

Reorganization of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Physical Protection Division

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Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc.


1. Reasons for reorganization

- A root cause analysis of the unauthorized use of an ID card and the partial loss of function to physical protection equipment at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station identified the "inability of Physical Protection Division managers to ascertain actual field conditions" and the "inability of the Protection Management Group, Headquarter departments in charge of security, and power station upper management to ascertain/resolve problems" as underlying factors of these incidents.
- In order to strengthen physical protection and cyber security in accordance with the improvement action plan, the physical protection division shall be strengthened; in order to do this the division shall be reorganized and new departments established.

Underlying factors	Identified issues
<p>[Unauthorized use of an ID card]</p> <p>Inability of Physical Protection Division managers to ascertain actual field conditions (organizational issue)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There are few opportunities for Physical Protection Division managers (Physical Protection Manager, Preparedness and Safety Department Manager, Protection Management GM) to go into the field thereby preventing them from ascertaining equipment defects and security conditions in the field.
<p>[Partial loss of function to physical protection equipment]</p> <p>The Protection Management Group/Headquarter Nuclear Power Plant Management Department/power station upper management were unable to ascertain/resolve issues (organizational issue)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Protection Management G was not aware of the doubts of employee security guards (communication issue). • Power station upper management has few opportunities to go to the Protection Division and are not aware of field conditions. • During Physical Protection Performance Improvement meetings, the Headquarter Nuclear Power Plant Management Department was not made aware of, or able to point out, the fact that multiple malfunctions had occurred and repairs had been drawn out. • The Site Superintendent and Headquarter Nuclear Power Plant Management Department Manager lack actual experience and knowledge about physical protection.

2. Department modifications


- ① A Security Management Department directly supervised by the Site Superintendent shall be newly established to centralize security management at the power station, such as physical protection and cyber security (① in the chart below)
- ② The Protection Management Group shall be divided into groups in charge of equipment management and security duties; and, these groups shall be removed from the Preparedness and Safety Department and put under the supervision of the Security Management Department (② in the chart below)
- ③ A Cyber Security Group shall be newly established and cyber security duties transferred to it from the Duty Systems Group (③ in the chart below)



※ A Nuclear Security Management Group dedicated to physical protection and a Cyber Security Management Group dedicated to cyber security shall also be newly established at Headquarters

(Reference) Duties of newly established groups

- The Protection Management Group was in charge of a wide variety of physical protection tasks, but the group will be split apart into the following groups in order to alleviate some of this burden.
 - ✓ **Nuclear Security Management G:** Physical protection duty planning function (activities to cultivate nuclear security culture, etc.); installation/management of protection equipment, etc.; restricted area entry permission procedures, etc.
 - ✓ **Nuclear Security Facilities Management G:** Patrols and security, such as monitoring using monitoring devices; entry/exit management
- Cyber security duties will be removed from the Duty System G and transferred to the aforementioned dedicated group.
 - ✓ **Cyber Security G:** Cyber security management; cyber security incident response
- The three groups mentioned above shall be centrally managed by the Security Management Department that is under the direct supervision of the Site Superintendent thereby strengthening the ability to respond to security issues.



(Reference) HQ department modifications

- ① Physical protection duties shall be removed from the Preparedness and Safety Group and transferred to the newly established Nuclear Security Management Group that will focus solely on physical protection duties (① in the chart below)
- ② Cyber security duties shall be removed from the Information Technology Group and transferred to the newly established Cyber Security Management Group that will focus solely on cyber security duties (② in the chart below)
- ※ The Information Technology Group shall be abolished and all other duties not related to cyber security shall be transferred to the Nuclear Power & Plant Siting Division, etc.

Prior to modification
After modification

