Nb-95	2.0E+04	2.7E-05	
44	Sb-125	4.0E+04	2.4E-05	
45	Sb-124	9.0E+02	2.0E-05	
46	Ru-103	3.0E+03	2.0E-05	
47	Ru-106	3.0E+02	1.9E-05	
48	Y-91	5.0E+02	1.7E-05	
49	Cs-135	8.0E+03	6.2E-06	
50	Cs-137	6.0E+02	6.1E-06	
51	Cs-134	4.0E+02	5.9E-06	
52	Cs-136	3.0E+03	4.7E-06	
53	Te-129	3.0E+03	3.0E-06	
54	Y-90	5.0E+02	2.0E-06	
55	Ba-140	4.0E+00	9.8E-07	
56	Pr-144	4.0E+00	6.7E-07	
57	Rb-86	4.0E+00	6.3E-07	
58	Sr-90	2.0E+02	2.9E-07	
59	Sr-89	5.0E+00	2.7E-07	
60	Rh-103m	5.0E+00	1.8E-07	
61	H-3	5.0E+00	1.3E-07	
62	Rh-106	6.0E+01	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
63	Ba-137m	6.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
64	Pr-144m	7.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide

Table C-4 Result of the external exposure assessment from beach sand in the case of discharge of each nuclide at the regulatory concentration limit

	Nuclide	Regulatory concentration limit (Bq/L)	Exposure from beach sand (mSv/year)	Remarks
1	Te-127	5.0E+03	1.0E-02	For the dose conversion factor, refer to the value of Co-60
2	Eu-155	3.0E+03	6.2E-03	For the dose conversion factor, refer to the value of Co-60
3	Gd-153	3.0E+03	6.2E-03	For the dose conversion factor, refer to the value of Co-60
4	Sn-119m	2.0E+03	4.1E-03	For the dose conversion factor, refer to the value of Co-60
5	Nb-95	1.0E+03	2.1E-03	For the dose conversion factor, refer to the value of Co-60
6	Ru-103	1.0E+03	2.1E-03	For the dose conversion factor, refer to the value of Co-60
7	Ce-141	1.0E+03	2.1E-03	For the dose conversion factor, refer to the value of Co-60
8	Pm-146	9.0E+02	1.9E-03	For the dose conversion factor, refer to the value of Co-60
9	Te-123m	6.0E+02	1.2E-03	For the dose conversion factor, refer to the value of Co-60
10	Cs-135	6.0E+02	1.2E-03	For the dose conversion factor, refer to the value of Co-60
11	Pm-148m	5.0E+02	1.0E-03	For the dose conversion factor, refer to the value of Co-60
12	Tb-160	5.0E+02	1.0E-03	For the dose conversion factor, refer to the value of Co-60
13	Co-58	1.0E+03	8.4E-04	For the dose conversion factor, refer to the value of Co-60
14	Sn-123	4.0E+02	8.3E-04	
15	Mn-54	1.0E+03	7.0E-04	
16	Rb-86	3.0E+02	6.2E-04	For the dose conversion factor, refer to the value of Co-60
17	Sr-89	3.0E+02	6.2E-04	For the dose conversion factor, refer to the value of Co-60
18	Y-91	3.0E+02	6.2E-04	For the dose conversion factor, refer to the value of Co-60
19	Ag-110m	3.0E+02	6.2E-04	For the dose conversion factor, refer to the value of Co-60
20	Cd-115m	3.0E+02	6.2E-04	For the dose conversion factor, refer to the value of Co-60
21	Sb-124	3.0E+02	6.2E-04	For the dose conversion factor, refer to the value of Co-60
22	Te-127m	3.0E+02	6.2E-04	For the dose conversion factor, refer to the value of Co-60
23	Te-129m	3.0E+02	6.2E-04	For the dose conversion factor, refer to the value of Co-60
24	Cs-136	3.0E+02	6.2E-04	For the dose conversion factor, refer to the value of Co-60
25	Ba-140	3.0E+02	6.2E-04	For the dose conversion factor, refer to the value of Co-60
26	Pm-148	3.0E+02	6.2E-04	For the dose conversion factor, refer to the value of Co-60
27	Eu-152	6.0E+02	5.5E-04	
28	Co-60	2.0E+02	4.1E-04	
29	Eu-154	4.0E+02	4.0E-04	
30	Sb-125	8.0E+02	2.9E-04	
31	Zn-65	2.0E+02	9.7E-05	
32	Cs-134	6.0E+01	8.2E-05	
33	Cs-137	9.0E+01	4.8E-05	
34	Ru-106	1.0E+02	1.9E-05	
35	Pu-241	2.0E+02	1.8E-05	

	Nuclide	Regulatory concentration limit (Bq/L)	Exposure from beach sand (mSv/year)	Remarks
36	Ce-144	2.0E+02	8.8E-06	
37	Te-125m	9.0E+02	7.5E-06	
38	Sn-126	2.0E+02	4.6E-06	
39	Cm-243	6.0E+00	8.2E-07	For the dose conversion factor, refer to the value of Am-243
40	Am-243	5.0E+00	6.8E-07	
41	Sr-90	3.0E+01	1.6E-07	
42	I-129	9.0E+00	5.1E-08	
43	Pm-147	3.0E+03	4.6E-08	
44	Am-242m	5.0E+00	4.4E-08	
45	Am-241	5.0E+00	3.7E-08	
46	Fe-59	4.0E+02	2.8E-08	
47	Tc-99	1.0E+03	2.8E-08	
48	Sm-151	8.0E+03	2.2E-08	
49	Cm-242	6.0E+01	9.8E-09	
50	Cd-113m	4.0E+01	7.2E-09	
51	Cm-244	7.0E+00	1.1E-09	
52	Pu-238	4.0E+00	6.3E-10	
53	Pu-240	4.0E+00	6.2E-10	
54	Pu-239	4.0E+00	3.7E-10	
55	H-3	6.0E+04	0.0E+00	
56	C-14	2.0E+03	0.0E+00	
57	Ni-63	6.0E+03	0.0E+00	
58	Y-90	3.0E+02	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
59	Rh-103m	2.0E+05	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
60	Rh-106	3.0E+05	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
61	Te-129	1.0E+04	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
62	Ba-137m	8.0E+05	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
63	Pr-144	2.0E+04	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
64	Pr-144m	4.0E+04	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide

