

## Main decommissioning work and steps


Fuel removal from the spent fuel pool was completed in December 2014 at Unit 4 and on February 28 2021 at Unit 3.  
 Work continues sequentially toward the start of fuel removal from Units 1 and 2 and debris (Note 1) retrieval from Units 1-3.

(Note 1) Fuel assemblies having melted through in the accident with nearby metal materials etc.

<Milestones in the Mid- and Long-Term Roadmap>

Units 1-6	Completion of fuel removal	Within 2031
Unit 1	Start of fuel removal	FY2027 - FY2028
Unit 2	Start of fuel removal	FY2024 - FY2026


First unit	Start of fuel debris retrieval
Unit 2	Within 2021 * The trial retrieval will commence in around October 2024 at the latest.



## Measures for treated water

### Handling of ALPS treated water

Regarding the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, TEPCO must comply with regulatory and other safety standards to safeguard the public, the surrounding environment and agricultural, forestry and fishery products. To minimize adverse impacts on reputation, efforts including enhanced monitoring, ensuring objectivity and transparency by engaging with third-party experts and having safety checked by the IAEA, will continue. Moreover, accurate information will be disseminated with full transparency.



## Contaminated water management - triple-pronged efforts -

### (1) Efforts to promote contaminated water management based on the three basic policies

- ① "Remove" the source of water contamination
- ② "Redirect" fresh water from contaminated areas
- ③ "Retain" contaminated water from leakage


- Strontium-reduced water from other equipment is being re-treated in the Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS: multi-nuclide removal equipment) and stored in welded-joint tanks.
- Multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including land-side impermeable walls and sub-drains, have stabilized the groundwater at a low level and the increased contaminated water generated during rainfall is being suppressed by repairing damaged portions of building roofs facing onsite. Through these measures, the generation of contaminated water has been suppressed and reduced, from approx. 540 m<sup>3</sup>/day (in May 2014) before implementing measures to approx. 80 m<sup>3</sup>/day (in FY2023), achieving the milestone of "suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to 100 m<sup>3</sup>/day or less during average rainfall within FY2025."
- Measures will proceed to further reduce the amount of contaminated water generated and suppress it to approx. 50-70 m<sup>3</sup>/day by FY2028.

### (2) Efforts to complete stagnant water treatment

- To reduce the stagnant water levels in buildings as planned, work to install additional stagnant water transfer equipment is underway.
- In 2020, treatment of stagnant water in buildings was completed, except for the Unit 1-3 Reactor Buildings, Process Main Building and High-Temperature Incinerator Building.
- While assessing the dust impact, measures to reduce the stagnant water level were implemented. In March 2023, the target water level in each building was achieved. For the Units 1-3 Reactor Buildings, "reducing stagnant water in the Reactor Buildings to about half the amount at the end of 2020 during the period FY2022-2024" was achieved.
- For zeolite sandbags on the basement floors of the Process Main Building and High-Temperature Incinerator Building, measures to reduce the radiation dose are being examined with stabilization in mind.

### (3) Efforts to stably operate contaminated water management

- As part of the tsunami countermeasures, openings in buildings were closed and work to install sea walls was completed. As countermeasures for heavy rain, sandbags are being installed to suppress direct inflow into buildings while work to enhance drainage channels and other measures is being implemented as planned.



## Progress status

- The temperatures of the Reactor and the Primary Containment Vessel of Units 1-3 have been maintained stable. There was no significant change in the concentration of radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Buildings into the air. It was concluded that the comprehensive cold shutdown condition had been maintained.

### Discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea (3rd discharge in FY2024)

In preparation for the 3rd discharge of ALPS treated water in FY2024, Tank Group B of the measurement/confirmation facility was analyzed and TEPCO and an external institute confirmed that the analytical results satisfied the discharge requirement. The results were announced on June 26.

Following the confirmation, discharge of ALPS treated water of Tank Group B of the measurement/confirmation facility into the sea commenced from June 28 and was completed on July 16.

Regarding tritium in seawater, TEPCO will continue to confirm that it is being discharged safely as planned, while meeting the discharge requirement based on quick daily analyses conducted by TEPCO and others.

### Operation commencement of the Solid Waste Storage 10 Facility

The Solid Waste Storage 10 Facility was installed to temporarily store contaminated soil generated in decommissioning and rubble after compaction in containers. Installation of A of three buildings (A-C) was completed.

Building A received a certificate of the pre-service inspection by the Nuclear Regulation Authority on July 24. Preparation for setting controlled areas is underway and operation will commence from August.

To eliminate the temporary storage of outdoor rubble, installation of the Solid Waste Storage 10 Facility continues.



< Solid Waste Storage 10 Facility >


### Investigation inside the front room of the Unit 3 X-6 penetration

To utilize X-6 penetration as an access route for PCV internal investigation and fuel debris retrieval, an investigation of the front room for the penetration is planned.

Due to the assumed high dose in the front room, a drilling portion for investigation will be set up on the concrete shielding wall, which was installed in the front room to reduce exposure. Visual inspection by camera, dose measurement and other investigations will be conducted through the drilling part from around the end of September.

At present, practice training is underway for drilling on the shielding wall.

Work will continue steadily while prioritizing safety.



### Unit 2 Status of preparation for fuel debris trial retrieval

Regarding the telescopic-type equipment to be used in the Unit 2 fuel debris trial retrieval, transportation to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station commenced on July 3 and reached the station on July 10.



During the next phase, the equipment was transported into the Reactor Building on July 19 and work to fix it to the connection pipe, which was installed at X-6 penetration, is underway.

For the edge tool to collect fuel debris, based on verification and evaluation and including a mockup test, a gripper method was adopted to confirm the state of gripping fuel debris.

Work will continue steadily while prioritizing safety above all.



< Whole view of the telescopic-type equipment after arrival at the on-site tent house >




< Gripper-type edge tool >

# Major initiatives – Locations on site

Discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea (3rd discharge in FY2024)

Unit 2 Status of preparation for fuel debris trial retrieval

Investigation inside the front room of the Unit 3 X-6 penetration




Operation commencement of the Solid Waste Storage 10 Facility

Provided by Japan Space Imaging Corp., photo taken on January 14, 2024  
Product (C) [2024] Maxar Technologies.


# I. Confirmation of the reactor conditions

## Temperatures inside the reactors

Through continuous reactor cooling by water injection, the temperatures of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) bottom and the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) gas phase were maintained as shown below for recent, though it varied depending on the unit and location of the thermometer.




