

Outline of Decommissioning, Contaminated Water and Treated Water Management


Main decommissioning work and steps

Fuel removal from the spent fuel pool was completed on December 22, 2014, at Unit 4 and on February 28, 2021, at Unit 3. On June 2, 2026, fuel removal commenced at Unit 2.

Trial fuel debris retrieval at Unit 2 commenced on September 10, 2024, and a milestone of the Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap “Commencing fuel debris retrieval at the first Unit” was achieved.

Work continues sequentially toward the start of fuel removal from Units 1 and fuel debris^(Note 1) retrieval from Units 1-3.


(Note 1) Fuel assemblies that melted during the accident along with nearby metal materials, etc.



Measures for treated water

Handling of ALPS treated water

Regarding the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, TEPCO must comply with regulatory and other safety standards to safeguard the public, the surrounding environment and agricultural, forestry and fishery products. To minimize adverse impacts on reputation, ongoing efforts will continue, including enhanced monitoring, ensuring objectivity and transparency by engaging with third-party experts and undergoing IAEA safety checks. Moreover, accurate information will be disseminated with full transparency.



Contaminated water management - triple-pronged efforts -

(1) Efforts to promote contaminated water management based on the three basic policies

- ① "Removing" the contamination source
- ② "Redirecting" groundwater from the contamination source
- ③ "Preventing leakage" of contaminated water


- For stagnant water in buildings (contaminated water), first, cesium and strontium are reduced by the cesium absorption apparatuses (SARRY and KURION). Then, stagnant water in buildings is treated by the multi-nuclide removal system (ALPS) and stored in welded-joint tanks.
- Multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including land-side impermeable walls and subdrains, have stabilized groundwater at a low level, and the increased contaminated water generated during rainfall is being suppressed by repairing damaged portions of the building roofs facing onsite. Through these measures, the amount of contaminated water generated has been reduced from approx. 540 m³/day (May 2014, before implementing measures) to approx. 60 m³/day (in FY2025, 70 m³/day even assuming average rainfall (approx. 1,470 mm)). It was confirmed that the milestone of “suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to around 50-70 m³/day during average rainfall by FY2028” was achieved three years ahead of schedule in FY2025.
- Measures to suppress the amount of contaminated water generated, such as facing around the buildings and local water shutoff of building exterior walls, will continue to further suppress the amount of inflow into the buildings and transfer from the T.P.+2.5m area to the buildings.

(2) Efforts to complete stagnant water treatment

- To reduce stagnant water levels in buildings as planned, work to install additional stagnant water transfer equipment will proceed.
- In 2020, treatment of stagnant water in buildings was completed, except for the Units 1-3 Reactor Buildings, Process Main Building and High-Temperature Incinerator Building.
- While assessing dust impact, measures to reduce the stagnant water level were implemented. In March 2023, the target water level in each building was achieved. For the Units 1-3 Reactor Buildings, “reducing stagnant water in the Reactor Buildings to about half the amount at the end of 2020 during the period FY2022-2024” was achieved.
- Measures are being implemented for the reduction of radiation dose and stabilization of zeolite sandbags on the basement floors of the Process Main Building and High-Temperature Incinerator Building.

(3) Efforts to stably operate contaminated water management

- As part of the tsunami countermeasures, openings in buildings were closed and work to install sea walls was completed. Construction to transfer the Water-Collection Facility Special for Subdrains & Groundwater drains from the T.P.+2.5m area to the T.P.+33.5m area will continue.
- As countermeasures for heavy rain, sandbags are being installed to suppress direct inflow into buildings while work to enhance drainage channels and other measures are being implemented as planned.



Progress status

- ◆ The temperatures of the Reactor and the Primary Containment Vessel of Units 1-3 have been maintained stable. There was no significant change in the concentration of radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Buildings into the air. It was concluded that the comprehensive cold shutdown state had been maintained.



Unit 3 PCV internal investigation (non-submerged area) using micro-drones

In March 2026, an investigation inside the PCV using ultra-small micro-drones was conducted. Using the images obtained during the investigation, point cloud data was generated and the dose rate was estimated.

Based on the evaluation of the dimensions using point cloud data from both inside and outside the pedestal, the structure presumed as the bottom of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) was found to generally match the dimensions specified in the drawings in terms of both position and thickness; therefore, it is highly likely that this is indeed the bottom of the RPV. Furthermore, the space at the bottom of the RPV is elliptical in shape, and its maximum diameter is estimated to be approx. 3 m.

Dose rate estimates derived from the amount of noise in the images confirmed that the eastern side outside the pedestal had the highest dose rate. Inside the pedestal, the dose rate was highest near the bottom of the RPV; since the dose rate increases closer to the deposits and adhering matter, these are considered to be significant sources of radiation.

The second investigation using micro-drones is planned to assess the distribution of deposits and the extent of outflow. Since improved communication is necessary for investigating the basement, the micro-drones' communication capabilities will be enhanced, and modifications and preparations will proceed, with the aim of conducting the investigation as early as this fiscal year.




Analysis results of fuel debris samples collected in the 1st and 2nd trial retrieval

Through trial retrieval operations, fuel debris from the bottom of the Unit 2 pedestal was collected twice from different locations. This report provides a follow-up on the analysis results for the fuel debris collected during the 2nd retrieval.

The findings were largely consistent with the analysis results of the fuel debris collected during the 1st retrieval. It was revealed that the debris likely contains zirconium components from cladding tubes and channel boxes, as well as structural materials; that fuel may have been mixed over a relatively wide area of the core; and that the concentration of radioactive cesium is low. Furthermore, voids were widely distributed within the samples, suggesting a structure prone to fragmentation; this provided foundational data for future studies on retrieval methods and tools.

The information obtained will be utilized to enhance understanding of conditions inside the reactor and to support technical studies on the handling of fuel debris.