*Nuclides subject to management are hatched

Table C-5 Result of the environmental protection assessment in the case of discharge of each nuclide at the regulatory concentration limit

	Nuclide	Regulatory concentration limit (Bq/L)	Exposure assessment result (mGy/day)			Remarks
			Flatfish	Crab	Brown seaweed	
1	Fe-59	4.0E+02	5.4E-01	5.4E-01	5.8E-01	
2	Sn-126	2.0E+02	9.7E-03	9.3E-03	9.0E-03	
3	Pm-148m	5.0E+02	7.5E-03	7.2E-03	8.1E-03	
4	Mn-54	1.0E+03	6.6E-03	6.0E-03	6.6E-03	
5	Eu-152	6.0E+02	5.4E-03	5.1E-03	5.4E-03	
6	Pm-146	9.0E+02	5.1E-03	4.9E-03	5.4E-03	
7	Tb-160	5.0E+02	4.2E-03	4.2E-03	4.5E-03	
8	Eu-154	4.0E+02	3.8E-03	3.6E-03	3.8E-03	
9	Nb-95	1.0E+03	2.3E-03	2.3E-03	2.4E-03	
10	Gd-153	3.0E+03	2.2E-03	2.0E-03	2.5E-03	
11	Pm-148	3.0E+02	1.5E-03	1.4E-03	2.0E-03	
12	Eu-155	3.0E+03	1.3E-03	1.3E-03	1.3E-03	
13	Co-58	1.0E+03	1.1E-03	1.1E-03	1.1E-03	
14	Sn-123	4.0E+02	1.0E-03	9.7E-04	1.0E-03	
15	Sn-119m	2.0E+03	9.6E-04	9.1E-04	6.7E-04	
16	Ce-141	1.0E+03	8.6E-04	8.2E-04	8.9E-04	
17	Co-60	2.0E+02	5.6E-04	5.6E-04	6.1E-04	
18	Ce-144	2.0E+02	4.7E-04	2.7E-04	4.7E-04	
19	Ru-103	1.0E+03	7.4E-05	7.4E-05	7.6E-05	
20	Cd-115m	3.0E+02	4.4E-05	1.9E-04	8.3E-06	
21	Ag-110m	3.0E+02	4.1E-05	2.3E-04	3.5E-05	
22	Y-91	3.0E+02	3.6E-05	2.2E-05	1.6E-04	
23	Zn-65	2.0E+02	3.3E-05	6.6E-05	3.2E-05	
24	C-14	2.0E+03	1.0E-05	8.4E-06	6.7E-06	
25	Cs-136	3.0E+02	9.5E-06	9.4E-06	9.4E-06	
26	Te-127	5.0E+03	9.4E-06	9.4E-06	8.7E-05	
27	Am-243	5.0E+00	8.8E-06	1.1E-05	9.7E-06	
28	Ru-106	1.0E+02	6.4E-06	6.4E-06	7.6E-06	
29	Cm-243	6.0E+00	5.8E-06	1.5E-05	9.4E-06	
30	Ba-140	3.0E+02	5.6E-06	7.7E-06	1.0E-05	
31	Sb-124	3.0E+02	5.1E-06	4.8E-06	6.1E-06	
32	Sb-125	8.0E+02	3.2E-06	3.0E-06	4.0E-06	
33	Pm-147	3.0E+03	2.9E-06	3.9E-05	2.7E-05	
34	Cd-113m	4.0E+01	1.7E-06	7.8E-06	1.4E-07	
35	Te-129m	3.0E+02	1.6E-06	1.6E-06	1.5E-05	

	Nuclide	Regulatory concentration limit (Bq/L)	Exposure assessment result (mGy/day)			Remarks
			Flatfish	Crab	Brown seaweed	
36	Sm-151	8.0E+03	1.5E-06	3.3E-05	1.3E-05	
37	Cs-134	6.0E+01	1.5E-06	1.4E-06	1.5E-06	
38	Te-125m	9.0E+02	1.0E-06	1.0E-06	8.8E-06	
39	Am-241	5.0E+00	9.4E-07	3.1E-06	9.7E-07	
40	Te-123m	6.0E+02	9.0E-07	9.2E-07	5.4E-06	
41	Cs-137	9.0E+01	8.0E-07	7.7E-07	8.0E-07	
42	Rb-86	6.0E+01	7.8E-07	9.9E-05	3.7E-05	
43	Cm-242	3.0E+02	7.7E-07	7.7E-07	7.2E-06	
44	Te-127m	5.0E+00	7.2E-07	8.0E-07	1.3E-06	
45	Am-242m	3.0E+02	6.7E-07	5.3E-07	1.3E-06	
46	Pu-238	4.0E+00	4.6E-07	3.1E-07	7.6E-07	
47	Pu-240	4.0E+00	4.3E-07	2.9E-07	7.1E-07	
48	Pu-239	4.0E+00	4.3E-07	2.9E-07	7.1E-07	
49	Ni-63	6.0E+03	2.3E-07	5.5E-06	1.7E-06	
50	Cm-244	7.0E+00	8.6E-08	1.1E-05	4.2E-06	
51	Tc-99	1.0E+03	6.7E-08	1.5E-05	4.5E-05	
52	Sr-89	3.0E+02	6.1E-08	2.1E-07	6.0E-08	
53	Cs-135	6.0E+02	5.3E-08	2.9E-08	4.3E-08	
54	Pu-241	2.0E+02	2.2E-08	1.5E-08	3.7E-08	
55	Sr-90	3.0E+01	1.1E-08	4.1E-08	1.1E-08	
56	H-3	6.0E+04	4.7E-09	4.7E-09	1.8E-09	
57	I-129	9.0E+00	9.1E-11	5.2E-08	2.3E-08	
58	Y-90	3.0E+02	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
59	Rh-103m	2.0E+05	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
60	Rh-106	3.0E+05	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
61	Te-129	1.0E+04	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
62	Ba-137m	8.0E+05	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
63	Pr-144	2.0E+04	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide
64	Pr-144m	4.0E+04	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	0.0E+00	Assessed with the parent nuclide