\*1 The trend graphs show part of the temperature data measured at multiple points.  
\*2 A part of data could not be measured due to maintenance and inspection of the facility and other work.



## Release of radioactive materials from the Reactor Buildings

As of June 2024, the concentration of radioactive materials newly released from Reactor Building Units 1-4 into the air and measured at the site boundary was evaluated at approx.  $2.2 \times 10^{-12}$  Bq/cm<sup>3</sup> and  $1.8 \times 10^{-12}$  Bq/cm<sup>3</sup> for Cs-134 and -137 respectively, while the radiation exposure dose due to the release of radioactive materials there was less than 0.00004 mSv/year.

## Annual radiation dose at site boundaries by radioactive materials (cesium) released from Reactor Building Units 1-4



### (Reference)

\* The concentration limit of radioactive materials in the air outside the surrounding monitoring area:  
[Cs-134]:  $2 \times 10^{-5}$  Bq/cm<sup>3</sup> Marc  
[Cs-137]:  $3 \times 10^{-5}$  Bq/cm<sup>3</sup>  
\* Data of Monitoring Posts (MP1-MP8).  
Data of Monitoring Posts (MPs) measuring the air dose rate around the site boundary showed 0.302–1.002 μSv/h (June 26 – July 23, 2024).  
To measure the variation in the air dose rate of MP2-MP8 more accurately, work to improve the environment (trimming trees, removing surface soil and shielding around the MPs) was completed.

Note 1: Different formulas and coefficients were used to evaluate the radiation dose in the facility operation plan and monthly report. The evaluation methods were integrated in September 2012. As the fuel removal from the spent fuel pool (SFP) commenced for Unit 4, the radiation exposure dose from Unit 4 was added to the items subject to evaluation since November 2013. The evaluation has been changed to a method considering the values of continuous dust monitors since FY2015, with data to be evaluated monthly and announced the following month.

Note 2: Radiation dose was calculated using the evaluation values of release amount from Units 1-4 and Units 5 and 6. The radiation dose of Unit 5 and 6 was evaluated based on expected release amount during operation until September 2019 but the evaluation method was reviewed and changed to calculate based on the actual measurement results of Units 5 and 6 from October.

## Other indices

There was no significant change in indices, including the pressure in the PCV and the PCV radioactivity density (Xe-135) for monitoring criticality, nor was any anomaly in the cold shutdown condition or criticality sign detected.


Based on the above, it was confirmed that the comprehensive cold shutdown condition had been maintained and the reactors remained in a stabilized condition.

## II. Progress status by each plan

### Measures for contaminated water and treated water

#### ➤ Status of contaminated water generated

- Multi-layered contaminated water management measures, including land-side impermeable walls and sub-drains, have stabilized the groundwater at a low level and the increased contaminated water generated during rainfall is being suppressed by repairing damaged portions of building roofs facing onsite. Through these measures, the generation of contaminated water has been suppressed and reduced from approx. 540 m<sup>3</sup>/day (in May 2014) before implementing measures to approx. 80 m<sup>3</sup>/day (in FY2023), achieving the milestone to “suppress the amount of contaminated water generated to 100 m<sup>3</sup>/day or less during average rainfall within FY2025.”
- Measures will proceed to further reduce the amount of contaminated water generated and suppress to approx. 50-70 m<sup>3</sup>/day by FY2028.



\*1 Values differ from those announced at the 20<sup>th</sup> Committee on Countermeasures for Contaminated Water Treatment (held on August 25, 2017) because the method of calculating the contaminated water volume generated was reviewed on March 1, 2018. Details of the review are described in the materials for the 50<sup>th</sup> and 51<sup>st</sup> meetings of the Secretariat of the Team for Countermeasures for Decommissioning and Contaminated Water Treatment.

\*2: The monthly daily average is derived from the daily average from the previous Thursday to the last Wednesday, which is calculated based on the data measured at 7:00 on every Thursday.

Figure 1: Changes in contaminated water generated and inflow of groundwater and rainwater into buildings

➤ Operation of the Water-Treatment Facility Special for Sub-drain & Groundwater drains

- At the Water-Treatment Facility Special for Sub-drain & Groundwater drains, release started from September 14, 2015 and up until July 15, 2024, 2498 release operations had been conducted.

The water quality of all temporary storage tanks satisfied the operational target.




Figure 2: Correlation between inflow such as groundwater and rainwater into buildings and the water level of Units 1-4 sub-drains

➤ Implementation status of facing

- Facing is a measure that involves asphaltting the on-site surface to reduce the radiation dose, prevent rainwater infiltrating the ground and reduce the amount of underground water flowing into buildings. As of the end of June 2024, 96% of the planned area (1,450,000 m² on site) had been completed. For the area inside the land-side impermeable walls, implementation proceeds appropriately after constructing a yard from implementable zones that leave the decommissioning work unaffected. As of the end of June 2024, 50% of the planned area (60,000 m²) had been completed.

➤ Status of the groundwater level around buildings

- Regarding the groundwater level in the area inside the land-side impermeable walls, the difference between the inside and outside has remained constant, though the groundwater level on the mountain side varied due to rainfall. The groundwater level of the groundwater drain observation well has remained sufficiently lower from the ground surface, at around T.P.+1.4m (the height of the ground surface: T.P.+2.5m).
- Regarding the Units 1-4 subdrains, the pumping amount varied depending on the precipitation. The pumping amount in the T.P.+2.5m area remained constant after the facing in this area was completed.

➤ Operation of the multi-nuclide removal equipment and other water-treatment facilities

- Regarding the multi-nuclide removal equipment (existing), hot tests using radioactive water were conducted (System A: from March 30, 2013, System B: from June 13, 2013, System C: from September 27, 2013). On March 23, 2022, a pre-service inspection certificate was granted by the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) and the entire pre-service inspection was completed. For the multi-nuclide removal equipment (additional), a pre-service inspection certificate was granted by the NRA on October 12, 2017. Regarding the multi-nuclide removal equipment (high-performance), hot tests using radioactive water were conducted from October 18, 2014. On March 2, 2023, a pre-service inspection certificate was granted by the NRA and the entire pre-service inspection was completed.
- Treatment measures comprising the removal of strontium by cesium-adsorption apparatus (KURION), the secondary cesium-adsorption apparatus (SARRY) and the third cesium-adsorption apparatus (SARRY II) continued. Up until July 18, 2024, approx. 766,000 m³ had been treated.