< Exterior of fuel debris sample > (approx. 5mm x 4mm)

Commencement of preparations to dismantle the Unit 3/4 exhaust stack

We will dismantle and remove the Unit3/4 exhaust stack, in order to make space for fuel debris retrieval facilities.

Improvements to the surrounding environment have resulted in a decrease in the ambient dose. In addition, unlike the situation when the upper part of the Unit 1/2 exhaust stack was dismantled, it allows workers to approach near the stack. Therefore, we will conduct manual cutting operations.

In preparation for the dismantling of the Unit 3/4 exhaust stack, we will commence the clean-up of the work yard and the removal of surrounding piping in late September 2026.



< Concept diagram of Unit 3/4 exhaust stack dismantling >

Major initiatives – Locations on site

Analysis results of fuel debris samples collected in the 1st and 2nd trial retrieval

Unit 3 PCV internal investigation (non-submerged area) using micro-drones

Commencement of preparations to dismantle the Unit 3/4 exhaust stack




Provided by Japan Space Imaging Corp., photo taken on November 10, 2025
Product (C) [2025] Vantor.


I. Confirmation of the reactor conditions

Temperatures inside the reactors

Through continuous reactor cooling by water injection, the temperatures of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) bottom and the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) gas phase were maintained as shown below for recent, though they varied depending on the unit and location of the thermometer.




*1 The trend graphs show part of the temperature data measured at multiple points.
*2 A part of data could not be measured due to maintenance and inspection of the facility and other work.



Release of radioactive materials from the Reactor Buildings

As of July 2026, the concentration of radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Building Units 1-4 into the air and measured at the site boundary was evaluated at approx. 5.0×10^{-12} Bq/cm³ and 5.7×10^{-12} Bq/cm³ for Cs-134 and -137 respectively, while the radiation exposure dose due to the release of radioactive materials there was less than 0.00002 mSv/year.

Annual radiation dose at site boundaries by radioactive materials (cesium) released from Reactor Building Units 1-4



(Reference)
* The concentration limit of radioactive materials in the air outside the surrounding monitoring area:
[Cs-134]: 2×10^{-5} Bq/cm³
[Cs-137]: 3×10^{-5} Bq/cm³
* Data of Monitoring Posts (MP1-MP8).
Data of Monitoring Posts (MPs) measuring the air dose rate around the site boundary showed 0.268 – 0.847 μ Sv/h (July 29 – August 25, 2026).
To measure the variation in the air dose rate of MP2-MP8 more accurately, work to improve the environment (trimming trees, removing surface soil and shielding around the MPs) was completed.

Note 1: Different formulas and coefficients were used to evaluate the radiation dose in the facility operation plan and monthly report. The evaluation methods were integrated in September 2012. As the fuel removal from the spent fuel pool (SFP) commenced for Unit 4, the radiation exposure dose from Unit 4 was added to the items subject to evaluation since November 2013. The evaluation has been changed to a method considering the values of continuous dust monitors since FY2015, with data to be evaluated monthly and announced the following month.
Note 2: Radiation dose was calculated using the evaluation values of release amount from Units 1-4 and Units 5 and 6. The radiation dose of Unit 5 and 6 was evaluated based on expected release amount during operation until September 2019 but the evaluation method was reviewed and changed to calculate based on the actual measurement results of Units 5 and 6 from October.
Note 3: Dose assessment has been changed since July 2024 due to the change of standard meteorology, etc. in the implementation plan (effective July 8, 2024).


Other indices

There was no significant change in indices, including the pressure in the PCV and the PCV radioactivity density (Xe-135) for monitoring criticality, nor was any anomaly in the cold shutdown state or criticality sign detected.
Based on the above, it was confirmed that the comprehensive cold shutdown state had been maintained and the reactors remained in a stabilized condition.

II. Progress status by each plan

Measures for contaminated water and treated water

- Status of contaminated water generated
 - Multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including land-side impermeable walls and subdrains, have stabilized groundwater at a low level, and the increased contaminated water generated during rainfall is being suppressed by repairing damaged portions of building roofs on-site. Through these measures, the amount of contaminated water generated has been reduced from approx. 540 m³/day (May 2014, before implementing measures) to approx. 60 m³/day (in FY2025, 70 m³/day even assuming average rainfall (approx. 1,470 mm)). It was confirmed that the milestone of “suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to around 50-70 m³/day during average rainfall by FY2028” was achieved three years ahead of schedule in FY2025.
 - Measures to suppress the amount of contaminated water generated, such as facing around the buildings and local water shutoff of building exterior walls, will continue to further suppress the amount of inflow into the buildings and transfer from the T.P. +2.5m area to the buildings.



*1 Values differ from those announced at the 20th Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment (held on August 25, 2017) because the method of calculating the contaminated water volume generated was reviewed on March 1, 2018. Details of the review are described in the materials for the 50th and 51st meetings of the Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Treatment.
*2: The monthly daily average is derived from the daily average from the previous Thursday to the last Wednesday, which is calculated based on the data measured at 7:00 on every Thursday

Figure 1: Changes in contaminated water generated and inflow of groundwater and rainwater into buildings

➤ Operation of the Water-Treatment Facility Special for Subdrains & Groundwater drains

- At the Water-Treatment Facility Special for Subdrains & Groundwater drains, releases started from September 14, 2015, and as of August 18, 2026, a total of 2,999 releases had been completed.

The water quality of all temporary storage tanks satisfied the operational target.




Figure 2: Correlation between inflow such as groundwater and rainwater into buildings and the water level of Units 1-4 subdrains

➤ Implementation status of facing

- Facing is a measure that involves asphaltting the on-site surface to reduce the radiation dose, prevent rainwater from infiltrating the ground, and reduce the amount of underground water flowing into buildings. As of the end of July 2026, 97% (1,410,000 m²) of the planned area (1,450,000 m²) on site had been completed. For the area inside the land-side impermeable walls, facing proceeds after appropriate yard coordination from the zones in which facing can be implemented without affecting the decommissioning work. As of the end of July 2026, 58% (30,000 m²) of the planned area (60,000 m²) had been completed.