* Nuclides subject to management are hatched

C2. Setting of management values

In the analysis results of tanks and ALPS outlet water, seven nuclides excluding C-14 were not detected among the nuclides subject to management. The management values of the undetected nuclides are obtained by rounding up 120% of the minimum detection limit (larger result of the two tank groups) in the secondary treatment performance test considering errors. That of C-14, which was detected, is obtained by rounding up the concentration twice as high as the maximum value.

Figure C-1 and Table C-6 show the setting flow of management values and the set management values, respectively.



Figure C-1 Flow of setting of management values

Table C-6 Set management values

Undetected nuclide	Nuclide	Regulatory concentration limit (Bq/L)	Minimum detection limit (Bq/L)	Minimum detection limit ×1.2 (Bq/L)	Operation and management value (Bq/L)	Ratio to regulatory concentration limit
	Fe-59	4.0E+02	8.66E-02	1.04E-01	2E-01	5.0E-04
	Ag-110m	3.0E+02	4.26E-02	5.11E-02	6E-02	2.0E-04
	Cd-113m	4.0E+01	8.55E-02	1.03E-01	2E-01	5.0E-03
	Cd-115m	3.0E+02	2.70E+00	3.24E+00	4E+00	1.3E-02
	Sn-119m	2.0E+03	4.24E+01	5.09E+01	6E+01	3.0E-02
	Sn-123	4.0E+02	6.59E+00	7.91E+00	8E+00	2.0E-02
	Sn-126	2.0E+02	2.92E-01	3.50E-01	4E-01	2.0E-03
Detected nuclide	Nuclide	Regulatory concentration limit (Bq/L)	Maximum detected value (Bq/L)	Maximum detected value×2 (Bq/L)	Operation and management value (Bq/L)	Ratio to regulatory concentration limit
	C-14	2.0E+03	2.15E+02	4.30E+02	5E+02	2.5E-01
	Total of regulatory concentration ratios					3.2E-01

C3. Simulation assessment of human exposure from ALPS treated water

To verify that the management values set in C2. reduce the risk caused by the uncertainty of the source term, we assessed the exposure from continuous discharge of simulated ALPS treated water containing only nuclides with relatively great impacts of exposure such as the nuclides subject to management as a very conservative assessment, though such ALPS treated water cannot exist in reality.

a. Setting of the source terms

Based on the following steps, we set the source term of each nuclide (annual discharge amount) of each nuclide as shown in Table C-7.

- The annual discharge amount of tritium shall be the upper limit: 22 TBq (2.2E+13Bq).
- The annual discharge volume of ALPS treated water is conservatively estimated as 220 million L (2.2E+08L) by setting a low tritium concentration of ALPS treated water used for the assessment to 100 thousand Bq/L below the minimum concentration of tritium confirmed so far (about 150 thousand Bq/L). Because of this, the annual discharge amount of nuclides other than tritium is conservatively estimated.
- Among 63 nuclides other than tritium, the management value, which is the upper limit, is set to the concentrations of 8 nuclides with relatively great impacts on exposure. The sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of the 8 nuclides is 0.32.
- For the other 55 nuclides, Zn-65, whose impact on exposure is relatively great following the 8 nuclides subject to management, shall be assessed, and the concentration of Zn-65 is set to 140Bq/L, which is equivalent to the regulatory concentration ratio of 0.68. Because of this, the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of 63 nuclides other than tritium become 1, which is the upper limit value in discharge management.
- Set the annual discharge amount of 9 nuclides by multiplying the concentrations of the 8 nuclides subject to management and Zn-65 by the annual discharge volume of water of 220 million L.

b. Concentration of each nuclide used for the exposure assessment in the seawater

For the concentration of each nuclide in the seawater used for exposure assessment, the concentration of the other nuclides was calculated from the ratio of tritium to the annual discharge amount of the other nuclides in the source term based on the annual average concentration within 10 km × 10 km and the annual average concentration of the sandy beach assessment point in the tritium concentration in the seawater (all layers) in Table 6-1-17. Table C-8 shows the concentration of each nuclide in the seawater used for the assessment.

c. Exposure assessment method

The migration pathway, the exposure pathway, exposure assessment method, and the setting of the representative person are the same as those of 6-1. “Exposure assessment under normal conditions”.

d. Exposure assessment result

Table C-9 shows the result of the exposure assessment using the source term with simulated ALPS treated water containing only the nuclides with relatively great impacts on exposure. Even if the source term that seems to be the most conservative in terms of discharge management is used, the results were much smaller than the dose limit of 1 mSv/year for the general public and the dose target of 0.05 mSv/year, which is equivalent to the dose constraint value.