➤ Risk reduction of strontium-reduced water

- To reduce the risks of strontium-reduced water, treatment using existing, additional and high-performance multi-nuclide removal equipment is underway. Up until July 18, 2024, approx. 932,000 m³ had been treated.

➤ Storage status of contaminated water and amount of ALPS treated water, etc. stored in tanks.

- The amount of ALPS treated water, etc. was approx. 1,299,947 m³ as of July 18, 2024.
- Total amount of ALPS treated water discharged into the sea since the discharge commenced on August 24, 2023 was approx. 54,734 m³ as of July 16, 2024.

As of July 18, 2024



(1): Stagnant water storage inside buildings (Units 1-4, Process Main Building, High Temperature Incinerator Building, Waste Liquid Supply Tank, SPT (A), SPT (B), Units 1-3 CST, buffer tank)  
 (2): Units 1-4 tank storage ((2)-a RO-treated water (fresh water)) + ((2)-b Concentrated salt water) + ((2)-c ALPS treated water, etc.) + ((2)-d Sr-reduced water, etc. (ALPS pre-treatment water))  
 \*: Water amount from tank bottom to water-level gauge 0% (DS)  
 \*1: Water amount for which the water-level gauge indicates 0% or more  
 \*2: Calculated in the method of contaminated water generated ((Inflow of groundwater/rainwater into buildings) + (other transfer) + (chemical injection into ALPS)), amount of ALPS treated water discharged was not taken into account.

Figure 3: Status of stagnant water storage

➤ Status of discharge of ALPS treated water

As of July 24, 2024

Measurement object	Requirement and operation target	Measurement results	Compliance with requirement
[TEPCO] Tritium concentration in seawater (sea-area monitoring at 10 points within 3 km from the Power Station)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Discharge suspension level: 700 Bq/L or less</li> <li>Investigation level: 350 Bq/L or less</li> </ul>	(Sampled on July 22) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Below the lower detection limit (less than 5.5-8.4 Bq/L)</li> </ul>	○ ○
[TEPCO] Tritium concentration in seawater (sea-area monitoring at 1 point within 10 km square from the Power Station)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Discharge suspension level: 30 Bq/L or less</li> <li>Investigation level: 20 Bq/L or less</li> </ul>	(Sampled on July 22) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Below the lower detection limit (less than 7.2 Bq/L)</li> </ul>	○ ○
[Ministry of the Environment] Tritium concentration in seawater (at 7 points off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>National safety requirement: 60,000 Bq/L</li> <li>WHO drinking water guidelines: 10,000 Bq/L</li> </ul>	(Sampled on July 10) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Below the lower detection limit (less than 8 Bq/L)</li> </ul>	○ ○
[Fisheries Agency] Tritium concentration in marine products (flounder and others)	-	(Sampled on July 16) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Below the lower detection limit (less than 8.8 Bq/kg)</li> </ul>	○
[Fukushima Prefecture] Tritium concentration in seawater (at 9 points off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>National safety requirement: 60,000 Bq/L</li> <li>WHO drinking water guidelines: 10,000 Bq/L</li> </ul>	(Sampled on July 8) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Below the lower detection limit (less than 3.6 - 4.1 Bq/L)</li> </ul>	○ ○

- From June 28 to July 16, 2024, the third discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea in FY2024 was conducted.
- Regarding the status of sea-area monitoring on handling ALPS treated water, more tritium measurement points for

seawater and fish were established near the power station and off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture and measurements of tritium and Iodine-129 of seaweed near the power station were added from April 20, 2022. As of July 24, 2024, no significant variation had been detected.

- Regarding sea-area monitoring conducted by TEPCO at 10 points within 3 km from the power station, quick measurements taken of the tritium concentration in the seawater sampled on July 22 showed concentrations under the detection limit (less than 5.5 – 8.4 Bq/L) at all points, which was below the TEPCO operation indices of 700 Bq/L (discharge suspension level) and 350 Bq/L (investigation level).
  - Regarding sea-area monitoring conducted by TEPCO at 1 point within 10 km square from the power station, quick measurements taken of the tritium concentration in the seawater sampled on July 22 showed concentrations under the detection limit (less than 7.2 Bq/L) at all points, which was below the TEPCO operation indices of 30 Bq/L (discharge suspension level) and 20 Bq/L (investigation level).
  - The quick measurement results obtained by each organization were as follows:  
Ministry of the Environment: The analytical results (obtained via quick measurements) for seawater sampled on July 10 at 7 points off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture showed tritium concentrations below the lower detection limit (less than 8 Bq/L) at all sampling points, which would have no adverse impact on human health and the environment.  
Fisheries Agency: Quick analytical results for tritium in flounder sampled on July 16 showed tritium concentrations below the lower detection limit (approx. less than 8.8 Bq/kg) in all samples.  
Fukushima Prefecture: On July 8, tritium concentrations in seawater at 9 sampling points off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture below the lower detection limit were recorded (less than 3.6 – 4.1 Bq/L) at all sampling points, which would have no adverse impact on human health and the environment.
- **Progress of the rearing test of marine organisms in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station**
- To eliminate concerns and reassure the public, a rearing test for marine organisms (flounder) in seawater with ALPS treated water added and normal seawater for comparison is underway.
  - Regarding the flounder and abalones, in both series of tanks (“normal seawater” and “ALPS treated water diluted with seawater”), no mass death or abnormality was detected (as of July 18).
  - Rearing of flounder and others in diluted ALPS treated water (less than 1,500 Bq/L) will continue.
  - The Organically Bound Tritium (OBT) concentration test on flounder (less than 1,500 Bq/L) will continue.

#### Fuel removal from the spent fuel pools

*Work to help remove spent fuel from the pool is progressing steadily while ensuring seismic capacity and safety.*

- **Main work to remove spent fuel at Unit 1**
- At Unit 1 Reactor Building, removal of overflowing rubble from the south-side external wall was completed on April 25. No significant variation was confirmed in the dust concentration during removal work.
  - Except for the south side and a portion of the west side neighboring the south side, installation of the lower structure was completed. At present, anchor drilling on the south side is underway and base plates are being installed sequentially.
- **Main work to remove the spent fuel at Unit 2**
- Before commencing the Unit 2 fuel removal, shielding has been installed on the top floor of the Reactor Building since last November. Concrete placement was completed on March 18, followed by the installation of partition shielding on April 2, whereupon all the work to install the shielding was completed.
  - Within the site, installation of a steel gantry frame for fuel removal was completed on June 7. At present, work to install roof panels is underway.
  - Outside the site, ground assembly to install a runway garter is underway.