➤ Status of the groundwater level around buildings

- For groundwater levels within the land-side impermeable walls, the difference between the inside and outside has remained constant, though the groundwater level on the mountain side varied due to rainfall. The groundwater level of the groundwater drain observation well remained sufficiently lower than the ground surface, at around T.P.+1.4m (the height of the ground surface: T.P.+2.5m).
- Regarding the subdrains of Units 1-4, pumping volumes varied with precipitation. The pumping amount in the T.P.+2.5m area remained constant after the facing in this area was completed.

➤ Operation of the multi-nuclide removal system and other water-treatment facilities

- Regarding the multi-nuclide removal system (existing), hot tests with radioactive water were conducted (System A: from March 30, 2013, System B: from June 13, 2013, System C: from September 27, 2013). On March 23, 2022, a pre-service inspection certificate was granted by the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) and the entire pre-service inspection was completed. For the multi-nuclide removal system (additional), a pre-service inspection certificate was granted by the NRA on October 12, 2017. Regarding the multi-nuclide removal system (high-performance), hot tests using radioactive water were conducted from October 18, 2014. On March 2, 2023, a pre-service inspection certificate was granted by the NRA and the entire pre-service inspection was completed.
- Treatment operations comprising the removal of strontium by cesium-adsorption apparatus (KURION), the secondary cesium-adsorption apparatus (SARRY) and the third cesium-adsorption apparatus (SARRY II) continued. Up until August 13, 2026, approx. 824,000 m³ had been treated.

➤ Risk reduction of strontium-reduced water


- To mitigate risks associated with strontium-reduced water, treatment using the existing, additional and high-performance multi-nuclide removal systems is underway. Up until August 13, 2026, approx. 991,000 m³ had been treated.

➤ Storage status of stagnant water and amount of ALPS treated water stored in tanks

- The volume of ALPS treated water was approx.1,234,591 m³ as of August 13, 2026.

- The total volume of ALPS treated water discharged into the sea since discharges commenced on August 24, 2023, was approx. 172,729 m³ as of the completion of the fourth discharge in FY2026.

As of August 13, 2026



(1): Stagnant water storage inside buildings (Units 1-4, Process Main Building, High Temperature Incinerator Building, Waste Liquid Supply Tank, SPT (A), SPT (B), Units 1-3 CST, buffer tank)
(2): Units 1-4 tank storage [(2)-a RO-treated water (fresh water)] + [(2)-b Concentrated salt water] + [(2)-c ALPS treated water, etc.] + [(2)-d Sr-reduced water, etc. (ALPS pre-treatment water)]
*: Water amount from tank bottom to water-level gauge 0% (DS)
*1: Water amount for which the water-level gauge indicates 0% or more
*2: Calculated in the method of contaminated water generated [(Inflow of groundwater/rainwater into buildings) + (other transfer) + (chemical injection into ALPS)], amount of ALPS treated water discharged was not taken into account.
*3: Amount of Sr-reduced water and others increased and decreased depending on the operation status of facilities due to clog of the cross-flow filter for the multi-nuclide removal system.

Figure 3: Status of stagnant water storage

➤ Status of discharge of ALPS treated water

As of August 25, 2026

Measurement object	Requirement and operation target	Measurement results	Compliance with requirement
[TEPCO] Tritium concentration in seawater (sea-area monitoring at 10 points within 3 km of the Power Station)	• Discharge suspension level: 700 Bq/L or less • Investigation level: 350 Bq/L or less	(Sampled on August 24) • Below the lower detection limit (less than 6.3-7.6 Bq/L)	○ ○
[TEPCO] Tritium concentration in seawater (sea-area monitoring at 1 point within a 10 km square area in front of the Power Station)	• Discharge suspension level: 30 Bq/L or less • Investigation level: 20 Bq/L or less	(Sampled on August 24) • Below the lower detection limit (less than 6.3 Bq/L)	○ ○
[Ministry of the Environment] Tritium concentration in seawater (at 15 points off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture, and 1 point off the coast of Ibaraki Prefecture)	• National safety requirement: 60,000 Bq/L • WHO drinking water guidelines: 10,000 Bq/L	(Sampled on August 3, 7 and 17) • Below the lower detection limit (less than 9 Bq/L)	○ ○
[Fisheries Agency] Tritium concentration in marine products (flounder)	-	(Sampled on August 18) • Below the lower detection limit (less than 7.6 Bq/kg)	○
[Fukushima Prefecture] Tritium concentration in seawater (at 9 points around the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station)	• National safety requirement: 60,000 Bq/L • WHO drinking water guidelines: 10,000 Bq/L	(Sampled on July 31) • Below the lower detection limit (less than 4.3 Bq/L)	○ ○

- From July 30 to August 17, 2026, the fourth discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea in FY2026 was carried out.
- For sea-area monitoring related to handling ALPS treated water, more tritium measurement points for seawater and fish were established near the power station and off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture and measurements of tritium and Iodine-129 in seaweed near the power station were added from April 20, 2022. As of August 26, 2026, no significant variation had been detected.
- For sea-area monitoring conducted by TEPCO at 10 points within 3 km of the power station, rapid measurements taken of the tritium concentration in seawater sampled on August 24 showed concentrations under the lower detection limit (less than 6.3-7.6 Bq/L) at all sampling points, which were below TEPCO operation indices of 700 Bq/L (discharge suspension level) and 350 Bq/L (investigation level).
- Regarding sea-area monitoring conducted by TEPCO at 1 point within a 10 km square area in front of the Power Station, rapid measurements taken of the tritium concentration in seawater sampled on August 24 showed concentrations under the detection limit (less than 6.3 Bq/L), which was below the TEPCO operation indices of 30 Bq/L (discharge suspension level) and 20 Bq/L (investigation level).
- The rapid measurement results obtained by each organization were as follows:
Ministry of the Environment: The analytical results (obtained via rapid measurements) for seawater sampled on August 3, 7 and 17 at 15 points off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture, and 1 point off the coast of Ibaraki Prefecture showed tritium concentrations below the lower detection limit (less than 9 Bq/L) at all sampling points, which would have no adverse impact on human health and the environment.
Fisheries Agency: Rapid analytical results for tritium in flounder sampled on August 18 showed tritium concentrations below the lower detection limit (less than 7.6 Bq/kg) in all samples.
Fukushima Prefecture: On July 31, tritium concentrations in seawater at 9 points around the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station showed concentrations of below the lower detection limit (less than 4.3 Bq/L) at all 9 sampling points, which would have no adverse impact on human health and the environment.