Table C-7 Source term using hypothetical ALPS treated water (annual discharge amount)

Target nuclide	Nuclide concentration (Bq/L)	Annual discharge volume of water (L)	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Remarks
H-3	1.0E+05	2.2E+08	2.2E+13	• For the annual discharge amount of tritium, the upper limit value is used. • In actual discharge, the water is diluted with seawater 100 or more times so that the tritium concentration will become less than 1,500Bq/L, so the Sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of 63 nuclides other than tritium in the discharged water will be less than 0.01.
C-14	5.0E+02		1.1E+11	
Fe-59	2.0E-01		4.4E+07	
Zn-65	1.4E+02		3.1E+10	
Ag-110m	6.0E-02		1.3E+07	
Cd-113m	2.0E-01		4.4E+07	
Cd-115m	4.0E+00		8.8E+08	
Sn-119m	6.0E+01		1.3E+10	
Sn-123	8.0E+00		1.8E+09	
Sn-126	4.0E-01		8.8E+07	

Table C-8 Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Source term using hypothetical ALPS treated water)

Target nuclide	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Bq/L)		
		Average of all layers within 10×10 km	Average of the top layers within 10×10 km	Average of all layers of the sandy beach assessment point
H-3	2.2E+13	5.6E-02	1.2E-01	8.8E-01
C-14	1.3E+09	2.8E-04	6.0E-04	4.4E-03
Fe-59	5.9E+06	1.1E-07	2.4E-07	1.8E-06
Zn-65	6.5E+06	7.8E-05	1.7E-04	1.2E-03
Ag-110m	3.3E+06	3.4E-08	7.2E-08	5.3E-07
Cd-113m	7.0E+06	1.1E-07	2.4E-07	1.8E-06
Cd-115m	1.9E+08	2.2E-06	4.8E-06	3.5E-05
Sn-119m	3.3E+09	3.4E-05	7.2E-05	5.3E-04
Sn-123	5.1E+08	4.5E-06	9.6E-06	7.0E-05

Target nuclide	Annual discharge amount (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Bq/L)		
		Average of all layers within 10×10 km	Average of the top layers within 10×10 km	Average of all layers of the sandy beach assessment point
Sn-126	1.2E+07	2.2E-07	4.8E-07	3.5E-06
Target exposure assessment		From fishing nets Ingestion of seafood	From sea surface From hulls	During swimming From beach sand Ingestion of seawater Inhalation of seawater spray

Table C-9 Human exposure assessment result (Assessment area: 10 km × 10 km)

Assessed case	Source term	Source term using hypothetical ALPS treated water	
	Ingestion of seafood	Average	Large
External exposure (mSv/year)	Sea surface	1.8E-07	
	Hull	1.4E-07	
	During swimming	1.2E-07	
	Beach sand	2.2E-04	
	Fishing net	4.5E-05	
Internal exposure (mSv/year)	Ingestion of water	4.6E-07	
	Inhalation of spray	2.1E-07	
	Ingestion of seafood	4.8E-04	2.0E-03
Total (mSv/year)		7E-04	2E-03

Table C-10 Assessment result of internal exposure from ingestion of seafood by age (10 km × 10 km)

Assessed case	Source term	Source term using hypothetical ALPS treated water	
	Ingestion of seafood	Average	Large
Internal exposure from ingestion of seawater (mSv/year)	Adult	4.6E-07	
	Child under school age	8.7E-07	
	Infant	-	
Internal exposure from inhalation of seawater spray (mSv/year)	Adult	2.1E-07	
	Child under school age	1.6E-07	
	Infant	1.0E-07	
Internal exposure from ingestion of seafood (mSv/year)	Adult	4.8E-04	2.0E-03
	Child under school age	7.5E-04	3.1E-03
	Infant	9.4E-04	3.9E-03

C4. Assessment of environmental protection with ALPS treated water

As with the human exposure assessment, we assessed exposure of animals and plants in the case of continuous discharge of simulated ALPS treated water.

a. Setting of the source terms

As with C3. a. Setting of the source term, based on the following steps, we set the source term of each nuclide (annual discharge amount) of each nuclide as shown in Table C-11.

- The annual discharge amount of tritium shall be the upper limit: 22 TBq (2.2E+13Bq).
- The annual discharge volume of ALPS treated water is conservatively estimated as 220 million L (2.2E+08L) by setting a low tritium concentration of ALPS treated water used for the assessment to 100 thousand Bq/L below the minimum concentration of tritium confirmed so far (about 150 thousand Bq/L). Because of this, the annual discharge amount of nuclides other than tritium is conservatively estimated.
- Among 63 nuclides other than tritium, the management value, which is the upper limit, is set to the concentrations of 2 nuclides with relatively great impacts on exposure. The sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of the 2 nuclides (Fe-59 and Sn-126) is 0.0025 (2.5E-03).
- For the other 61 nuclides, Pm-148m, whose impact on exposure is relatively great following the 2 nuclides subject to management, shall be assessed, and the concentration of Pm-148m is set to 499Bq/L, which is equivalent to the regulatory concentration ratio of 0.9975 (9.975E-01)). Because of this, the sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of 63 nuclides other than tritium become 1, which is the upper limit value in discharge management.
- Set the annual discharge amount of 3 nuclides by multiplying the concentrations of the 2 nuclides subject to management and Pm-148m by the annual discharge volume of water of 220 million L.

b. Concentration of each nuclide used for the exposure assessment in the seawater

For the concentration of each nuclide in the seawater used for exposure assessment, the concentration of the other nuclides was calculated from the ratio of tritium to the annual discharge amount of the other nuclides in the source term based on the tritium concentration in the seawater (bottom layer) in Table 7-3-1. Table C-12 shows the concentration of each nuclide in the seawater used for the assessment.

c. Exposure assessment method

The migration pathway, the exposure pathway, exposure assessment method, and the setting of the representative person are the same as those of 7. Assessment of environmental protection.

d. Exposure assessment result

Table C-13 shows the result of the exposure assessment of the standard animals and plants using the source term with simulated ALPS treated water containing only the nuclides with relatively great impacts on exposure. Even if the source term, which seems to be the most conservative in terms of discharge management, is used, the dose rate is much lower than the lower limit value of derived consideration reference level (DCRL)

Table C-11 Source term using hypothetical ALPS treated water (annual discharge amount)