#### Plans to store, process and dispose of solid waste and decommission of reactor facilities

*Promoting efforts to reduce and store waste generated appropriately and R&D to facilitate adequate and safe storage, processing and disposal of radioactive waste*

- **Management status of rubble and trimmed trees**
- As of the end of June 2024, the total storage volume for concrete and metal rubble was approx. 401,700 m<sup>3</sup> (+1,000

m<sup>3</sup> compared to the end of May with an area-occupation rate of 79%). The total storage volume of trimmed trees was approx. 80,500 m<sup>3</sup> (+200m<sup>3</sup>, with an area-occupation rate of 46%). The total storage volume of used protective clothing was approx. 15,200 m<sup>3</sup> (+200 m<sup>3</sup>, with an area-occupation rate of 60%). The total storage volume of radioactive solid waste (incinerated ash and others) was approx. 38,300 m<sup>3</sup> (a slight increase, with an area-occupation rate of 60%). The increase in rubble was attributable to decontamination of flanged tanks, work related to the area around the Units 1-4 buildings and work related to site preparation.

➤ **Management status of secondary waste from water treatment**

- As of July 4, 2024, the total storage volume of waste sludge was 423 m<sup>3</sup> (area-occupation rate: 60%), while that of concentrated waste fluid was 9,507 m<sup>3</sup> (area-occupation rate: 92%). The total number of stored spent vessels, High-Integrity Containers (HICs) for multi-nuclide removal equipment and others, was 5,778 (area-occupation rate: 86%).

➤ **Progress status of measures for fire alarm activation of the additional Radioactive Waste Incinerator**

- Collection of chips and water in the waste storage pit is underway and will be completed in October 2024.
- After the collection, work to investigate and inspect the area around the waste storage pit is scheduled.
- Work to investigate and inspect each area and piece of equipment is underway. For the waste supply room and the waste storage pit, the entire area must be cleaned and the equipment renewed.
- Other than the above area, there are portions to which water vapor and tar-like substances adhere and where partial cleaning of the equipment and building interior and renewal are necessary.
- For the inside of the main incinerator equipment, no abnormality was confirmed.
- The recovery process of the entire facility will be decided in future based on future investigation and inspection results and recurrence-prevention measures. For recovery, a project system will be established from July.

➤ **Progress status of interference removal before installing equipment to remove sludge of the decontamination equipment**

- The decontamination equipment installed in the Process Main Building operated from June to September 2011 to treat contaminated water generated after the earthquake.
- The building includes highly contaminated areas due to contaminated water scattered by troubles during the operation and test operation of the decontamination equipment. Accordingly, as preparation before installing equipment to remove waste sludge, decontamination on the 1<sup>st</sup> floor of the building is underway.
- From September 2024, interferences in the area to be installed the equipment to remove waste sludge inside the Process Main Building will be removed. Due to the dosage in the areas for removal, interferences will be removed by remote control as far as possible from the perspective of reducing exposure dose but manually where this is not possible

#### Reactor cooling

*The cold shutdown condition will be maintained by cooling the reactor by water injection and measures to complement the status monitoring continue*

➤ **Status of water level reduction in the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) of Unit 1**

- For Unit 1, due to the high water level in the PCV Suppression Chamber (S/C), a phased reduction in the water level was planned with the need to improve seismic resistance in mind.
- The water level reduction to the third hold point (HP (3)) commenced from June 13 and was reached on June 29. The water level HP (3) would accelerate the exposure of deposits in the pedestal to the gas phase. Therefore, the water level will be maintained for about one month for careful confirmation.
- At present, no parameter variation that could hinder the ongoing water reduction has been detected.
- Water level reduction to the fourth hold point (HP (4)) will commence in late July. The process will continue carefully, confirming that there is no nuclear safety risk based on plant parameters and prioritizing safety.


Reduction in radiation dose and mitigation of contamination

Effective dose-reduction at site boundaries and purification of port water to mitigate the impact of radiation on the external environment


➤ Status of the groundwater and seawater on the east side of Turbine Building Units 1-4

- In the Unit 1 intake north side area, the H-3 concentration was below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes and remained constant or has been declining overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but increased temporarily from April 2020 and is even increasing or declining at many observation holes at present, including Nos. 0-1, 0-1-2, 0-2, 0-3-1, 0-3-2 and 0-4. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the area between the Unit 1 and 2 intakes, the H-3 concentration has remained below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes. It has been increasing or declining at Nos. 1-14 and 1-17 but has otherwise remained constant or been declining overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but has been increasing at No. 1-6 and increasing or declining at Nos. 1-9 and 1-11 at low concentration. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the area between the Unit 2 and 3 intakes, the H-3 concentration has been below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes. It has remained constant or been declining at many observation holes overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but has been increasing or declining at No. 2-5. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the area between the Unit 3 and 4 intakes, the H-3 concentration has been below the legal discharge limit of 60,000 Bq/L at all observation holes and remained constant or been declining overall. The concentration of total β radioactive materials has remained constant overall but has been increasing or declining at Nos. 3-4 and 3-5. The trend continues to be carefully monitored.
- In the groundwater on the east side of the Turbine Buildings, as with the total β radioactive materials, the concentration of cesium has also remained constant as the overall area but been increasing or declining at observation holes with low concentration and exceeded the previous highest record at some observation holes. Investigations will continue, including to ascertain the impact of rainfall.
- The concentration of radioactive materials in drainage channels has remained constant overall, despite increasing during rainfall. In Drainage Channel D, drainage of the low-dose area on the west side of the site started to pass from August 30, 2022. It has remained low, despite concentrations of cesium and total β radioactive materials increasing during rainfall. From November 29, 2022, continuous monitors were installed and drainage around the Units 1 and 2 switch yard started to pass.
- In the open channel area of the seawater intake for Units 1 to 4, the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater has remained below the legal discharge limit and been declining long term, despite the temporary increases in Cs-137 and Sr-90 observed during rainfall. They have also been declining following the completed installation and the connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls. The concentration of Cs-137 remained slightly higher in front of the south-side impermeable walls and slightly lower on the north side of the east breakwater since March 20, 2019, when the silt fence was transferred to the center of the open channel due to mega float-related construction.
- In the port area, the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater has remained below the legal discharge limit and has been declining long term, despite temporary increases in Cs-137 and Sr-90 observed during rainfall. They have remained below the level of those in the Units 1-4 intake open channel area and been declining following the completed installation and connection of steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls.
- In the area outside the port, regarding the concentration of radioactive materials in seawater, those of Cs-137 and Sr-90 declined and remained low after steel pipe sheet piles for the sea-side impermeable walls were installed and connected. Regarding the concentration of Cs-137, a temporary increase was sometimes observed on the north side of the Unit 5 and 6 outlets and near the south outlet due to the influence of weather, marine meteorology and other factors. Regarding the concentration of Sr-90, variation was observed in FY2021 in the area outside the port (north and south outlets). Monitoring of the tendency continues, including the potential influence of the weather, marine

meteorology and others. During the period of discharge of ALPS treated water, the tritium concentration increased at the sampling point near the discharge outlet, but this was considered within the assumed range based on the results of the oceanic dispersion simulation.