Fuel removal from the spent fuel pools

Activities ahead of spent fuel removal from the pool are progressing steadily while ensuring seismic capacity and safety.

➤ Progress of work toward fuel removal at Unit 1

- The large cover installation was completed on January 19, 2026. A pre-service inspection certificate was granted on March 4 and 5, 2026. For the overhead crane for rubble removal, a completion inspection certificate was granted on March 19, 2026.
- For ancillary facilities for the large cover, consisting of the ventilation equipment, dust radiation monitors and other components, which are used for rubble removal after the large cover installation, a pre-service inspection certificate was granted on March 25, 2026. Operation of the ancillary facilities for the large cover commenced on May 13, 2026.
- Within the large cover, rubble removal commenced on June 22, 2026. In the investigation of the floor on the north side of the operating floor, which commenced in January 2026 and was conducted in accordance with the plan to place work platforms and heavy machinery for rubble removal there, no structurally significant damage to the floor was detected. The investigation is underway in parallel with the rubble removal.
- Due to high radiation levels in the operating floor, rubble removal is generally performed remotely using remote-controlled removal equipment. However, for tasks such as slinging equipment or containers and maintenance work, personnel may be present within a restricted work area.
- As a general rule, rubble to be removed is placed in containers such as vessels on the operating floor and transported out through the north exit. Some large steel structures and similar items will be removed directly through the open retractable roof once the risk of dust dispersal has been confirmed as low.
- During rubble removal, dust concentration levels must be monitored. If an alarm is issued, work must be suspended; water must be sprayed as necessary; and if the retractable roof is open, it must be closed immediately.
- To reduce waste, the fuel handling machine that was installed in Unit 4 in 2013 was sent back to the manufacturer for modification and will be reused for Unit 1.
- For reuse, parts that cannot be used in their current condition, or those expected to be discontinued or to deteriorate over time will be newly manufactured.
- Disassembly and transport of the Unit 4 fuel handling machine commenced on November 4, 2025, and were

completed on February 25, 2026. Transport to the factory was completed on April 9, 2026.

➤ Progress of work toward fuel removal at Unit 2

- The fuel removal system was transported from the factory on May 21, 2025, carried into the site of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on May 24, 2025 and hoisted within the work platform for fuel removal on May 30, 2025.
- Regarding the progress of fuel handling system installation, the system was granted a pre-service inspection certificate on March 18, 2026, marking the completion of installation.
- In preparation for the start of fuel removal work in the first quarter of FY2026, fuel removal training began on March 25, 2026. As the workers' skills are steadily improving, work commenced on June 2, 2026.
- A total of 615 fuel assemblies (587 spent and 28 fresh) were stored in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool. As of August 27, 14 spent fuel assemblies and 28 fresh fuel assemblies have been removed from the pool.
- As of the commencement of fuel removal from Unit 2, there was empty space in the common pool to store approximately 380 fuel assemblies. Spent fuel currently being stored in the common pool will be loaded into dry casks and relocated to a dry cask temporary storage facility on high ground, thereby creating empty space in the common pool. This task will begin in October 2026.
- Although work will be suspended to perform facility inspections and to make room in the common pool, the aim is to complete fuel removal within FY2028.

Plans to store, process and dispose of solid waste and decommission of reactor facilities

Promoting efforts to reduce and store waste generated appropriately and R&D to facilitate adequate and safe storage, processing and disposal of radioactive waste

➤ Management status of rubble and trimmed trees

- As of the end of July 2026, the total storage volume for concrete and metal rubble was approx. 431,300 m³ (+4,500 m³ compared to the end of June with an area-occupation rate of 70%). The total storage volume of trimmed trees was approx. 68,500 m³ (a slight increase, with an area-occupation rate of 39%). The total storage volume of used protective clothing was approx. 9,600 m³ (+700 m³, with an area-occupation rate of 38%). The total storage volume of radioactive solid waste (incinerated ash and others) was approx. 38,700 m³ (a slight increase, with an area-occupation rate of 61%). The increase in rubble was due to work related to transfer to decontamination work of flanged tanks, areas around the Units 1-4 buildings, etc.

➤ Management status of secondary waste from water treatment

- As of August 6, 2026, the total storage volume of waste sludge was 518 m³ (area-occupation rate: 74%), while that of concentrated waste fluid was 9,412 m³ (area-occupation rate: 91%). The total number of stored spent vessels, High-Integrity Containers (HICs) for the multi-nuclide removal system and others, was 6,051 (area-occupation rate: 88%).

Reduction in radiation dose and mitigation of contamination

Effective dose reduction at site boundaries and purification of port water to mitigate the impact of radiation on the external environment

➤ Status of the groundwater and seawater on the east side of Turbine Building Units 1-4

- In the Unit 1 intake north side area, the H-3 concentration was below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes and remained constant or has been declining overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has generally remained constant but temporarily increased from April 2020 and is even currently increasing or declining at a low concentration at observation holes including Nos. 0-1, 0-1-2, 0-2, and 0-3-2. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the area between the Units 1 and 2 intakes, the H-3 concentration has remained below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes. It has been increasing or declining at Nos. 1-14 and 1-17 but has otherwise remained constant or been declining overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but has been increasing at No. 1-6 and increasing or declining at low concentration at Nos. 1-8, 1-9, 1-11, 1-12 and 1-14. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the area between the Units 2 and 3 intakes, the H-3 concentration has been below the legal discharge limit of

60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes. It has remained constant or been declining at many observation holes overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but has been increasing and a larger fluctuation was seen at No. 2-5. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.