Target nuclide	Nuclide concentration (Bq/L)	Annual discharge volume of water (L)	Annual volume of discharge (Bq)	Remarks
H-3	1.0E+05	2.2E+08	2.2E+13	• For the annual discharge amount of tritium, the upper limit value is used. • In actual discharge, the water is diluted with seawater 100 or more times so that the tritium concentration will become less than 1,500Bq/L, so the Sum of the ratios to regulatory concentrations limits of 63 nuclides other than tritium in the discharged water will be less than 0.01.
Fe-59	2.0E-01		4.4E+07	
Sn-126	4.0E-01		8.8E+07	
Pm-148m	5.0E+02		1.1E+11	

Table C-12 Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Source term using hypothetical ALPS treated water)

Target nuclide	Annual volume of discharge (Bq)	Concentration in the seawater used for the assessment (Bq/L)
		Within 10 × 10 km Average of the bottom layer
H-3	2.2E+13	5.6E-02
Fe-59	4.4E+07	1.2E-07
Sn-126	8.8E+07	2.4E-07
Pm-148m	1.1E+11	3.0E-04
Target exposure assessment		Environmental protection

Table C-13 Assessment result regarding environmental protection

Assessed case		Source term using hypothetical ALPS treated water
Exposure (mGy/day)	Flatfish	7.8E-03
	Crab	7.5E-03
	Brown seaweed	8.4E-03
derived consideration reference level (DCRL) Flatfish: 1-10 mGy/day Crab: 10-100 mGy/day Brown seaweed: 1-10 mGy/day		

Reference D Assessment result of environmental impacts including other elements than radiation related to discharge of ALPS treated water

We have assessed non-radiological environmental impacts associated with the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea. This document presents the result of our review of whether non-radiological factors associated with the presence and operation of facilities and its construction related to the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea "could cause substantial pollution or significant and harmful changes in the marine environment." In conclusion, we have assessed that none of such element was associated with such risks.
First, we analyzed the measurement items specified in the Water Pollution Prevention Law and related ordinances of Fukushima Prefecture other than radioactive materials contained in the stored ALPS treated water. The analysis result is described in Attachment II "Properties of ALPS treated water," with which we verified that all measurement items are below the standard values and that even if these water are discharged into the water, any significant or harmful changes will not occur in the marine environment due to non-radioactive substances contained in these water in the case of discharge into the sea.
Moreover, we also assessed the possibility for non-radiological environmental impacts from discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea or its method. Tables D-1 and D-2 show the systems subject to the assessment and their overview, and the overview of the assessment result, respectively. We considered the following two factors as those which may cause an impact:

a. Presence or operation of the facilities related to discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea (facilities related to measurement/confirmation, transfer, dilution, and discharge) (middle column);
b. Implementation of installation or operation of the facilities (right column).

We assessed the possible impacts of these influencing factors on the components of various environment such as air quality, water quality, geology, terrain, soil, and ecosystem. We also included the impacts of the radioactivity which already exist in the environment as the targets of the assessment. As a result, the expected effects on these components of the environment were evaluated to be either none or sufficiently small to be negligible.
The targets are the same conditions as those of discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, impacts of discharge of contents, and impacts of construction of the related facilities assumed in the radiation impact assessment handled in this report.

Table D-1 Facilities related to discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea

Classification of facilities	Facilities	Specifications
Measurement /confirmation facilities	Measurement/confirmation tanks	For measurement and confirmation, reuse 30 out of 35 current units (about 34 thousand m^3) installed in the K 4 area as facilities
	Circulation pump	160 m^3/h/unit × 2 units
	Stirring equipment	One unit per tank, A total of 30 units
	Piping, valve, etc.	Connecting tube (nominal diameter of the pressure hose equivalent to 200A or steel pipe 100A) Duplicate boundary valves in series to prevent water mixing among tank groups
Transfer facilities	ALPS treated water transfer pump	30 m^3/h/unit × 2 units (1 reserve)
	Emergency isolation valve	Install two valves with different operating principles and installation locations in series for multiplexing and diversification
	Flowmeter	
	Other valves, piping, etc.	
Dilution facilities	Water intake channel	Reuse the Unit 5 facility
	Seawater transfer pump	7,086 m^3/h × 3 units
	Flowmeter	
	Seawater pipe header	Nominal diameters of 2200A and 1800A
	Discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage)	1 reinforced concrete storage, Height about 37 m × Width about 18 m × Depth about 7 m, Capacity about 2,000 m^3
	Other valves, piping, etc.	
Related facilities	Discharge vertical shaft (down-stream storage)	1 reinforced concrete storage, Height about 7 m × Width about 12m × Depth about 18 m, Capacity about 800 m^3
	Discharge tunnel	Shield tunnel, Inner diameter about 3 m, Overall length about 1 km
	Discharge outlet	Discharge outlet caisson: W about 9 m × D about 12 m × H about 10 m (Discharge outlet: 3 m in four directions, Height 2 m) Backfill the upper base about 40 m × about 40 m, lower base about 16 m × about 16 m, and depth about 11 m in the surrounding with anti-washout underwater concrete, etc.

For the allocation, installation, and operation of these facilities, we made the following considerations in order to reduce the impacts on the environment as much as possible.

- We made considerations to prevent new terrain modifications by reusing 30 tanks out of a total of 35 tank of the existing K4 area tank group (about 34,000 m^3) for facilities for measurement and confirmation (the other 5 tanks continue to be used as ALPS treated water storage) as facilities related to discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea.
- The dilution facilities to be newly installed shall be installed in the existing development area in the FDNPS to prevent new terrain modifications excluding discharge vertical shafts and tunnel outlets.
- For the water intake channel, the existing Unit 5 water intake channel is reused to avoid new terrain modifications.
- Discharge is designed to minimize the impacts of the presence, operation, and construction of facilities by the undersea tunnel method, which affects no impact to the terrain such as seabed surface by drilling bedrock, for maximum environmental protection.