<Unit 1 intake north side, between Unit 1 and 2 intakes>



<Between Unit 2 and 3 intakes, between Unit 3 and 4 intakes>

Figure 4: Groundwater concentration on the Turbine Building east side




Figure 5: Seawater concentration around the port

**Outlook of the number of staff required and efforts to improve the labor environment and conditions**

*Adequate number of staff will be secured in the long-term, while firmly implementing radiation control of workers. The work environment and labor conditions will be continuously improved by responding to the needs on the site.*

➤ **Staff management**

- The monthly average total of personnel registered for at least one day per month to work on site during the past quarter from March to May 2024 was approx. 9,000 (cooperating company workers and TEPCO HD employees), which exceeded the monthly average workforce (approx. 7,600). Accordingly, sufficient personnel were registered to work on site.
- It was confirmed with the prime contractors that the estimated manpower necessary for the work in August 2024 (approx. 4,400 workers per day: cooperating company workers and TEPCO HD employees) would be secured at present. The average numbers of workers per day for each month (actual values) for the most recent 2 years were maintained, at approx. 3,500 to 4,700.
- The number of workers from both within and outside Fukushima Prefecture increased slightly. As of June 2024, the local employment ratio (cooperating company workers and TEPCO HD employees) remained constant at around 70%.
- The average exposure doses of workers were approx. 2.51, 2.16 and 2.18 mSv/person-year during FY2021, 2022 and 2023, respectively (The legal exposure dose limits are 100 and 50 mSv/person-year respectively over five years, the TEPCO HD management target is 20 mSv/person-year).
- For most workers, the exposure dose remained sufficiently within the limit and allowed them to continue engaging in radiation work.




Figure 6: Changes in the average number of workers weekday per day for each month of the most recent 2 years (actual values)




Figure 7: Changes in monthly average exposure dose of individual worker (monthly exposure dose since March 2011)

➤ **Health management of workers in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station**

- As health management measures in line with the guidelines of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (issued in August 2015), a scheme was established and operated, whereby prime contractors confirmed reexamination at medical institutions and the subsequent status of workers who were diagnosed as requiring “detailed examination and treatment” in the health checkup, with TEPCO confirming the operation status by the prime contractors.
- The recent report on the management status of the health checkup during the 4th quarter (January – March) in FY2023 confirmed that the prime contractors had provided appropriate guidance and managed operations properly under the scheme. The report on the follow-up status during the 3rd quarter in FY2023 and before confirmed that responses to workers, which had not been completed by the time of the previous report, were being provided on an ongoing basis and checking of operations will continue.

➤ **Status of heat stroke cases**

- In FY2024, measures to further prevent heat stroke commenced from April to cope with the hottest season.
- In FY2024, two workers suffered heat stroke due to work up until July 24 (in FY2023, four workers up until the end of July). An environment encouraging workers to report any feelings of illness will continue to be created and countermeasures will be taken to prevent heat stroke.



➤ Countermeasures for infectious diseases

- Countermeasures for various infectious diseases (influenza, norovirus, etc.) depend on personal decisions and basic countermeasures (visiting medical institutions when feeling unwell, ventilation, avoidance of the “Three Cs,” frequent handwashing, etc.) being implemented appropriately by each worker and TEPCO proceeds with decommissioning while prioritizing safety.
- Regarding countermeasures for COVID-19, based on the increase in new infections, wearing masks is strongly recommended, handwashing is recommended, an antiseptic solution is installed and silent eating is requested in the dining room from July 11, 2024.

Others

➤ Progress status of the Mid-and-Long-Term Plan of accident investigation in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station


- As part of efforts to investigate and analyze the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (hereinafter referred to as 1F), many matters were clarified in the “Internal Accident Report” and “Examination of Unsolved Issues” and others and including instructions provided by internal and external accident investigation committees and others, reflected in the safety measures appropriately. To acquire information to help clarify the whole picture and make power reactors even safer, many insights need to be drawn by acquiring on-site information, utilized and subsequently reflected in safety measures.
- At the same time, steady decommissioning in 1F is also important. New useful insights for accident investigation and analysis may be acquired in the course of on-site work. However, inadequate data sampling may impact on on-site conditions and result in valuable information being lost. The results of the accident investigation and analytical results need to be appropriately organized and shared to proceed with on-site work.
- Therefore, to help implement future investigations of the accident in 1F according to plan and substantially by TEPCO HD in collaboration with decommissioning, the Mid-and-Long-a Term Plan of the 1F accident investigations was formulated in November 2021. The plan was revised in accordance with the latest work progress and status and reviewed the decommissioning steps and investigation items scheduled in FY2024. Based on this information, decommissioning work will proceed while acquiring necessary on-site information. The plan will be revised annually as the decommissioning progresses.

## Status of seawater monitoring within the port (comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

“The highest value” → “the latest value (sampled during June 3 - July 22)”; unit (Bq/L); ND represents a value below the detection limit

Note: The Total β measurement values include natural potassium 40 (approx. 12 Bq/L). They also include the contribution of yttrium 90, which radioactively balance strontium 90.