- In the area between the Units 3 and 4 intakes, the H-3 concentration has been below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes and remained constant or been declining overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but has been increasing or declining at Nos. 3-4 and 3-5. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the groundwater on the east side of the Turbine Buildings, as with the total β radioactive materials, the concentration of cesium has also remained constant across the area overall, but has been increasing or declining at observation holes with low concentrations, and exceeded the previous highest record at some observation holes. Investigations will continue, including ascertaining the impact of rainfall.
- The concentration of radioactive materials in drainage channels has remained constant overall, despite increasing during rainfall. In Drainage Channel D, drainage of the low-dose area on the west side of the site started passing from August 30, 2022. It has remained low, despite concentrations of cesium and total β radioactive materials increasing during rainfall. From November 29, 2022, continuous monitors were installed and drainage around the Units 1 and 2 switch yard started passing.
- In the open channel area of the seawater intake for Units 1 to 4, the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater has remained below the legal discharge limit and been declining long term, despite the temporary increases in Cs-137 and Sr-90 observed during rainfall. They have also been declining following the completed installation and the connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls. The concentration of Cs-137 remained slightly higher in front of the south-side impermeable walls and slightly lower on the north side of the east breakwater since March 20, 2019, when the silt fence was transferred to the center of the intake open channel due to mega float-related construction.
- In the port area, the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater has remained below the legal discharge limit and been declining long term, despite temporary increases in Cs-137 and Sr-90 observed during rainfall. They have remained below the level of those in the Units 1-4 intake open channel area and been declining following the completed installation and connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls.
- In the area outside the port, regarding the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater, those of Cs-137 and Sr-90 declined and remained low after steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls were installed and connected. For Cs-137 concentrations, a temporary increase was sometimes observed on the north side of the Units 5 and 6 outlets and near the south outlet due to the influence of weather, marine meteorology and other factors. For Sr-90 concentrations, variation was observed in FY2021 in the area outside the port (north and south outlets). Monitoring of the tendency continues, including the potential influence of weather, marine meteorology and others. During the period for which ALPS treated water was discharged, the tritium concentration increased at the sampling point near the discharge outlet, but this was considered within the expected range based on oceanic dispersion simulation results.




Figure 4: Groundwater concentration on the Turbine Building east side




Figure 5: Seawater concentration around the port

Outlook of the number of staff required and efforts to improve the labor environment and conditions

Adequate number of staff will be secured in the long-term, while firmly implementing radiation control of workers. The work environment and labor conditions will be continuously improved by responding to the needs on the site.

➤ Staff management

- The monthly average total of personnel registered for at least one day per month to work on site during the past quarter from April – June 2026 was approx. 10,300 (cooperating company workers and TEPCO HD employees), exceeding the monthly average workforce requirement (approx. 8,100). Accordingly, sufficient personnel were registered to work on site.
- It was confirmed with the prime contractors that the estimated manpower necessary for the work in September 2026 (approx. 4,400 workers per day: cooperating company workers and TEPCO HD employees) would be secured at present. The average numbers of workers per day per month (actual values) for the most recent two years were maintained, at approx. 3,700 to 5,100.
- The number of workers from within Fukushima Prefecture remained constant, while those from outside the prefecture slight decreased. As of July 2026, the local employment ratio (cooperating company workers and TEPCO HD employees) remained constant at around 70%.
- The average exposure doses of workers were approx. 2.18, 2.08 and 1.75 mSv/person-year during FY2023, 2024 and 2025, respectively (the legal exposure dose limits are 100 and 50 mSv/person-year respectively over five years, the TEPCO HD management target is 20 mSv/person-year).
- For most workers, the exposure dose remained sufficiently within the limit and allowed them to continue engaging in radiation work.




Figure 6: Changes in the average number of workers weekday per day for each month of the most recent 2 years (actual values)




Figure 7: Changes in monthly average exposure dose of individual worker
(monthly exposure dose since March 2011)

- Status of heat stroke cases

- In FY2026, measures to further prevent heat stroke commenced from April to cope with the hottest season.
- In FY2026, seven workers suffered heat stroke due to work up until August 24 (in FY2025, seven workers up until the end of August). An environment encouraging workers to report any feelings of illness will continue to be created and countermeasures will be taken to prevent heat stroke.

- Countermeasures for infectious diseases


- Countermeasures for various infectious diseases (influenza, norovirus, COVID-19, etc.) depend on personal decisions and basic preventive measures (visiting medical institutions when feeling unwell, ventilation, avoidance of the “Three Cs”, frequent handwashing, etc.) being implemented appropriately by each worker. TEPCO continues decommissioning while prioritizing safety.

Status of seawater monitoring within the port (comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

"The highest value" → "the latest value (sampled during August 14 - 24)"; unit (Bq/L); ND represents a value below the detection limit

Summary of TEPCO data as of August 25, 2026

Note: The Total β measurement value is the total radioactivity concentration of radioactive materials that emit β -ray (Potassium-40, Cesium-137, Strontium-90, progeny nuclide Yttrium-90, etc.). In general, approx. 12 Bq/L of natural nuclide Potassium-40 is included in seawater.