Table D-2 shows the details of the consideration of the items of environmental impact assessments of other elements than radiation based on the plan reflecting these design considerations. All of them were judged to have no impact on the environment.

Table D-2 TEPCO's consideration result of the non-radiological environmental impact assessment of nuclides contained in the ALPS treated water[1]

Impact factors / Environmental elements	Presence and operation of the facilities	Implementation of construction
	Presence of facilities related to discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea - Discharge of ALPS treated water using the facilities	Construction of facilities related to discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea
Atmosphere environment (Air quality and noise/vibration)	The motor operation method or pneumatic method shall be adopted for the power to drive active components such as pumps or valves and no facility to emit air pollutants shall be installed. In addition, the total flow rate of 3 seawater dilution pumps in normal operation for discharge of ALPS treated water and 1 ALPS treated water transfer pump (maximum daily amount: about 510 thousand m^3) is smaller than that in normal operation of the circulation water pump of a general nuclear power plant (about 9 times as large daily amount in Unit 1, which is the smallest, if FDNPS before the accident is used as an example: about 4.25 million m^3). The area surrounding the FDNPS is used as an intermediate storage facility	The ships used for construction are 1 dredger, 2 crane barges, and 1 concrete plant vessel (not operated simultaneously). Heavy equipment is up to about 20 units/day. The shield machine (diameter of about 3m) is one unit. Material transportation is up to about 30 units/day. Only the installation of the intake and discharge facilities is construction out of the site and most of the installation of the intake and discharge facilities is construction of the undersea tunnel. The construction is limited to the inside of the FDNPS and the area where no fishing is conducted on a daily basis and the surrounding area of the FDNPS within about 2 km from the place of construction are used for the

[1] Based on table 1.1 in "Environmental Impact Assessment Technical Guide" p.6.

Impact factors / Environmental elements	Presence and operation of the facilities	Implementation of construction
	Presence of facilities related to discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea - Discharge of ALPS treated water using the facilities	Construction of facilities related to discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea
	completely surrounding the land side of the FDNPS, and the closest place in the outside Difficult-to-Return Zone is at least 1 km away from the site boundary of FDNPS and about 2 km away from the place assumed to be the construction site (seaside area of Unit 5). Therefore, there is no target whose impact on the life environment should be assessed within the possible range of noise, vibration, etc.	intermediate storage facilities, so there is no target whose impact on the life environment should be assessed within the range where noise, vibration, etc., caused by the construction may cause any impact.
Water environment (Water quality/Water temperature/Flow velocity)* Other than radioactive materials	ALPS treated water is contaminated water with the contained radioactive materials eliminated by coagulating sedimentation, absorbents, filters, etc. Heavy metal, infusible suspended substances, organic substances, etc., are eliminated. No treatment to increase the pollution load, which causes an increase in COD, etc., is performed. It was verified in past measurement[2] that the water quality of ALPS treated water sufficiently meets the wastewater standard. Moreover, in actual discharge of ALPS treated water, the water to be discharged shall be verified to meet the wastewater standard. In addition, seawater to be taken and discharged is only used for dilution of ALPS treated water and is not heated. The temperature of ALPS treated water stored on land may change due to the ambient temperature. However, it is not in an equilibrium state with the seawater temperature and discharged after diluted 100 or more times with seawater, so there is almost no difference between the temperatures of wastewater and seawater. The discharge flow velocity from the discharge outlet is as slow as about 1m/s even in the case of the maximum flow rate with the three seawater dilution pumps in operation. Water is discharged straight up from the seabed with a water depth of about 12 m. Therefore, changes	There is no target to be assessed because occurrence of water turbidity caused by the construction is deemed to be limited because the construction of the intake facilities is performed in the port, most of the discharge facilities is constructed by the shield method as undersea tunnels, and a rocky shore is selected as the site for tunnel outlets.

[2] December 28, 2018 “Analysis of chemical substances in ALPS treated water tanks”
https://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/osensuitaisaku/committtee/takakusyu/pdf/012_04_01.pdf

Impact factors / Environmental elements	Presence and operation of the facilities	Implementation of construction
	Presence of facilities related to discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea - Discharge of ALPS treated water using the facilities	Construction of facilities related to discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea
	in the flow velocity are limited to near the discharge outlet.	
Other environments (terrain/geology, subgrade, and soil)	The discharge flow velocity from the discharge outlet is as slow as about 1m/s even in the case of the maximum flow rate with the three seawater dilution pumps in operation. Water is discharged straight up from the seabed. The protrusion from the seabed height is limited to a height of about 2 m within about 3 m in the four directions. The square area of about 40 m around the discharge outlet (about 1,600 m^2) is backfilled. Therefore, changes in the flow velocity are limited to near the discharge outlet, and there is no risk of scouring. Pumping of groundwater, which causes ground subsidence, shall not be performed and it is planned not to use any substance which causes soil contamination.	Terrain modifications are limited to very small areas, namely the discharge vertical shaft (upper-stream storage of about 670 m^2, down-stream storage of about 80 m^2, a total of about 750 m^2) and the outlet of the undersea tunnel (about 1,600 m^2) by avoiding new terrain modifications by reuse of the existing facilities, installation of the undersea tunnel by the shield method which gives very low change to terrain drilling bedrock.
Animals, plants, and ecosystem	Most of the facilities are installed in places where site preparation has been completed within the site of the FDNPS. The facility for discharge is an undersea tunnel and requires the minimum necessary area of about 40 m x about 40 m (about 1,600 m^2) near the outlet. The impact of discharge of ALPS treated water on tidal currents, etc., is small and there is almost no impact of the operation of the facility on organisms, because of ALPS treated water being diluted 100 or more times with the seawater of the adjacent sea and the low discharge flow velocity of about 1 m/s.	New terrain modifications are avoided by reuse of the existing facilities, installation of the undersea tunnel by the shield method, etc. No important species, habitat, etc., have been found in the sea area where construction is to be performed.
Rich natural environment (landscape, etc.)	There is no item to be assessed because the existing facilities are reused and the scale of the facilities to be newly installed is small.	Since the scales of the facilities to be installed are small, the traffic of vehicles for transportation of materials, etc., is assumed to be up to 20 vehicles/day, which is limited.
Environmental loads (waste, emission of greenhouse gas, etc.)	Discharge of ALPS treated water does not generate any new waste. In addition, the motor operation method or pneumatic method shall be adopted for the power to drive active components such as pumps or valves used for the facilities for discharging ALPS treated	Construction waste soil is generated (about 40 thousand m^3) associated with excavation of the undersea tunnel, but the generated amount is small and it is disposed of at the existing soil disposal site in the premises without transfer to outside.