Summary of TEPCO data as of July 23, 2024



Source: TEPCO website Analysis results on nuclides of radioactive materials around Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station <http://www.tepco.co.jp/decommission/planaction/monitoring/index-j.html>

## Status of seawater monitoring around outside of the port (comparison between the highest values in 2013 and the latest values)

Unit (Bq/L); ND represents a value below the detection limit; values in ( ) represent the detection limit; ND (2013) represents ND throughout 2013

(The latest values sampled during June 3 - July 22)

Summary of TEPCO data as of July 23, 2024

	Legal discharge limit	WHO Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality
Cesium-134	60	10
Cesium-137	90	10
Strontium-90 (strongly correlate with Total β)	30	10
Tritium	60,000	10,000

【Northeast side of port entrance (offshore 1 km)】

【East side of port entrance (offshore 1 km)】

【Southeast side of port entrance (offshore 1 km)】

Cesium-134	: ND (H25)	→	ND(0.39)
Cesium-137	: ND (H25)	→	ND(0.26)
Total β	: ND (H25)	→	ND(14)
Torium	: ND (H25)	→	-

Cesium-134	: ND (H25)	→	ND(0.35)
Cesium-137	: 1.6 (H25/10/18)	→	ND(0.25) Below 1/2
Total β	: ND (H25)	→	ND(14)
Torium	: 6.4 (H25/10/18)	→	- Below 1/10

Cesium-134	: ND (H25)	→	ND(0.30)
Cesium-137	: ND (H25)	→	ND(0.27)
Total β	: ND (H25)	→	ND(14)
Torium	: ND (H25)	→	-

Cesium-134	: ND (H25)	→	ND(0.28)
Cesium-137	: ND (H25)	→	ND(0.32)
Total β	: ND (H25)	→	ND(14)
Torium	: 4.7 (H25/8/18)	→	- Below 1/10

Cesium-134	: 3.3 (H25/12/24)	→	ND(0.37) Below 1/8
Cesium-137	: 7.3 (H25/10/11)	→	ND(0.30) Below 1/20
Total β	: 69 (H25/8/19)	→	18 Below 1/3
Torium	: 68 (H25/8/19)	→	1.4 Below 1/40

【North side of north breakwater (offshore 0.5 km)】

【Port entrance】

【South side of south breakwater (offshore 0.5 km)】



Cesium-134	: 1.8 (H25/6/21)	→	ND(0.90) Below 1/2
Cesium-137	: 4.5 (H25/3/17)	→	ND(0.71) Below 1/6
Total β	: 12 (H25/12/23)	→	9.3
Torium	: 8.6 (H25/6/26)	→	ND(0.30) Below 1/20

Cesium-134	: ND (H25)	→	ND(0.35)
Cesium-137	: ND (H25)	→	ND(0.26)
Total β	: ND (H25)	→	ND(14)
Torium	: ND (H25)	→	-

Cesium-134	: ND (H25)	→	ND(0.90)
Cesium-137	: 3 (H25/7/15)	→	ND(0.71) Below 1/4
Total β	: 15 (H25/12/23)	→	5.2 Below 1/2
Torium	: 1.9 (H25/11/25)	→	ND(0.29) Below 1/2

【North side of Unit 5 and 6 release outlet】

【Near south release outlet (\*)】



Note: The Total β measurement values include natural potassium 40 (approx. 12 Bq/L). They also include the contribution of yttrium 90, which radioactively balance strontium 90.

\* Due to erosion, the sampling point was moved from approx. 320m south to approx. 1,300m south from the south release outlet in December 2021. In September 2023, since erosion was eliminated, the sampling point was returned to the original point, approx. 320m south from the south release outlet. Moreover, due to erosion, the sampling point has been moved again to approx. 1,300m south from the south release outlet since June 11, 2024.




# 1 Contaminated water management

- Milestones of the Mid- and Long-term Roadmap (major water processes)
- [Completed] Suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to 150 m<sup>3</sup>/day or less (within 2020)
- [Completed] Suppressing the amount of contaminated water generated to 100 m<sup>3</sup>/day or less (within 2025)
- [Completed] Treatment of contaminated water in buildings was completed\* (within 2020) \*Except for Units 1-3 Reactor Buildings, Process Main Building and High Temperature Incinerator Building.
- [Completed] Contaminated water in Reactor Buildings was reduced to about a half of the level at the end of 2020 (FY2022-FY2024)



- Efforts to promote contaminated water management based on three basic policies:
- ① "Remove" the source of water contamination ② "Redirect" fresh water from contaminated areas
- ③ "Retain" contaminated water from leakage

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Contaminated water management [Remove]	Contaminated water treatment facility ▽ Reception start of contaminated water to Central Waste Treatment Building ▽ Decontamination equipment (AREVA) ▽ Evaporative concentration equipment ▽ Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (KURION) ▽ 2nd Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (SARRY)		Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (KURION)											
	Removal of contaminated water from seawater pipe trench ▽ Landing of the second Cesium Adsorption Apparatus (SARRY)			Multi-nuclide removal equipment (ALPS)										
Contaminated water management [Redirect]	Groundwater bypass													
	Sub-drain													
	Land-side impermeable wall													
	Facing													
Contaminated water management [Retain]	Bank groundwater measures													
	Storage facility													
Treatment of stagnant water														
Countermeasures to tsunami	Closure of openings													
	Seawall													
	Mega float													



In "The Inter-Ministerial Council for Contaminated Water, Treated water and Decommissioning" held on April 13, the basic policy on how to handle ALPS treated water was set. Based on this, the response of TEPCO was announced on April 16.

Regarding the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea, TEPCO must comply with regulatory and other safety-related standards to ensure the safety of the public, surrounding environment and agricultural, forestry and fishery products. To minimize adverse impacts on reputation, monitoring will be further enhanced, objectivity and transparency ensured by engaging with third-party experts and safety checked by the IAEA. Moreover, accurate information will be disseminated continuously and in a highly transparent manner.



### Information provision and communication to foster understanding

- Occasions to deepen the understanding are organized by communications related to decommissioning via various media and visit to the power station.



- On the dedicated website "Treated Water Portal Site" (Japanese, English, Chinese and Korean) within the TEPCO website, monitoring results of radioactive materials are published timely.



Dialogue meeting

- Visit and dialogue meeting of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station have been held since 2019 for 13 cities, towns and villages.



- Through various opportunities such as visit and on-site explanations, communications continue where opinions of related parties are heard, their thought is taken seriously, and TEPCO conveys its efforts, thought and countermeasures for reputational damage.

### Status of discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea

Discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea commenced from August 24, 2023, and the 1st discharge was completed on September 11.


During the discharge period, no abnormality was detected by the sea area monitoring conducted by the national government, Fukushima Prefecture and TEPCO.