Source: TEPCO website Analysis results on nuclides of radioactive materials around Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station <http://www.tepco.co.jp/decommission/planaction/monitoring/index-j.html>

Status of seawater monitoring around outside of the port (comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

Unit (Bq/L); ND represents a value below the detection limit; values in () represent the detection limit; ND (2013) represents ND throughout 2013
Summary of TEPCO data as of August 25, 2026

(The latest values sampled during July 7 - August 25 2026)

	Legal discharge limit	WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality
Cesium-134	60	10
Cesium-137	90	10
Strontium-90	30	10
Tritium	60,000	10,000



Note: The Total β measurement value is the total radioactivity concentration of radioactive materials that emit β -ray (Potassium-40, Cesium-137, Strontium-90, progeny nuclide Yttrium-90, etc.). In general, approx. 12 Bq/L of natural nuclide Potassium-40 is included in seawater.

* Due to erosion, the sampling point was moved from approx. 320m south to approx. 1,300m south from the south release outlet in December 2021. In September 2023, since erosion was eliminated, the sampling point was returned to the original point, approx. 320m south from the south release outlet. Moreover, due to erosion, the sampling point has been moved again to approx. 1,300m south from the south release outlet since June 11, 2024.

Source: TEPCO website, Analysis results on nuclides of radioactive materials around Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station
<http://www.tepco.co.jp/decommission/planaction/monitoring/index-j.html>

TEPCO Holdings Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Site

Appendix 2
August 27, 2026



瓦礫等及び水処理二次廃棄物の保管状況は、2024年12月公表 福島第一原子力発電所 固体廃棄物の保管管理計画（～2024年度改訂について～）から引用

- Efforts to promote contaminated water management based on three basic policies:

- "Removing" the contamination source
- "Redirecting" groundwater from the contamination source
- "Preventing leakage" of contaminated water

Milestones of the Mid- and Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)

- [Completed] Suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to 150 m³/day or less (within 2020)
- [Completed] Suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to 100 m³/day or less (within 2025)
- [Completed] Treatment of stagnant water in buildings was completed* (within 2020) *Except for Units 1-3 Reactor Buildings, Process Main Building and High Temperature Incinerator Building.
- [Completed] Stagnant water in Reactor Buildings was reduced to about a half of the level at the end of 2020 (FY2022-FY2024)

		2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026
Contaminated water management [Remove]	Contaminated water treatment facility	▽ Reception start of contaminated water to Central Waste Treatment Building ▽ Decontamination equipment (AREVA) ▽ Evaporative concentration equipment ▽ Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (KURION) ▽ 2nd Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (SARRY) 															
	Removal of contaminated water from seawater pipe trench																
Contaminated water management [Redirect]	Groundwater bypass																
	Subdrain																
	Land-side impermeable wall																
	Facing																
Contaminated water management [Retain]	Bank groundwater measures																
	Storage facility																
Treatment of stagnant water																	
Countermeasures to tsunami risks	Closure of openings																
	Seawall																
	Mega float																



Chishima Trench Tsunami Seawall complete



Japan Trench Tsunami Seawall

<Unit 4 south side>

2 Handling of ALPS treated water



Reference 2/6

August 27, 2026

Secretariat of the Team for
Countermeasures for Decommissioning,
Contaminated Water and Treated Water

In “the Inter-Ministerial Council for Contaminated Water, Treated Water and Decommissioning Issues” held on April 13, 2021, the basic policy on how to handle ALPS treated water was set. Based on this, the response of TEPCO was announced on April 16.

Regarding the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, TEPCO must comply with regulatory and other safety-related standards to ensure the safety of the public, surrounding environment and agricultural, forestry and fishery products. To minimize adverse impacts on reputation, monitoring will be further enhanced, objectivity and transparency ensured by engaging with third-party experts and safety checked by the IAEA. Moreover, accurate information will be disseminated continuously and in a highly transparent manner.



Information provision and communication to foster understanding

- Occasions to deepen the understanding are organized by communications related to decommission via various media and visit to the power station.



- On the dedicated website “Treated Water Portal Site” (Japanese, English, Chinese and Korean) within the TEPCO website, monitoring results of radioactive materials are published timely.



Dialogue meeting

- Visit and dialogue meeting of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station have been held since FY2019 for 13 cities, towns and villages in the Hamadori region. From FY2021 onward, these activities have been expanded to include the entire Fukushima Prefecture.



- Through various opportunities such as visit and on-site explanations, communications continue where opinions of related parties are heard, their thoughts are taken seriously, and TEPCO conveys its efforts, thoughts, and countermeasures for reputational damage.

Examination concerning handling of ALPS treated water

Tritiated Water Taskforce (2013.12 – 2016.5, 15 meetings)



2016.6 Report of Tritiated Water Taskforce

Subcommittee on Handling of ALPS treated water (2016.11 – 2020.1, 17 meetings)

2018.8 Explanatory and hearing meeting, receiving opinions

2020.2 Report of Subcommittee on Handling of ALPS treated water

Opportunity for receiving opinions from parties concerned concerning handling of ALPS treated water (2020.4 – 2020.10, 7 meetings)

Review meeting concerning the implementation plan on handling of ALPS treated water (2021.7 - 2022.4, 15 meetings)

2021.12.21 The “Application Documents for Approval to Amend the Implementation Plan for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Specified Nuclear Facility” regarding ALPS treated water were submitted to the Nuclear Regulation Authority

2021.12.28 “The Action Plan concerning the Continuous Implementation of the Basic Policy on Handling of ALPS Treated Water” was formulated

2022.4.28, 5.13, 7.15

Application to partially revise the Application Documents for Approval to Amend the Implementation Plan was submitted

2022.7.22 Application for the Application Documents for Approval to Amend the Implementation Plan was approved

2022.8.4 Work has commenced

2022/8/30 The “Approach to Strengthening and Expansion of Measures in the Handling of ALPS Treated Water” was summarized

2022.11.14 Application for the Application Documents for Approval to Amend the Implementation Plan was submitted (amendment of organizational structure, and nuclides to be measured and assessed, and others)

2023.6.26 Completion of installation

2023.7.7 Receipt of Certificate of Completion for Inspection Prior to Use



Publication of the Comprehensive Report of the IAEA safety review

The Comprehensive Report on the safety review concerning handling of ALPS treated water was published by the IAEA on July 4, 2023.