Impact factors / Environmental elements	Presence and operation of the facilities	Implementation of construction
	Presence of facilities related to discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea - Discharge of ALPS treated water using the facilities	Construction of facilities related to discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea
	water into the sea, so no greenhouse gas including that generated by combustion of fossil fuel is emitted. Therefore, there is no item to be assessed.	Therefore, there is no item to be assessed.
Radioactive materials already exist in environment	The planned discharge outlet is installed in a rocky shore outside the port, the surrounding square area of 40 m is backfilled with concrete, etc., and water is discharge straight up at a low flow velocity of about 1 m per second, so discharge of treated water does not swirl marine sediment or disperse radioactive materials. The seawater for diluting the ALPS treated water is planned to be drawn from the outside of the port (north side of the Unit 5/6 discharge outlet) by blocking the intake path opening channel with partition weir (rubble mound and sheet) from the port of the Unit 1-4 side considering that the concentration of radioactive materials is slightly higher than that of the seawater in the surrounding sea area and that it may swirl marine sediment, etc., in the port. As shown in attachment V “Impacts of intake and discharge of diluted water on outside,” the result of the assessment of exposure considering the impact of the radioactive materials, which may be contained in drawn seawater in the case of intake of seawater outside this port is 9.6E-05 mSv/year, which is much lower than 0.05mv/year.	It is considered that construction in the port has almost no impact such as dispersion of radioactive materials, etc., thanks to installation of contamination prevention fences for construction, careful work at slower construction speed than usual, etc., in order to reduce sedimentation sand swirled in the port. It was confirmed that the concentration of radioactive materials in the seawater did not vary significantly during similar construction performed in the port (pouring materials such as riprap into the sea by using working crafts and backhoes) in the past three years[3]. Actually, the concentration of radioactive materials in the seawater in the port is below the domestic regulatory standard even inside the intake path opening channel of Units 1 to 4, in which the concentrations are relatively high (Cs-137 1E+00Bq/L order, Sr-90 1E+00Bq/L order, 10E+2Bq/L as of 2021)[4]. In addition, it is considered that the tunnel outlet construction outside the port has almost no impact, such as swirling of the seabed sediment, because a rocky shore is selected for the construction area, the excavation area is as small as about 40 m × 40 m, the concentration of radioactive materials contained the marine sediment is low[5] according to the investigation result of the surrounding sea area, and measures such as temporarily

[3] 9th Review Meeting on the Implementation Plan Regarding the Handling of ALPS Treated Water Material 1-1, pp. 39 -40
https://www.tepco.co.jp/en/hd/decommission/information/committee/pdf/2022/alps_22021501-e.pdf

[4] 35th Environmental Monitoring and Evaluation Sub-committee of the Safety Monitoring Council on Decommissioning of the Nuclear Power Station of Fukushima Prefecture Material 2-1, p.1
https://www.pref.fukushima.lg.jp/uploaded/attachment/495913.pdf

[5] The Nuclear Regulation Authority “Change of the radioactivity concentration of the sediment in sea area close to Fukushima Daiichi NPS / coastal sea area”
https://radioactivity.nsr.go.jp/en/contents/8000/7747/24/engan_soil.pdf

Impact factors / Environmental elements	Presence and operation of the facilities	Implementation of construction
	Presence of facilities related to discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea - Discharge of ALPS treated water using the facilities	Construction of facilities related to discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea
		suspending the construction will be taken if a significant change in the turbidity of seawater is observed during the construction period. Therefore, we assessed that there is almost no impact of construction such as dispersion of radioactive materials, etc.

Reference E　State of consultation with domestic and foreign stakeholders

The Basic Policy of the government on the handling of ALPS treated water states that “every effort will be made to foster understanding among the public and international community” and we are proactively working with the government to promote risk communication.

E1.　Activities toward steady implementation of the Basic Policy

On April 16, 2021, the government established “the Council of Relevant Cabinet Ministers for Steady Implementation of the Basic Policy on the Handling of ALPS Treated Water,” and decided to speedily and steadily take countermeasures stipulated in the Basic Policy as a united government, and to listen carefully voices of stakeholders and those who concern about the impact, and to take necessary additional measures in a flexible countermeasures to dispel their concerns.

Specifically, a working group of the Council was held in various regions including Fukushima, Miyagi, and Ibaraki, and opinions were exchanged with local governments, those who are engaged in agriculture, forestry, fisheries, commerce and tourism etc. The Council also developed the “Immediate Measures Associated with the handling of ALPS Treated Water at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station of Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc. (Decision at the 2nd Ministerial Council on Measures for Steady Implementation of the Basic Policy on the Handling of ALPS treated water, August 2021)”[1] and “Action plan for Steady Implementation of the Basic Policy for the Handling of ALPS Treated Water (Decision at the 3rd Ministerial Council on Measures for Steady Implementation of the Basic Policy on the Handling of ALPS Treated Water, December 2021)”[2].