<Discharges in FY2023>

Tank group discharged	Tank Group C	Tank Group A	Tank Group B
Tritium concentration	190,000 Bq/L	170,000 Bq/L	170,000 Bq/L
Discharge commencement	April 19, 2023	May 17, 2024	June 28, 2024
Discharge termination	May 7, 2023	June 4, 2024	July 16, 2024
Discharge amount	7,851 m <sup>3</sup>	7,892 m <sup>3</sup>	7,846 m <sup>3</sup>
Total tritium amount	1.5 trillion Bq	1.3 trillion Bq	1.3 trillion Bq

### Rearing test of marine organisms

- To alleviate concerns and lead to relief of local residents, related parties and the everyone in society, marine organisms are being reared in tanks of seawater containing ALPS treated water and the status is compared with the original seawater controls.
- External experts also confirmed that there was no difference in rearing statuses between the tanks of the original seawater controls and those of seawater containing ALPS treated water.
- As shown in the existing research results conducted in Japan and overseas, it was confirmed that "tritium in vivo reached equilibrium in a certain time period and the concentration of tritium in vivo reaching equilibrium did not exceed the level in the growing environment."



Flounder in rearing preparation tank



Overall view of mock tanks

- Daily rearing status is published in the TEPCO website and Twitter
  - TEPCO website: <http://www.tepco.co.jp/decommission/information/newsrelease/readingtest/index-j.html>
  - TEPCO X (Old Twitter): <https://twitter.com/TEPCOfishkeeper>



### Publication of the Comprehensive Report of the IAEA safety review

The Comprehensive Report on the safety review concerning handling of ALPS -treated water was published by the IAEA on July 4, 2023.


In the Executive Summary of the IAEA Comprehensive Report, the IAEA concluded the following: (1) the activities by Japan associated with the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea are consistent with relevant international safety standards, (2) the discharge of the ALPS treated water will have a negligible radiological impact on people and the environment.

We will continue to share necessary information with the IAEA, while striving to foster further understanding of the international community about the discharge of ALPS treated water into the sea.

<https://www.iaea.org/topics/response/fukushima-daiichi-als-treated-water-discharge-comprehensive-reports>




### Examination concerning handling of ALPS treated water



# 3 Removal of fuel from spent pool

## Milestones of the Mid- and Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)

- Completion of Unit 1-6 fuel removal (within 2031)
- Completion of installation of Unit 1 large cover (around FY2023), start of Unit 1 fuel removal (FY2027-2028)
- Start of Unit 2 fuel removal (FY2024-2026)



\* Part of the photo is corrected because it includes machine information related to nuclear material protection.


Milestones of the Mid- and Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)

Start of fuel debris retrieval from the first unit (Unit 2). Expanding the scale in stages (within 2021 \* The schedule will be extended for about 1 year due to the spread of COVID-19 infections)


Before removing fuel debris, investigations inside the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) are conducted to inspect the conditions there, including locations of fuel debris.

Unit 1 Investigation overview

- In April 2015, a device having entered the inside of the PCV via a narrow opening (bore:φ100 mm) collected information such as images and airborne dose inside the PCV 1st floor.
- In March 2017, an investigation using a self-propelled investigation device was conducted to inspect the spreading of debris to the basement floor outside the pedestal, with images taken of the PCV bottom status for the first time. The conditions inside the PCV will continue to be examined, based on the imagery and dose data obtained.



In February 2022, the guide ring\* was installed to facilitate the investigation. From March 28, 2023, the investigation inside the pedestal by ROV-A2 started and confirmed that a portion of the bar arrangement was exposed. Regarding the soundness of the pedestal, based on the past earthquake resistant evaluation by the International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning (IRID), it was evaluated that even though a portion of the pedestal was lost, there would be no serious risk. However, as the present information is very limited, the investigation will continue to acquire as much information as possible for continued evaluation.



Unit 1 PCV internal investigation

Investigations inside the PCV	1st (2012.10)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature and dose rate - Measuring the water level and temperature - Sampling stagnant water - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	2nd (2015.4)	Confirming the status of the PCV 1st floor - Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature and dose rate - Replacing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	3rd (2017.3)	Confirming the status of the PCV 1st basement floor - Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Sampling deposit - Replacing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	4th (From 2022.2)	Acquiring information inside PCV (inside/outside of the pedestal) - Acquiring images - Measuring deposit thickness and sampling deposit - Detecting deposit debris, 3D mapping
Leakage points from PCV	- PCV vent pipe vacuum break line bellows (identified in 2014.5) - Sand cushion drain line (identified in 2013.11)	
Evaluation of the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons Confirmed that there was no large fuel in the reactor core. (2015.2-5)		

Unit 2 Investigation overview

- In January 2017, a camera was inserted from the PCV penetration to inspect the conditions of the rail on which the robot traveled. The results of a series of investigations confirmed some gratings had fallen and deformed as well as a quantity of deposit inside the pedestal.
- In January 2018, the conditions below the platform inside the pedestal were investigated. Based on the analytical results of images obtained in the investigation, deposits, probably including fuel debris, were found at the bottom of the pedestal. Moreover, multiple parts exceeding the surrounding deposits were also detected. We presumed that there were multiple instances of fuel debris falling.
- In February 2019, an investigation touching the deposits at the bottom of the pedestal and on the platform was conducted and confirmed that the pebble-shaped deposits, etc. could be moved and that hard rock-like deposits that could not be gripped may exist.



- In October 2020, as part of work to prepare for the PCV internal investigation and trial retrieval, a contact investigation to study deposits inside the penetration (X-6 penetration) was conducted, which involved inserting a guide pipe incorporating an investigative unit into the penetration. This confirmed that deposits inside the penetration had not deformed and come unstuck. The investigative information obtained will be utilized in the mockup test of the equipment to remove deposits inside the X-6 penetration.