In the Executive Summary of the IAEA Comprehensive Report, the IAEA concluded the following: (1) the activities by Japan associated with the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea are consistent with relevant international safety standards, (2) the discharge of the ALPS treated water will have a negligible radiological impact on people and the environment.

We will continue to share necessary information with the IAEA, while striving to foster further understanding of the international community about the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea.

<https://www.iaea.org/topics/response/fukushima-daiichi-alps-treated-water-discharge-comprehensive-reports>

3 Removal of fuel from spent pool

- Milestones of the Mid- and Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)
- Completion of Units 1-6 fuel removal (within 2031)
 - [Completed] Completion of installation of Unit 1 large cover (around FY2023)
 - Start of Unit 1 fuel removal (FY2027-2028)
 - [Completed] Start of Unit 2 fuel removal (FY2024-2026)



* Part of the photo is corrected because it includes machine information related to nuclear material protection.


Milestones of the Mid- and-Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)

Commencement of fuel debris retrieval from the first unit (Unit 2). Expanding the scale in stages (From September 10, 2024, trial fuel debris retrieval commenced)


Before removing fuel debris, investigations inside the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) are conducted to inspect the conditions there, including locations of fuel debris.

Unit 1 Investigation overview

- In April 2015, a device having entered the inside of the PCV via a narrow opening (bore:φ100 mm) collected information such as images and airborne dose inside the PCV 1st floor.
- In March 2017, an investigation using a self-propelled investigation device was conducted to inspect the spreading of debris to the basement floor outside the pedestal, with images taken of the PCV bottom status for the first time. The conditions inside the PCV will continue to be examined, based on the imagery and dose data obtained.



- In February 2022, “the guide ring” was installed to facilitate the investigation. From March 28, 2023, the investigation inside the pedestal by ROV-A2 started and confirmed that a portion of the bar arrangement was exposed. Regarding the soundness of the pedestal, based on the past earthquake resistant evaluation by the International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning (IRID), it was evaluated that even though a portion of the pedestal was lost, there would be no serious risk. However, as the present information is very limited, the investigation will continue to acquire as much information as possible for continued evaluation.




Unit 1 PCV internal investigation


Investigations inside the PCV	1st (2012.10)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature and dose rate - Measuring the water level and temperature - Sampling stagnant water - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	2nd (2015.4)	- Confirming the status of the PCV 1st floor - Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature and dose rate - Replacing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	3rd (2017.3)	- Confirming the status of the PCV 1st basement floor - Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Sampling deposit - Replacing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	4th (From 2022.2)	- Acquiring information inside PCV (inside/outside of the pedestal) - Acquiring images - Measuring deposit thickness and sampling deposit - Detecting deposit debris, 3D mapping
Leakage points from PCV	- PCV vent pipe vacuum break line bellows (identified in 2014.5) - Sand cushion drain line (identified in 2013.11)	
<u>Evaluation of the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons</u> Confirmed that there was no large fuel in the reactor core. (2015.2-5)		

Unit 2 Investigation overview


- In January 2017, a camera was inserted from the PCV penetration to inspect the conditions of the rail on which the robot traveled. The results of a series of investigations confirmed some gratings had fallen and deformed as well as a quantity of deposit inside the pedestal.
- In January 2018, the conditions below the platform inside the pedestal were investigated. Based on the analytical results of images obtained in the investigation, deposits, probably including fuel debris, were found at the bottom of the pedestal. Moreover, multiple parts exceeding the surrounding deposits were also detected. We presumed that there were multiple instances of fuel debris falling.
- In February 2019, an investigation touching the deposits at the bottom of the pedestal and on the platform was conducted and confirmed that the pebble-shaped deposits, etc. could be moved and that hard rock-like deposits that could not be gripped may exist.



- In October 2020, a deposits contact investigation at the PCV penetration (X-6 penetration) was conducted. This confirmed that deposits inside the penetration had not deformed and come unstuck.



- From September 10, 2024, the end tool of the telescopic equipment passed through the isolation valve, and the trial fuel debris retrieval commenced. On October 30, fuel debris was gripped with the end tool, on November 2, the guide pipe was pulled off, and the telescopic equipment was stored in the enclosure. On November 7, fuel debris was carried out from the hatch on a side of the enclosure, and the trial retrieval was completed.





Unit 2 PCV internal investigation

Investigations inside the PCV	1st (2012.1)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature
	2nd (2012.3)	- Confirming water surface - Measuring the water temperature - Measuring the dose rate
	3rd (2013.2 – 2014.6)	- Acquiring images - Sampling stagnant water - Measuring water level - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	4th (2017.1-2)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Measuring the air temperature
	5th (2018.1)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Measuring the air temperature
	6th (2019.2)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Measuring the air temperature - Determining characteristics of a portion of deposit
Leakage points from PCV	- No leakage from the torus chamber rooftop - No leakage from any internal/external surfaces of S/C	
<u>Evaluation of the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons</u> The existence of high-density materials, which were considered to constitute fuel debris, was confirmed at the bottom of RPV and in the lower part and outer periphery of the reactor core. It was assumed that a significant portion of fuel debris existed at the bottom of RPV. (2016.3-7)		

Unit 3 Investigation overview

- In October 2014, the conditions of X-53 penetration, which may be under water and which is scheduled for use to investigate the inside of the PCV, were investigated via remote-controlled ultrasonic test equipment. The results showed that the penetration was not under water.
- In October 2015, to confirm the conditions inside the PCV, an investigative device was inserted into the PCV from X-53 penetration to obtain images, data on dosage and temperature and sample stagnant water. No damage to the structure and walls inside the PCV was identified and the water level was almost identical to estimated values. In addition, the dose inside the PCV was confirmed to be lower than in other Units.
- In July 2017, the inside of the PCV was investigated using the underwater ROV (remotely operated underwater vehicle) to inspect the inside of the pedestal. Analysis of the imagery obtained in the investigation identified damage to multiple structures and the supposed core internals.
- Videos obtained in the investigation were reproduced in 3D. Based on the reproduced images, the relative positions of the structures, such as the rotating platform slipping off the rail with a portion buried in deposits, were visually understood.
- In March 2026, an investigation inside the PCV using ultra-small micro-drones was conducted. Using the images obtained during the investigation, point cloud data was generated and the dose rate was estimated.