In the abovementioned action plan, the results of the assessment of the radiation impacts on humans and the environment and the result of the ocean diffusion simulation shall be explained and disseminated by preparing easy-to-understand materials as part of efforts over the next one year. The results of the assessment will be revised and enhanced based on the review by the IAEA, review by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and opinions from the public, and will be verified over the medium to long term based on the latest status and actual discharge data to confirm that no impact has occurred.

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1 Web site of the Cabinet Secretariat (August 24, 2021) “List of materials distributed at the ministerial meeting on measures for steady implementation of the basic policy on handling of ALPS treated water (2nd)” Material 3 https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hairo_osensui/alps_shorisui/dai2/index.html

2 Web site of the Cabinet Secretariat (December 28, 2021) “List of materials distributed at the ministerial meeting on measures for steady implementation of the basic policy on handling of ALPS treated water (3rd)” Material 1 https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hairo_osensui/alps_shorisui/dai3/index.html

E2. Responses to public comments regarding the Radiological Impact Assessment Report

After the public action of this report on November 17, 2021, we received 400 or more opinions from both inside and outside of Japan in response to our Public Comment Procedure. We have revised the contents of the report in April 2022, by taking into account the public comments we received through this procedure[3].

In addition, we explained the contents of the radiological impact assessment in various occasions. For example, on December 6, 2021 and January 19, 2022, we explained the contents of the Radiation Impact Assessment at the Environmental Monitoring and Evaluation Sub-committee of the Safety Monitoring Council on Decommissioning of the Nuclear Power Station of Fukushima Prefecture. Moreover, we have also provided about 3,000 explanations to those who are engaged in fishery, seafood processing and distribution industry, agriculture, commerce and industry and tourism, local governments, civil groups, etc. respectively (result of FY 2021).

E3. Transmission to and consultation with the international community

(1) Cooperation with the IAEA

On the day following the announcement of the Basic Policy, then Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, Kajiyama (hereinafter called “Minister Kajiyama”), had a teleconference with Rafael Mariano Grossi, the Director General of IAEA. The Minister Kajiyama requested the IAEA to disseminate information on IAEA's assessment of the safety related aspects of ALPS treated water with the international community as well as Japan based on their scientific knowledge. Also, he made a formal request in the following areas: (1) dispatch of review missions, (2) support to environmental monitoring, and (3) ensuring transparency towards the international community. Director General Grossi welcomed the announcement of the Basic Policy, responded positively to the request made by Minister Kajiyama, and will cooperate and work together with Japan in a highly transparent manner in each stage of the process, before, during and after the discharge[4]. In addition, the Director General Grossi said in the statement announced by IAEA in response to the Basic Policy “The Japanese Government’s decision is in line with practice globally, even though the large amount of water at the Fukushima plant makes it a unique and complex case,” “Nuclear safety is a national responsibility and it was for the Government of Japan to decide how to address the critical issue of water management. I’m confident that the Government will continue to interact with all parties in a transparent and open way as it works to implement today’s decision,” and “Our cooperation and our presence will help build confidence – in Japan and beyond – that

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[3] With regard to the major opinions collected through the call for opinions and our responded, please refer to our reply issues at the same time of the revised report.

[4] Web site of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (April 14, 2021) “Minister Kajiyama met with IAEA Director General Grossi”
https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2021/0414_001.html

the water disposal is carried out without an adverse impact on human health and the environment." [5]

Based on the communication between the leaders of the government and the IAEA, both parties accelerated preparation for cooperation, and the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the Cooperation Framework for ALPS treated water was signed in July 2021. Following this TOR, IAEA decided to conduct a review regarding safety and other aspects of the handling of ALPS treated water including the assessment of the radiation impact on human and environment in accordance with IAEA safety standards[6].

Based on the TOR, the review mission of safety aspects of ALPS treated water was conducted from February 14 to 18 this year. IAEA members and international experts visited the FDNPS and had discussions with the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. In addition, they also saw and reviewed the ALPS, the K4 tank groups to be reused for measurement and confirmation of the concentration of radioactive materials contained in the treated water before dilution and discharge, and the harbor area which is being considered for the installation of facilities for dilution and discharge of the treated water[7]. The contents of discussions with the IAEA were also reflected in the review of this report.

(2) Briefing for diplomats and bilateral exchange of opinions

In addition to providing explanations to domestic parties, we also attended the Video Conference briefing session for diplomats in Tokyo held on November 18, 2021, the day after the publication of the first edition of the report, and the Video Conference briefing session for the Government of Republic of Korea held on December 3, 2021, both in the presence of government officials, to provide detailed explanation of the contents of the report. In addition, we also provided individual explanation to interested countries and regions together with the relevant Ministries of the government.

At these Video Conference briefing sessions, we explained that the result of the assessment of the radiation impacts on humans and environment in accordance with the internationally recognized methods was significantly lower than the dose limit of the public, etc. and that it would take measures according to the international standards and practices, with maximum consideration given to the impacts on the health and safety of environment and humans. We

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5 Web site of IAEA (April 13, 2021) "IAEA Ready to Support Japan on Fukushima Water Disposal, Director General Grossi Says" https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-ready-to-support-japan-on-fukushima-water-disposal-director-general-grossi-says

6 This report was reviewed by IAEA as a part of the review of the safety of ALPS treated water based on TOR mentioned above.

7 Web site of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (February 18, 2022) "IAEA conducted a review of the safety of ALPS treated water at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station." https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2022/0218_001.html

also carefully answered the questions from foreign governments during the question-and-answer session.
The Government of Japan has provided explanations to foreign governments through Embassies, Consulates and Permanent Missions of Japan overseas as well as explanations to diplomats in Tokyo, and we also have provided the necessary information including technical contents at request.
Through these activities, the Government of Japan and we have been engaged in mutual communication with not only domestic parties but also the international community, and in revising this report, we have taken into consideration the opinions provided through these communications.