Unit 2 PCV internal investigation

Investigations inside the PCV	1st (2012.1)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature
	2nd (2012.3)	- Confirming water surface - Measuring the water temperature - Measuring the dose rate
	3rd (2013.2 - 2014.6)	- Acquiring images - Sampling stagnant water - Measuring water level - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation
	4th (2017.1-2)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Measuring the air temperature
	5th (2018.1)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Measuring the air temperature
	6th (2019.2)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the dose rate - Measuring the air temperature - Determining characteristics of a portion of deposit
Leakage points from PCV	- No leakage from the torus chamber rooftop - No leakage from any internal/external surfaces of S/C	
Evaluation of the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons The existence of high-density materials, which were considered to constitute fuel debris, was confirmed at the bottom of RPV and in the lower part and outer periphery of the reactor core. It was assumed that a significant portion of fuel debris existed at the bottom of RPV. (2016.3-7)		

Unit 3 Investigation overview

- In October 2014, the conditions of X-53 penetration, which may be under water and which is scheduled for use to investigate the inside of the PCV, was investigated via remote-controlled ultrasonic test equipment. The results showed that the penetration was not under water.
- In October 2015, to confirm the conditions inside the PCV, an investigative device was inserted into the PCV from X-53 penetration to obtain images, data on dosage and temperature and sample stagnant water. No damage to the structure and walls inside the PCV was identified and the water level was almost identical to estimated values. In addition, the dose inside the PCV was confirmed to be lower than in other Units.
- In July 2017, the inside of the PCV was investigated using the underwater ROV (remotely operated underwater vehicle) to inspect the inside of the pedestal. Analysis of the imagery obtained in the investigation identified damage to multiple structures and the supposed core internals.
- Videos obtained in the investigation were reproduced in 3D. Based on the reproduced images, the relative positions of the structures, such as the rotating platform slipping off the rail with a portion buried in deposits, were visually understood.





Unit 3 PCV internal investigation

Investigations inside the PCV	1st (2015.10-12)	- Acquiring images - Measuring the air temperature and dose rate - Measuring the water level and temperature - Sampling stagnant water - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation (2015.12)
	2nd (2017.7)	- Acquiring images - Installing permanent monitoring instrumentation (2017.8)
Leakage points from PCV	- Main steam pipe bellows (identified in 2014.5)	
Evaluation of the location of fuel debris inside the reactor by measurement using muons The evaluation confirmed that no large lump existed in the core area where fuel had been placed and that a portion of the fuel debris potentially existed at the bottom of the RPV. (2017.5-9)		



Milestones of the Mid- and Long-Term Roadmap (major target processes)  
 Eliminating temporary outdoor storage of rubble and others \* Except for secondary waste of water treatment and materials for reuse or recycling (within FY2028)

★ 2016.3 Announcement of Storage Management Plan of Solid Waste (Ver. 1) ★ 2017.6 Revision ★ 2018.6 Revision ★ 2019.6 Revision ★ 2020.7 Revision ★ 2021.7 Revision ★ 2023.2 Revision ★ 2023.11 Revision















Note: Used protective clothing before incineration and BG-level concrete waste for which treatment and reuse is decided at present are not included.

- The exposure dose at the site boundaries will be reduced by aggregation to indoor storage and eliminating outdoor storage.
- The exposure dosage in exhaust gas from incinerators and at site boundaries is measured and announced on the website and others.



While ensuring reliable exposure dose management for workers, sufficient personnel are secured. Moreover, while getting a handle on on-site needs, the work environment and labor conditions are continuously improved.

Regarding the site-wide reduction in the radiation dose and prevention of contamination spreading, the radiation dose on site was reduced by removal of rubble, topsoil and facing. Moreover, the operation was improved to use environmentally-improved areas as a Green Zone, within which workers are allowed to wear general work clothes and disposable dust-protective masks which are less of a physical burden.

2011	2012年	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023~
<p>▼ From March 12, 2011, in response to the increased airborne concentration of radioactive materials, instructions were issued to wear full-face masks throughout the Fukushima Daiichi NPS site, excluding the Main Anti-Earthquake Building and the rest house.</p>  <p>External view of Access Control Facility</p>	<p>▼ From May 2013, full-face mask unnecessary area was expanded sequentially.</p> <p>▼ In June 2013, operation of the Access Control Facility started near the main gate of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS, to which duties conducted at J-village were shifted, including contamination examination, decontamination, switching protective equipment on and off and distribution/collecting of dosimeters.</p>  <p>Large rest house under construction (2014.9.30)</p>	<p>▼ To help workers in the Fukushima Daiichi NPS precisely understand the conditions of their workplaces, a total of 86 dose-rate monitors were installed by January 2015. These monitors allow workers to confirm on-site dose rates at their workplaces in real time.</p> <p>▼ In March 2015, the Fukushima revitalization meal service center opened.</p> <p>▼ A large rest house for workers was established and its operation commenced in May 2015. Spaces in the large rest house are also installed for office work and collective worker safety checks as well as taking rest. In March 2016, a convenience store opened in the large rest house. In April, the shower room went into operation.</p>  <p>Access Control Facility (2014.11.7)</p>	<p>▼ In February 2017, operation started at the Partner Companies' Building next to the New Administration Office Building.</p> <p>▼ In May 2017, a heliport for emergency transport was installed inside the Fukushima Daiichi NPS and went into operation. Compared to the previous operation (at Koriyama Coast, Futaba Town or Fukushima Daini NPS, relying to a doctor helicopter), a faster response is available for seriously ill patients requiring treatment at external medical institutions.</p> 	<p>▼ From November 2018, from the west-side high-ground area, where Unit 1-4 can be viewed, visitors can see the site in their normal clothes without having to change.</p>  <p>Visit by Governor of Fukushima a Prefecture to the Fukushima Daiichi NPS (2018.11.1)</p>  <p>Visit by Prime Minister Kishida to the Fukushima Daiichi NPS (2021.10.17)</p>	<p>▼ In May 2013, areas excluding those around Unit 1-4, tank areas and rubble storage areas were set to full-face mask unnecessary areas.</p> 	<p>▼ In May 2015, full-face mask unnecessary area was expanded to cover about 90% of the site.</p> <p>▼ In March 2016, based on the progress of measures to reduce the environmental dosage on site, the site was categorized into two zones: Highly contaminated area around Unit 1-4 buildings, etc. and other areas where limited operation started to optimize protective equipment according to each category.</p> 	<p>▼ In March 2017, the G-zone area was expanded to cover 95% of the whole site.</p> <p>▼ In May 2018, within about 96% of the site, workers are allowed to wear light equipment such as general workwear and disposable dust-protective masks.</p> 	<p>▼ Travel survey results of major roads within the site&gt; It was confirmed that, compared with the last fiscal year, the dose rate has been declining on roads on the west and south sides of the High Temperature Incinerator Building (area circled by black dot line).</p>  <p>&lt;FY2022 4th Quarter&gt; (Measured in February 2023) &lt;FY2023 4th Quarter&gt; (Measured in February 2024)</p>	<p>▼ In August 2021, operation started while eliminating the need for the DS2 mask during light work in G-zone outside the protection area around Unit 1-4 (except for inside Units 5 and 6).</p>  <p>Move in general working clothes (2016.1.7)</p>  <p>Facing (2017.4.13)</p>	