Unit 3 PCV internal investigation

Investigations inside the PCV	Submerged ROV investigation 1st (2015.10-12)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature and dose rate - Measuring the water level and temperature - Sampling stagnant water - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation (2015.12)
	Submerged ROV investigation 2nd (2017.7)	- Acquiring images - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation (2017.8)
	Micro-drone investigation (2016.3)	- Acquiring images - Generating point cloud data - Estimating the dose rate
Leakage points from PCV	- Main steam pipe bellows (identified in 2014.5)	
<u>Evaluation of the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons</u> The evaluation confirmed that no large lump existed in the core area where fuel had been placed and that a portion of the fuel debris potentially existed at the bottom of the RPV. (2017.5-9)		

5 Management of solid radioactive waste


August 27, 2026

Secretariat of the Team for


Countermeasures for Decommissioning, Contaminated Water and Treated Water

Milestones of the Mid- and Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)

Eliminating temporary outdoor storage of rubble and others * Except for secondary waste of water treatment and materials for reuse or recycling (within FY2028)



- Solid Waste Storage Management Plan for the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (Revision in February 2026)





Note: Used protective clothing before incineration and BG-level concrete waste for which treatment and reuse is decided at present are not included.

- The exposure dose at the site boundaries will be reduced by aggregation to indoor storage and eliminating outdoor storage.
- The exposure dosage in exhaust gas from incinerators and at site boundaries is measured and announced on the website and others.

6 Improvement of work environment

While ensuring reliable exposure dose management for workers, sufficient personnel are secured. Moreover, while getting a handle on on-site needs, the work environment and labor conditions are continuously improved.

Regarding the site-wide reduction in the radiation dose and prevention of contamination spreading, the radiation dose on site was reduced by removal of rubble, topsoil and facing. Moreover, the operation was improved to use environmentally-improved areas as a Green Zone, within which workers are allowed to wear general work clothes and disposable dust-protective masks which are less of a physical burden.

2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026~
▼ From March 12, 2011, in response to the increased airborne concentration of radioactive materials, instructions were issued to wear full-face masks throughout the Fukushima Daiichi NPS site, excluding the Main Anti-Earthquake Building and the rest house.	 External view of Access Control Facility	▼ From May 2013, full-face mask unnecessary area was expanded sequentially. ▼ In June 2013, operation of the Access Control Facility started near the main gate of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS, to which duties conducted at J-village were shifted, including contamination examination, decontamination, switching protective equipment and off and distribution/collection of dosimeters.	 Large rest house under construction (2014.9.30)  Access Control Facility (2014.11.7)	▼ To help workers in the Fukushima Daiichi NPS precisely understand the conditions of their workplaces, a total of 86 dose-rate monitors were installed by January 2015. These monitors allow workers to confirm on-site dose rates at their workplaces in real time. ▼ In March 2015, the Fukushima revitalization meal service center opened. ▼ A large rest house for workers was established and its operation commenced in May 2015. Spaces in the large rest house are also installed for office work and collective worker safety checks as well as taking rest. In March 2016, a convenience store opened in the large rest house. In April, the shower room went into operation.	 Facing (2017.4.13)  Helicopter landing area (2017.4.13)	▼ In February 2017, operation started at the Partner Companies' Building next to the New Administration Office Building. ▼ In May 2017, a heliport for emergency transport was installed inside the Fukushima Daiichi NPS and went into operation. Compared to the previous operation (at Koriyama Coast, Futaba Town or Fukushima Daini NPS, relaying to a doctor helicopter), a faster response is available for seriously ill patients requiring treatment at external medical institutions.	▼ From November 2018, from the west-side high-ground area, where Units 1-4 can be viewed, visitors can see the site in their normal clothes without having to change.	 Visit by Governor of Fukushima Prefecture to the Fukushima Daiichi NPS (2018.11.1)  Visit by Prime Minister Kishida to the Fukushima Daiichi NPS (2021.10.17)		 Visit by Prime Minister Ishiba to the Fukushima Daiichi NPS (2024.12.14) (Left) Observation of the decommissioning state at high ground from which whole view of Units 1-4 can be seen (Right) Encouragement from Prime Minister Ishiba	<Travel survey results of major roads within the site> Compared with the last fiscal year, no significant variation was identified. <FY2024 4th Quarter> (Measured in March 2025)  Provided by Japan Space Imaging Corp. (C)DigitalGlobe	<FY2025 4th Quarter> (Measured in February 2026)  Provided by Japan Space Imaging Corp. (C)DigitalGlobe			
		▼ In May 2013, areas excluding those around Unit 1-4, tank areas and rubble storage areas were set to full-face mask unnecessary areas. 		▼ In May 2015, full-face mask unnecessary area was expanded to cover about 90% of the site. ▼ In March 2016, based on the progress of measures to reduce the environmental dosage on site, the site was categorized into two zones: Highly contaminated area around Units 1-4 buildings, etc. and other areas where limited operation started to optimize protective equipment according to each category. 	▼ In March 2017, the G-zone area was expanded (to cover 95% of the whole site). 	▼ In May 2018, within about 96% of the site, workers are allowed to wear light equipment such as general workwear and disposable dust-protective masks. 			▼ In August 2021, operation started while eliminating the need for the DS2 mask during light work in G-zone outside the protection area around Unit 1-4 (except for inside Units 5 and 6).						

